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Abstract
This is a study of the Leningrad regional party organisation during the first Five 
Year Plan period (1928-1932). Its membership, structure, organisation and changing 
role are examined in the context of economic and social change which took place 
during the first FYP. The main focus is on party organs below the oblast level, in 
particular the grass roots level of the party. This study relies heavily on an analysis of 
the material collected during my stay in Moscow in 1993-4 and 1996, in particular 
archival material collected from the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of 
Documents of Recent History (RTsKhlDNI). Party journals, newspapers, and 
pamphlets collected from the Lenin Library and the History Library in Moscow were 
also used.
For Leningrad region, as for the whole of the Soviet Union, the first FYP was a 
period of rapid transformation. The change of economic policy, that is, the 
acceleration of the expansion of industry and the forced collectivisation of agriculture, 
not only had a significant impact on the economic structure of the region, but also set 
in motion a profound change in social structure. The thesis shows that social and 
economic change was reflected in party life at lower levels. In particular, factory party 
cells experienced a considerable transformation: party membership expanded rapidly; 
party structure became more elaborated; party activists, rather than full-time officials, 
voluntarily earned out various party work; and party cells became more involved in 
production matters.
It is argued that the effect of these changes was not always what the party 
leadership had hoped for. Although a considerable number of workers enrolled in the 
party, not all of them became politically conscious and active party members. The 
‘breaking up’ of factory party cells, equally, had its negative aspects. Party cells were 
often created in a formalistic sense and did not operate properly. Moreover, the 
complicated party structure caused a serious problem in controlling lower party cells. 
The connection between different levels of party organisation within factories was 
weak, and factory party committees were often unable to control or monitor activities 
of party cells below them. The promotion of industrial workers into more responsible 
jobs within the party and state apparatuses also caused a serious party personnel 
problem within factories. Facing difficulties to find suitable party personnel for the 
rapidly expanding party apparatuses within factories, the party mobilised less 
experienced activists for party work, which often resulted in party work being canied 
out poorly. More importantly, the party’s growing involvement in production matters 
resulted in the party’s losing its ‘political’ character. While factory party cells were 
occupied by economic tasks for which they were not well equipped, their real work in 
the realm of politics and ideology was no longer carried out properly.
Overall, during these years of massive transformation, the centre’s grip on 
affairs at the local level was not as close as often assumed, and central party organs 
were unable to finnly control the way party policy was implemented at the local level. 
The relationship between central party bodies and the local level, in turn, has 
implications for other spheres and for our understanding of ‘Stalinism’ during the 
period.
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1. Introduction
1.1 The purpose of the study
This is a study of the Leningrad regional party organisation during the first Five 
Year Plan period (1928-1932). This study aims to facilitate a better understanding of 
the Soviet communist party by examining the party at the regional level during the 
crucial period of economic, social and cultural transforaiation, with special reference 
to its size, membership, organisation and functional role. This work concentrates on 
the intermediate level as well as the lower, grass-roots level of the party, in particular 
on the oblast committee {obkom), the district committee {raikom), and party cell at the 
factory level. By focusing on the intermediate and lower levels of the party, one can 
obtain an insight into the way the communist party actually operated in the Stalin era 
and the changing relationship between the central party leadership, party branches and 
the mass membership.
The reason for focusing on regional party organisations is that very little 
research has been carried out concerning how the party operated at the local level in 
this period, at least by Western scholars. Although party’s central organs during the 
1920s and 1930s have already been the subject of numerous studies, party 
organisations below the central organs have not generally been subject to analysis.’ 
Most studies of the communist party were interested primarily in high politics and 
emphasis was laid on leadership and control. The assumption that the communist 
party was a monolithic organisation which did not allow any autonomy to lower party 
organisations discouraged scholars from undertaking a serious analysis of local party 
organisations. The lack of reliable information on party personnel and operations 
below the central organs also practically prevented serious research from being
' In this respect, Merle Fainsod’s work on the Smolensk regional party organisation was exceptional 
and o f particular importance. Using the Smolensk archive as a source, he provided a pioneering 
study o f local party activities in the Western oblast. See Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule 
(London: Macmillan, 1959). Nicolas Werth has provided a comparable view ‘from below ’ using the 
same source in his book Être Communiste en U.R.S.S. sous Staline (Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1981). 
Jerry Hough’s most thoroughly researched study of regional party organisations in industrial 
decision-making is among a few studies about the regional party organisations. However, it dealt 
with regional party organisations in the 1960s, whose role was significantly different from that in 
the 1930s. See Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision­
making (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1969).
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undertaken.^ It was not until relatively recently that some detailed studies of party 
organisations at the regional or lower levels began to appear.^ This reflected a change 
in emphasis from the central party organs to the local and grass-roots levels. 
Challenges to the totalitarian model of Soviet politics have led researchers to adopt an 
approach ‘from below’ and accordingly more attention is now being paid to the local 
and grass-roots levels. Moreover, the opening of Russian archives, to which foreign 
researchers had generally been denied access by the mid-1980s, facilitated study of 
the regional party organisations. However, in spite of these opportunities relatively 
little new work has so far been done on the lower levels of the party. Therefore, this 
thesis attempts to fill the gap and give a more meaningful picture of party life at the 
local level.
The study of the regional party organisation is important not simply because 
relatively little work has so far been done on the lower levels of the party, but also 
because it helps us understand better the communist party and the way it operated 
under Stalin. The communist party has been the centre of the scholarly attention not 
only because it was the only political party in the Soviet Union, but also because its 
nature and role were vital to an understanding of the Stalinist political system. Many 
different views have been put forward over the last fifty years. These views were 
diverse in their approaches, emphasis, and perspectives. Not all of them will be dealt
 ^ Before the opening of Russian archives in 1990, the Smolensk archive was the only available 
substantial archival source for the study of party history. The Smolensk archive was captured from 
the Soviets by the Gennan army in 1941, and seized by the U. S. army in 1945. It is now kept in the 
U.S. It contains the records o f the party organisations o f the Western region from 1917 to 1939.
 ^ For recent works on the Moscow party organisation, see Catherine M enldale, Moscow Politics and  
the Rise o f  Stalin: The Communist Party in the Capital, 1925-32 (London: Macmillan, 1990); and 
Nobuo Shimotomai, Moscow Under Stalinist Rule, 1931-34 (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
Emphasising the importance o f questions about society and its relationship with the political 
structure, Merridale explored the way the ordinary people at the grass roots level related to the party 
or influenced it from within, and concluded that initiatives were indeed taken at the lowest levels, 
though seldom on major issues. Shimotomai looked at political and social processes in Moscow, at 
both regional and city level, in the period 1931-34. His study concentrated mainly on the 
bureaucratic and political structure o f the Moscow region and city as they strove to cope with a 
rapidly-changing situation. His work focused on the process of creating and implementing policies, 
interactions between various institutions and elites, and relations between the central power and 
Moscow. On the other hand, Daniel Thorniley provides an excellent analysis o f the mral party 
organisations in the 1930s in The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Rural Communist Party, 1927-39 
(London: Macmillan, 1988). His work concentrates on the lower, grass-roots level o f the party, in 
particular on the district committee and cell in the countiyside. For party organisations at the factory 
level, see Antony Sadler, The Party Oi'ganisation in the Soviet Enterprise 1928-34 (unpublished 
MSocSci dissertation. University of Birmingham, 1979).
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with in my thesis, since it is beyond the space that is available. However, two major 
streams of thought will be looked at in some detail here: the first is the studies of the 
Soviet communist party that are based on the totalitarian paradigm; the other, a 
‘revisionist’ view, which emphasises the operation of the system ‘from below’ and 
rejects the totalitarian paradigm. The examination of the merits and limits of each 
approach will provide a theoretical foundation for this study.
Several major studies of the Soviet communist party in the 1950s and 1960s 
were strongly influenced by the totalitarian model.'’ The classic Western paradigm, 
which was predominant in Western Sovietology in the decades after the Second 
World War, described the Stalinist regime as totalitarian.^ Definitions of the term 
varied, but all highlighted aspects - such as a radical official ideology, a single party 
headed by a dictator, terrorist police control, the party’s monopoly of mass 
communication and weapons, and central control of the economy - which were taken 
to be characteristic of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, among others.^ The totalitarian 
paradigm went roughly as follows. The Soviet system under Stalin consisted of a 
nonpluralist, hierarchical dictatorship in which command authority existed only at the 
top of the pyramid of political power. Ideology and violence were monopolies of the 
mling elite, which passed its orders down a pseudo-military chain of command. At the 
top of the ruling elite stood an autocratic Stalin whose personal control was virtually 
unlimited in all areas of life and culture. Major policy articulation and implementation 
involved the actualisation of Stalin’s ideas, whims, and plans, which in turn flowed 
from his psychological condition. By definition, autonomous spheres of social and
See, for instance, Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1953); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1956); Jolui A. Armstrong, The Politics o f  
Totalitarianism: The Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union from  1934 to the Present (New York: 
Random House, 1961); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge o f  the Thirties (London: 
Macmillan, 1968); and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. 
(London: Methuen, 1970).
 ^ Major examples of such works include Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship 
and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); and Leonard Schapiro, 
Totalitarianism (London: Pall Mall, 1972).
 ^The totalitarian model was developed on the basis of observed similarities between the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Gennany, and the essence of this model was a passive society dominated by an elite that 
was determined to maximise its own power and to transform society on the basis of its own 
ideological perceptions. For a classic definition, see Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 9-10.
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political activity did not exist at all in Soviet society. The Soviet populace and rank- 
and-file party members remained outside the political process, objects acted upon or 
manipulated from above but never historical actors in their own right.
Derived from the interpretation of totalitarianism was the view of the 
communist party as a monolithic organisation which did not allow any autonomy to 
the lower party organisations, and an undemocratic organisation which did not allow 
any opposition to Stalin’s power or any serious criticism from below. Totalitarian 
theorists highlighted the fact that the party was hierarchically organised. Within the 
party, it was agreed by totalitarian theorists, authority and decision-making was highly 
centralised.^ The analysis of the structure of the communist party was based on the 
conception of the ‘pattern of party controls’ in which all authority was imposed from 
the top down, and more specifically on the principle of ‘democratic centralism’.^  It 
was assumed that local party organisations simply implemented the policy decided by 
the party leadership, and that their performance was closely monitored and controlled 
by the party leadership. As a result, the party did not decide even if they voted or 
elected the leadership; it was subject to autocratic direction in matters of policy, and 
to hierarchical control in matters of leadership.^ It was also agreed that there was no 
longer democracy within the party: Stalin’s ruthless ‘suppression of disagreement and 
the crushing of opposition’ stifled inner-party democracy.”’ Ranlc-and-file party 
members remained outside the political process, and were simply mobilised by the 
party to achieve the regime’s goals. In this condition, the party was merely an 
instrument of Stalin’s power. Merle Fainsod believed that ‘the party ceased to be a 
creative association which shaped policy and was transformed instead into a 
bureaucratic extension of the personality and dynamism of the dictator.’” Leonard
 ^ Many totalitarian theorists found the operational principles o f a totalitarian party in the Leninist 
theory of party organisation: democratic centialism. Friedrich and Brzezinski expressed this view: 
‘in his fanatic insistence on strict party discipline, total obedience to the will o f the leadership, and 
unquestioning acceptance o f the ideological programme, Lenin charted the path so successfully later 
followed by Stalin.’ See Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 27. 
For those who follow this line o f argument, Stalinism was a direct outgrowth o f Leninism. Leonard 
Schapiro, however, disagreed with this view. He saw a discontinuity in paiiy history between Lenin 
and Stalin. For more information, see Schapiro, The Communist Party, p. 621.
® Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, chapter, 7.
 ^Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 27.
Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, p. 150.
“ Ibid., p. 150.
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Schapiro also argued that ‘Stalin used the years between his first accession to power 
and the end of the purges to transform the party into something that was much more 
like a personal corps of adherents than a traditional party.
This view was supported by Merle Fainsod’s study of the Smolensk regional 
party organisation. He believed that by the 1930s the Soviet Union was a ‘full-blown 
totalitarian regime in which all the lines of control ultimately converged in the hands 
of the supreme dictator’, although he admitted that the totalitarian machine, at least in 
the Smolensk area, was far from perfect and efficient. The party retained a tyrannical 
hold on the dominated population through ‘force, terror, and organisation’, which 
were the ‘instruments of power’. In his view, the party became a creature of Stalin’s 
will and lost such policy-determining functions as it once possessed. Its role was 
reduced to that of a transmission belt, which Stalin used to communicate his 
directives, to mobilise support for them by propaganda and agitation, and to check on 
their execution.’^
The totalitarian model of Soviet politics always had its critics. In Great Britain 
at least, a strong empirical tradition persisted in Soviet historical studies. British 
scholars such as E. H, Carr and R. W. Davies adopted a different approach and 
regarded the Soviet political system as more multifaceted than depicted in the 
totalitarian model.’'’ The totalitarian paradigm had, in any case, been under attack 
since the 1950s, partly as a result of political changes within the countries to which it 
was applied.’  ^ In particular, the emergence of ‘revisionism’ in the 1970s made a 
considerable impact upon the understanding of the Soviet Union. Reflecting a change 
in political mood, revisionist scholarship rejected the totalitarian model, which was 
considered to be the product of the Cold War ideology.”  ^ Some made a serious
Schapiro, Totalitarianism, p. 60.
Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, pp. 12, 85, 448-51.
See E. H. Can', The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1950, 
1951); E. H. Carr, Socialism in One Countiy, 1924-1926, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1958, 
1959); B. H. Carr, Foundations o f  a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 
1971); R. W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation o f  Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 
(London: Macmillan, 1980); and Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in 
Organisational Change, 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1979).
Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Soviet Union changed considerably, and the regime seemed to 
be losing many of its totalitarian characteristics.
For a discussion of the totalitarian m odel’s weakness and its pernicious influence, see Stephen F. 
Cohen, ‘Scholarly Missions: Sovietology as a Vocation’, in his Rethinking the Soviet Experience, 
Politics and History Since 1917 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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theoretical criticism of the totalitarian model and sought for an alternative paradigm,”  
Others saw a basic discontinuity in Soviet history between Lenin and Stalin, and 
regarded Stalinism as an aberration and postulated a genuine ‘Bulcharin alternative’ to 
Stalinism.”
However, the most serious challenge to the totalitarian model came from social 
history. Although social history had made earlier incursions into the question of 
Stalinism and its origins,”  it did not begin to make a major impact upon the 
conception of Stalinism until the late 1970s and early 1 9 8 0 s . I n  particular, in the 
middle of the 1980s, a crop of new, younger historians began to make an impact upon 
the understanding of the Stalinist period.^’ This ‘new cohort’, to use Sheila 
Fitzpatrick’s term,^^ has been critical of the effect the totalitarian model has had upon 
our understanding of the Soviet system in general and Stalinism in particular. In their 
view, the focus upon the upper levels of the political system and the use of a cold war
17
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See Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theoiy (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard 
University Press, 1977).
This view is associated primarily with Stephen Cohen and Moshe Le win. See Stephen F. Cohen, 
Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (London; Wildwood 
House, 1974) and Rethinking the Soviet Experience, Politics and History Since 19J7; and Moshe 
Lewin, Lenin's Last struggle (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968) and Political Undercurrents in 
Soviet Economic Development: Bukharin, and the Modern Reformers (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974).
For example, see Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study o f  Collectivisation 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968) and Roger Pethybridge, The Social Prelude to Stalinism  
(London: Macmillan, 1974).
In particular, see Moshe Lewin, ‘The Social Background of Stalinism’, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., 
Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), pp. 111-136; 
Sheila Fitzpati'ick, ed.. Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978).
Although all social historians wanted to shift the emphasis to soeial forces and processes, their 
approaches vary in their emphasis. Some thought it particularly important to study the Soviet 
working class. See, for example, Lymie Viola, The Best Sons o f  the Fatherland: Workers in the 
Vanguard o f  Soviet Collectivisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Hiroaki Kuromiya, 
Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-Î932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988); Donald A. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialisation: The Formation o f  
Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (London; Pluto, 1986); and Lewis Siegelbaum, 
Stakhanovism and the Politics o f  Productivity in the USSR, 1935-41 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). Others emphasised the theme of social mobility, suggesting that the 
opportunity for working-class and peasant upward mobility into the new elite played a role in 
legitimising the regime in the Soviet period. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility 
in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and ‘Stalin and the 
Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939’, Slavic Review, vol. 38, no. 3, September 1979, pp. 377-402. A 
shared assumption o f revisionist historians was that Soviet society was more than a passive object of 
regime manipulation and that scholars should investigate Stalinism ‘from below ’ as well as ‘from 
above’.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘New Perspectives on Stalinism’, The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 4, October 
1986, p. 358.
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concept like totalitarianism obscured the reality of the system as it actually operated. 
It imposed upon that system a rationality and a consistency which did not exist. 
Moreover, it cast the situation in terms of an active state dominating a passive society. 
In contrast to this, they argued for the adoption of a ‘perspective from below’. Such a 
perspective highlighted the chaos and in'ationalities attendant upon policy 
implementation, emphasised the limits of central power and portrayed the society as 
less of a passive subject and more of a partner with the state in the on-going course of 
Soviet development.^^
The totalitarian view of the communist party has also been challenged by 
scholars who regard the totalitarian paradigm as inappropriate an understanding of the 
Soviet Union. Political historians who have adopted the approach ‘from below’ 
generally put less emphasis on tenor, party-state control and the personal role of 
Stalin. Instead, they highlighted the chaotic situation within the party and the wider 
society, the limitations of party-state control, and the existence of popular support 
from some sections of the society, if not from the whole populace.^'’ Some have drawn 
attention to chaos in the Soviet Union’s provinces in the 1930s, raising questions 
about the centre’s grip on political affairs at the local level. J. Arch Getty, for instance, 
in his study of the communist party in the 1930s, draw the conclusion that the party 
was not the monolithic and homogenous machine that totalitarian theorists had 
suggested. In his view, administration was so chaotic, irregular, and confused that 
even Merle Fainsod’s characterisation of the system as ‘inefficient totalitarianism’ 
overstated the case.^^ Daniel Thorniley also suggested that the Soviet rural communist 
party was not an efficient, monolithic, totalitarian machine capable of manipulating 
the rural population at will.^^
For argument among revisionists on the relationship of state and society in the Stalin period and the 
question o f initiative ‘from below’, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, et al., ‘New Perspectives on Stalinism’, 
The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 4, October 1986, and comments by Stephen Cohen and Geoff Eley 
in ibid., and J. Arch Getty, Roberta Maiming and others in The Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4, 
October 1987.
Among these are J. Arch Getty, Gabor T. Rittersporn, and Roberta T. Manning. See, for example, J. 
Arch Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Gabor Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications 
and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953 (Paris: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991).
Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 198.
Thorniley, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Rural Communist Party.
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Others argued that there was a relative freedom of initiative at the local level. 
Catherine Merridale, for instance, indicated that initiatives were indeed taken at the 
lowest levels, though seldom on major issues. She agrees that major strategic 
decisions were handed down from the Politburo to local organisations, and that in 
Moscow’s case central inteiwention was a feature of daily life. Yet, in her view, there 
were modifications when it came to implementation. Vague official directives were 
often left for local interpretation. Imprecision arising from the absence of an official 
policy, or from a lack of practical forethought, led to the local officials’ and party 
activists’ relative freedom of initiative during rapid industrialisation.^^ She has also 
argued that there was support for the Stalinist policy within the party, especially at the 
lowest level. She believed that ‘without the more or less committed support of 
thousands of party activists, the economic achievements and social transformation 
associated with the first FYP and the consolidation of Stalin’s political position would 
not have been possible
The most important criticism made of the ‘revisionist’ approach is that it 
underestimates the importance and power of the central party authorities. By focusing 
upon the wealcness of political controls in the countryside, the limitations of party 
record-keeping, or the extent of popular initiative in the collectivisation campaign, 
revisionists tend at best to downplay and at worst to ignore the high degree of 
centralisation and the significant capacity to exercise power enjoyed by the central 
political authorities. Reflective of this tendency is the charge that ‘the terror is 
ignored, obscured or minimised’ in many of these works and that Stalinism is reduced 
to ‘humdrum politics
Given the shortcomings of both perspectives, from above and below, it soon 
became obvious to some scholars that both perspectives must be adopted if they were 
to understand Stalinism. For instance, Graeme Gill, in his analysis of the communist 
party, attempted to combine both approaches. In his view, the high level of 
centralisation at elite levels coexisted with significant looseness lower down the
Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin, p. 223.
Ibid., p. 222.
Respectively, Stephen F. Cohen, ‘Stalin’s Terror as Social History’, The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 
4, October 1986, p. 378 and Peter Kenez, ‘Stalinism as Flumdrum Politics’, ibid., p. 395. Also see 
in the same collection Geoff Eley, ‘History with the Politics Left Out - Again?’. The debate was 
continued in The Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4, October 1987, pp. 375-431.
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political structure in the Soviet Union under Stalin. The party machine was 
insufficiently developed to be able to ensure that the centre could exercise a 
continuing control over events at lower party levels. Wliile the centre could certainly 
intervene and remove individual party leaders at subnational levels, it could not 
exercise a continuous close monitoring of what local leaders were doing. The 
institutional machinery for exercising close control of this kind was simply lacking. 
Channels of communication between centre and localities were underdeveloped, while 
the central party apparatus was not an efficient, smoothly-operating machine. The 
organisational ties between centre and lower officials were therefore looser than had 
often been assumed and certainly were not sufficiently strong to enable us to talk of a 
solid, highly organised and disciplined Stalin machine. Due to the lack of tight and 
continuing central controls over lower-level figures, regional party leaders retained 
substantial autonomy in loeal affairs. Local party leaders were able to follow 
substantially their own policy lines in local affairs; the levying of their own local taxes 
on top of central demands is one illustration of the room for manoeuvre they 
possessed at this time. Furthermore, the degree of control which local party organs 
themselves were able to exercise over their local regions remained limited by such 
things as poor transport and communications, despite the effects of the ‘revolution 
from above’
The Western debate has been exciting and fruitful. Yet, the debate is still far 
horn being resolved. Many questions concerning the role and function of the 
communist party have still to be answered. These include whether the communist 
party was a monolithic organisation or not, to what extent the lower party 
organisations enjoyed effective autonomy, and to what extent party ranlc-and-file 
members were supportive of party policy and played an active role in implementing it. 
This study attempts to answer these questions by examining the regional party 
organisation which was the main linlc between the central party leadership and the 
masses organised in party branches. By focusing on the regional party organisation, 
one can obtain a at least limited insight into the work of the higher party organs and of
Graeme Gill, Stalinism, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 10, 34. See also Graeme Gill, The 
Origins o f  the Stalinist Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and 
‘Stalinism and Institutionalisation: The Nature of Stalin’s Regional Support’, in John W. Str ong, ed,, 
Essays on Revolutionaiy Culture and Stalinism  (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990).
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the primary party organisations as the regional party organisation came into contact 
with them.
Another concern of this study is related to Stalinism. The nature of Stalinism 
and the origins of Stalinism have been a central concern of scholarly research both in 
West and in Russia. These issues have become particularly controversial in the last 
fifteen years or so. Particularly striking was the scholarly controversy about Stalinism 
in Russia. Although a critique of Stalinism had appeared in 1956-64 as part of 
Khrushchev’s ‘de-Stalinisation’ campaign/’ serious reexamination of ‘the Stalin 
question’ came only under Gorbachev as part of his glasnost po l i cy . Un l i ke  the 
criticism on Stalinism under Khrushchev which was largely limited to specific 
‘mistakes’ and ‘excesses’ committed by Stalin/^ a whole range of issues concerning 
Stalinism had been extensively discussed in an open and forthright manner under 
Gorbachev.^'’ Initial discussion was conducted principally by journalists/^ but was
3J
The ‘de-Stalinisatioii’ campaign began in 1956 when Khrushchev delivered his ‘secret speech’ to a 
closed session o f the twentieth Party Congress. The ‘thaw’ among historians began almost 
immediately and lasted for about a decade. A number of historians contributed to the widening 
debate, including V. V. Adamov, E. Burdzhalov, P. V. Volobuev and V. P. Danilov. For a fuller 
discussion, see R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (London: Macmillan, 
1989), pp. 1-2.
With Khrushchev’s fall from power, official policy moved away from active de-Stalinisation and the 
public discussion of Stalin was closed down. Under Brezhnev, there was no attempt either to mount 
a sustained critique o f the Stalin period or to investigate the systemic roots of the phenomenon. 
Publication of a number of major de-Stalinising historical and literary works was blocked, and their 
authors were obliged to keep them ‘in the drawer’. In a number o f cases, they circulated them 
secretly at home or allowed their publication abroad. There was a large volume of samizdat 
publications in the late 1960s and 1970s. For instance, see Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The 
Origins and Consequences o f  Stalinism  (London: Macmillan, 1972); Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The 
Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, vols. 1-3, (London: 
Collins & Harvill Press, 1974-8); Nadezhda Mandelshtam, Hope against Hope: A Memoir (London: 
Collins & Harvill Press, 1971); Evgeniia Ginzburg, Into the Whirlwind (London: Collins & Harvill 
Press, 1967); and Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, The Time o f  Stalin: Portrait o f  a Tyranny (New York: 
Haiper & Row, 1981).
By implication, the key to the phenomenon of Stalinism was Stalin him self - a leader whose 
pathological traits were abetted by an ‘unhealthy’ situation in the communist paity and a security 
police operating without the necessary restraints. The major thrust o f the de-Stalinisation campaign 
was to demythologise the person o f Stalin without demythologising the rule o f the communist party. 
It was Stalin personally who was made responsible for Soviet disasters and failures, just as he had 
once been held personally responsible for Soviet achievements. This approach was taken by 
Khrushchev who, in his ‘secret speech’, denounced Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ and abuse of 
power, but did not offer a systemic explanation.
Gorbachev called for the elimination o f all ‘blank spots’ from Soviet history, and this constituted 
official sanction for the wave o f historical discussion and revelation which came to characterise the 
Soviet press and the scholarly community. ‘The Stalin question’ encapsulated a whole range of 
issues, including the reasons for Stalin’s rise, how the system came to be established, responsibility 
for the purges and terror, and the costs o f the establishment o f the system.
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soon joined by scholarly historians. This discussion ranged widely across all areas of 
the Stalinist phenomenon. A variety of views emerged regarding the origins of 
Stalinism, with a particularly popular line being that which attributed primary 
importance to the link with Lenin, The costs of the great transformation and possible 
alternatives (especially that of Bukharin) were canvassed, as were issues of 
responsibility for and the extent of the famine of 1932-3. The terror, responsibility for 
it, its extent and whether those involved should be punished, were discussed widely. 
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and associated charges that the Soviet Union had 
brought on the Second World War, the early failings of the Soviet military and 
responsibility for this, the strengths and wealoiesses of Stalin as a military leader, and 
Soviet responsibility for atrocities committed during the war were all debated in a 
heated fashion. Hardly a single major area of the Stalinist experience remained 
unexamined, as Soviet writers embarked on this wholescale discussion of the past.^^
Inevitably, the extensive discussion of the extraordinary experience under Stalin 
led to a reappraisal of Stalin and Stalinism. The official account of Stalin and Stalinist 
regime published before glasnost had described them in a rather positive way.^^ 
However, Russians are now more likely to reject and denunciate Stalin and Stalinism. 
For many Russian intellectuals, Stalin has become an outright villain rather than just a 
flawed leader. In the present intellectual climate, a discussion of Stalin that portrayed 
any of his actions in an unambiguously favourable light - outside a few left-wing sects 
- would be almost as surprising to the reader as the opposite would have been in the 
heyday of Stalinism.
Questions concerning the nature of Stalinism and its origins have become a 
central preoccupation of Russian scholars and intellectuals. Many different answers 
have been offered. These included the totalitarian model, Trotsky’s Revolution
The most daring and infonnative re-evaluations o f Soviet history in the early years of glasnost 
appeared in the mass media - Ogone/c, Literaturnaia gazeta, Moskovskie novosti, Kommunist, and 
Druzhba narodov, to name a few.
For discussion of historical revelations under glasnost, see Alec Nove, Glasnost in Action: Cultural 
Renaissance in Russia (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev 
Rrevolution', Walter Laqueur, Stalin: The Glasgost Revelations (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); and 
Sheila Pitzpati'iek, ‘Constructing Stalinism: Reflections on Changing Western and Soviet 
Perspectives on the Stalin Era’, in Alec Nove, ed.. The Stalin Phenomenon (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1993).
For instance, see History o f  the Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union (Bolshevilcs): Short Course 
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939).
24
Betrayed hypothesis, the theory of a ‘Bukharin alternative’ to Stalinism, Slavophile 
and neo-Populist arguments about the course of Russian history, and the ‘barracks 
socialism’ view of Stalinism. Among others, the totalitarian model, often rather 
crudely borrowed from the West, is favoured by many of the more outspoken Russian 
historians and political scientists.
Concerning the origins of Stalinism, two types of general explanation emerged 
as dominant. The first finds the origin of Stalinism in the political system of one-party 
rule with a ban on internal factions established after the Revolution. This implies that 
the core characteristic of Stalinism was repressive dictatorship not limited by rule of 
law, and that Stalinism was essentially an outgrowth of Len in i sm.The  other type of 
explanation focuses on social forces. In the most popular argument of this type, it is 
bureaucratisation and the emergence of a new bureaucratic ruling class that are the 
quintessence of Sta l in i sm.Both  imply that Stalinism had no substantial support 
outside the new bureaucratic elite. But there is also some cautious discussion of the 
possibility that Stalinism did in fact have some social support from outside the elite. 
This includes the theory that Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’ at the beginning of the 
1930s had support from urban workers and ranlc-and-file members of the communist 
party and Komsomol."^^
The opening of Russian archives during the late 1980s had a very significant 
impact on the understanding of the Soviet past under Stalin in both the Western and 
Russian academic worlds. Improved access to Russian archives has made it possible 
to ask questions which could not have been answered before. Virtually almost all 
aspects of Stalinism came under scrutiny based on the newly available material from 
Russian archives. As Russian archives have become more accessible, a large amount 
of excellent primary research by both Western and Russian scholars has been 
published in the past few y ea r s . Ba s ed  on the new material found in the archives,
It is similar to one o f the standard Western inteipretations related to the totalitarian paradigm.
This view is similar to that o f many European M araists and some revisionist Western historians such 
as Moshe Lewin. See G. Popov’s review article on the novel Novoe naznachenie by Aleksandr Bek, 
published in Nauka i zhizn no. 4, April 1987, pp. 54-65.
See, for example, the articles by G. Bordiugov and V. Kozlov in Pravda, 3 October 1988, p. 3 and 
Literaturnaia gazeta, 12 October 1988, p. 11; and lu. A. Poliakov, ‘20-e gody: Nastroeniia 
paitiinogo avangarda’, Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 10, 1989, pp. 25-38.
A sample o f new research based on the recently released archival material were provided by R. W. 
Davies. For more details, see chapters 10-17 in R. W. Davies, Soviet H istojy in the Yeltsin Era 
(London: Macmillan, 1997).
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various aspects of Stalinism have been reexamined.By now, much more is Imown 
about how high-level politicians including Lenin, Stalin, and other prominent 
communist leaders acted in their political struggle and in the formation of party 
p o l i c y T h e  terror has attracted much attention, and both Western and Russian 
historians have tackled the subject from various angles .Quest ions  related to the 
scale of mass terror have been answered,"^  ^ and various regional studies of the Great 
Purges have showed how the terror was conducted at the local l e ve l . So c i a l
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For instance, see Julian Cooper, Maureen Penie, and E. A. Rees, eds., Soviet History, J917-53: 
Essays in Honour o f  R. W. Davies (London: Macmillan, 1995); and John Channon, ed., Politics. 
Society and Stalinism in the USSR (London: Macmillan, 1998).
For interesting documents on this topic, see Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, 
eds., S ta lin ’s Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Oleg V. 
Khlevniuk, et al,, eds., Stalinskoe politbiuro v 30-e gody: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: AIRO- 
XX, 1995); Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro: Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-e gody 
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996); and Feliks Ivanovich Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin 
Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago: 1. R. Dee, 1993). For biographies on Stalin, see 
Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, trans. by Harold Shukman (London; Weidenfeld 
and Nieolson; 1991); Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker o f  Nations (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1993); and Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from  Above, 1928-1941 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1990). For work on other politicians, see, for instance, Oleg V. 
Khlevniuk, In S ta lin’s Shadow: The Career o f  'Sergo ' Ordzhonikidze (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Shaipe, 
1995).
For instance, see J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning, Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Oleg V. Khlevnyuk, ‘The Objectives o f the Great 
Terror, 1937-38’, in Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie, and E. A. Rees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53; 
and Robert W. Thurston, Life and Terror in S ta lin’s Russia, 1934-1941 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996). A comprehensive selection of archive documentation is now available in 
Getty’s new book, but it was not yet available at the time my work was being completed. See J. 
Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction o f  the 
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
The Archives show that the number o f convicts in the gulag was lower than Conquest and others 
suggested in the 1980s, and that the number of persons executed or sent into administrative exile 
during the Great Purges was higher than the revisionists supposed. See Alec Nove, ‘Victims of 
Stalinism: How M any?’ in Getty and Manning, eds.. Stalinist Terror, and his supplementary article 
‘Tenor Victims - Is the Evidence Complete?’, Ewope-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, 1994, pp. 535-7; 
J. Arch Getty, Gabor T. Rittersporn, and V. N. Zemskov, ‘Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the 
Pre-War Years; A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence’, American Historical Review, 
vol. 98, no. 4, October 1993, pp. 1017-49; and Edwin Bacon, The Gulag at War: S ta lin ’s Forced 
Labour System in the Light o f  the Archives (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994).
For studies of purge at the local level, see Roberta T. Manning, ‘The Great Purges in a Rural Distr ict: 
Belyi Raion Revisited’, The Russian Histoiy/Histoir-e Russe, vol. 16, nos. 2-4, 1989, pp. 409-433; 
Francesco Benvenuti, ‘Industry and Purge in the Donbass, 1936-1937’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
45, no. 1, 1993, pp. 57-78; Robert Weinberg, ‘Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan in 
1937’, Slavic Review, vol. 52, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 13-27; Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 
Stalirrism as a Civilisation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), chapter 7; Hiroaki 
Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Dorrbas: A Ukr'ainian-Russian Bot'deriand, 1870s-l990s 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 6; and James R. Harris, ‘The Purging of 
Local Cliques in the Urals Region, 1936-7’ in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Ddections 
(London: Routledge, 1999).
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47historians also have produced valuable studies of various social aspects of Stalinism. 
Some focus on class and social identity/^ and others focus on peasant resistance. 
Those who have adopted cultural approaches to Stalinism focus on sociocultural 
issues in the realm of everyday life and the private sphere.^^ In particular, women and 
gender questions in the Stalin period have been dealt with by many young scholars.^’ 
We now laiow more about Stalinism than ever before. However, the debate on 
the nature of Stalinism and its origins is not yet resolved, and the task of 
comprehending the extraordinary phenomenon of the Stalin period is just beginning. 
As the picture of the 1930s becomes clearer, the question of Stalinism’s origins 
assumes a new intensity. How could such a regime have emerged, and when did it 
take on its final form? Was it merely imposed from above, or is there any evidence of 
popular support for the new order? Did the Soviet people contribute to the shaping of 
this oppressive political system? At present there is no sign of a consensus on these 
matters among historians in the West or in Russia.^^
Given the shortcomings of the totalitarians and the social historians, it is worth 
attempting a more rounded approach which pays due attention to the interaction of
For instance, see Nick Lamport and Gabor T. Rittersporn, eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: 
Essays in Honor o f  Moshe Lewin (London: Macmillan, 1992); and William G. Rosenberg and Lewis 
H. Siegelbaum, eds., Social Dimensions o f  Soviet Industrialisation (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993). See also the articles by Chris Ward, John Flatch, Catherine Merridale, John 
Russell, and Robert W. Thurston in Stephen White, ed.. New Directions in Soviet History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
For instance, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds.. Making Woricers Soviet: 
Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaea: Cornell University Press, 1994); and David L. Hoffmann, 
Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1994).
For instance, see James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts o f  Resistance: Hidden Tr-anscripts (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Sheila Fitzpatrick, Sta lin’s Peasants: Resistance artd Survival 
in the Soviet Village after Collectivisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Lynne 
Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivisation and the Cultwe o f  Peasant Resistance (New 
York, 1996).
See, for instance, Kotkin, Magrretic Mountain; Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultw'al Front: Power and 
Cultw'e in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraor'dinary Times: Soviet Russia m the 1930s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directiorts; and Catriona Kelly and 
David Shepherd, eds., Constructing Russian Cultw'e in the Age o f  Revolutiort, 1881-1940 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) and Russian Cultural Studies: An Intr'oduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998).
See, for instance, Wendy Goldman, Women, the State arrd Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and 
Social Life, / P / 7-/956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Catherine Merridale, ‘The Origins of the Stalinist State: Power and Politics in Moscow, 1928-32’, in 
Channon, ed.. Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR, pp. 69-70.
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political and social p o lic ie s .In  this respect, a study of the party at the intermediate 
and lower levels is of particular importance as these levels were where the spheres of 
politics and society overlapped. By examining the role and function of the regional 
party organisation, the party’s relationship with its ranlc and file, and also the interplay 
between the party and the masses at a grassroots level, this study will enable us to 
answer questions concerning the nature of the Stalinist regime. More generally, it is 
hoped that this study will help to renew the debate on the nature of the Stalinist 
regime and Soviet society in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
1.2 The scope of the study
This study has a limited objective. Its scope is limited in several aspects. First of 
all, this study focuses on the period of the first Five Year Plan.^ "^  This was a period of 
great transfoimation for the whole of the Soviet Union. Often refeired to as the 
‘revolution from above’, it was a period of rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, 
accompanied by massive social changes. In the industrial sector, rapid transfonnation 
was evident. Primary emphasis was placed upon the development of heavy industiy, 
with the result that the established industrial centres in the country were refurbished 
and expanded and completely new industrial centres were created from the ground up. 
In the countryside, agriculture was rapidly collectivised, and by the end of the first 
FYP collectivisation encompassed seventy per cent of households. The impact of 
rapid industrialisation and collectivisation on Soviet society was tremendous. The 
industrial workforce expanded rapidly and millions of peasants flooded into the towns 
seeking employment in the rapidly expanding industrial sector. Workers constantly
For assessment of both approaches, see Martin McCauley, Stalin and Stalinism  (London; Longman,
1995), pp. 78-85. In this respect, Stephen Kotkin’s book. Magnetic Mountain, made a 
groundbreaking contribution to the historiography o f Stalinism. It synthesises elements from both 
interpretations, retaining an active view of the subject but at the same time acknowledging the 
significance o f Bolshevik ideology. Bringing together the disparate strands o f intellectual and social 
history, he compelHngly showed how ideology fashioned life in Stalinist Russia. See Kotkin, 
Magnetic Mountain. For critical review o f his book, see Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, 
‘Rethinking the Stalinist Subject; Stephen Kotkin’s “Magnetic Mountain” and the State of Soviet 
Historical Studies’, JahrbUcherfiir Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 44, no. 3, 1996, pp. 456-463.
Before 1931 the Soviet economic year ran from 1 October to 30 September o f the succeeding year. 
The firs FYP was originally projected for the five economic years from October 1928 to September 
1933. At the end of 1932, however, the plan was declared to have been fulfilled in four years and 
three months. This study deals with the period between the beginning of 1928 and the end of 1932, 
as the beginning of the ‘revolution from above’ came in January 1928. Events which took place in 
1933 will be dealt with, whenever necessary.
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moved from one job to another, or one place to another. In the countryside, relatively 
well-to-do peasants, often labelled ‘kulaks’, were subject to the policy of 
dekulakisation, which effectively meant shooting or deportation to northern Russia or 
Siberia. Millions of peasants died during the course of collectivisation and 
dekulakisation, particularly during the famine of 1932-3.
The importance of this period in the study of Stalinism is due to the fact that 
this is when the main characteristics of the Stalinist system, particularly in the 
economic sphere, became visible. Most importantly, the Stalinist economic system 
emerged in this period. Both in the agricultural and industrial sectors, market 
principles were replaced by central direction as the key guiding force of the economy. 
The policy of five-year-plan industrialisation affirmed highly centralised state 
planning and state ownership, which in turn became the main features of the Stalinist 
economic system. In the agricultural sector too, collectivisation had the effect of 
placing the peasantry under firm state control and thereby guaranteed continuing state 
access to the grain resources of the countiy. The first FYP period was also an 
interesting period in the formation of the Stalinist political system. The Stalinist 
political system did not emerge abruptly, as did the Stalinist economic system. 
Although full-blown Stalinism was to come in the mid-1930s, it was in the first FYP 
period that Stalin began to consolidate his power. In the political sphere, the 
ideological struggle regarding how to build a socialist country came to an end with 
Stalin’s victory at the beginning of 1928 and the last organised opposition to operate 
on a national scale was defeated by Stalin’s faction in 1929. The consolidation of 
Stalin’s personal authority became the main characteristic of the Soviet political 
system in the early 1930s, and it paved the way to the full-blown Stalinism of the 
mid-1930s. By 1932, the main characteristics of the Stalinist economic, social and 
political order had become clearly visible, though this was more clearly the case in the 
economic sphere than in the political.
Of greater direct relevance to this study is the fact that the party itself went 
tlirough considerable changes in terms of its size, organisation, and functional role in 
this period. By the end of NEP, the idea of the ‘mass’ party had taken hold, and the 
party membership expanded rapidly with massive recruitment of workers in the first 
FYP period. Party organisations were restructured several times, and new and often
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experimental party structures in the industrial enterprise proliferated. Party ranlc and 
file members were encouraged to display their activism and great emphasis was 
placed on the role of activists in party work. It was also in this period that the party, 
especially party cells in factories, began to get involved in the details of economic 
management. Indeed, the first FYP was a unique period in the development of the 
party organisations and, therefore, this period deserves special attention.
The Leningrad party organisation has been chosen as a case study of the 
regional party organisation for a number of reasons. First of all, it was the second 
largest regional party organisation in the Soviet Union, containing approximately 9 
per cent of the whole party membership at the beginning of 1928. Traditionally, the 
Leningrad party organisation boasted of its large number of members with pre- 
revolutionaiy party standing and experience of the 1917 revolution. Many of its party 
members were veteran Bolsheviks who experienced the hard times of the Revolution 
and the Civil War. In 1927, about 30 per cent of its membership had joined the party 
before and during the Russian Revolution and the Civil War. Moreover, it had a 
strong worker representation throughout the 1920s. At the beginning of the first FYP, 
75 per cent of its members were workers by social origin. In the city of Leningrad, the 
proportion of workers was even higher, reaching 80 per cent. Furthermore, Leningrad 
city party organisation had an extremely high percentage of ‘bench-workers’; over 60 
per cent.
Of even greater direct relevance to this study is the fact that the Leningrad party 
organisation was one of the most active regional party organisations. Politically, 
Leningrad occupied a unique position. Leningrad had been the capital of the Russian 
empire, the political centre under the old regime and during the Bolshevik Revolution. 
After losing its status as capital, Leningrad became a political rival of Moscow. The 
Leningrad party organisation was more ‘proletarian’ than the Moscow party 
organisation, and, after October 1917, considered itself the real vanguard party 
organisation. The result was a vigorous rivalry between activists in the two cities. The 
Leningrad party organisation had a reputation of generally taking a hard-line approach 
in debates over policy. It was the headquarters of Zinoviev, in particular, during his
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political struggle against Stalin in the mid-1920s/^ and although Zinoviev and his 
supporters had been removed by the beginning of the first FYP, the importance of the 
Leningrad party organisation could not be ignored in the period we are concerned 
with. In particular, Kirov, the first secretary of the Leningrad party organisation at this 
time, was a politician of national prominence who reportedly enjoyed considerable 
support from the working-class masses. Furthennore, the rank-and-file members of 
the Leningrad party organisation were often considered to be politically conscious and 
active in carrying out their party duties.
This study is important in itself as only one study has so far been carried out on 
the local level of the Leningrad party organisation.^^ Moreover, given the importance 
of the Leningrad regional party organisation for the party as a whole, this case study 
may have wider relevance in identifying political and organisational changes within 
the party organisations during the first FYP period. Furthennore, this study will 
enable us to obtain a more comprehensive overview of the communist party under 
Stalin by highlighting similarities as well as differences between party organisations 
in different regions. The Leningrad region was different from both the Moscow and 
Smolensk regions on which some adequate studies already exist. The Smolensk 
region, which was examined in detail by Fainsod, remained predominantly an 
agricultural area even during the industrialisation drive of the 1930s. In this sense, 
Smolensk might not be typical of the party as a whole, although as a rural 
organisation in a predominantly peasant country, its study was amply justified. By 
contrast, the Leningrad region was mainly an industrial area even before the 
industrialisation drive. Leningrad was not only the second largest city, but also the 
most industrialised city in the country. Having inherited its industrial base from the 
Tsars, Leningrad was already a well-established industrial city at the beginning of the 
first FYP. It had a considerable number of factories, some of which were of national
See D. A. Hughes, Zinoviev, the Leningrad Party Organisation and the 1925 Opposition 
(Unpublished MSocSci dissertation. University o f Binningham, 1977).
As far as the Leningrad party organisation is concerned, P. O. Gooderham’s paper presented to the 
Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at University o f Birmingham is the only 
available one. His focus is primarily on the party’s own bureaucratic apparatus - that is, the full­
time, salaried officials who manned positions of responsibility in Leningrad’s paity committees and 
bureaux, although in the course o f the discussion he also dealt with the role o f the unpaid, volunteer 
party members who carried out important duties in the organisation, the so-called activists. See P. O. 
Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan: The Case o f  Leningrad 
(CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, University of Birmingham, 1983).
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importance. Moreover, it had skilled workers, with 93 per cent literacy. Having such 
advantages, Leningrad’s industrial sector expanded rapidly during the 
industrialisation drive. It is obvious that the party organisation in Leningrad played a 
very different role to an organisation such as Smolensk, based in a largely rural 
region.
The Moscow region was also peculiar in that Moscow, the capital of the Soviet 
Union, was the political and administrative centre of the country. It was a region 
where huge industry, and administrative, commercial and cultural institutions were 
concentrated. The Moscow party organisation was regarded as one of the most 
privileged of the local party organisations. Its relationship with the central party 
organs must have been completely different from that of other regional party 
organisations as it was located in the very city that housed the central party organs.
Although the Moscow region was a well-developed industrial region, it was 
different from the Leningrad region in terms of its industrial structure. Whereas the 
fonner heavily depended on light industry, the latter was the heavy industrial centre 
of the country. Accordingly the majority of the workforce in the Moscow region were 
engaged in light industry, whereas in the Leningrad region they were engaged in 
heavy industry. Therefore, this case study of the Leningrad regional party 
organisation will enable us to better identify the similarities and differences between 
party organisations in different regions and will highlight the impact of the 
industrialisation drive on the party in general.
1.3 Research framework
1.3.1 Research questions
In this study, three different but related questions will be addressed. The first 
question is related to the impact of the state-initiated industrialisation drive on the 
party organisations. Unlike many other European countries, where the role of state in 
the industrialisation process was limited to a greater or lesser extent, the Soviet state 
initiated, planned, and controlled the industrialisation process. This state-led 
industrialisation brought about not only massive social upheavals, but also dramatic 
changes in the make-up of state institutions. Since the target and speed of Stalinist 
industrialisation demanded an enonnously active role of the state sector, state organs
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had to reorientate themselves in order to cope with the tasks imposed upon them. This 
included both functional and structural changes. The communist party was no 
exception. The party was the initiator and organiser of these changes, and in doing so, 
the party itself went through considerable changes in its nature and function. In 
particular, the lower party organs which were expected to implement party policy, 
including fulfilment of industrialisation targets by ‘mobilising and guiding’ the 
masses, experienced significant developments in term of their size, membership and 
organisation. More importantly, the lower party organs’ function changed 
considerably by their growing involvement in industry. The particular questions posed 
in this study are: what was the party’s response to ever increasing demands made 
upon it during the rapid industrialisation drive, and whether the methods the party 
undertook were effective.
The second question is whether Stalinist state-led industrialisation caused or 
facilitated bureaucratisation within the party organisations. To put it differently, the 
question is whether the party had been transformed into an administrative body, or as 
Trotsky put it, bureaucratised during the first FYP period. In order to answer these 
questions, it will be necessary to closely analyse how the party organisation was 
structured and functioned; and how party workers were recmited and how they related 
to the party, ranlt-and-file members and the masses.
The final question concerns the emergence of the Stalinist system. The question 
is whether the structural and functional changes within the party facilitated the 
emergence of the Stalinist political system. To what extent could the central party 
leadership control the activities of the lower level party organisations and ensure that 
the policy fonnulated above was implemented by the lower level organs? How could 
Stalin consolidate his power within the party? Is there any evidence of popular 
support for the Stalinist policy within the party and who were they? These questions 
will be addressed either directly or indirectly in the main body of the thesis. I will also 
return to them at some length in the conclusion.
1.3.2 Research sources
This study relies heavily on an analysis of the material collected during my stay 
in Moscow in 1993-4 and 1996. This included party journals, newspapers, pamphlets
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and booklets collected from the Lenin Library and the History Library situated in 
Moscow. In addition, archival material collected from the Russian Centre for the 
Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKIiIDNI), also located 
in Moscow, is one of the main sources of my research. Unfortunately, I was not able 
to visit the local libraries and archives in St Petersburg. This was partly due to the 
limited financial resources and time, but mainly because material on the Leningrad 
party origination, which was available in Moscow, was sufficient for the purposes of 
the present study.
The material available on the Leningrad party organisation includes a variety of 
types of source. The basic sources most frequently used in this study are party 
journals published both at the national level and at the local level. The party journals 
published by the Central Committee, such as Izvestiia TsK (called Partiinoe 
stroiteVstvo after 1929), regularly gave space to the Leningrad party organisation. The 
Leningrad oblast committee also published specialised journals: Biulleten’
Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), a factual publication covering its main 
resolutions and decisions, m d Partmbotnik, a party journal containing articles written 
by party officials and activists on various topics. The latter, which was issued twice a 
month, embraced major decisions by the local party organisations as well as some of 
its debates.
The party’s newspapers were strictly censored during the period we are 
concerned with. Nevertheless, the local newspaper, Leningmdskaia pravda, provides 
accounts of all the Leningrad party organisation’s major meetings, as well as selective 
information on the work of the district {raion) and factory party committees. Pravda, 
the central party’s newspaper, also provides useful information covering all the major 
decisions by the Central Committee, and it often provides accounts of the major 
events in the Leningrad region.
Published accounts of local party meetings tend to be less heavily censored. 
Stenographic records of party congresses and conferences are particularly useful. 
These include the records of the first Leningrad oblast committee conference in 
November 1927, the second one in March 1929, the third one in June 1930, and the 
fourth one in January 1932. These are of great value since they normally range over a 
wide variety of topics, and matters were sometimes discussed relatively openly as
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they were intended for party audiences. Other Russian sources include pamphlets, 
articles, reports by the factory party committee at Krasnyi putilovets, and a number of 
statistics published by the Leningrad oblast committee.
Archive material from the former central party archive (RTsKhlDNI)^^ are of 
crucial importance to my research. This particular archive holds various precious 
documents related to party activities from central to regional levels.D ocum ents sent 
by the Leningrad oblast organisation to the Central Committee can be found under the 
heading in fond  17, opis ' 21. These cover the protocols of the oblast plenum meetings 
including one stenographic record of the plenum meeting held on 7 September 1929; 
the protocols of obkom bureau meetings and of obkom secretariat meetings over the 
period 1928-1931; and the protocols of joint obkom and gorkom bureau meetings and 
secretariat meetings in 1932.
For the transliteration of Russian I have based myself upon the scheme used by 
the Library of Congress, but where other forms are familiar to an English-language 
reader I have preferred them (thus Bolshevik, rather than bol’shevik, and soviet, rather 
than sovet). Citations are given in full when they first occur in each chapter, and 
thereafter in a shortened form. Place names are particular difficult, given that many of 
them have changed; but as a general rule I have prefened the name that prevailed at 
the time to which the discussion refers (thus Leningrad rather than St Petersburg).
1.3.3 The structure of the thesis
This chapter is an introductory chapter which lays out the theoretical and 
conceptual framework of this research. Chapter 2, another introductory chapter, 
provides a general background on the characteristics of the Leningrad region, with 
special reference to geographic, economic, and demographic aspects of the region. 
This chapter aims to highlight the economic and social changes which occuired 
during the first FYP period. Given the importance of the city of Leningrad, special
This archive has been renamed again in 1999 and it is now called RGASPI (Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii).
RTsKhlDNl contains party documents issued during the period up to 1952. The Centie for the 
Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), which has now been renamed RGANI, 
mainly contains post-1952 documents. For more information on these archives, see Davies, Soviet 
History in the Yeltsin E m , p. 95.
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attention was paid to the importance of the city in the second part of this chapter. It 
intends to emphasis the status of Leningrad as a well-established industrial city. Some 
background information on its major factories was given in this chapter, since these 
factories will be frequently referred to in later chapters. Following this is an in-depth 
analysis of Leningrad’s population, in particular, of the composition of the working 
class population. This will clearly reveal the impact of the industrialisation drive on 
the city’s population.
Apart from these introductory chapters, my thesis consists of four parts. The 
first part concerns the structure and organisation of the regional party organisation. 
The second part concerns membership changes and the effect of party purges on the 
membership. The third part deals with party personnel and their recruitment. The 
fourth part deals with the role and function of factory party cells. Each part 
approximately corresponds to each chapter, except the second part which is made up 
of two chapters. All the chapters, except chapter 5 and 7, consists of two sections, the 
first dealing with party apparatus from the obkom to raikom level, the latter dealing 
with the party cells at the factory level. Chapter 5 differs from the other chapters in 
that it did not give a special space to the party cells at factory level. In chapter 7, a 
whole chapter is devoted to the factoi*y party cells in order to highlight the dynamics 
of changes within the factory.
Chapter 3 concerns the organisational development of the Leningrad party 
organisation. The major questions in this chapter are how the formal structure of the 
party organisation changed as the party assumed a new role as a guiding force in 
industrialisation, and whether this system operated effectively. In this chapter, the 
major questions are whether there was a process of bureaucratisation within the party 
organisation. The following questions will be answered: whether the party 
organisation had become more hierarchically structured, or whether the party 
organisation had become more specialised and departmentalised. The first part of this 
chapter deals with the structure of the party apparatus, from the obkom down to 
raikoms. Major topics included: the abolition of okruzhlcoms in 1930, the 
establislrment of the Leningrad gorkom in 1931, the development of raikoms into the 
key middle-level party link, and finally the reorganisation of the party apparatus in 
1930 and 1931. In particular, the reorganisation of the party apparatus along
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functional lines will show how the party apparatus at the regional level developed into 
a more specialised and departmentalised one during the period of rapid 
industrialisation. The second issue which will be addressed in this chapter is the 
development of factory party cells. Even though party cells in other sectors, especially 
those in agriculture, also experienced a significant organisational development, the 
main focus will be on party cells in factories. This is not because the former are of less 
importance, but rather simply because there is no room for a detailed discussion in 
this thesis. The restructuring of factory party cells, which took place several times 
during the period which we are concerned with, will clearly show what the party’s 
organisational response to the demand placed upon it during the period of 
industrialisation was.
Chapter 4 examines in some depth the party membership change within the 
Leningrad party organisation. Emphasis is placed on the effects of the massive 
recruitment policy implemented between 1928 and 1932. The first part deals with 
worker recruitment, the change in the size of the party membership, and the change in 
its composition in terms of the social origin, occupation, and length of party 
membership. The consequence of the massive worker recruitment will be also 
considered. The second part focuses on the party membership within industrial 
enterprises. At first, the composition of workers recruited between 1928 and 1932 will 
be examined in terms of the length of industrial work experience, skill level, and 
participation in shock-worker movement. A major question here is how well the 
factory party cells were able to recruit workers as instructed from above. Secondly, 
the impact of worker recruitment on party saturation level within Leningrad’s 
factories will be examined. Finally, the allocation of communists inside factories or 
workshops will be dealt with. This is to show whether or not the massive worker 
recruitment brought about the effects which the party leadership hoped for in terms of 
communists’ relationship with other workers.
Chapter 5 deals with the 1929-30 and 1933 party general purges. The major 
concern of this chapter is the impact of these two party purges on the Leningrad party 
membership. These two purges were chosen as a case study because they had visible 
effects on the party membership. This thesis is not really concerned with the year 
1933. However, the 1933 purge is chosen as a case study because it had the effect of
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reversing the trends towards an ever-increasing party membership in the previous four 
years. In order to understand the dynamics of the party membership change, it is 
necessary to deal with the 1933 purge. In addition, the atmosphere and political aims 
of these two purges were quite different. The comparison of these two purges will 
show clearly the change in political emphasis within the first FYP period. In each 
part, the backgrounds and political aspects of the purge will be mentioned briefly. 
This will be followed by an analysis of the actual conduct of the purges in the 
Leningrad region. An in-depth analysis of the purge results will be included at this 
stage. When relevant, the purge figures for the Leningrad region will be compared 
with national figures as well as the figures available for the other regions.
Chapter 6 examines the composition of party workers with special reference to 
size, social composition, and mobility. The major questions in this chapter are how 
the local party organisations recruited their workers and whether there was a 
substantial change in the composition of party personnel. The first part concerns party 
officials at the obkom level down to the raikom levels. An in-depth analysis of the 
composition of party workers will be conducted in relation to party membership’ 
length, social origin and occupation. In doing so, the impact of the self-criticism 
campaign carried out in 1928 and 1929, and of the 1929-30 purges will be considered. 
The second part is devoted to the party workers at the various levels of party 
organisations within the factories. At factories, both full-time party officials and non­
paid party activists were carrying out party work. Emphasis is placed on the impact of 
the massive recruitment of party activists for party work, and the dynamics of the 
relationship between party officials and party activists.
Chapter 7 examines the changing role and function of party cells at the factory 
level in the process of industrialisation. The main question posed in this chapter is to 
what extent the local party organisations were able to implement decisions made by 
the central party leadership, and to what extent the local party organisations could 
impose the party’s decisions on the masses. Unlike other previous chapters, this 
chapter focuses mainly on the factory party cells. It goes without saying that party 
organisations at other levels - obkom and raikoms - were also involved in production 
matters. However, this chapter focuses mainly on the factory party cells in order to 
highlight the complexity of party work in industiy. Major topics included: the turn of
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party cells to economic work, the implementation of the principle of edinonachalie, 
the shifting of the focus of party work down to workshop cells and party units, and 
finally the re-emphasising of political-mass work in 1932. In dealing with these 
topics, the dynamics and changing relationship between party cells, industrial 
managers and workers will be discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the level 
of mass mobilisation. Workers’ participation in production meetings and socialist 
competition movement will be examined. The role of party cells in mobilising the 
working class masses will also be examined. The major question here is to what 
extent the party cells could mobilise the workers and whether this had the desired 
effect. In this particular chapter, frequent references will be made to some of 
Leningrad’s major factories, including the Krasnyi putilovets, the Elektrosila, the Karl 
Marx factoiy and others.
Finally in the concluding chapter, I will return to the questions posed in 
introduction, after briefly summarising the findings of each chapter. These include: to 
what extent the local party organisation was able to implement decisions made by the 
central party leadership, and to what extent and how the local party organisations 
could impose the party’s decisions on the masses. Another question to be answered is 
whether or not party members, if not all ordinary workers, supported Stalinist 
industrialisation. In other words, the question is who was the main source of the 
support for the Stalinist regime - party officials, activists, or workers. Finally, it will 
be necessary to explore more seriously the general question of the political 
significance of the bureaucratisation of the party organisations.
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2. Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad City
The first Five Year Plan was a period of rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation. The industrialisation drive of these years and the forced 
collectivisation of agriculture that accompanied it had a visible effect on the economic 
structure of the Soviet Union. Industry, in particular heavy industry, rapidly expanded 
and agriculture underwent fundamental change. The tumult of collectivisation and the 
voracious demand for labour unloosed by the first FYP had immediate and profound 
social consequences, resulting in a radical transformation of the society. The 
Leningrad region also experienced a significant change in its economic structure and 
population over this period: the rapid expansion of the region’s industry, 
collectivisation of agriculture, the massive increase in its working class population, 
and a peasant migration into the city of Leningrad.
This chapter provides some background infoimation on the Leningrad region 
during the first FYP period. Geographic, economic and demographic characteristics of 
the region are considered in this chapter. Emphasis is placed on the impact of the 
industrialisation drive on the region’s industry and its industrial working class. Given 
the importance of the city of Leningrad for the region, special attention is paid to 
Leningrad’s industry and population. At first, the structure of the city’s industry is 
addressed in terms of capital investment, number and size of factories and the 
expansion of industrial output in each industrial sector. We go on to consider the 
Leningrad population - which consisted mainly of workers. The following 
characteristics of urban demography are given particular attention: the size and growth 
of the population in general; the size and distribution of the working class population 
among various sectors of industry; and the composition of the working class 
population in terms of social origin, gender, age, and literacy.
2.1 Leningrad oblast
Leningrad oblast was one of the 32 oblasts belonging to the European part of 
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). It was located in the 
northwest of the RSFSR, sharing its border with the Estonian Soviet Socialist
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Republic (SSR) and the Latvian SSR to the west, and with the Sevemyi krai to the 
east. The Baltic Sea and two large inland lakes, Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega, formed 
the northern border. The Belorussian SSR and the Western and Moscow oblasts were 
situated to the south, and the Karelian Autonomous SSR to the north (see map 1). The 
administrative centre of the region was the city of Leningrad, which was founded on 
the delta of the Neva River flowing into the Bay of Finland. Lake Ladoga was situated 
about 30 kilometres north-east of Leningrad, and the Finnish border was only a few 
miles north of Leningrad. As a window to the West, the city had been an important 
port and naval base even though the bay and the city were icebound during the winter 
months. Another major city within the boundary of Leningrad oblast was Kronstadt, 
which was about 40 kilometres away from Leningrad. A naval base was located on 
this small island.
At the beginning of 1928, Leningrad oblast was composed of nine okrugs: 
Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Velikie luki, Cherepovets, Borovichi, Luga, Lodeinoe 
pole and Murmansk. ' When the Velikie luki okrug was transferred to the Western 
oblast in 1929, Leningrad oblast had a territory of about 331,500 square kilometres.^ 
After okrugs were eliminated as a unit of administration in 1930, the territory of the 
oblast was subdivided into more than 100 raions.^ Leningrad and Ki'onstadt belonged 
to the oblast until November 1931. Then, the city of Leningrad became an 
independent administrative-economic unit, separated from the oblast. In addition, the 
city of Kronstadt and the Prigorodnyi raioiri came under the jurisdiction of the city of 
Leningrad, being subordinated to the Ispolkom (executive committee) of the 
Leningrad Soviet. ^
’ Partrabotnik, no. 1, January 1928, p. 39.
2 Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1930), vol. 4, p. 574.
 ^ In 1930, a total of 107 mral raions were grouped into three categories: 13 industi'ial, 13 half- 
industrial, and 81 simple raions. See RTsKlrlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2754, p. 74. Later in June 
1931, rural raions were grouped into four according to their economic characteristics: the flax 
growing, milk and livestock, timber industry, and cottage industry raions. Each group contained 26, 
24, 12 and 27 raions respectively. For more information, see Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik 
Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Izdanie oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), pp. 23-31.
^ In 1930 the Prigorodnyi raion was created out o f five suburban and m ral raions surrounding 
Leningrad. For more information on this raion, see Partrabotnik, no. 23, August 1930, pp. 42-44.
 ^ Sankt-Peterburg, Petrograd, Leningrad: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik (Moscow: B ol’shaia 
rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 1992), p. 538.
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Leningrad oblast had a population of 5.6 million in 1927/8. As table 2-1 shows, 
some 30 per cent of the oblast’s total population lived in the city of Leningrad, ten per 
cent lived in other small cities and towns of the oblast, and the rest lived in the 
countryside. By 1931 the oblast’s total population had increased to 6.6 million. 
Leningrad’s population showed rapid growth, and its proportion of the total 
population had increased to 38 per cent. By contrast, the oblast’s rural population 
declined slightly, and its proportion had fallen to 50 per cent. By occupation, some 45 
per cent of Leningrad’s population were industrial workers. Of those living in other 
small cities and towns, 32 per cent were industrial workers, and 4 per cent were either 
kolkhozniks or individual peasants. Of those living in the countryside, about 44 per 
cent were peasants, whereas only five per cent were w orkers .T ak ing  into 
consideration that approximately half the population were not involved in economic 
activities, these figures suggest that the majority of the active workforce in the city of 
Leningrad were working in factories whereas the majority of the active workforce in 
the countryside were engaged in agriculture. According to the 1926 census, the 
majority of the people in the oblast were Russians (91 per cent), and 86 per cent of 
those aged between ten and 49 were literate,'^ this percentage being somewhat lower 
than in Leningrad itself.
Table 2-L Population o f Leningrad oblast by place o f residence, 1927/28 and 1931
Place of residence 1927/28 1931
N % N %
Leningrad 1,677,000 29.8 2,483,000 37.7
Other cities and towns 582,000 10.3 788,000 11.9
Countryside 3,366,000 59.9 3,316,000 50.4
Total 5,625,000 100.0 6,587,000 100.0
Source: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Izdanie 
oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), p. 15.
2.1.1 Agriculture
The economy of Leningrad and that of the surrounding area in the oblast were 
closely interrelated. Like many other industrial cities, Leningrad depended on the
^ Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 147.
7 Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningrada i Leningradskoi oblasti za 60 let: Statisticheskii sbornik 
(Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1977), p. 118
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local area for the majority of its food, especially for milk and vegetables. Leningrad 
oblast, encompassing a large agricultural area, produced most of the agricultural 
products consumed in Leningrad city. In return, the oblast depended on Leningrad city 
for industrial products. During the first FYP period, agricultural reconstruction aimed 
to transform the oblast into the main milk and vegetable reserve in order to meet the 
demand of workers in Leningrad and other industrial centres within the oblast.^
The area to the North-west of Leningrad was traditionally a grain-deficit zone.^ 
Neither the soil nor the climate in the oblast was well suited for agriculture. The 
growing season was short, and most of the area was covered by forest, lakes, and 
swamps. Approximately half the land was forest area and only about 25 per cent of 
the land was suitable for agriculture. Of the latter, half was used for crop cultivation 
and the other half for pasture. In 1928, a total of 319,500 hectares were used for crop 
cultivation; 70 per cent was used for grain cultivation, 17 per cent for forage crops, 11 
per cent for vegetables and potatoes, and two per cent for industrial crops." By 1932, 
an additional 81,700 hectares had been used for crop cultivation. Between 1928 and 
1932, there was a differential increase in the amount of land used for forage crops as 
opposed to the amount used for grain cultivation: the grain acreage increased by a 
mere 12 per cent, whereas the forage crops acreage increased by almost 56 per cent. 
As a result, by 1932, the percentage of the land used for grain cultivation in the total 
acreage of arable land had been cut to 62 per cent, whereas that for forage crops 
increased to 22 per eent. Some 14 per cent of the total arable land was used for the 
cultivation of vegetables and potatoes, and two per cent for industrial crops at this
time.
Crop cultivation and livestock farming played an equally important role in the 
oblasf s rural economy. In 1927/28, 44 per cent of the total agricultural output was 
derived from crop cultivation and the rest from livestock farming. Grain accounted for 
24 per cent of the gross agricultural output, potatoes for ten per cent, vegetables for
 ^Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 104.
 ^ R. W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation o f  Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 
(London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 20.
Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 105.
' 1 Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningradskoi oblasti: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
statisticheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1957), pp. 32-34.
12/W ., p. 32.
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six per cent, and flax for four per cent. Milk production accounted for as much as 37 
per cent of the gross agricultural output and meat production for 14 per cent. 
However, the 1930/31 figures show some changes in the relative proportion of each 
production. The proportion of grain in the gross agricultural output increased to 28 per 
cent, flax to six per cent, and vegetables to ten per cent. By contrast, that of milk 
production decreased to 34 per cent and meat production to ten per cent, resulting in 
the proportion of the agricultural output derived from livestock farming in the total 
decreased to 49 per cent.*^
Only a small portion of agricultural products produced in the region was sold at 
markets: 17 per cent in 1927 and 1930. Grain was the main agricultural product, 
accounting for almost a quarter of the gross agricultural output, but only a little was 
sold at markets. Flax was the most important marketable agricultural product: in 1927, 
45 per cent of the flax cultivated was sold at markets, and in 1930 this increased to 64 
per cent. It is probably due to the fact that the authorities sought to make flax 
Leningrad’s principal agricultural product since flax was exportable. Indeed, much 
importance was placed on its cultivation during the first FYP. Vegetables were not the 
main marketable agricultural product in 1927: only five per cent was sold at markets. 
However, in 1930 the figure increased considerably to 22 per cent. A relatively high 
percentage of the milk and meat produced in the region was sold at markets in 1927: 
31 per cent of the meat produced and 21 per cent of the milk produced. However, their 
percentages had fallen by almost 30 per cent by 1930. In 1930 only 13 per cent and 18 
per cent respectively was sold at markets.
In 1928, fanning in the Leningrad oblast was largely undertaken by individual 
peasants: 97 per cent of the land sown was farmed either by individual fanners or 
workers. Sovldiozy (state farms) and kolkhozy (collective faims) accounted for less 
than three per cent of the total farming land.*  ^ Between 1928 and 1930, 
collectivisation was carried out more slowly in the Leningrad region than in the rest of 
the country. In October 1930, only six per cent of peasant households were
'2 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 121. 
14/W ., p. 122.
Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 37.
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collectivised in the region, as compared with 22 per cent in the country as a whole. 
The rapid advance of collectivisation in the region came only in 1931. The proportion 
of households collectivised increased dramatically from seven per cent in January 
1931 to 44 per cent in October 1931.1? By October 1931, about 11,400 kolldiozy had 
been established in the region, and some 285,000 peasant households had been 
collectivised.*^ In spite of an effort to increase the size of kolldiozy, the average size 
of the kolldioz remained relatively small in October 1931, with 25 households, 84 
ploughed fields, 18 horses and 14 cows.’  ^ This led to the average size of a rural 
settlement (selenie) in the region being small, with 20 households, 73 ploughed fields, 
14 horses and 25 cows.20 Much livestock was socialised in kolldiozy. Already in 
spring 1931, as many as 98 per cent of the total number of horses in kolkhozy were 
socialised. A far smaller percentage of cattle and other livestock was socialised: only 
46 per cent of the total number of cattle and 43 per cent of the total number of pigs 
were socialised in kolldiozy.2*
Table 2-2. Peasant households collectivised in the Leningrad region, 1928-1931 
(percentages)
1928 1929 1930 1931 1931 1931 1931 1931
October October October February April June August October
0.5 1.0 6.1 9.7 23.5 34.2 39.6 43.5
Source: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 115.
2.1.2 Industrial structure
Leningrad oblast was an industrial centre of national importance, accounting, in 
1927/28, for 13 per cent of the country’s gross industrial output and for 11 per cent of
**^ The figure for the Leningrad region is from Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi 
oblasti, p. 115. The figure for All-Union is from Davies, The Socialist Offensive, pp. 442-443.
*? Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 115.
Ibid., p. 115. Between 1930 and 1931, the number of sovkliozy established in the region also 
increased rapidly from 63 to 230. The figure for 1930 is from Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningrada i 
Leningradskoi oblasti za 60 let, p. 150; the figure for 1931 is from Ekonomiko-statisticheskii 
spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 113.
Ibid., p. 115.
20 Ibid., p. 117, Central Industrial, North-W estern and Western Russia and Belomssia tended to have 
small settlements, with an average of 16-20 households, whereas South-Eastern Russia and the 
Ukraine had larger settlements, with an average 100-150 households. R. W. Davies, The Soviet 
Collective Farm, 1929-1930 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 34.
2 * Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 117.
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its industrial workforce.22 The metalworking and electrical engineering industries of 
the region were particularly important, producing a considerable proportion of the 
country’s total output. In 1927/28, the region’s metalworking industry aecounted for 
14 per cent of the gross national output in that sector. Moreover, the electrical 
engineering industry in the region produced almost half of the electrical goods 
produced in the country as a whole.22
The industries of the region were heavily concentrated within the city of 
Leningrad. For instance, in 1930 Leningrad produced almost 82 per cent of the 
region’s gross industrial output. The major industries of the region, such as 
metalworking, electrical engineering and textile, were heavily concentrated in 
Leningrad. In 1930, Leningrad produced 84 per cent of the oblast’s gross output in the 
metalworking industry, 100 per eent in the electrieal engineering industry, and 92 per 
cent in the textile industry.?^ The chemical, footwear and clothing industries were also 
heavily concentrated in the city. Some 95 per cent of the region’s total chemieal 
output, 100 per cent of its total clothing output, and 99 per cent of its total footwear 
output was produced in Leningrad.25
By contrast, the mineral mining and processing, fuel, paper, wood and building 
materials industries were mainly situated in the area surrounding Leningrad. However, 
these were of lesser importance than those in Leningrad itself, accounting for just 
under 20 per cent of the region’s gross output in 1930.26 The building materials 
industry was a major industrial sector, with 24 brick factories, more than 20 sawmills 
and plywood factories and four glass factories.?? There were 21 peat processing 
plants, and a number of factories producing porcelain, cement, matches and 
agricultural machinery. In general, these factories situated outside Leningrad were 
relatively small in terms of the size of their workforce. Only about one quarter of the 
factories employed more than 1,000 w o r k e r s .The Izhorskii metalworking faetory, 
located in the city of Kolpino, was the largest with more than 5,000 workers.
22 Ibid., p. 17.
22 Ibid., p. 17.
24 Ibid., p. 70.
25 Ibid., p. 70.
26 Ibid., p. 70.
2? Ibid., tables, p. 132.
2  ^Ibid., tables, pp. 106-113.
29 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 419.
46
However, the Izhorskii factory was rather exceptional. Other metalworking factories 
in the oblast were relatively small scale factories produeing rather simple machines 
compared to those based in Leningrad.
In the early 1920s, the industrial production of the region fell significantly, due 
to the collapse of industry caused by the Civil War. For instance, industrial output in 
1922/23 was only 27 per cent of the 1913 level. However, the industrial output of the 
region grew steadly from 1923 and it had almost recovered to the prewar level by 
1927.30 The electrical engineering, leather, textile and paper industries managed to 
reeover to their prewar industrial levels, whereas the industrial output of the 
metalworking, chemical, food and printing industries was still below the prewar 
level. 21
The oblasf s industry, which had just recovered to the prewar industrial level at 
the begimring of the First FYP period, expanded rapidly in the following four years. 
Under the first FYP, as much as nine per cent of the total capital available in the 
country was due to be invested into the Leningrad oblasf s industiy, and the gross 
output produced in this region was supposed to reach 13 per cent of the national gross 
output,22 the equivalent of 3,792 million rubles.22 The target set for the Leningrad 
region was 174 per cent growth as compared with the industrial level of 1927/28. 
Particular importance was given to the development of heavy industry, and its target 
was much higher than the target for light industry, a 213 per cent growth compared to 
a 155 per cent growth.24 In order to ensure the rapid development of industries, much 
emphasis was given to the development and utilisation of regional resources. 
Therefore, the mineral mining, fuel and building materials industries were to expand 
rapidly in order to provide necessaiy resources for factories, especially those in
Leningrad. 25
In accordanee with the plan, a huge amount of capital was invested into the 
oblasf s industry. In the economic year of 1929/30, a total of 290.4 million rubles was
20 Partrabotnik, no. 1, January 1928, p. 41.
21 Ibid., p. 41.
22 Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona v gody pervoi piatiletki I929-I932gg. (Leningrad: 
Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1967), p. 95.
22 Ibid., p. 96 
24/W ., p. 96. 
25 /W ., p. 95.
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invested, and by 1932, the figure had increased to 675.4 million rubles. Altogether
1,736.3 million rubles were invested during the first FYP period, and 48 per cent of 
them went into the reconstruction and expansion of existing factories. In addition, 
more than 100 new factories were constructed in the region.26
According to official Soviet figures, most industries in the region succeeded in 
reaehing the targets set out in the FYP.2? More than 20 enterprises in the region had 
fulfilled the targets within two and half years. As a whole, the oblasf s industry had 
met the plan’s targets in three years.28 By the end of 1932, the industry of the region 
as a whole had exceeded the production targets by 16 per cent.29 As a result, the 
oblast’s total industrial output tripled between 1928 and 1932: whereas industrial 
production in 1928 was worth 1.5 million rubles, the gross output in 1932 was valued 
at 4.7 million rub les.
As the first FYP envisaged a more rapid growth in heavy industry than light 
industry, a higher growth rate was set for heavy industry. The rapid growth of heavy 
industiy was only possible at the expense of light industiy. As it happened, heavy 
industry in the Leningrad oblast actually exceeded the speeifled target by 42 per cent, 
while the oblast’s light industry as a whole reached only 83 per cent of the target.41 As 
a result, in 1932, gross output of heavy industry was four times what it had been in 
1928, and that of light industry was two times.42 In particular, the gross output of the 
metalworking industry increased fourfold. In the electrical engineering industry, it 
grew by 350 per cent, and in the chemical industry it doubled.42
26 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, pp. 393-394.
2? Official Soviet estimates have tended to exaggerate the results of the plan. Therefore, the figures 
given above are somewhat overestimated. For a discussion of the problems o f the measurement of 
plan fulfilment, see, for instance, Alec Nove, An Economic History o f  the U.S.S.R. (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1969), p. 192; Naum Jasny, Soviet Industrialisation 1928-1952 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1961); G. Warren Nutter, The Growth o f  Industrial Production in the 
Soviet Union (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), chapter 2; Eugene Zaleski, Planning fo r  
Economic Growth in the Soviet Union 1918-1932 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1971); and Roger Munting, The Economic Development o f  the USSR (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 
pp. 91-92.
2^  Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 13.
29/W ., p. 170.
40/W .,  p. 169.
41 Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 170. For instance, the wood industry fulfilled only 
77.7 per cent of the specified target, while the food industiy exceeded the target by 29.5 per cent.
42 Ibid., p. 170.
42 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 419.
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The rapid expansion of the oblast’s industry led to an increase in its proportion 
of the national industrial output. Although the proportion of capital invested into the 
industry of the oblast decreased from nine per cent of that of the whole country in 
1928/29 to six per cent in 1931, the oblast’s proportion of the gross national output 
increased from 13.5 per cent to 14 per cent over the same period.44 This increased 
further to 15 per cent in 1932.45 By 1931, the gross output of the metalworking and 
chemical industries of the oblast increased to 17 per cent and 12 per cent respectively 
of these sectors’ gross national output. The oblast’s electrical engineering industry 
accounted for 43 per cent of this sector’s gross national output, somewhat lower than 
in 1927/28.46
2.1.3 Industrial workforce
In 1929, the Leningrad oblast had 1,018,700 industrial and office workers, 
representing about eight per cent of the Soviet Union’s total of 12.4 million.4'^ 
Between 1929 and 1931 the number of industrial and official workers in the region 
increased by 59 per cent, and in 1931, the Leningrad oblast had 1,624,500 industrial 
and office workers, approximately nine per cent of the Soviet Union’s total of 18 
m i l l i o n . 4 8  I f  we count only industrial workers, the oblast’s proportion of workers 
increased to 13 per cent of the Soviet total of 5.4 million in 1931.49
The dependence of the oblast’s industries on the city of Leningrad was quite 
visible in terais of relative size of workforce. In 1930, Leningrad had 80 per cent of 
the total industrial workforce in the region. Almost all the workers employed in the 
electrical engineering industry were working in Leningrad. Likewise, 87 per cent of 
the workforce in the metalworking industry and 86 per cent in the chemical industry 
were made up of workers from Leningrad. The proportion of Leningrad workers in the 
total workforce employed in light industry was even higher than that in heavy 
industry. Some 91 per cent of the workers in the textile industry, 100 per cent in the
44 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 17.
45 Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 170.
46 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti^ p. 17.
47 Ibid., p. 149.
48/W ., p. 150.
49/W ., p. 150.
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clothing industry, 96 per cent in the food industry, and 94 per cent in the footwear 
industry were based in the city.^o
The size of the regional workforce outside Leningrad was rather small, but in 
certain industrial sectors the proportion of those workers was relatively high. In 1929 
they accounted for 97 per cent of the total workforce in the fuel industry and 85 per 
cent in the mineral mining and processing industi-y.^  ^ In 1930, those workers who 
were working outside Leningrad comprised 81 per cent of the total workforce in the 
paper industry and 68 per cent in the building-materials industry. By contrast, only 18 
per cent of the total workforce in the leather industry were working outside Leningrad. 
In the textile industry the figure was only nine per cent, and in the metalworking 
industry it was 13 per cent.^^
Table 2-3. Size o f warJforce in Leningrad oblast excluding Leningrad city by branch 
o f industry, 1929-1932
Branch of industry 1929 1930 1931 1932
January
1932
July
Mineral mining and processing 18,198 20,915 26,614 30,853 34,821
Fuel 1,693 3,380 5,362 11,188 36,371
Metalworking (machine-building) 10,844 12,815 22,310 30,900 30,634
Chemicals 5,575 6,778 7,074 7,737 7,722
Wood 6,863 10,255 12,340 14,225 15,874
Paper 6,810 7,612 9,159 9,460 8,943
Textiles 5,168 5,000 5,783 5,458 6,057
Food 948 1,286 1,874 3,803 5,789
Total 58,328 71,301 95,393 120,982 153,784
Source: XV let diktatury proletariata: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii sbornik po gorodu 
Leningradu i Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad: Izdanie oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), 
tables, pp. 74-75.
Table 2-3 shows the number of industrial workers in the oblast excluding 
workers in the city of Leningrad. In 1929 a total of 58,328 were working outside 
Leningrad. Of these, some 31 per cent was engaged in the mineral mining and 
processing industry, 19 per cent in the metalworking industry, 12 per cent in the wood 
industry, 12 per cent in the paper industry, and three per cent in the fuel industry. 
During the first FYP the workforce outside the city expanded rapidly: by July 1932,
60 Ibid., p. 70.
61 Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 251.
62 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 70.
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the workforce had increased to 153,784, with a growth rate of 263 per cent within 
three and half years. The workforce in the fuel industry showed the most remarkable 
growth: 2050 per cent. The workforce in the food industry also increased sixfold, in 
the metalworking industry it increased threefold, and in the wood industry by 130 per 
cent. In textiles, the workforce remained relatively stable, showing only a 17 per cent 
increase. Due to the differential increase in the workforce employed in each industrial 
sector, the composition of the workforce in relation to industrial sector had changed 
considerably. By July 1932, the workforce in the fuel industry accounted for as much 
as 24 per cent of the total workforce. The proportion of workers employed in the 
mineral-mining and processing industiy slightly declined to 23 per cent, while that of 
metalworkers in the total workforce rose to 20 per cent. In the wood industry the 
figure fell to ten per cent, in the paper industry it fell to six per cent, and in textiles 
four per cent.
2.2 Leningrad city
As the administrative centre of the region, Leningrad housed the central offices 
of the oblast, and exercised control over the surrounding area. The city and oblast 
governments were closely integrated, and the oblast government was dependent on the 
city in every respect. However, Leningrad was more than just a regional centre. It was 
the capital of the old Russian Empire and also the city of the 1917 revolution. Since 
the foundation of the city by Peter I, St Petersburg, as the capital, had been the 
political and cultural centre of Russia up to the 1917 R e v o l u t i o n s . ^ ^  Administrative 
and educational institutions had been clustered in the city. It was this city that 
witnessed historical events such as the revolutions of 1917. Leningrad lost its status as 
the capital of the Soviet Union in March 1918 when Lenin reinstated Moscow as the 
capital of the c o u n t r y . 64 However, the city still remained one of the most important 
cities in the country.
66 Leningrad was originally called as St Petersburg at the time of its foundation. The city was renamed 
Petrograd during World War I to eliminate the supposedly German connotation of the original 
name. Once again it was renamed after Lenin at the time of his death in 1924, when it became 
Leningrad.
64 Lenin moved the capital back to Moscow, fearing that the position of the capital was too exposed to 
Gemian forces.
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Indeed, Leningrad was second only to Moscow in importance. The prestige and 
authority of Leningrad, as the cradle of the Revolution and the city of the proletariat, 
had not yet been completely eroded in the 1920s, since Leningrad was still, at a time 
when other large industrial centres had not yet been developed, the focal point of 
heavy industry and of the industrial p r o l e t a r i a t . 6 5  It had never quite lost its status 
acquired under the Tsars as the original seat of Russian industry and especially of 
heavy industry. Unlike the Moscow region, where many of the largest factories were 
situated in the countryside, Leningrad had its major factories within the boundary of 
the city. It was uniquely accessible to the west and still the centre of industry and 
world trade. The poverty of the soil, in fact, made it easier here than in Moscow to 
recruit an industrial proletariat divorced from the land. Leningrad was the stronghold 
of the class-conscious, organised proletariat: mainly the workers in heavy industry 
who had provided from the earliest days the hard proletarian core o f  B o l s h e v i s m . 66 All 
these factors accounted for Leningrad still being important in this period of the 
industrialisation drive.
2.2.1 Geographic characteristics
In 1928 Leningrad covered an area of approximately 266 square kilometres,6? 
and was subdivided into six administrative units (miony): Vasileostrovskii, 
Volodarskii, Vyborgskii, Moskovsko-narvskii, Petrogradskii, and Tsentral’no- 
gorodskoi. In 1930 some administrative changes took place: the Tsentral’no- 
gorodskoi raion was renamed Oktiabr’skii raion; the Smol’ninskii raion was re­
established; and the Moskovsko-narvskii raion was divided into two separate raions; 
Moskovskii and Naiwskii.68
The Tsentral ’no-gorodskoi raion, bordered by the Neva River and the Fontanka 
River, was the central part of the city. It had been the most important part of old St 
Petersburg, containing the administrative centre of Imperial Russia. Therefore, it was 
here that many important events in the country’s history took place, especially during 
the last 50 years of Imperial Russia. Under the Soviet regime, the administrative and
66 E. H. CaiT, Socialism in One Country, 1925-1926 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), vol. 2, 
p. 67.
66 Ibid., p. 66.
67 Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 4, p. 574.
68 Sankt-Peterburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, pp. 536-538.
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political importance of this raion had been reduced somewhat, since the city was no 
longer the capital of the country and, furthermore, the centre of political gravity had 
been transfened to the periphery of the city, the residential areas of workers.69 
Nevertheless, this district remained the busiest part of the city in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The administrative institutions of the Northwest region, the governments, the State 
Tmsts, and banks were located here.^o The area around Nevskii Prospekt, Leningrad’s 
main thoroughfare, was the main commercial and financial centre of the city, being 
home to the majority of the city’s commercial and financial establishments. Apart 
from the historical buildings from Imperial Russia such as palaces, churches, and 
cathedrals, it also had, being a cultural centre, numerous museums and theatres.
The Vasileostrovskii raion, consisting of the two islands of Vasil’evskii and 
Decembrists, formed the northwestern part of central Leningrad. Vasil’evskii Island, 
which was one of the first areas of St Petersburg to be built up, had been the cultural 
centre of the city. On this island, especially in the area around the southeastern end, 
were situated institutions of higher education such as the Leningrad State University 
and the Academy of Sciences, and many other institutions, colleges and museums. It 
was therefore an attractive residential area for academics, scientists, teachers, and 
students.
However, this raion was not an exclusively white collar area. To the west, not 
far from the student district, lay numerous industrial enterprises, factories and the 
workers’ housing es t a t e .The  Baltic shipbuilding works, which was one of the oldest 
and largest shipbuilding works in the country, stood on this southwestern part of the 
island. A string of leather-working factories were located between the Baltic shipyard 
and the Sevkabei’ cable works (formerly the Kabel’nyi factory). Other industrial 
entei*prises on the island included the Elektroapparat (formerly the Siemens & 
Schukert works), the Krasnyi gvozdil’shchik, and the Uritskii tobacco factory 
(formerly the Laferme tobacco factory). The Kazitskii radiotelegraph works (formerly
69 A. Rado, Guide à travers l'Union Soviétique (Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1928), p. 206.
60 Ibid., p. 206.
61 The proximity of the workers’ housing estate and the student district made it easier for workers and 
students to take the common action in the revolutionary movement. Ibid., p. 274.
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the Siemens & Hal’ske works) and the Trubochnyi factory were some of the factories 
located in the north of the island.02
The Petrogradskii raion, north of the Neva, consisted of seven islands and the 
northwestern part of the mainland. The Petrograd side of this raion, including the 
main Petrogradskii Island and three other small islands around it, was the most ancient 
part of the city. The surroundings of the Peter-Paul fortress were the first residential 
places of craftsmen, tradesmen and the nobles. Three other islands between the 
Bol’shaia Nevka River and the Malaia Nevka River were developed mainly as holiday 
resorts. The mainland area on the northern bank of the Bol’shaia Nevka, known as the 
Staraia Derevnia and the Novaia Derevnia, was also an area containing country
houses.63
Even though the Petrogradskii raion, with its fonner bourgeois apartments, 
parks, and gardens, was not the main industrial area of the city, it also had sizeable 
factories. Not far from the Peter-Paul fortress stood the Znamia truda (formerly 
Langenzippen engineering works) and the Ravenstvo cotton mill. To the northwest lay 
the Kiasnoe znamia (formerly Kersten knitwear factory) and the Vulkan copper 
founding and boiler factory, and to the northeast the Krasnogvardeets (fonnerly 
Voenno-vrachebnykh zagotovlenii factory).
The Vyborgskii raion, covering the area north of the Neva and east of the 
BoTshaia Nevka, was the main industrial district of the city. This raion had been 
famous for its numerous factories and the density of its working class population.64 
This raion had developed by the latter part of the 19th century into a squalid industrial 
suburb and a centre of working class militancy.66 As the only solid working-class 
district of the city, this raion was important in the course of the revolutionary 
movement. The workers in this raion played an important role in the 1905 revolution, 
erecting barricades during the great strike of July 1914, and they were among the 
leaders of the mass movement in February 1917. After the overthrow of the Tsar, this
62 The workers o f these factories were prominent in the revolutions o f 1905 and 1917. See P. P. 
Pirogov, Vas il ’ evskii osti'ov {LQmngmd: Lenizdat, 1966).
63 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 283.
64 Ibid., p. 292.
66 Evan and Margaret Mawdsley, Moscow and Leningrad (London: Ernest Benn, 1980), p. 322.
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raion became one of the Bolsheviks’ main strongholds in the city.66 In the Soviet era, 
this raion was well developed and it was one of the fastest growing parts of the city.6?
The factories in this raion, predominantly metalworking, were adjacent to one 
another. Lined up along the bank of the BoTshaia Nevka were red brick factories and 
refineries, cotton mills, steel factories, paper works, and weaving factories.68 One of 
the important factories in this area was the Russkii dizeT machine-building factory 
(fonnerly the Nobel factory) which overlooked the Naberezhnaia Fokina. Along Karl 
Marx Avenue, which runs parallel to the BoTshaia Nevka, stood a considerable 
number of factories: the Oktiabr’ factory, the Krasnaia zaria telephone factory 
(formerly the Erikson factory) and the Karl Marx machine-building factory (foimerly 
part of the Lessner engineering firm) among others.
The Poliustrovo district in the southeastern part of the Vyborgskii raion 
contained a considerable number of industrial enterprises. Along Poliustrovskaia 
Naberezhnaia stood a number of factories, including the Sverdlov lathe combine 
(formerly the Phoenix factory), the Krasnyi vyborzhets copper manufacturing works 
(foimerly the Rozenkiants factory), and the Stalin machine-building factoi*y. The 
Kulakov telephone and telegraph factory and the Proletarii porcelain factory were also 
situated in this district. Malaia Oldita, Udel’naia, and Lesnoi were also industrial 
districts, containing the Vozrozhdenie spinning mill, the Svetlana electric lamp 
factory (formerly Aivaz works) and the Engels machine-building factory, to name but 
a few. The Krasnyi SudostroiteT shipbuilding yard was located in Matrosskaia 
Sloboda, another district in this raion.69
The Volodarskii raion, in the southeast of the city, was another proletarian area. 
In the pre-revolutionary period, this area was mainly occupied by factory buildings 
and badly equipped workers’ settlements. Workers, living in poor conditions, had 
played an active role in the revolutionary movement under the Tsar’s regime.70 For 
instance, the violent strike by the workers of the Obukhov steel mill in 1901, Icnown
66/W ., p. 322.
67 Between December 1926 and January 1931, the population of this raion grew from 157,300 to 
230,500, showing the rapidest growth rate (46.5 per cent) among the raions o f Leningrad. See 
Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, p. 394.
68 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 293.
69/W .,pp. 292-294.
76 For more information on the revolutionary activities of the workers in this raion, see V. Lunev and 
V. Shilov, Nevskii raion (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1966).
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as Obuldiovskaia Oborona, was one of the first revolutionary activities undertaken by 
Leningrad’s workers. Under the Soviet regime, this raion had not seen much real 
development until the mid-1930s. Nevertheless, some construction took place in the 
1920s: new buildings and works were constructed on the left banlc of the Neva.^i
Workers’ districts were situated further along the southward curve of the Neva. 
Prospekt Sela Volodarskogo, which ran along the left banlc of the Neva, went through 
the suburbs of Stekliannoe and Volodarskoe, where the Krasnaia truba pipe works, the 
Lenin machine-building factory, the Rabochii spinning mill (formerly Maxwell cotton 
mill) and the Nogin factory s t o o d . 7 2  At the end of the avenue stood the Lomonosov 
porcelain works, which was one of the oldest in E u r o p e . 7 3  Alexandrovskoe suburb 
began where Prospekt Sela Volodarskogo became the Shlissel’burg Shosse. Amongst 
the great number of factories standing here, the Bol’shevik metallurgical works 
(formerly Obukhov works) was the most important, being the first steel mill founded 
in R u s s i a . 7 4  The district of the Malaia Oldita, on the right bank of the Neva, was also a 
workers’ settlement. Here, opposite the Bol’shevik factory, stood electric power 
station no. 5 called Krasnyi oktiabr’. This power station transmitted 60,000 kw to 
Leningrad in 1928.76
The Moskovsko-narvskii raion, situated southwest of the Fontanlea, was one of 
the most important raions during the industrialisation drive in the first FYP period, 
with its building sites, factories, the quay which occupied its western part, and the 
train stations which linked Leningrad to the Baltic countries. From the beginning, this 
raion had been populated principally by workers, to whom the decisive role had often 
been delegated during the revolutionary movement.76 The workers of this raion played 
a decisive role in 1917 in opposing the army attacks, and in 1919 combating the White 
led by General Iudenich.77 In particular, the Putilov works, being one of the biggest 
factories in Imperial Russia, was an important centre of the revolutionary labour
7' Sankt-Peterburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, p. 426; Evan and Margaret Mawdsley, Moscow and 
Leningrad, p. 287.
72 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 268.
73 Ibid., p. 268. This factory was established in 1744 in order to supply necessary equipment for the 
Imperial Palace.
74 Lunev and Shilov, Nevskii raion, p. 10. The B ol’shevik factory used to produce guns and cannons in 
Imperial Russia, but it produced motors and tractors in the 1920s.
76 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 269.
76 It was this raion that Lenin had began his activity as a propagandist around 1890.
77 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 270.
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movement. The strike and lock-out at this factory in early 1917 contributed greatly to 
the mass movement which overthrew the Tsar, and the workers of this factory played 
an active role during the October R e v o l u t i o n . 78
The Obvodnyi Canal, which ran horizontally across the northern part of this 
raion, used to mark the southern limit of St Petersburg, and the area south of the canal 
was mainly an industrial district. From the top of the Naiwa Triumphal Ai'ch, standing 
not far from the canal, one could clearly distinguish the demarcation between the 
rather salubrious residential area with its tall houses stretching to the north and the 
worker suburbs with their numerous factories stretching to the south.79 Along the 
canal stood a number of factories, including the Vereteno, the oldest cotton mill in the 
country. The Krasnyi treugol’nik rubber factory, situated not far from the canal, was 
one of the largest industrial enterprises in the country.
The western part of the raion, known before the revolution as the Narvskaia 
Zastava, used to be a region of aristocratic estates and dachas until the middle of the 
19th century, but the Russian industrial revolution led to the creation in this area of 
some of the largest factories in the co u n try .P ro sp ek t Stachek, stretching 
immediately to the south of the Narva Arch, formed the main axis of the southwestern 
part of the raion. During the 1920s this area was redeveloped in an attempt to redress 
the imbalance between the formerly wealthy central districts and the squalid industrial 
suburbs.81 The Krasnyi putilovets metalworking factory, dominating the southwestern 
area, was of national importance, being one of the largest industrial enterprises in the 
c o u n t r y . 82 This factory housed a number of cultural institutions such as clubs, theatres 
and cinemas, and it organised training schools and polytechnic courses for a d u l t s . 83 
Not far from this factory stood the Severnaia verf shipbuilding works.
Mezhdunarodnyi Prospekt, which ran through the eastern part of the raion, was 
one of the major avenues of southern Leningrad, the northern part of which contained
78 See M. MitePman, B. Glebov, and A. UPianskii, Istoriia putilovskogo zavoda (Leningrad: 
Gosudarstvemioe sotsiaPno-ekonomicheskoe izdatePstvo, 1939); Putilovets na putiakh k oktiabriu: 
Iz istorii 'Krasnogoputilovtsa' (Leningrad: Partiinoe izdatePstvo, 1933).
79 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 272.
86 Evan and Margaret Mawdsley, Moscow and Leningrad, p. 331.
81 Ibid., p. 332.
82 This factory was established as the St Petersburg State Iron Works in 1801, then renamed the Putilov 
works in 1868. From 1922 the factory had been named the Krasnyi putilovets. This factory 
specialised in heavy engineering and it produced the first tractor in the Soviet Union in 1924,
83 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, p. 273.
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several important institutions of higher education. The southern part of this avenue, 
beyond the Obvodnyi Canal, was an industrial district even before 1917, but it was 
further developed in the Soviet period. Some of Leningrad’s most important factories 
were situated along this part of the avenue: the Skorokhod shoe factory, the 
Elektrosila electrical engineering factory (formerly the Siemens-Schukert works) and 
the Egorov factory, which produced railway w a g o n s . 84
2.2.2 Economic characteristics
Leningrad was already a well established industrial city by the beginning of the 
first FYP. As the industrial centre of Imperial Russia, Leningrad, unlike the rest of the 
country, had a strong industrial base with numerous factories and many industrial 
workers. A great number of factories were scattered throughout the city, in particular, 
in the Moskovsko-narvskii and Vyborgskii raions. At the begimiing of 1928, a total of 
365 factories were operating in Leningrad. Metalworking and textile industries were 
the city’s traditional industries: there were 86 metalworking factories including five 
shipbuilding works and 29 machine-building factories, and 26 textile factories. In 
addition, Leningrad had 18 electrical engineering factories, 28 chemical factories, and 
45 footwear and clothing factories.85 Many of Leningrad’s factories were of national 
importance and 35 of them were regarded as the most important enterprises in the 
country in 1932.86
Reflecting the long industrial history of the city, many of its factories predated 
1917. The Mart’ shipbuilding works, the Lomonosov porcelain works and the 
Academy of Sciences printing works, established in the 18th century, were some of 
the oldest factories in Leningrad and indeed among the first factories in Russia. Most 
of the major factories, however, were founded during the 19th century and in the first 
two decades of the 20th century, when the Russian industrial revolution turned the 
city into an industrial centre. According to infonnation on 248 industrial enterprises, 
which were the most important ones in Leningrad in 1932, approximately 70 per cent
84 Evan and Margaret Mawdsley, Moscow and Leningrad, pp. 329-330.
86 The number o f factories in the beginning o f 1928 is my recalculation based on the information on 
Leningrad’s factories in 1928-29. See Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, 
tables, pp. 78-81.
86 For more information on those factories selected as the most important enterprises in the country in 
1932, see table 2-9.
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had been established before the Revolution. Out of 248 factories, about 110 factories 
had been established in the 19th centuiy, 54 factories were built in the city between 
1900 and 1917, and some 38 factories had been constructed in the period 1917-1927 
under the Soviet regime.8?
Traditionally, the metalworking and textile industries had been the most 
important industries in the city, and this was still the case in 1928. As these branches 
of industry demanded a high degree of labour concentration within a factory, 
Leningrad had been renowned for its large f a c t o r i e s . 88 In 1928 the Krasnyi treugol’nik 
rubber factory, the largest one in the countiy, employed more than 13,000 workers, 
and the Krasnyi putilovets metalworking factory, which was also one of the largest in 
the country, employed as many as 12,000 w o r k e r s . 89 Other metalworking factories 
employed fewer workers than the Krasnyi putilovets, however some employed a 
considerable number. For instance, the Krasnyi vyborzhets copper manufacturing 
factory employed 3,900 workers in 1928.96 The large concentration of workers within 
the shipbuilding works was also notable: the Severnaia verf shipbuilding works 
employed 2,100 workers9i and the Lenin naval vessel building works employed 1,800 
w o r k e r s . 92 The machine-building factories in Leningrad were generally large-scale 
ones, some of them employing more than 1,000 workers. For instance, in 1928 the 
Stalin factory employed 3,200 workers, the Karl Marx factory 1,800, the Russkii 
dizef 1,500 and the Engels works 8 0 0 . 9 3  The following electrical engineering 
factories employed more than 500 workers in 1928: the Svetlana electric lamp factory 
with a workforce of 1,300 workers; the Kiasnaia zaria telephone factory with 900 
workers; and the Proletarii porcelain works with 500 w o r k e r s . 94
87 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 88-105.
88 The concentration o f the workforce in large scale enterprises was legendary in Imperial Russia. It is 
said that 77 per cent o f the city’s 1914 labour force were employed in factories employing over 500 
workers, and that nearly half the Petrograd labour force worked in enterprises employing over 1,000 
workes. See S. A. Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories 1917-1918 (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 12.
89 Rado, Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique, pp. 272-273.
96/W .,  p. 294.
91 Ibid., p. 273.
9 2 /W .,p . 268.
93 pp. 293-294.
94 Ibid., pp. 293-294.
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No data have been found on the number of workers employed within each 
textile factory in 1928. However, taking into consideration the fact that the number of 
workers employed in the textile industry as a whole showed only a marginal increase 
during the first FYP period (see table 2-14), one can assume that in 1928 Leningrad’s 
textile factories employed almost as many workers as they did in 1930. Based on this 
assumption, one can guess that in 1928 the Khalturin spinning mill probably 
employed about 6,000 workers, and the Krasnaia nit’ and Rabochii spinning mill 
employed over 3,000 workers each (see table 2-9).
The city was the most important industrial centre in late Imperial Russia, and its 
enterprises accounted for 26 per cent of Russia’s total industrial production in 1916.96 
However, the outbreak of the Civil War and its associated industrial and social 
dislocation had devastating effects on the city’s industry. In the early 1920s, industrial 
production in Leningrad had fallen significantly due to the collapse of industry. By 
early 1921 industrial production had fallen to one eighth of the level it had been in 
1913.96 I f  consider the fact that the level of industrial production in 1917 exceeded 
that of 1913, then the rate of collapse might have been even greater. At the end of 
January 1921, 186 of the 410 enterprises under the command of the Petrograd 
Sovnarkhoz were not operating at all.9? In 1920 and 1921 the Putilov works (later 
called Krasnyi putilovets) was operating at only tliree per cent of its full capacity. In 
1921 metalworking and machine-building production stood at seven per cent of the 
1913 figure, and the production of the textile industry stood at thi'ee per c e n t . 9 8  
However, the industrial output of the city grew steadily from 1922. Whereas gross 
output in 1921 stood at 13 per cent of the 1913 level, the figure reached 18 per cent in 
1922, and 25 per cent by 1923.99 The gradual recovery continued in the mid-1920s, 
and by 1928, Leningrad’s industrial output recovered to its prewar industrial level.
In 1928, the gross industrial output of Leningrad was 1.4 times what it had been 
in 1913. The metalworking and machine-building industries managed to reach the
96 O. I. Slikaratan, Tzmeneniia v sotsial’nom sostave fabrichnozavodskikh rabochikli Leningrada 
1917-1928,’ Voprosy istorii SSSR, no. 5, 1959, p. 23.
96 N. Mironov and Z. V. Stepanov, ‘Sti'oiteli sotsializma’ in Rabochie Leningrada, ! 703-1975: Kratkii 
istoricheskii ochefL {Ltningva.di'Nmka, 1975), p. 184.
97 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 147.
98/W ., p. 148.
99 Mironov and Stepanov, ‘Sti’oiteli sotsializma’, p. 187.
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level of output they had attained in 1913, even though the gross output of the metal- 
cutting lathe industry reached only 71 per cent.'6® The industrial output of building 
material industry was 1.6 times what it had been in 1913, whereas the output from the 
wood, paper and woodworking industry had not yet reached its 1913 level. Light 
industry recovered its prewar level of industrial output more easily than heavy 
industry. The clothing industry showed the highest rate of growth and its output was 
eight times what it had been in 1913. The industrial output of the textile industry 
increased 1.6 times. For instanee, 72 million linear metres of cotton fabrics was 
produced in 1928 whereas 45.1 million linear metres was produced in 1913. However, 
the production of woollen fabrics did not reach its prewar level: in 1928, only 2.1 
million linear metres of woollen fabrics was produced, whereas 2.4 million linear 
metres was produced in 1913.^61 The leather and footwear industry grew rapidly in the 
mid 1920s and by 1928, its production output was 3,7 times as large as the 1913 level. 
For instance, 10.2 million pairs of leather shoes were produced in 1928, whereas only
3.8 million pairs had been produced in 1913.^62
Table 2-4. Gross industrial production and labour productivity in Leningrad, 1928 
(as compared with 1913)
B ranch  o f  in d u stiy G ross ou tpu t L a b o u r  p ro d u c tiv ity
Heavy industry: n. d. n. d.
Metalworking and machine-building 1.1 1.2
Wood, paper, and woodworking 1.0 1.2
Construction materials 1.6 2.6
Light industry: 2.1 1.3
Textiles 1.6 1.2
Clothing 8.0 1.5
Leather, footwear, and fur 3.7 1.6
Food 1.2 1.2
Entire industiy 1.4 1.2
Source: L e n in g ra d  za  50 let: S ta tis tich esk ii sb o rn ik  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967), pp. 24, 35- 
37.
'60 Leningrad za 50 let: Statisticheskii sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967), p. 39. 
'6 ' Ibid., p. 4L  
'62 Ibid., p. 42.
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In the first FYP period, not only did the great new industrial centres in the 
Urals, Kuzbass, and the Volga take shape, but also the traditional areas such as 
Leningrad, Moscow and the Donbass expanded. The impact of the industrialisation 
drive on the industry of the city was just as great as in other regions. Leningrad’s 
industrial base expanded considerably as a result of the construction of new factories 
and the technical reconstruction of industry, which was made possible by a massive 
capital investment. The total capital invested into Leningrad’s industry from October 
1928 to December 1932 was valued at 348 million rubles, out of which 294 million 
rubles were invested for the construction-assembly work.'63 in this period, more than 
140 factories were constructed within the city.'64 In addition, a large amount of capital 
was invested into existing factories and as a result, a number of new workshops, 
equipped with modem machinery, were constmcted within them.'66 Moreover, due to 
the technical reconstmction of industry, the equipment within Leningrad’s factories 
was replaced by technologically more advanced machinery. As a result, by 1932, the 
equipment which had been either established or upgraded during the first FYP period 
comprised about 40 per cent of the total equipment within Leningrad’s factories.'66
Table 2-5. Structure o f capital investment into Leningrad’s industry in the First FYP 
(percentages)
Total capital Construction- Equipment, Simple capital worlcs
investment assembly worlts instrument, stock and expenditure
100 84.5 13.0 2.5
Source: Leningrad za 50 let, p. 66.
As the first FYP envisaged more rapid growth in the heavy industrial sector than 
in the light industrial sector, Leningrad’s already well-established heavy industry was 
to develop further. Moreover, as the industrial centre of the country, Leningrad was to 
produce the means of production not only for its own industry but also for industries
'63 Ibid., p. 65.
'64 Some 14 factories were built in 1928-29 and another 107 factories were built in 1930. In 1931 at 
least 23 factories were constr ucted within the city. However, the exact number of new factories built 
in 1931 and 1932 has not been found. See Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi 
oblasti, tables, p. 78.
'65 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 394.
'66 Ocherki istorii Leningrada (Leningrad: Nauka, 1964), vol. 4, p. 338.
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of other regions in the country, which were being developed as new industrial 
a r e a s . ' 6 7  Therefore, the importance of the rapid growth of Leningrad’s heavy industry, 
especially the metalworking (including machine-building) and electrical engineering 
industries, was ever more emphasised.
The great importance attached to the development of Leningrad’s heavy 
industry was reflected in the fact that a great proportion of available funds was 
invested into the heavy industry throughout the FYP period. Although data given in 
the table 2-6 do not cover the entire industrial sector, it clearly shows that priority was 
given to heavy industry, in particular, the metalworking, electrical engineering, and 
chemical industries. For instance, in 1928-29 about 76 per cent of total investment 
funds went into the heavy industrial sector. Moreover, the share of heavy industry in 
total investment increased further to 86 per cent in 1930 and to 90 per cent in 1931. 
The metalworking industry, which was planned to show the greatest growth, received 
more than one third of total investment funds each year. In particular, the machine- 
building industry received 21 per cent of total investment funds in 1928-29, 17 per 
cent in 1930 and 33 per cent in 1931. This reveals that great priority was given to the 
development of the machine-building industry. At the same time, the electrical 
engineering and chemical industries received increasing amounts of investment funds 
each year (see table 2-6).
By contrast, the light industrial sector received a far smaller proportion of total 
investment funds. In 1928-29, only about a quarter of the total investment funds was 
allocated to the light industrial sector. Since the total volume of investment funds 
which went into light industry increased only marginally in the following years, the 
share of light industry in total investment had decreased considerably by 1931, 
accounting for only ten per cent of total investment. Furthermore, in some branches of 
light industry, investment decreased not only in its proportion in total investment but 
also in volume. For instance, the textile industi*y received 8.8 million rubles in 1928-
'67 Indeed, during the first FYP Leningrad’s heavy industr ial factories produced a range o f equipment 
for the great new industrial centres within the country, i.e. they produced tractors, other agricultural 
machinery, blooming mills, turbines, tube generators and many other modern machines. About 69 
per cent o f the machinery produced in the city was sent to other regions. In particular, 73 per cent o f 
the machinery manufactured at the Krasnyi putilovets, the Lenin factory, the Ekonomaizer and the 
Metal factory was transferred to regions outwith the Leningrad oblast. See Ocherki istorii 
Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 393.
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29, but two years later, it received only 5.5 million rubles. Likewise, the volume of 
investment funds which went into the footwear and clothing industry decreased from
5,9 million rubles in 1928-29 to 3.2 million rubles in 1931 (see table 2-6).
Table 2-6. Capital investment into Leningrad’s industry administrated by VSNKh and 
Narkomsnab, 1928-29, 1930 and 1931 (million rubles)
1928-29 1930 1931
Entire industry 72.3 164.9 192.2
Group A: 54.6 141.2 172.4
Metalworking 27.2 58.8 96.0
Of which shipbuilding 6.2 11.0 12.1
Of which machine-building 15.1 28.7 62.9
Electrical engineering 5.8 19.0 25.0
Chemicals 9.0 14.1 23.1
Construction materials 2.2 3.1 5.5
Group B: 17.7 23.7 19.8
Textiles 8.8 10.9 5.5
Footwear and clothing 5.9 5.9 3.2
Note: The figures above cover only the industiy administrated by VSNKh and Narkomsnab. 
Therefore, the figures for the entire industry in Leningrad are bigger than the figures above. 
For instance, the Leningrad industry as a whole received a total of 80.2 million rubles in 
1928-29 and a total of 178 million rubles in 1930. For more information on the entire 
Leningi'ad’s industry, see Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, 
tables, pp. 78-81.
Source: Adapted from Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, 
pp. 38-45.
Consequently, the heavy industry of Leningrad, in particular the metalworking, 
electrical engineering, and chemical industries, expanded rapidly during the first FYP 
period. The metalworking industry, which included the shipbuilding and machine- 
building industries, saw the most rapid expansion. In 1930, a total of 22 metalworking 
factories, including one new shipbuilding works and thi*ee new machine-building 
factories, were built in the eity.'^s in 1931, another seven factories were 
constructed.'69 Moreover, a large amount of capital was invested into the existing 
factories to enable their reconstruction. For instance, the Krasnyi putilovets, the 
largest and most famous metalworking factory in Leningrad, received 10.7 million
'68 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, p. 78.
'69 Ibid., tables, p. 39. As this figure covers only the factories controlled by the VSNKh, there might 
have been a larger number of new factories built in 1931.
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rubles, which resulted in doubling the value of its assets over this period."6 Other 
metalworking factories such as the Ki'asnyi gvozdiTshchik also received huge 
investment funds.*" In addition, the value of the assets of the Mart’ shipbuilding 
works and the Severnaia verf shipbuilding works increased significantly due to 
massive capital investment. For instance, in 1931 the additional capital and other 
resources allocated to these two factories was the equivalent of 3.6 million mb les and 
3.4 million rubles respectively.
The electrical engineering industry also saw a great expansion. Instead of 
constructing new factories, existing factories were expanded and modernised. A huge 
amount of available funds went into existing factories, and new workshops equipped 
with modem machinery were built within factories such as the Elektrosila, the 
Elektroapparat, the Sevkabei’, and the Kazitskii factory."3 This, in turn, resulted in an 
increase in the value of the assets of each factory. For instance, in 1931 the value of 
the assets of the Elektrosila and the Elektroapparat increased by seven million mbles 
and by two million mbles respectively. "4
The chemical industry also expanded. Two new chemical factories were built in
1928-29 and another five were constmcted in 1930. "6 The construction of new
chemical complexes such as the Nevkhimkombinat and the Apatitovyi complex 
considerably expanded the base of the chemical industry not only within the city of 
Leningrad but also within the Leningrad oblast. "6 in addition, the existing chemical 
factories expanded considerably due to the massive investment. Almost all major 
chemical factories in Leningrad saw a significant increase in the value of their assets. 
For instance, in 1931 the total value of the assets of the Krasnyi treugol’nik and the 
Krasnyi khimik increased by ten million mbles and by 3.4 million mbles
respectively. "7
At the same time, the labour workforce in Leningrad expanded rapidly during
the first FYP period. Between 1929 and July 1932, the number of Leningrad’s
" 6  Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 394.
’ ’ * Ibid., vol. 2, p. 394.
Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 90-91. 
"3  Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 394.
" 4  Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 92-93. 
" 6  Ibid., tables, p. 79.
" 6  Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 394.
" 7  Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spj'avochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 94-95.
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industrial workers almost doubled. * * ^  As the table 2-1 shows, the most rapid 
expansion took place within the heavy industrial sector, in particular within the 
metalworking, electrical engineering, and chemical industries. Between 1928 and 
1931 the number of workers employed in this sector increased from 113,600 to 
203,900, whereas the number of workers employed in the light industrial sector grew 
only marginally, from 98,900 to 120,900 in the same period. The metalworking 
industry, especially the machine-building industry, saw the greatest increase in their 
workforce. The number of workers employed in the electrical engineering industry 
also increased rapidly, doubling between 1928 and 1931. By contrast, the textile 
industiy, whieh employed as many workers as the metalworking industry in 1928, 
employed even fewer workers in 1931 than in 1928 (see table 2-7).
Table 2-7. Increase o f worlforce by branch o f industry in Leningrad, 1928-29, 1930 
and 1931 (thousands)
1928-29 1930 1931
Entire industry 212.5 285.8 324.8
Group A 113.6 172.5 203.9
Metalworking 58.0 94.9 117.0
Of which shipbuilding 12.1 15.8 22.1
Of which machine-building 31.1 53.1 64.2
Electi'ical engineering 17.1 29.7 35.9
Chemicals 22.1 27.6 31.5
Group B 98.9 113.3 120.9
Textiles 50.1 48.9 47.1
Footwear and clothing 37.9 51.0 54.2
Note: The figures above cover only the industry administrated by VSNKh and Narkomsnab. 
Source: As for table 2-6.
As most of the expanding workforce went into existing factories, the size of the 
workforce employed in each factory considerably increased. In particular, the labour 
workforce became highly concentrated within large-scale factories, mostly 
shipbuilding, machine-building, and electrical engineering factories. As a result, the 
scale of labour concentration within Leningrad’s large enterprises became even
X V  let diktatury proletaiiata: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii sbornik po gorodu Leningradu i 
Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningrad; Izdanie oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), tables, pp. 74-75.
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greater. As table 2-8 shows, in 1930 a total of 77 factories employed over a thousand 
workers and in 1931 the number of factories employing over a thousand increased to 
88. In 1930, out of 77 factories, one factory employed over 20,000 workers, one 
employed between 15,000 and 20,000 workers, one employed between 10,000 and
15,000 workers, and five employed between 5,000 and 10,000 w o r k e r s . " 9  a  year 
later, the number of factories with the workforce of more than 20,000 increased to 
two, the number of factories of 5,000 to 10,000 workers increased to eight, and the 
number of factories of 1,000 to 5,000 workers increased to 77.
Table 2-8. Number offactories by size o f worlforce in Leningrad, 1930 and 1931
Year Total Number of workers
Under 500- 1000- 5000- 10,000- 15,000- Over
500 1000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 20,000
1930 240 121 42 69 5 1 1 1
1931 242 114 40 77 8 1 0 2
Note: The figures above do not cover all the factories in the city, but all the biggest factories 
are included.
Source: This is my recalculation based on the information given in Ekonomiko-statisticheskii 
spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 88-105.
It was the large scale faetories within heavy industry that saw the most rapid 
increase in their workforce (see table 2-9). For instance, the Krasnyi treugoTnik, the 
largest factory in Leningrad, already employed as many as 20,000 workers in 1930 
and a year later the number of its workers had increased to 25,000. The Krasnyi 
putilovets, another gigantic factory in Leningrad, employed approximately 17,000 
workers in 1930 and its workforce increased further to 21,000 by 1931. In addition, all 
three shipbuilding works experienced a considerable increase in their workforce. For 
instance, the Baltic shipbuilding works, the city’s largest shipbuilding works, 
employed as many as 6,900 workers in 1930, and its workforce increased to 8,700 
workers in 1931. Likewise, the size of the workforce employed in the Mart’ and 
Severnaia verf shipbuilding works increased significantly: the workforce within the 
former increased from 4,461 to 5,950 between 1930 and 1931, and within the latter it 
increased from 3,957 to 7,460 in the same period. At the same time, the workforce
' *9 For more details, see table 2-9.
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within the major machine-building and electrical engineering factories expanded 
considerably. For instance, the workforce within the Stalin machine-building factory 
increased by 1,600 workers between 1930 and 1931, resulting in an increase of its 
total workforce to 5,564 workers in 1931. The Elektrosila electrical engineering 
factory and the Kazitskii radio factory also experienced a considerable increase in 
their workforce: between 1930 and 1931 the workforce within the former increased by 
1,600 workers and within the latter it increased by 1,400 workers. The workforce 
within the Krasnaia zaria and Elektropribor telephone factories also increased by 950 
and 766 workers respectively in the same period.
On the other hand, factories within light industiy did not experience a rapid 
increase in their workforce due to the fact that light industry was not given a high 
priority in development. For instance, the Skoroldiod shoe factory, which was one of 
the largest factories in Leningrad, employed approximately 12,000 workers in 1930, 
however, its workforce remained relatively stable in 1931. This was a big contrast to 
the rapid increase in the workforce within factories such as the Ki'asnyi treugol’nik 
and the Krasnyi putilovets. Likewise, the Khalturin and Krasnoe znamia factories, the 
largest textile factories employing over 5,000 workers in 1930 did not experience a 
rapid increase in their workforce: in 1931 the former did not show any increase in its 
workforce, and the latter showed a marginal increase (see table 2-9).
Taking into the consideration the massive investment and the rapid increase in 
the workforce which took place within heavy industiy, it is no wonder that some 
factories in Leningrad were very successful in fulfilling their targets for industrial 
output set out by the first FYP. The specific targets for industrial output which had to 
be met by each factory were often very a m b i t i o u s a n d  it was not always easy to 
meet them.*21 However, due to the massive capital investment that had been made in
120 por instance, the target set for the Krasnyi putilovets was the industiial output equivalent of 102 
million rubles, and that for the Stalin factory was the industrial output equivalent of 50 million 
rubles. See table 2-10.
*7* For instance, at the beginning of 1931, a number o f factories including the Elektrosila and Nogina 
factory failed to meet the specified targets set out for the first quarter o f the third economic year of 
the FYP. As a whole the Leningrad industry was unable to fulfil the requirements of the plan in the 
first quarter o f the third year. See Partrabotnik, no. 7, April 1931, p. 1.
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Table 2-9. List o f the most important enterprises in the Leningrad region, 1932
Names o f  factories Branch o f  industiy Year o f  
establish 
-ment
Location
*
Numbers o f  
workers 
1930 and 1931
Krasnyi putilovets machine building, 
metallurgical works
1801 MN 17184 21200
Zavod imeni Stalina large scale machine building 1857 VYB 3946 5564
Zavod imeni Lenina machine building 1861 VOL 3595 4700
Elekti'osila electi’o-machine building 1912 MN 5106 6752
Kiasnaia zaria telephone 1897 VYB 4750 5700
Zavod imeni Kazitskogo radio set 1867 VAS 2041 3467
Sevkabei’ cable works 1878 VAS 1870 2377
Baltiiskii zavod shipbuilding works 1856 VAS 6931 8720
Zavod imeni Marti shipbuilding works 1792 LEN 4461 5950
Severnaia v e rf shipbuilding works 1913 MN 3957 7460
Krasnyi vyborzhets copper manufacturing works 1866 VYB 3215 3551
Lenenergo thermal-electi'ic station LEN n. d. n. d.
Ki'asnyi treugol’nik rubber works 1860 MN 20807 25194
B ol’shevik steel mill 1863 VOL n. d. n. d.
Izhorskii zavod metal working 1703 Kolpino 7644 8608
Volkhovskaia stantsiia hydroelecti'ic power station 1927 LEN 95 93
Rabochii spimiing and weaving mill 1839 VOL 3643 4194
Fabrika imeni Klialturina spimiing mill 1833 TG 6999 6991
Krasnaia n if spinning mill 1891 VYB 3473 3766
Krasnyi tkach wollen cloth 1841 LEN 1957 2529
Krasnoe znamia hosiery, jersey 1855 PET 5715 6476
Vereteno textiles, cotton mill 1835 MN 2114 2104
Skorokhod shoe factory 1882 MN 12030 12337
Proletarskaia pobeda no. 1 shoe factory 1910 MN 5249 2338
Proletarskaia pobeda no.2 shoe factory 1929 MN 2721 2960
Zavod imeni Voroshilova copper manufacturing works 1924 VOL 708 1093
Svetlana electric lamps 1914 VYB 2950 3050
Elektropribor telegraph, telephone, radio 1927 LEN 1862 2628
Elektroapparat electro-machine building 1910 VAS 2708 3350
Russkii dizel’ machine (disel) building 1862 VYB 1743 2250
Zavod imeni Karla Marksa industi ial machine building 1909 VYB 4215 5197
Notes: Enterprises are selected based on the ‘list of the first groups of enterprises’ published 
in Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 22, November 1932, p. 78. The list contained 262 enterprises in 
USSR. Some 36 of these were located in Leningrad oblast, thus putting the oblast only 
second to Moscow oblast, which accounted for 83 of these enterprises. Out of the 36 
enterprises, Lenenergo, Zavod no. 7, Khibinskie apathy, Zavod no. 6, Zavod no. 52, 
Kulotinskaia factory and Il’ichevka factory are omitted in this table, due to lack of data. 
However, the Karl Marx factory has been added to this table, because frequent references to 
this particular factoiy are made in later chapters.
TG stands for Tsentral’no-gorodskoi raion in Leningrad, VAS for Vasileostrovskii, VYB 
for Vyborgskii, MN for Moskovsko-narvskii, VOL for Volodarskii, PET for Petrogradskii 
raion. Enterprises whose locations cannot be confirmed are simply given as LEN 
(Leningi'ad). Of the enterprises listed above, only the Izhorskii factory was located outside 
Leningrad city.
Source: Adapted from Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, 
pp. 88-107.
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order to allow for technical reconstruction, some metalworking (including 
shipbuilding and machine-building) and electrical engineering factories even managed 
to meet their production target earlier than scheduled. *22 As table 2-10 shows, seven 
factories in Leningrad had, by 1930, already met the level of industrial output 
specified in the FYP. In 1931, another ten factories met the targets set by the F Y P . * 2 3  
Subsequently, those factories which fulfilled the plan within two and half years, such 
as the Ki'asnaia zaria, the Karl Marx factory, the Russkii dizel’, the Svetlana, the 
Volodarskii factory, were rewarded with the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red
Banner. *24
Table 2-10. Industrial enterprises, which had met their target for gross output 
planned by the first FYP in 1930 and 1931 (thousand rubles at 1926-27 
prices)
Plan Achieved in 1930 Achieved in 1931
N N % N %
Krasnyi putilovets 101,750 110,448 108.5 161,015 158.2
Russkii dizel’ 11,073 9,623 86.9 15,138 136.7
Zavod imeni Egorova 13,524 11,305 83.6 22,731 168.1
Pnevmatika 5,886 6,670 113.3 9,771 166.0
Zavod imeni Voskova 20,000 18,154 90.8 30,399 152.0
Krasnyi oktiabr’ 11,000 8,449 66.0 18,611 169.2
Il’ich 14,422 14,592 101.2 17,914 124.2
Elektrosila 46,815 48,697 104.2 66,113 141.2
Elektroapparat 38,291 33,051 76.5 51,545 134.6
Krasnaia zaria 17,800 32,533 182.8 46,434 260.9
Zavod imeni Kazitskogo 19,200 18,725 97.5 23,938 124.7
Svetlana 19,500 39,922 205.1 54,790 281.0
Zavod imeni Stalina 50,177 37,578 74.9 50,672 101.0
Zavod imeni Lenina 24,806 22,008 88.7 29,913 120.6
Baltiiskii zavod 41,200 51,801 125.7 54,464 132.2
Zavod imeni Marti 18,800 17,546 93.3 37,280 198.8
Izhorskii zavod 55,115 51,635 93.7 62,836 114.0
Zavod imeni Karla Marksa 26,086 23,196 88.9 27,963 107.2
Source: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 71.
As a consequence of the massive investment and the rapid increase of the 
workforce, the gross output of Leningrad’s industry increased rapidly during the first 
FYP period. Even though table 2-11 does not cover 1932, the final year of the first
*22 See table 2-10. Out of the 18 factories listed in table 2-10, 12 were metalworking factories and five 
were electi'ical engineering factories. The Voskov sawmill was the only exception in this aspect.
*23 This does not include the Izhorskii factory, which was located outside Leningrad.
*24 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 420.
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FYP, it clearly shows that more rapid growth in gross output took place in the heavy 
industrial than in the light industrial sector. Between 1928 and 1931 the gross output 
of Leningrad’s heavy industry showed a 229 per cent growth, whereas that of light 
industiy showed a 153 per cent growth. Within the heavy industrial sector, the 
greatest growth took place within the metalworking and electrical engineering 
industries. Gross output within the metalworking industry increased from 403 million 
rubles to 1,040 million rubles between 1928 and 1931, resulting in a 258 per cent 
growth within three years. In particular, growth rates within the shipbuilding and 
machine-building industries were exceptional high, 290 per cent and 270 per cent 
respectively. The electrical engineering industry also showed a drastic increase in its 
gross output: the value of the output of the electrical engineering industry rose from 
168 million mbles in 1928-29 to 440 million mbles in 1932. On the other hand, the 
gross output of light industry increased much slowly. For instance, the gross output of 
the textile industry remained at the same level, and that of the footwear and clothing 
industry increased only by 68 per cent (see table 2-11).
Table 2-11. Gross industrial production in Leningrad, 1928-29, 1930 and 1931 
(million rubles at 1926-27prices)
1928-29 1930 1931 Growth rate between 
1928 and 1931 
(percentages)
Entire industry 1,794 2,522 3,469 193.4
Group A 961 1,485 2,198 228.7
Metalworking 403 633 1,040 258.1
Of which shipbuilding 70 92 203 290.0
Of which machine- 200 334 539 269.5
building
Electrical engineering 168 294 440 261.9
Chemicals 227 361 524 230.8
Construction materials 38 48 57 150.0
Group B 832 1,037 1,270 152.6
Textiles 305 317 305 100.0
Footwear and clothing 356 487 600 168.5
Notes: The figures given in this table cover only the industry administrated by VSNKh and 
Narkomsnab. The figures for the growth rate between 1928 and 1931 are my own 
recalculation.
Source: As for table 2-6.
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By the end of 1932, Leningrad industry as a whole had exceeded the production 
target set by the FYP by 18 per cent. In particular, the metalworking industry 
overfulfilled the plan by 55 per cent and the electrical engineering industry by 66 per 
cent.*25 As a consequence, total industrial output was three times as large as it had 
been in 1928. The heavy industrial sector showed a greater increase, that is 440 per 
cent.‘26 In particular, the gross output of the metalworking and the electrical 
engineering industries increased five and 23 times respectively when compared to the 
1913 industrial level. *22 The industrial output of each factory grew remarkably: the 
gross output of the Svetlana factory increased 15.5 times; at Elektrosila it increased 
four times, and at Krasnyi putilovets it increased 3.5 times.*28 The labour productivity 
of Leningrad’s industry increased by 58 per cent and prime production costs fell by 17 
per cent.*29 For instance, labour productivity in the Krasnyi putilovets, the Sverdlov 
factory, and the Baltic shipbuilding works doubled on average. *20 In particular, due to 
improvements in labour productivity, the growth rate of gross output in the electrical 
engineering industry exceeded that of the capital investment put into it. For instance, 
the gross output from the Elektrosila increased more than thi'ee times, while the value 
of its basic funds only doubled in this period. Likewise, with a 1.5 times increase in 
the value of its basic funds, the gross output from the Elektropribor increased 
approximately 35 times, and from the Svetlana factory it increased 20 times.*2*
By contrast, light industry did not experience a rapid growth. As a consequence, 
the importance of the light industry in Leningrad shaiply declined. For instance, the 
textile industry, which was as important as the metalworking industi'y at the start of 
the first FYP, did not grow at all in the period of 1928 and 1932 due to the fact that 
the textile industry was not given a high priority in terms of capital investment. 
Consequently its importance in Leningrad declined steeply after 1929 relative to the
*25 OcherJci istorii Leningrada, vol. 4, p. 337.
*26 Mezhdu dvuniia s ”ezdami: Leningradskaia partiinaia organizatsiia v resheniiakh konferentsii i 
plenumov oblastkoma i LK VKP(b) mezhdu X V I i XVII s ”ezdami (Leningrad: Lenpartizdat, 1934), 
p. 205.
*22 P.  L. Bulat and S. L. Sverdlin, Bor'ba za tekhniko-ekonomicheskuiu nezavisimost’ SSSR 
(Leningrad, 1935), p. 45.
*28 Ibid., p. 46.
*29 Mezhdu dvurnia s ”ezdami, p. 206.
*29 Ocherki istorii Leningrada, vol. 4, p. 339.
*2* Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 395.
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metalworking, electrical engineering and chemical industries.*22 xhe clothing, leather 
and footwear industries showed the same trend. The gross output from these industries 
increased somewhat during the first FYP period, however, the increase was not 
significant when compared with the increase which took place within the other 
branches of heavy industry.
2.2.3 Demographic characteristics
As table 2-12 shows, the 1917 Revolution, the Civil War and the 
industrialisation drive had a very visible impact on the population of Leningrad. 
Between 1910 and 1917, the population of the city increased due to the rapid influx of 
peasants into the city, as the city quickly assimilated these peasants as industrial 
workers. After 1917, however, the population began to contract, as political and 
economic crises set in. The growing shortage of food, the rapid decline of industrial 
production and the loss of its status as capital had left Leningrad’s population depleted 
by the end of the Civil War. The city’s population fell from 2,400,000 in 1915 to
1,468,000 in 1918 and to 722,000 by the end of 1920.*22 No official figures on the 
population were kept, but by extrapolating the census figures of 1910 and 1926 it is 
estimated that by 1920 the number of inliabitants had declined to less than half that of 
1910.*24 However, in the 1920s there was a gradual increase in population, as the city 
recovered from the devastating effects of the 1917 Revolution and the Civil War. The 
city’s population increased to one million in 1923 and to 1.6 million by 1926, yet it 
did not regain its 1910 level until the end of the 1920s.
Nevertheless, in 1926, Leningrad, covering the densely populated area at the 
mouth of the Neva river, was the second largest city in the USSR in terms of 
population. According to the 1926 census, Leningrad had a population of 1.6 
m i l l i o n . *25 Of Leningrad’s working population, some 33 per cent were classified as 
production workers, while about 28 per cent were classified as employees and 
professionals. The Leningrad population was predominantly Russian (86 per cent), the
*22 Pqj. instance, the output from the textile industry accounted for only 14.9 per cent of Leningrad’s 
total industrial output in 1930, whereas the output from the metalworking industiy accounted for
30.4 per cent. See Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 70. 
Leningradskaia pravda, 12 Febmary 1925.
*24 Gorodskoe khoziaist\>o (Leningrad, 1957), p. 9.
*25 Leningrad za 50 let: Statisticheskii sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967), p. 24.
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largest minority being Jews (five per cent). The remaining minorities were Poles, 
Germans, and Estonians, who individually accounted for no more than one to two per 
cent of the p o p u l a t i o n . I n  1926, Leningrad had the highest level of literacy in the 
country: 93 per cent of those aged between 10 and 49 were literate.
Table 2-12. Population o f St Petersburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, 1910-1939
Year (date) Population
1910 1,906,000
1917 2,300,000
1920 720,000
1923 1,071,000
1926 (17 December) 1,614,000*
1929 1,775,000
1931 (1 January) 2,232,600**
1939 (17 January) 3,015,000*
Sources: Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1930), vol. 
4, p. 572; * Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast’ v tsifrakh: Statisticheskii sbornik (Leningrad: 
Lenizdat, 1964), p. 13; and ** Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, 
tables, p. 394.
The industrialisation drive during the first FYP period resulted in a huge 
increase in Leningrad’s population and in its industrial workforce. By 1932, the city’s 
population was estimated at 2.8 million, an increase of 1.2 million in just six years.
In particular, the active workforce increased by one million between 1926 and 1931. 
The natural increase accounted for only 60,000 and the rest consisted of new arrivals 
to the city.'^^ Approximately 62 per cent of new arrivals were men since the city’s 
industry attracted more males than females from the rural a r e a s . The overwhelming 
majority of those entering the city were peasants, either from Leningrad’s own region 
or from the neighbouring Western, Moscow and Ivanovo r e g i o n s . In 1931 industrial 
workers accounted for 45 per cent of Leningrad’s population and artisans for six per 
cent. Dependants (children, the elderly and the unemployed) comprised 36 per cent, of
Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 4, p. 570.
Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast’ v tsifrakh: Statisticheskii sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1964), 
p. 14.
X V  let diktatury proletariata, tables, p. 135.
Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 144.
Ibid., p. 145. According to the 1926 census, women outnumbered men in Leningrad, accounting for
51.5 per cent o f the population.
X V  let diktatury proletariata, p. 150.
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which 13 per cent were aged between 16 to 59. This group provided a potential 
reserve for more workers to be drawn from.'^s The Leningrad population continued to 
grow in the 1930s and by 1939 it had almost doubled to more than three million.
The size and distribution o f industrial worJforce.
Leningrad had been renowned for its large working class population, even 
before the industrialisation drive in 1929-32. Since the city was an important 
industrial centre under the old regime, it had a considerable number of industrial 
workers in the pre-revolutionary years. The size of the Petrograd working class had 
increased dramatically by 1917. The number of workers employed in the enterprises 
of the city had risen from 234,733 in December 1910 to 242,600 by January 1914.'^ 3 
Between 1914 and 1917, it grew by 150,000 to reach 392,800 - or 417,000, if one 
includes the factories situated on the outskirts of the city.’"^"^ At the beginning of 1917, 
the factory workers of Petrograd represented about 12 per cent of Russia’s 3.4 million 
industrial w o r k e r s .  ^ 4 5  These industrial workers who gradually came to dominate the 
city were major supporters of the revolts against the Tsars in 1905 and early 1917, and 
against the Provisional Government in November 1917.
However, it was in 1918 that the industrial working class began its rapid 
decline. Unemployment and famine forced many workers to leave the city and return 
to their villages. At the same time, a substantial number of workers left the city either 
to join the Red Aimy or to get a new job in the administrative apparatus of the new 
state. As a result, the size of the industrial population of the city significantly shrank 
between 1918 and 1921. The active industrial workforce in the city, which numbered
293,000 on 1 January 1918, had shrunlc to 79,500 by September 1920.'46 jn 1921, the 
number of workers in the city’s enterprises fell further from 91,200 to 69,700.'4? Only
33.2 per cent of the 1913 total of industrial workers were employed in the city’s 
enterprises in January 1921. Material misery caused by unemployment and famine 
also took its toll on the remaining industrial population of the city. In addition, real
'42 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 147.
'43 Shkaratan, ‘Izmeneniia v sotsiaPnom sostave’, p. 22.
'44 Smith, Red Petrograd, p. 10.
'43 Rabochii klass i rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1964), p. 75. 
'46 Shkaratan, Tznieneniia v sotsial’nom sostave’, pp. 24, 26.
'47 Mironov and Stepanov, ‘Stroiteli sotsializma’, p. 184.
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wages had drastically fallen to one tenth of the 1913 level by 1921,'48 and this led to a 
catastrophic drop in living standards even for those who maintained their jobs.
From 1922 onwards, however, the size of Leningrad’s industrial workforce 
expanded, as Leningrad gradually regained its pre-revolution industrial strength. More 
and more enterprises were functioning normally, and workers began returning to 
work. The number of industrial workers rose from 80,616 in 1921 to 141,739 in 
1924/25, reaching 58 per cent of the 1913 level.'49 The working class population in 
Leningrad did not recover to the 1913 level until 1928, when it totalled 240,104.'30 
Although the Leningrad workforce expanded in almost all branches of industiy 
between 1921 and 1928, the number of workers employed in light industry grew 
faster than in heavy industry. The textile industry showed the most rapid growth in 
tenns of workforce, with a growth of 1465 per cent. By contrast, the workforce in the 
electrical engineering industry grew by 507 per cent, in the chemical industry it grew 
by 197 per cent and in the metal industry it grew only by 158 per cent in the same 
period (see table 2-13).
Table 2-13. Size o f worlforce in Leningrad by branch o f industry, 1921, 1924/25 and
Branch of Industry 1921 1924/25 1927/28
Metalworking 25156 43961 64937
Electrical engineering 2550 8735 15493
Chemicals 6739 13338 20080
Printing 5650 11240 11010
Textiles 3514 25265 55025
Leather and footwear 5292 6120 16042
Clothing 7771 6267 19009
Source: Istoriia rabochikh Leningrada (Leningrad; Nauka, 1972), vol. 2, p. 147.
The rapid expansion of industry during the first FYP period brought about 
another massive increase in the size of the Leningrad workforce. In this period, the 
industrial proletariat was not only the largest section of the population, but also the 
fastest-growing one. The number of industrial workers rose from 257,464 to 498,092
'48 /W ., pp. 183-184.
'49 L. I. Derevnina, ‘Vosstanovlenie Peti'ogradskoi promyshlennosti; Izmeneniia v chislennosti i 
sostave rabochikh,’ in Istoriia rabochikh Leningrada (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), vol. 2, p. 146.
'30 Ibid-, p. 146.
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between 1929 and July 1932: a growth rate of 94 per cent. The population classified 
as production workers increased from 24 per cent of the total Leningrad population of 
1.6 million in 1926 to 51 per cent of 2.8 million in 1932.’3'
The huge expansion of the workforce between 1929 and 1932 occurred in all 
branches of industry. However, as can be seen in table 2-14, the workforce employed 
in heavy industry grew faster than in light industry. The electrical engineering and 
metalworking industries showed the most rapid growth in their workforce: 180 per 
cent and 170 per cent respectively. By contrast, the workforce in the textile industry 
remained constant in size, while the workforce in the clothing industry grew by 144 
per cent.
As a consequence of these different growth rates, the extraordinary 
predominance of metalworkers in the Leningrad workforce was even further 
intensified during this period. The city’s metal industry had 59,886 workers in 1929, 
but the number had increased to 162,002 by July 1932. Whereas metalworkers had 
comprised 23 per cent of the Leningrad workforce in 1929, three years later they 
accounted for almost a third. In the same period, textileworkers decreased in number 
from 56,186 to 52,720, and dwindled as a proportion of the workforce from 22 per 
cent to ten per cent.
Table 2-14. Size o f worlforce in Leningrad by branch o f industry, 1929-1932
Branch of industry 1929 1930 1931 Jan. 1932 July 1932
Metalworking 59886 70885 121809 167475 162002
Electrical engineering 16952 20896 39659 51140 47497
Chemicals 24218 26733 34190 53582 40615
Textiles 56186 51096 56131 59168 52720
Food 18741 17809 26825 33274 31392
Clothing 13267 15278 24169 31305 32337
Footwear 12185 16735 18450 23860 22355
Printing 9793 12394 16422 18623 17720
Entire industiy 257464 285553 419141 532137 498092
Source: As for table 2-3.
The massive intake of new workers resulted in a change in the composition of 
the Leningrad workforce in terms of length of service in industry. At the beginning of
'3' XV let diktatury proletariata, p. 138.
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the first FYP, the majority of Leningrad workers were skilled ones who had been 
working in industry for more than five years. However, by 1931, new arrivals with 
less than two years’ industrial work experience constituted a high percentage of the 
Leningrad workforce. In 1929 a survey of workers in the metalworking and electrical 
engineering industries showed that 14 per cent had been working for less than two 
years; 23 per cent for between two and five years; and 63 per cent for five years or 
more. In 1931, however, the proportion of workers with less than two years’ industrial 
work experience increased to 40 per cent, whereas the proportion of workers with five 
or more years’ work experience decreased to 41 per cent. In the textile industry, the 
proportional change in terms of length of service was less sharp than in the 
metalworking and electrical industries. Between 1929 and 1931 the proportion of 
workers with less than two years’ work experience increased from 12 per cent to 29 
per cent, whereas the proportion of workers with five or more years’ work experience 
decreased slightly from 59 per cent to 57 per cent (see table 2-15).
Table 2-15. Length o f employment o f workers in industry, 1929 and 1931 
(percentages)
Industry less than 2-5 5-10 10-15 15-25 more than
2 years years years years years 25 years
Metal-working and
engineering
1929 13.5 23.4 23.4 39.7*
1931 39.9 18.8 18.7 8.6 7.3 6.7
Textiles
1929 11.7 28.9 18.9 40.5*
1931 28.5 14.7 19.7 10.5 14.6 12.0
Note: * These percentages are for those who had worked five or more years.
Source: XV let diktatury proletariata, tables, p. 90.
The breakdown of workers by year of entry into industry also confirms this 
trend (see table 2-16). In 1929, workers who had joined the workforce before the 1917 
Revolution accounted for 52 per cent of workers in the metalworking and electrical 
engineering industries and for 51 per cent of textileworkers. In general, these were 
skilled workers with several years’ work experience in industry. They were also 
considered politically trustful as they had experienced the 1917 revolution. However, 
as late as 1931, they were no longer the majority of the workforce: their proportion
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decreased to 27 per cent in the metalworking and electrical engineering industries and 
to 39 per cent in the textile industry. By then, the Leningrad workforce was composed 
largely of newcomers who had joined the workforce since 1926: they accounted for 54 
per cent of workers in the metalworking and electrical engineering industries and 42 
per cent in the textile industry.
Table 2-16. Composition o f workers by year o f entry into industry in Leningrad, 1929 
and 1931 (percentages)
Industiy before
1905
1906-
1913
1914-
1917
1918-
1921
1922-
1925
1926-
1929
1930 and 
after
Metal-working and 
engineering 
1929 22.1 17.9 11.5 8.3 21.3 18.9
1931 11.0 9.1 6.7 5.6 13.7 24.3 29.6
Textiles
1929 22.1 18.4 10.4 5.1 25.9 18.1
1931 16.4 14.4 7.9 4.4 15.3 19.4 22.2
Source: XV let diktatury proletariata, tables, pp. 88-89.
More importantly, a significant change took place in the social composition of 
the Leningrad workforce during this period. As Leningrad’s industry rapidly 
expanded, there was an increasingly urgent need for workers. By 1931, it had become 
impossible to draw new workers from within the urban population. The imier-city 
workforce reserves, including women and youth from working-class families, were 
not sufficiently large to meet the need of rapidly expanding industry. Therefore, from 
1931 onwards, most new workers were drawn from the c o u n t r y s i d e . Since a 
considerable number of peasants had arrived in the city and had been recruited as 
factory workers during the first FYP period, it was believed that peasant elements 
among factory workers had increased over time.
According to a survey of the social origins of the metalworkers and 
textileworkers in 1929 and 1931, the second-generation workers who had been born 
into working-class families comprised about half the workforce, whereas the workers 
who came from peasant families comprised approximately one third (see table 2-17). 
If we consider the fact that 20 per cent of metalworkers and 25 per cent of
Leningradskie rabochie v bor'be za sozializm, 1926-1937 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1965), p. 151.
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textileworkers had one or both parents who were workers in 1918,'^3 the figures in 
1929 and 1931 reveal that there had been an increase over time in the proportion of 
second-generation workers in Leningrad. However, as can be seen in table 2-17, the 
proportion of those classified as children of workers had slightly decreased between 
1929 and 1931: it dropped from 52 per cent to 51 per cent in the metalworking and 
electrical engineering industries and from 58 per cent to 56 per cent in the textile
industry.'^ 4
Table 2-17. Social origins o f workers in Leningrad, 1929 and 1931 (percentages)
Industry Born into working 
class families
Born into employee 
families
Born into peasant 
families
Metal-working and
engineering
1929 51.8 1.2 38.6
1931 50.8 8.5 37.1
Textiles
1929 57.7 4.8 35.5
1931 55.6 4.6 36.5
Source: As for table 2-16.
The drop in the proportion of second-generation workers can be explained by 
the growing recmitment of workers from peasant families. As can be seen in table 2- 
18, among new arrivals, the proportion of those who came from peasant families 
increased considerably in 1931. Almost half the new workers recruited in 1931 were 
from peasant families. This is a considerable increase from the figure in 1930. As a 
reflection of this change, the metalworking industry experienced a massive intake of 
those who were from peasant families. In 1931, 49 per cent of the new intake were 
peasants by social origin, whereas only 39 per cent were workers. Likewise, in the 
textile industry, as many as 52 per cent of the new intake were from peasant families, 
whereas only 40 per cent were from working-class families.
V. Z. Drobizhev, A. K. Sokolov and V. A. Ustinov, Rabochii klass Sovetskoi Rossii v pervyi god  
proletarskoi diktatury (Moscow, 1975), p. 93.
'^4 The Leningrad region economic-statistical handbook gives even lower figures for the percentage of 
the second-generation workers in 1931. Some 48.7 per cent o f metalworkers and 54.5 per cent of 
textileworkers were classified as o f worker background whereas those classified as children of 
peasants accounted for as much as 40.8 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. Ekonomiko- 
statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 155.
'55 /W ., p. 155.
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Table 2-18. Social origins o f newly recruited workers in Leningrad, 1930 and 1931 
(percentages)
Year of entry into the 
industry
Born into working class families Born into peasant families
June-December 1930 44.6 9.8
January-June 1931 40.0 45.2
July-December 1931 36.6 55.1
Source: Leningradskie rabochie v bor’be za sozializm, 1926-1937 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 
1965), p. 152.
Table 2-19. Previous jobs o f workers in Leningrad, 1929 and 1931 (percentages)
Industry Agri­ Institutions and Army Study Unem­ Others
culture enterprises of non­
production type
service ployed
Metal-working and
engineering
1929 17.9 21.2 60.9 *
1931 22.7 21.9 6.7 37.5 10.3 0.9
Textiles
1929 13.7 19.7 66.6 *
1931 25.0 26.2 1.4 31.7 15.4 0.3
Note: * These figures include artisans, the unemployed and those who were engaged in trade, 
study and military service.
Source: As for table 2-16.
Table 2-19, in which the workforce is subdivided by previous employment, 
allows a still eloser analysis of the composition of the Leningrad workforce at this 
time. Although workers were drawn from various sectors, the increasing influence of 
peasant elements over time is quite evident. In 1929, those who had been engaged in 
agriculture prior to their entry into industry accounted for only 18 per cent of workers 
in the metalworking and electrical engineering industries and 14 per cent in the textile 
industry. However, by 1931, their proportion in the total workforce had increased to 
23 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. This suggests that a considerable number of 
peasants joined the industrial workforce between 1929 and 1931. In actual fact, in 
1931 some 26 per cent of the new arrivals in the metalworking industry and 30 per 
cent in the textile industry had been engaged in agriculture before they began work in 
factories.'56 Another notable feature of table 2-19 is that the textile industiy showed a
'5 6 /W ., p. 156.
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sharper increase than the metalworking and electrical engineering industries in the 
proportion of workers who had been engaged in agriculture before they joined the 
industrial workforce. This implies that the new arrivals in textiles were more likely to 
have come from the agricultural sector than those in the metalworking and electrical 
engineering industries.
Another indicator of the extent to which peasant elements were entering the 
ranks of the working class in the city is the workers’ relationship with the agricultural 
economy. Generally speaking, one can distinguish two groups within the workforce. 
The first consisted of peasants who worked in industry, but who still retained strong 
ties with the countryside. They included those who owned or farmed land, those who 
came to the city with the intention of staying until they had earned enough money to 
make the family farm a viable undertaking once more, and those who had immediate 
family dependants in their native village - a wife or child - and supported them by 
sending money to the countryside.'5? The second consisted of workers who depended 
exclusively on wages for their income and who were fully committed to factory life. 
They comprised either peasants who had settled in the towns and severed their ties 
with the land, or second-generation workers who had been bom into working-class 
families.'58 The relative weight of each of these two groups within the labour force 
was a matter of concern since only the latter was believed to be truly ‘proletarian’ in 
character. In other words, it was believed that the more firmly workers severed their 
links with agriculture and came to identify with the industrial working class, the more 
likely they were to become fully fledged proletarians. Soviet historians have often 
used this as an index to show the extent to which the process of proletarianisation was 
under way among the workers who came from the countiyside.
The ownership and cultivation of land, either directly or indirectly, was what 
most cmcially characterised a ‘tie’ to the countryside. The censuses of 1926 and 1929 
provide some information on land-ownership among Leningrad metalworkers and 
textileworkers. In 1926 some ten per cent of metalworkers and 12 per cent of 
textileworkers owned land,'5^ while in 1929 the figures changed to 12 per cent and
'57 Smith, Red Petrograd, pp. 15-16.
'5^ Ibid., p. 14.
'59 Krasil’nikov, ‘Sviaz’ Leningradskogo rabochego s zemlei’, Statisticheskoe obozrenie, vol. 4, 1929,
p. 108.
82
four per cent respectively .A ccording to a recalculation based on the 1926 census 
figures, 12 per cent of workers in Leningrad owned land and four per cent of these 
actually farmed land. By 1929 the proportion of workers who owned land had 
decreased to ten per cent.'^' This reveals that only a small minority of workers in 
Leningrad owned land, and only a minority of these actually farmed it. In addition, it 
emerges from these figures that metalworkers were no less attached to the land than 
textileworkers. The 1929 census also revealed that the proportion of landowners was 
highest among workers with the longest service in industry. The landowners in the 
pre-1905 workforce accounted for 18 per cent of metalworkers and eight per cent of 
textileworkers, while the proportion of landowners among workers who came into 
industiy in the later period was much lower than these f i g u r e s . n  | g  thus apparent 
that a long period of work experience in industry did not necessarily erode ties with 
the countryside.
The 1931 survey, which gives information on ties with the agricultural economy 
among metalworkers and t e x t i l e w o r k e r s , does help to establish the extent to which 
a ‘peasant’ character had prevailed among Leningrad workers by this time (see table 
2-20). According to the survey, 65 per cent of metalworkers and 69 per cent of 
textileworkers had not had and did not have any links with the agricultural economy. 
Some 24 per cent of metalworkers and 23 per cent of textileworkers had had ties with 
agriculture in the past, but had severed their ties by 1931. Only 12 per cent of 
metalworkers and eight per cent of textileworkers still retained ties with the 
agricultural economy. This indicates that the majority of workers in Leningrad did not 
have any links with the agricultural economy in 1931. In addition, these figures 
provide further evidence that peasant influence among metalworkers was no less 
strong than among textileworkers, in spite of the fact that metalworkers were normally 
considered the ‘vanguard’ of the proletariat.
The survey also revealed that male workers were more likely to retain ties with 
the countryside. About 13 per cent of male metalworkers and 14 per cent of male
’60 A. G. Rashin, Sostav fabrichnogo-zavodskogo proletariata SSSR  (Moscow, 1930), p. 30.
’61 Smith, Red Petrograd, p. 17.
’62 Rashin, Sostav fabrichnogo-zavodskogo proletariata, p. 30.
’63 The 1931 survey results should be inteipreted with caution, since the concept o f a ‘tie’ to the 
countryside is a vague one.
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textileworkers still retained ties with agriculture, while only six per cent of women 
workers retained ties. This is probably due to the fact that more male workers came 
into the city as a breadwinner while their wife or children were in their native village.
A further breakdown of workers by the year of entry into industry showed that 
the proportion of those who still retained ties with agriculture was highest among the 
new intake from 1930 onwards. Amongst the 1926-1929 intake, only ten per cent of 
metalworkers and seven per cent of textileworkers still maintained a linlc. However, 
amongst those who joined the industrial workforce from 1930 onwards, the figure 
increased to as much as 21 per cent of metalworkers and 22 per cent of textileworkers. 
This confirms that in the period 1930-1931 new workers were recruited 
overwhelmingly from the countryside. Another notable aspect is the relatively high 
percentage of the pre-1917 workforce who retained links with the countryside. Having 
worked in industiy for more than ten years, they must have been more proletarian than 
peasant in their character, even if they had some kind of ties with the countryside. 
This suggests that having ties with the countryside does not always mean that a 
worker is less proletarianised.
Table 2-20. Workers’ relationship with the agricultural economy in Leningrad, 1931 
(percentages)
Metalworkers Textileworkers
Those who had Those who Those who had Those who
had ties with still retained had ties with still retained
agriculture in ties with agriculture in ties with
the past agriculture the past agriculture
Among men workers 23.6 12.7 25.3 13.8
Among women workers 23.3 6.4 22.5 6.2
Among those who came 
into industry: 
before 1917 22.9 10.8 24.5 4.5
1918-1925 22.7 6.6 20.5 3.6
1926-1929 23.8 9.9 19.7 7.0
1930 and after 25.7 21.1 27.1 22.3
Total workforce 23.6 11.8 23.0 7.6
Source: Trud i profdvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti 1932 goda: Statisticheskii spravochnik 
(Leningrad: Izdanie oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), p. 36.
Leningrad’s industrial workforce also experienced a significant change in 
relation to gender and age. In urgent need of workers, factories rapidly recruited
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women and youths who had previously been unemployed. As a consequence, there 
was a considerable increase in the number of women employed in Leningrad industry. 
By Januaiy 1930 some 105,527 women were working in the city’s factories, and the 
number of women workers had risen to 188,371 by July 1931.’ 4^ The female 
workforce increased not only in number but also in its proportion of the total 
workforce. Their proportion rose from 36 per cent in July 1926, to 37 per cent in 
January 1930, and to 41 per cent in July 1931.’65 Young people were another source 
of new workers. As late as 1931, 44,612 of Leningrad’s total workforce of 454,832 
were youths under 18.’66 Not only did the number of young workers grow, but also 
their proportion of the total workforce increased notably: by 1931 their proportion had 
increased to ten per cent.’6? If we consider the fact that the proportion of young 
workers fell from seven per cent in 1921 to tliree per cent in 1922,’68 we can see that 
the growth rate between 1922 and 1931 was extremely high.
The 1931 census provides more detailed infonnation on the distribution of 
women workers among various industrial sectors. It shows that by this time more 
women were working in the metalworking and electrical engineering industries than 
in textiles - 45,434 as against 39,024. Some 41,481 women worked in the clothing 
industry, and a further 22,762 women were employed in chemicals.’69 However, the 
proportion of women was higher in the light than in the heavy industrial sector. 
Traditionally, the textile industry had the highest proportion of women workers and 
this remained unchanged at this point: about 76 per cent of textileworkers were 
women. The clothing industry also showed a high percentage of women workers: 75 
per cent. The figures for the heavy industrial sector were considerably lower. In the 
chemical industry, about half the workforce were women. In the metalworking and 
electrical engineering industries, women workers constituted only 21 per cent.’ o^ 
However, it should be recognised that this figure represents a major increase from the
’64 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 153.
’65 For 1926 see Derevnina, ‘Vosstanovlenie peti’ogradskoi promyshlennosti,’ p. 151; the figure for 
1930 and 1931 is reported in Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, p. 153. 
’66 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 422-423.
’67 Ibid., tables, pp. 422-423.
’68 Derevnina, ‘Vosstanovlenie Peti’ogradskoi promyshlennosti,’ p. 151.
’69 Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 422-423.
’70 Ibid., tables, pp. 422-423.
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1930 level of 11 per cent.’ i^ This suggests that a considerable number of women were 
recruited into the metalworking and electrical industries between 1930 and 1931. 
Indeed, the female intake into the metalworking and electrical industries from January 
1930 to July 1931 numbered 33,383, whereas only 2,836 went into the textile industry 
in the same period.’72
Table 2-21. Gender and age breakdown o f Leningrad worlforce, July 1931
Total Men workers Women workers
Under 18-22 over 23 Under 18-22 over
18 18 23
N % % % % % %
Metalworking 212,633 8.4 17.8 52.4 3.5 6.3 11.6
and engineering
Chemicals 40,631 4.3 7.0 32.7 6.3 12.4 37.3
Textiles 51,264 0.5 6.2 17.2 6.5 21.7 47.9
Clothing 55,459 0.7 6.5 18.0 5.5 27.4 41.9
All branches 454,832 5.4 13.3 39.9 4.4 12.2 24.8
Note: The proportional figures are my recalculation from the absolute figures.
Source: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii spravochnik Leningradskoi oblasti, tables, pp. 422-423.
According to the 1931 census, young workers were most numerous in the 
metalworking and electrical engineering industries: about 25,313 workers were under 
18. A further 4,302 youths were employed in the chemical industry, and in the textile 
and clothing industries, each had over 3,000 youths working within them.’73 The 
heavy industrial sector had not only a larger number of young workers, but also a 
higher proportion of them than the light industry sector did. Young workers under 18 
comprised 12 per cent of the workforce in the metalworking and electrical engineering 
industries, and 11 per cent in the chemical industry, whereas in the textile and clothing 
industries, they comprised seven per cent and six per cent respectively of their total 
workforce.’74 Considering that around 1917 the textile, food and leather industries had 
a much greater proportion of young workers than the metalworking and chemical 
industries,’75 these figures suggest that more young workers had been recruited into
’7’ Ibid., p. 153.
’72 p . 153.
’73 Ibid., tables, pp. 422-423.
’74 However, young female workers were still predominant in textiles and clothing industries.
’75 Z. V. Stepanov, Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr’skogo 
vooruzhhennogo vosstaniia (Moscow, 1965), p. 34.
86
the heavy industrial sector than the light industrial sector by this point in time. This is 
probably due to the fact that much more emphasis was placed on the expansion of 
heavy industry during the first FYP period.
Table 2-22. Illiteracy o f metalworkers and textileworkers in Leningrad, 1931 
(percentages)
Metalworkers Textileworkers
Total workforce 2.9 13.9
Among men workers 2.0 5.0
Among women workers 7.8 16.0
Among those who came into
industry:
before 1917 4.5 22.9
1918-1925 2.0 8.5
1926-1929 1.7 4.6
1930 and after 2.8 8.4
Source: Trud iprofdvizhenie v Leningradskoi oblasti 1932 goda, p. 42.
Leningrad showed a relatively high level of working class literacy. As late as 
1 9 3 1 ,  9 7  per cent of metalworkers and 8 6  per cent of textileworkers were literate. This 
was a notable improvement from the literacy rate in 1 9 1 8 ,  when 8 8  per cent of 
metalworkers but only 5 0  per cent of textileworkers were l i t e r a t e . ’ ^ 6  Working class 
literacy was closely related to gender, occupation, and length of service in industry. 
The 1931 survey of metalworkers showed that thr ee per cent were illiterate, but only 
two per cent of men were illiterate as compared to eight per cent of women. Illiteracy 
among textileworkers was much higher than among metalworkers. Some 14 per cent 
of textileworkers were illiterate, and five per cent of men were illiterate as compared 
to 1 6  per cent of women. It suggests that women workers, especially in the light 
industrial sector, were more likely to be illiterate. The survey also revealed that 
illiteracy was highest among those who joined the industrial workforce before 1917. 
In addition, the 1 9 3 1  suiwey showed that illiteracy was relatively high among those 
who came into industry from 1 9 3 0  onwards, especially when compared to the 1 9 2 6 -  
2 9  intake (see table 2 - 2 2 ) .  This suggests that those who came into industry from 1 9 3 0
’76 Smith, Red Petrograd, p. 34.
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onwards were drawn from more ‘backward’ sectors, probably from the countryside, 
than those who came into industry between 1926 and 1929.
In conclusion, we can say that the impact of the industrialisation drive on the 
population of the city in general and on the working class population in particular was 
massive. It brought about a rapid expansion of the population, of the industrial 
workforce, in particular, and a huge peasant migration into the city. More 
significantly, it caused the composition of the population and of the workforce to 
change.
From the data provided above, it can be said that there were discernible social 
divisions within the industrial workforce, according to degree of proletarianisation, 
skill, sex and age. Indeed, the workforce in Leningrad in the first FYP period was far 
from homogeneous. There was a crucial cleavage between the longer established 
workers and peasant workers. In addition, there were other divisions between skilled 
and unskilled, male and female, old and young workers. Therefore, one can roughly 
divide Leningrad’s working class into two groups: one consisting of peasant workers, 
women workers and workers new to industry, and the other consisting of older, 
proletarianised, skilled, male workers.
One may say that this was not a feature peculiar to this period. However, it 
appears that in Leningrad these divisions had been regaining importance over the first 
FYP period. What is more important is the change in the relative weight of these two 
groups of workers. It is difficult to estimate their exact proportion, yet the data on the 
composition of the workforce lead us to conclude that by 1932 more peasant workers, 
new arrivals to industry, women and young workers were employed in Leningrad’s 
industry than before, and that the longer established workforce comprised slightly 
more than half of the total. We shall see the implication of these changes in the 
composition of the workforce in the following chapters.
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3. Party Structure and Organisation
As seen in the previous chapter, the society and economy underwent 
fundamental changes during the first FYP. With the launch of the industrialisation 
drive, the party became more enmeshed in the control and supervision of the rapidly 
expanding economy; it increased its level of complexity, and introduced 
organisational changes to meet social, political and economic circumstances. With the 
party’s increasing involvement in the economy, especially after 1929, party 
organisations evolved into much more elaborate stmctures in response to the demands 
placed upon them.
As organisational matters were regarded as one of the keys to overall success, 
the party apparatus was reorganised several times between 1928 and 1932. 
Olcruzhkoms were abolished, and raikoms emerged as the main link between the 
primary cells and the regional authority. Yet the most notable development was the 
introduction of a functional-sectoral system into the party apparatus. The Central 
Committee secretariat was reorganised, in order to give priority to economic 
questions, adding ‘sectors’ responsible for industry and agriculture to the established 
departments. This reorganisation was reflected in the entire party apparatus at lower 
levels.
At the same time, with the rapid expansion of party membership and the party’s 
increasing involvement in the economy came the organisational development of 
primary cells in industrial enterprises. As the party sought to reach every workshop 
and shift in every factory, the primary cells were broken up into smaller units from 
1928 onwards. As a result, the primary cells in the enterprise, which were relatively 
few in the mid-1920s, proliferated during the first FYP and factory party organisations 
became far larger and more complex organisations. However, new and often 
experimental party structures in the industrial enterprise proliferated only until 1932, 
when there was a major simplification of all aspects of the factory party organisation.
This chapter discusses how the party at the regional level reacted 
organisationally to the new demands made upon it during the first FYP. It aims to 
show the organisational changes that were reflected in the Leningrad region,
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especially within Leningrad’s enterprises. It also offers an explanation of the 
organisational reversal of 1932-1934.
3.1 Party apparatus at the intermediate level
In the 1920s the party apparatus, as well as the rest of the party’s membership, 
was organised hierarchically on a temtorial basis. The territorial pattern of party 
organisations remained substantially unchanged, despite experiments with ‘functional’ 
organisation in the early 1930s. Up to 1927 the party in the Leningrad region was 
organised at province {guberniia), area (olcrug) and district (raion) levels.* However, 
several important changes were made during the first FYP period. This was because 
the party’s administrative units, which corresponded to those of the state, were 
reorganised whenever state administrative changes took place.
Firstly, the Leningrad provincial organisation was reorganised and renamed the 
Leningrad oblast organisation in November 1927, following the transformation of 
Leningrad province into Leningrad oblast in August of that year.^ According to the 
1925 Party Rules, the provincial level of organisation appears to have been considered 
more important than the regional one, even though the powers and responsibilities 
exercised by party organs at both levels were broadly the same.^ However, the 
provincial level of organisation gradually disappeared in the country"* and importance 
shifted towards regional organisations. By 1934, the oblast level of organisation had 
established itself as the level immediately below the national one.
Another important change relating to party structure came in 1930, when the 
olcrug level of organisation was abolished. Olcrugs, the level of administration 
intermediate between the oblasts and the raions, were abolished in the summer of
' Each organisation had its committee, bureau and secretaries. For their responsibilities and rights, see 
the Party Rules adopted at the fourteenth Party Congress in 1925. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i 
resheniiakh s ”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (Moscow; Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatuiy, 
1984), vol. 3, pp. 479-483.
 ^ Sankt-Peterburg, Petrograd, Leningrad: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik (Moscow: Bol’shaia 
rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 1992), p. 328.
 ^ Graeme Gill, The Rules o f  the Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union (Armonk, NY: M. E. Shaipe, 
1988), p. 32.
For example, the Moscow provincial organisation was reorganised as the Moscow oblast organisation 
in 1929. See Catherine M enidale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin: The Communist Party in 
the Capital, 1925-32 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 96.
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1930. Instead, rural raions emerged as the central link at the middle-lower levels of 
the administrative hierarchy, acting as an intermediary between the central authorities 
at oblast level on the one hand and the village and the kolldioz on the other. 
Confirmation of the raion’s growing importance was given at the sixteenth Party 
Congress in the summer of 1930. Subsequently eight olaug party organisations and 
their apparatuses were abolished, and some 111 raikoms were established in the rural 
area of the Leningrad oblast.^ The number of rural raion party organisations increased 
significantly, as did the total number of staff, with the addition of staff transferred 
from the former okruzhlcoms.^ As the principal linlc between the regional authorities 
and the rural party cells, the rural raikoms acquired more responsibilities and they 
were to supervise rural affairs including collectivisation.
The city of Leningrad was the political and administrative centre of the oblast, 
but it was not until the end of 1931 that a separate Leningrad city party organisation 
and its apparatus were set up alongside the obkom. On 10 December 1931, a joint 
plenum of the Leningrad obkom and the Leningrad oblast control commission 
approved the resolution of the obkom bureau concerning the separation of the city 
from the oblast as an independent administrative-economic unit.^ It seems that the 
separation of the two was decided upon because of the economic mismatch between 
the city and its sun'ounding province (see chapter 2). Two days later, the first 
Leningrad city party conference took place. The Leningrad gorkom was given 
responsibility for the administration of party organisations within the city, exercising 
supei*vision over a number of urban raions, whereas the obkom, now in charge of 
supei*vising the gorkom and raikom of the oblast, was to concentrate more of its 
attention on agricultural concerns. The Leningrad urban raikoms, which increased 
from six to eight in number due to the administrative changes in 1930, came under the 
gorkom’s supervision. The gorkom was also entrusted with the guidance of urban 
raikoms set up in Kronstadt city and the Prigorodnyi raion. By supervising the urban 
raikoms, the gorkom took responsibility for the guidance of party kollektivy of
 ^ RTsIOiIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 123.
‘Ov itogakh likvidatsii okrugov i uki'eplenii raionov’, in Rezoliutsii o b ”edinnennogo plenuma 
Leningradskogo obkoma i oblKK VKP(b) 15-16 fevralia 1931 goda (Leningrad: Ogiz-Priboi, 1931), 
p. 3.
 ^Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1980), vol. 2, p. 502.
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important industrial enterprises, newly built plants {novostroiki) and higher 
educational establishments within the city,^
These changes show that the party structure immediately below the central party 
leadership was significantly streamlined during the first FYP period. The rather 
complicated structure stipulated in the 1925 Party Rules had disappeared with the 
abolition of provincial, area, country and parish levels of organisation. Consequently, 
there remained only three basic levels between the central organs and the primary 
organisations, which were the regional, city and district levels. This simplified party 
structure was formally confirmed at the seventeenth Party Congress in 1934.^
Each level of organisation had its own administrative apparatus. In the regional 
party organisation there were regular conferences and an obkom, which in turn elected 
an executive body and two to five secretaries. The city and raion party organisations 
likewise held regular conferences and elected a committee, a bureau and secretaries. 
In accordance with ‘democratic centralism’, each organisation was hierarchically 
subordinate to the one immediately above it - the primary to the raion, the raion or 
city to the regional organisation, and the latter to the Central Committee and the All- 
Union organisation.
Table 3-1. Number o f leading party organs in Leningrad oblast, 1928, 1930 and 1932 
(1 January)
L ea d in g  p a r ty  organs
(1)
1930
(2)
1932
(3)
O bkom 1 1 1
L eningi'ad gorkom - - 1
U rban  ra ikom s in L en ingrad 6 6 8
R ural ra ikom s n. d. - 75
O kruzhkom s 9 8 -
Sources: (1) B iu lle te n ’ L en in gradskogo  oblastnogo  kom iteta  VKP(b), no. 3, 1928, p. 30; (2) 
A dap ted  from  L en ingradska ia  organ iza tsiia  VKP(b) v tsifrakh  (L eningrad : L enizdat, 1974), 
p. 137; (3) B iu lle te n ’ L en ingradskogo  ob lastnogo  kom iteta  VKP(b), no. 5, 1932, pp . 30-37.
Ibid., p. 378.
See the 1934 Party Rules in KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1985), vol. 6, pp. 137-142.
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3.1.1 Leningrad oblast committee (obkoml
In 1928, the Leningrad obkom, the highest party organ in the region, assumed 
political responsibility for the Leningrad oblast party organisation. In the hierarchy of 
party organs, it was directly subordinate to the Central Committee and superior to all 
other party organs in the region including the Leningrad gorkom, which had been 
established in 1931. The obkom, which was elected at a regional party conference, 
held plenums to discuss a wide range of party work, and had a bureau and a secretariat 
to oversee its work.
The obkom was a huge body containing more than a hundred members. For 
instance, the obkom elected at the first oblast conference in 1927 comprised 155 
members and 48 candidates.*** They included representatives of the Central 
Committee, the secretaries of the obkom, the heads of its departments, the seeretaries 
of the city’s raikoms, and also the secretaries of local organisations in the region. 
Other members included representatives of the Leningrad Soviet, of the military 
district, of the local Komsomol, and editors of Leningradskaia pravda. The rest were 
local delegates including the secretaries of local cells, mostly from factories, and also 
workers ‘from the bench’. Most of the largest enterprises in the city such as Ki'asnyi 
putilovets, Bol’shevik, Krasnoe znamia and the Baltic shipbuilding works sent their 
delegates.**
Regional party conferences, the equivalent of the Party Congress at regional 
level, were held at irregular intervals. The Rules adopted at the thirteenth Party 
Congress in 1925 stipulated that they should be held once a year, but regional 
conferences were not held in 1928, 1931, and 1933.*  ^Regional conferences appointed 
a presidium and elected the oblast committee, the oblast control commission and the 
auditing commission. More importantly, they considered the reports of the Central 
Committee, the Central Control Commission, the oblast committee, and the oblast 
control commission, and approved the party policy presented by these party organs. 
They also discussed and decided the outlines of future policy: the first Five Year Plan
Stenograficheskii otchet pervoi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b) (Leningrad: Priboi,
11
1927), p. 245. 
Ibid, pp. 245-246.
The first oblast party conference was held in November 1927, the second in March 1929, the third in 
June 1930 and the fourth and fifth, both held jointly with the city organisation, in January 1932 and 
1934 respectively.
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for the Leningrad oblast was discussed at the second oblast conference in 1929, for 
instance.’^
Plenums were the other occasion on which the whole obkom could meet as a 
body. The 1925 Party Rules stipulated that plenums of the obkom should be convened 
at least once every two months.*"* However, it was decided at the Leningrad obkom 
plenum of April 1929 that plenums should be held at least every six weeks. *^  In fact, 
plenums were held nine times in 1929. However, in the following years, they were 
held approximately six times a year. The obkom often held plenums jointly with the 
oblast control commission, or with the Leningrad gorkom, as was the case in 1931 and 
1932. Members and candidates of the obkom, members of the oblast control 
commission and the oblast auditing commission, and some obkom instructors were 
regular participants. Party workers of the oblast, olcrug, city and raion committee, and 
some economic, trade union, Soviet and press workers were often invited to a plenum 
depending on the subjects being discussed.*^
It was at these plenums that appointments to the post of secretary and 
department head, membership of the secretariat and the bureau of both the obkom and 
of gorkom were formally confirmed.*^ Obkom representatives to the oblast control 
commission and to the local Komsomol also required approval.*^ In addition, 
appointments to important posts of government and institutions in the region had to be 
confirmed at obkom plenums. These posts included the chairman, vice chairman and 
secretaiy of the oblast executive committee (obispolkom), chainnan of the oblast 
council of trade unions, and editors of the local newspapers such as Leningradskaia 
pravda, Krasnaia gazeta, and Krest Hanskaia pravda}^
The obkom work plans, elaborated by the bureau every three to six months, 
were regularly submitted to the plenum for approval. These plans, which gave 
guidance as to the work of the plenum, the bureau and the secretariat, show the vast
Itogi 2-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi partkonferentsii (Leningrad; Priboi, 1929).
KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 3, p. 480.
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, p. 12.
See protocols o f the plenum meeting in RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2693-2694, 2696-2698. 
Yet again, the appointment to these posts needed the approval o f the Central Committee.
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocol 1.
Among these posts, the chairmanship of the oblast executive committee, o f the oblast council of 
trade unions, and the editorship of Leningradskaia pravda needed the approval o f the Central 
Committee.
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range of issues the party apparatus had to deal with. The topics for discussion ranged 
from internal party matters such as regulation and growth of the party membership, 
purges of the party, cadre problems, organisational work, mass-agitation work and 
cultural-propaganda work, to planning and economic questions. For instance, the 
work plan for autumn and winter 1928, adopted at the October plenum, listed eleven 
separate headings for the party’s work: party questions; economic questions; party 
education and general education; Soviet and mass work; trade union and mass work; 
Komsomol work; political education and cultural work; work among women; the 
press; rural work and national minority work.^ ** The work plan for the period of 
January to March 1930 provides another example. The party’s work was grouped 
under seven headings: industrial constmction; securing realistic wages for workers; 
questions of agriculture, co-operation, collectivisation and the spring sowing 
campaign; trade union work and improvement of the work of state apparatus; party 
construction; cadres; and cultural construction and mass work.^’ Under each heading, 
specific areas of work were allotted to the plenum, bureau and secretariat. These plans 
nonnally prescribed a month by which the work was to be completed, and also 
stipulated whieh non-party experts were to be consulted, including chairmen of the 
oblast executive committee and of the oblast council for the national economy, heads 
of tmsts, experts in specific areas such as transport or housing, and trade union 
officials.
In general, regular plenums were convened according to a prescribed plan, and 
they discussed important questions of the obkom’s work as stipulated by the work 
plan. At the April 1929 plenum, it was recommended that the date and agenda of a 
plenum should be announced at least a week before a plenum, and that materials 
concerning the subjects of discussion be sent to the obkom members no later than a 
week before a plenum, in order for the participants to be ready to participate in the 
discussion.H ow ever, it appears that the obkom did not always adhere strictly to 
these plans. For instance, the work plan for November 1930 to March 1931 stipulated 
that housing problems should be discussed in December 1930,^^ but a plenum did not
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2693, pp. 50-57. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2710, pp. 201-203.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, p. 12.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2712, p. 94.
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convene in December and it was not until May 1931 that the obkom discussed this 
problem at a plenum.^"* On the other hand, questions outside the provisions of the plan 
were sometimes discussed if these questions were considered to be important, as was 
the case at the September plenum in 1929.^^
The agenda of a plenum usually included three or four main items. 
Undoubtedly, internal party matters were the main concern of the obkom. Issues such 
as the regulation of membership growth, re-election of party organs, and party-mass 
work were often discussed. At the same time, the obkom became more and more 
involved in questions of an economic nature, such as planning and industrialisation. 
The obkom heard reports concerning the preliminary result of the FYP and forecasts 
for the next year’s economic growth, and confirmed control figures for the year to 
come. It also discussed such detailed economic questions as labour supply, 
rationalisation of industry, the fulfilment of industrial and financial plans 
{promfinplan), and the introduction of a profit-and-loss accounting system 
{khozraschet). Even though the Leningrad oblast was not a major agricultural region 
in national terms, questions concerning collectivisation and the agricultural economy 
were often discussed, as in the case of plenums in December 1929, March 1930, 
Febmaiy 1931 and April 1932.^ *^  Other issues discussed at the plenum included 
questions of food supply, improving trade union work, eliminating illiteracy, housing 
problems, and the re-election of the Soviet.
Yet oblast party conferences and plenums, while important, were not the place 
where the real work was done. The real direction of the committee came from its 
bureau and secretariat, which were the policy-making bodies of the regional party 
organ. The bureau and secretariat were responsible for the day-to-day administration 
of the party. Party documents concerning the responsibilities of each organs suggest 
that there was a clear division of labour between the bureau and the secretariat. 
According to the instruction given in 1929, the bureau was supposed to deal with 
questions of planning nature and questions related to the supervision of the work of
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2697, protocol 4.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocol 6. The oblast committee discussed articles in Pravda on 
1 September 1929, which criticised the leaders o f Leningrad for bureaucratism and suppression of 
criticism, and revealed shortcomings o f some party organisations in Leningrad.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, pp. 497-502.
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the economic, soviet, and trade union organs and party work, whereas the secretariat 
was to deal with questions concerning the work of the obkom apparatus/^ Another 
instruction issued in December 1931 specified that the bureau should concern itself 
with collectivisation, industry, transport, newly built plants and the labour supply. On 
the other hand, it instructed that the secretariat should concern itself with the selection 
of cadres and the work of the obkom departments. The secretariat also had to check 
whether the trade union, soviet and economic organs were operating according to 
party guidelines.^^
The obkom bureau, which included the most powerful figures in the region, had 
30 members and nine candidates in 1929 and 31 members and six candidates in 1930, 
but it reduced its membership to 22 while maintaining its nine candidates in 1931 and 
1932. The typical composition of the obkom bureau was as follows: the obkom 
secretaries; the chairman of the oblast executive committee; the chairman and 
secretary of the oblast council of trade unions; the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet; 
the head of the security police (OGPU); the editor of Leningradskaia pravda', the 
secretary of the local Komsomol and the local representative of the council for the 
national economy. In addition, the chairman of the oblast union of mechanical 
engineering, some raikom secretaries from Leningrad city and other important oblast 
party and government officials were qualified to be obkom bureau members.^^
Bureau meetings took place, on average, once a week during 1928 and 1929. 
However, the bureau met less frequently from 1930 onwards: it met roughly once 
every ten days in 1930 and 1931,^ ** but only 24 times, approximately twice a month, in 
1932.^* Attendance at bureau meetings varied from about 35 to as many as 216.^^ 
Both full members and candidates of the obkom bureau were entitled to participate in
The obkom apparatus was reorganised according to this lines in January 1930. See RTsKliIDNI,
fond 17, opis 21, delo 2711, p. 8.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 1, 1932, p, 11.
For instance, in January 1932, secretaries of the tliree largest raikoms (Narvskii, Vyborgskii and 
Smol’ninskii raikoms) were included in the obkom bureau. See RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 
2698, protocol 1.
The work plan for the obkom bureau for the period between April and September 1931 confirms this 
tendency. According to it, the bureau were supposed to meet every ten days. See ibid., fond 17, 
opis’ 21, delo 2713, pp. 61-66.
On 23 December 1931, the obkom bureau decided to hold its meeting on the 9th and 23rd of each 
month in 1932. Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 1, 1932, p. 11.
See protocol of bureau meetings in RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707-2716.
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the meeting. A number of members and candidates of the obkom and the oblast 
control commission, some department heads and instructors also took part in bureau 
meetings. The editors of Krasnaia gazeta and of Leningradskaia pravda were 
regularly invited to meetings in 1928 and 1929, but from 1930 this was no longer the 
case. Representatives of other institutions and organisations, as well as specialists, 
were invited to report or advise. The obkom bureau resolution in December 1931 
suggested that bureau meetings should be attended by the deputy heads of 
departments, responsible instructors of the obkom, the chairman or deputy chainnan 
of the oblast control commission, heads of sectors, and the editors of Leningradskaia 
pravda and Krest ’ianskaia pravda?^
The secretariat was composed of secretaries and two or three others. The size of 
the secretariat, while relatively small, expanded from two secretaries and three others 
in 1929, to three secretaries and two others in 1930, and finally five secretaries and 
thine others from December 1931 onwards.^"* The obkom secretaries, who held full­
time positions, were the real leaders at local level. The first secretary of the obkom, 
Sergei M. Kirov, was in turn the real party boss in the region, and a key figure in the 
party administration; the neeessity of adapting general directives to fit local conditions 
inevitably required him to exercise a considerable measure of executive initiative and 
vested him with important residual powers. Throughout this period he was assisted by 
a second secretaiy, M. S. Chudov, except between December 1931 and May 1932. 
During this period, Chudov was engaged in organising the Leningrad gorkom, and 
instead of him, P. I. Struppe took the job as second secretary. From April 1930 a third 
secretary was ap p o in ted ,an d  from December 1931 two more were appointed to 
assist the first secre tary .A part from obkom secretaries, two or three of the most 
important figures in the oblast joined the secretariat. In March 1929, for example, the 
secretariat consisted of two secretaries and tliree others: the head of the department for 
agitation, propaganda and press;^^ the chairman of the oblast executive committee and
Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 1, 1932, p. 11.
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2696.
One of them was responsible for tiansport. See ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2697, protocol 7.
The heads o f this depaitment, A. I. Stetskii and his immediate successor B. P. Pozern were included 
in the secretariat in 1929.
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that of the oblast council of trade unions?^ After that, the secretariat normally 
included the latter two/^
The secretariat met more often than the bureau, but the frequency of secretariat 
meetings also declined from about twice a week in 1928 to once a week in 1932^° 
Secretariat meetings were on a smaller scale than those of the bureau: the number of 
participants ranged from about 15 to 50/^ Apart from the five to eight secretariat 
members, only a few members of the obkom and the oblast control commission were 
invited to meetings. Some department heads and instructors also participated. 
Representatives of other institutions and organisations, including the Central 
Committee and the Central Control Commission, were occasionally invited. 
According to the obkom bureau resolution in 1931, the heads of departments, the 
chairman or deputy chairman of the oblast control commission, the secretary of the 
oblast Komsomol, and the editors of Leningradskaia pravda and Krest’ianskaia 
pravda were entitled to participate in the meeting.
The routine work of the obkom was carried out by a number of departments 
{otdely) responsible to the secretariat. During the period which concerns us, 
departments were established principally along functional lines."^  ^ In 1929 the obkom
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, plenum protocals 1-2.
For instance, P. A, Alekseev, who was the ehaimian of the oblast council of trade unions, was the 
member o f the obkom secretariat from March 1929 onwards. I. F. Kadatskii, the chairman o f the 
oblast executive committee, was the member o f the secretariat from March 1930 to December 1931, 
and his successor, F. F, T sar'kov accordingly took his place as secretariat member.
The secretariat met 94, 65, 38, 43, and 50 times from 1928 to 1932 respectively. See protocol of 
secretariat meetings in RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2737-2764.
See protocol o f secretariat meetings in ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2737-2764.
Biulleten ’ Leningmdskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 1, 1932, p. 11.
In the period 1925-35 the organisation of departments was a matter o f conhoversy. A most 
significant debate revolved around the issue of whether to organise departments on the basis o f 
functions such as personnel, propaganda, culture and inner-party work and so forth, or to adopt a 
system which followed production branch lines. The functional departments supervised their 
relevant subject in all subordinate party organisations, whereas the party department based on 
production lines supeiwised all functions within a particular branch o f the economy such as 
transport, heavy industry or agriculture. For instance, in the former system, the orgraspi'edotdel was 
responsible for selection and overall control o f the distribution of all party members, whereas, in the 
latter system, each department was responsible for selecting cadres in their own area. The functional 
system was taken for granted in the 1920s and this remained much in vogue in the early 1930s. 
However, in 1934, in an attempt to exercise direct control over industry and agriculture from the 
centr-e, the functional system was replaced by the system based on production branch lines. For 
more details, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1953), p. 166-177; Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union (London: Methuen, 
1970), pp. 451-456; Gill, The Rules o f  the Communist Party, p. 46; and Daniel Thorniley, The Rise 
and Fall o f  the Soviet Rural Communist Party, 1927-39 (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 52.
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secretariat had six departments, which were stmctured following the Central 
Committee’s model. The key departments of the secretariat were the orgraspredotdel, 
which was responsible for the organisational matter and for the selection and 
assignment of c ad re s ,an d  the agitpropotdel, which was responsible for agitation and 
propaganda and for controlling the press. The importance attached to these two 
departments was reflected in the fact that the heads of these departments were entitled 
to be members of the obkom secretariat in 1929. The other departments included those 
for general work {obshchii otdet), for women, for party history and for mral affairs.
However, by 1930 it became obvious that the existing system could not cope 
with the pressure imposed by the demands of industrialisation, in particular in the 
sphere of the appointment of cadres. As industry was rapidly expanding and 
agriculture was undergoing fundamental change, a severe strain was placed on the two 
largest departments, the orgraspredotdel and the agitpropotdel, due to a hugh increase 
in workload. In January 1930 the organisation of the Central Committee apparatus 
was altered in response to the pressures on these two departments."^^ By introducing a 
functional-sectoral system, the party apparatus sought to deal effectively with the 
problems posed by the demands of industrialisation. New functional departments, 
with their sectoral subdivisions, were set up in order to attain a greater specialisation 
of duties.
This change was soon mirrored in the local organisations. In the Leningrad 
region, the obkom departments were reorganised in January 1930. The 
orgraspredotdel was split into two departments: one for organisation and instruction, 
and the other for assignment. The former had responsibility for organisational work 
within the party, including party appointments, and for verifying the fulfilment of 
directives, whereas the latter was made responsible for the selection and appointment 
of state and economic administrators, trade union leaders and many other non-party 
nomenldatura posts. The agitpropotdel was also split into two: a department for
In 1929, the work of orgraspredotdel was subdivided into three sections: party-professional and 
cultural-educational work; the work for the economy (industi'y and ti'ansport), professional-technical 
education and higher technical educational establishments; and the work for the soviet and trade - 
cooperatives. A deputy head was in charge of each section. A number of instructors and assistant 
heads were also allocated to each section. In addition, a special assistant head was put in charge of 
searching for reserves and familiarising him self with cadres in order to select suitable cadres for 
promotion. See RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2748, p. 202.
Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, no. 2, February 1930, pp. 70-72.
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agitation and mass campaigns, responsible for agitational work among the population 
as a whole, and a department for culture and propaganda, responsible for political 
education work among party members. The general department and the department 
for party history remained unchanged while those for women and for rural affairs 
were abolished."^  ^ Instead, a total of 18 sectors were set up alongside the departments, 
including sectors for women, information-statistics and vérification-instruction.
Another change to the structure of the obkom apparatus came in July 1930 when 
okruzhkoms were abolished and the obkom had to supervise vast rural areas. 
However, the Leningiad obkom secretariat decided that it was not necessary to set up 
a department or sector specialising in rural affairs, and that the existing structure with 
four functional departments and 18 sectors should be preserved. Instead, in each 
department or corresponding sector, an individual party worker or a group of workers 
was given responsibility for supervising and monitoring rural raikoms. The instruction 
department, with the help of information sectors operating in each department, was 
charged with the task of supervising the work of rural raikoms and giving them 
instructions. A number of rural raions were grouped together according to their 
economic or political nature (for instance, industrial, frontier, livestock, and flax 
growing raions), and an instructor was attached to each group of them. It was 
expected at this time that the number of staff in the verification and instmction sector 
would increase in order for an instructor to supervise a maximum of eight rural raions. 
Obkom instructors were expected to spend most of their time in rural raions. It was 
the organisation and instruction department’s responsibility to provide plans for 
instructors’ visits to mral raions.
In the spring of 1931 the obkom apparatus was reorganised yet again. In 
accordance with the Central Committee resolution on the reconstmction of the work 
of party organs, the obkom bureau made a decision to reorganise the obkom apparatus 
in April 1931. The main change proposed was that the functional sectors introduced 
the previous year should be supplemented by production-territorial sectors. The 
principal reason for this change was the need to supervise more efficiently the various 
sectors of the economy, which was experiencing rapid growth. Another important
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2711, pp. 8-11. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, pp. 127-128.
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change made this time was the abolition of the information sector attached to the 
department for organisation and instruction. With the abolition of the information 
sector, its work was spread among the remaining sectors: all production-territorial and 
functional sectors had to inform the obkom apparatus of major economic-political 
events and inner-party matters occurring within their corresponding areas or within 
their area of jurisdiction."^^
The structure of four departments with four to five sectors attached to each 
department, which was discussed in the obkom bureau resolution of April 1931, was 
as follows. The department for organisation and instruction had three functional 
sectors, responsible for party construction, party cadres and transport respectively. 
Alongside these functional sectors, five production-tenitorial sectors were set up in 
this department, each of them responsible for the raions in the following branches of 
industry: urban industry (Leningrad, Ki'onstadt and Pskov), flax growing, milk and 
livestock, timber, and cottage industries. The department for agitation and mass work 
had four sectors: agricultural campaigning; mass work in Leningrad industries; current 
campaigns; and mass work among women and peasants. Meanwhile, the structure of 
the department for culture and propaganda remained unchanged with its four sectors - 
press, propaganda, cadre and public education. The department for cadres, previously 
otdel raspredeleniia, also remained unchanged with one exception - an additional 
sector was set up to select cadres for higher educational establishments (VUZ), higher 
teclinical educational establishments (VTUZ), academies, teclmical secondary schools 
(Tekhnikum), factory-and-workshop schools {FZY} and other institutions."^^
At the January 1932 joint plenum of the Leningrad obkom and gorkom, only 
five departments - cadres, organisation and instruction, culture and propaganda, mass 
work and general work - were mentioned,^^ which suggests that the department for 
party history had been abolished by this time. Apart from this, the functional-sector
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2713, pp. 71-72. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2713, pp. 71-73. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, protocol, 1.
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D E PA R T M E N T S SEC TO R S
O rganisation and Instruction
Functional Sectors 
Party Construction 
Party Cadres 
Transport
Production-Territorial Sectors 
Urban Raions 
Flax Growing Raions 
Milk and Livestock 
Timber Industry 
Cottage Industiy
A gitation and M ass w ork
Agricultural Campaigning
Mass work in Leningrad Industiy
Current Campaigning
Mass work among Women and Peasants
C ulture and Propaganda
Press
Propaganda
Cadres
Public Education
Cadres
Higher Educational Establishments 
Other
Figure 3-1. Departments and sectors at the obkom level, April 1931 
Source: RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2713, pp. 71-73
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system remained in effect until 1934 when the departments established on a functional 
basis were abandoned.^^ One of the reasons for this change in direction was the lack 
of efficient controls caused by the diffusion of responsibility inherent in a functional- 
sector system. By 1934 departments were re-established on an integral-production 
branch basis.
3.1.2 Leningrad city committee Igorkoml
The Leningrad gorkom took over responsibility for supervising urban raions in 
the city of Leningrad. A separate gorkom was elected at the first conference of the 
Leningrad city party organisation, held on 12 December 1931. In January 1932 the 
gorkom elected a bureau consisting of 27 full members and six candidates, and a 
secretariat composed of four secretaries and three o th e rs .F o u r  departments were 
attached to the gorkom secretariat: organisation and instruction; cadre; culture and 
propaganda; and mass work. "^^
The city party organisation held its conferences and plenums at irregular 
intervals. The second city party conference was held in Januaiy 1932, and the third 
one, two years later, in Januaiy 1934. The first plenum of the Leningrad gorkom took 
place on 13 December 1931, and plenums were held six times in 1932.^^ The obkom 
and the gorkom worked closely together, often holding joint conferences and 
plenum s.Furtherm ore, the bureaux and secretariats of the two organisations held 
their meetings together from 26 March 1932 and from 3 September 1932 
respectively.^^
As a reflection of the city’s importance, the Leningrad gorkom was staffed as 
fully as the obkom. The composition of the gorkom bureau and secretariat also shows 
that there was a considerable overlap in personnel between the gorkom and the
Gill, The Rules o f  the Communist Party, p. 46.
This meant that all aspects of, for example, agriculture were handled in the agriculture department, 
whether personnel, verification of the implementation o f decisions, supervision of lower organs, or 
agitation and propaganda.
”  RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, protocol 1.
In 1932 the gorkom held its plenums on the following days: on 29 January, 19-20 April, 29 May, 9- 
10 July, 15-16 October, and 20 November.
The second and third city party conferences were held jointly with the obkom. Most gorkom 
plenums were held jointly with the obkom. The only exception was the plenum o f 19-20 April 
which was held jointly with the Leningrad city control commission.
”  RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2716 and 2762.
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obkom. Kirov, the first secretary of the obkom, also headed the gorkom as first 
secretary. Chudov, former second secretaiy of the obkom, became second secretary of 
the gorkom in January 1932. B. P. Pozem, former obkom secretary, and 1. 1. Gaza, 
former secretary of Narvskii raikom, became the third and fourth secretaries. All 
gorkom secretaries were members of the obkom bureau at the same time. In May 
1932, when Chudov was transferred to his previous job in the obkom, he was 
succeeded by Gaza. At this time, A. 1. Ugarov, former head of the department for 
culture and propaganda, became a gorkom secretary.^^ The three others who made up 
the gorkom secretariat were the head of the department for culture and propaganda, 
the chaiiman of the oblast executive committee, and the chaiiman of oblast council of 
trade u n i o n s . T h e  last two were also members of both the obkom bureau and the 
secretariat.
In January 1932, the gorkom bureau was composed of gorkom secretaries, all of 
Leningrad’s raikom first secretaries, selected obkom secretaries, the chainnan of the 
oblast executive committee, the chairman of the oblast council of trade unions, the 
editor of Leningradskaia pravda, the local representative of the council for the 
national economy and other leading party and government of f ic ia l s .Out  of the 33 
gorkom bureau members or candidates, 16 were also members or candidates of the 
obkom bureau.
3.1.3 Urban and rural raion committees (raikoms)
In 1928 the city of Leningrad was divided into six raions, and each raion had its 
own party organisation and a raikom which was responsible for political life within 
the raion. Leningrad’s six raikoms were Tsentral’no-gorodskoi, Vasileostrovskii, 
Petrogradskii, Volodarskii, Vyborgskii and Moskovsko-narvskii. Later in 1930, 
following the administrative changes, the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi raion party 
organisation was divided into two separate raion organisations: Oktiabr’skii and 
SmoTninskii. The Moskovsko-narvskii raion party organisation was also split into 
two: Moskovskii and Narvskii.
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, protocol 3. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, protocol 1. 
“ ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, pp. 10-11.
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Urban raikoms in the city of Leningrad were of considerable importance, due to 
the large size of party membership they had to supeiwise. Already in 1928 each raion 
party organisation had a considerable number of members within them. All raion 
party organisations, except Petrogradskii, had a party membership of over 10,000. The 
Moskovsko-narvskii raion organisation was particularly large, with over 20,000 party 
m em bers.Furtherm ore, the size of party membership in each organisation increased 
considerably over the first FYP period. By April 1930, the Moskovsko-narvskii raion 
organisation contained approximately 38,000 members and the TsentraFno-gorodskoi 
raion organisation, the second largest, contained over 25,000 members. The others had 
a party membership of between 10,000 and 20,000.*^  ^ In January 1933, the 
SmoFninskii, Narvskii and Vyborgskii raion party organisations had a party 
membership of over 30,000. All the others, except Moskovskii, had a party 
membership of between 20,000 and 30,000.^^
The number of party kollektivy under the raikom’s supeiwision varied in each 
raion: in January 1928 the TsentraFno-gorodskoi raikom supeiwised 229 party 
kollelctivy; Moskovsko-narvskii 198; Volodarskii 120; Vyborgskii 84; Petrogradskii 
81; and Vasileostrovskii 74.^ "^  The number of party kollektivy under each raikom’s 
supervision also increased over the first FYP period. For instance, in December 1929 
the TsentraFno-gorodskoi raikom supervised some 280 party kollektivy and 700 party 
hactions {komfraktsii) in non-party organisations.^^ In 1930 the same raikom 
supervised a total of 198 party kollelctivy and 282 department cells which were set up 
in various institutions. In addition, it supervised 37 party kollektivy in higher 
educational establishments (VUZ) and 65 faculty cells,^^ In 1932, the SmoFninskii 
raikom monitored more than 500 party kollelctivy which were diverse in nature.
Secondly, these urban raikoms were considered particularly important in the 
process of industrialisation since they were responsible for monitoring Leningrad’s
Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 13, 1928, p. 33.
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Leningrad, 1930), no. 2, p. 5.
“  Ibid. (Leningrad, 1933), no. 4, p. 4.
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 3, 1928, p. 30.
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2749, p. 81. The party kollektivy o f this raion were 
predominantly those established in the soviet institutions. This was probably because the majority of 
Leningrad’s soviet institutions were situated in this raion.
“  Partrabotnik, no. 11, May 1930, p. 63.
Ibid., no. 15, August 1932, p. 15.
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industrial enterprises. In 1928, for instance, the Moskovsko-narvskii raikom was 
monitoring more than 100 industrial enterprises and 125,000 industrial workers within 
the raion.*"^  This is probably why the Central Committee paid so much attention to the 
work of this raion party organisation: in 1928 and again in April 1930 the Central 
Committee investigated the work of the Moskovsko-narvskii raion organisation, 
highlighting its achievements and wealcnesses, and suggesting improvements.^^ The 
Vyborgskii, Volodarskii and Vasileostrovskii raikoms also monitored a considerable 
number of factories in their raions. The TsentraFno-gorodskoi raikom monitored a 
lesser number of factories: in December 1929 it monitored 51 industrial enterprises, 
only three of which were large scale ones.^^
Each raion party organisation held its conference (approximately once a year), 
where it heard and approved reports of the raikom, raion auditing commission and 
other raion institutions, and elected the raikom. The raikom was like a scaled-down 
obkom, in terms of its structure. Each raikom had its secretariat and bureau. The 
raikom bureau generally comprised the leading party workers of the raion, including 
raikom secretaries, and a number of important state officials and representatives of the 
major economic enterprises in the area. The day-to-day work of the raikom was 
carried out by a number of departments, the structure of which mirrored those of the 
obkom. The reorganisation of the party apparatus in 1930 also affected the structure of 
the raikom departments.^* In January 1930, the obkom bureau recommended that 
urban raikoms in Leningrad abolish their departments and, instead, organise four 
sectors. More sectors could be set up if necessary, but no more than six.^  ^ However, 
just three months later in April 1930, departments were restored to the urban raikoms 
and 14 sectors were attached to departments. This time, it was recommended that the 
urban raikoms have four functional departments and one general department dealing 
with the technical operation of the raikom apparatus. The general department did not 
have its own sectors, but all the other departments had three to four sectors set up
“  Ibid., nos, 12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 31.
“  Ibid, nos. 12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 31; Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 9, May 1930, pp. 58-59; Ocherki 
istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1980), vol. 2, p. 501.
RTsICliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2749, p. 81.
In 1928, there were orgraspredotdel, agitpropotdel, department for women and information 
subdivision.
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2711, p. 10.
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along functional lines. The department for organisation and instruction was 
recommended to have three sectors; inner-party construction and cadre selection; 
verification of party directives and instmction; and information and statistics. Larger 
raions were allowed to have an additional sector for the regulation and growth of the 
party. The work of the cadres department was divided into four sectors: selection of 
economic and industrial cadres; selection of soviet and co-operative cadres; 
accounting; and promotion and training. The department for culture and propaganda 
had thi'ee sectors subdivided according to its different functions: propaganda of 
Mai*xism and Leninism; culture and daily life; and the press. The department for mass 
work had four sectors: mass campaigning of an industrial-economic nature; current 
agitation and voluntary societies; work among women workers; and rural work in the 
countryside and worker shefstvoP
By contrast, mral raikoms in the countryside were on a much smaller scale and 
of less importance. Since communists were sparsely distributed in the vast area of the 
countryside, each rural raion party organisation contained a relatively small number of 
party members. In January 1928, approximately 28,000 party members were living in 
the countryside in the Leningrad region. The number of communists in each okrug 
ranged from 1,200 to 7,700, and the number of party cells in each of them ranged 
Ifom 61 to 262.^ "* This means that okruzhkoms were supeiwising fewer communists 
and party cells than Leningrad’s urban raikoms. It is obvious that rural raikoms 
supervised comparably small number of communists and party cells at this time. 
Indeed, in some rural raions there were only a few communists: about ten to fifteen.
With the abolition of the okruzlilcoms in 1930, rural raikoms came directly 
under the supervision of the obkom. As the mral area in the region was divided into 
more than 100 raions, a total of 111 rural raikoms had been set up by July 1930.^^ 
Each rural raikom supervised approximately 270 communists at this time. By 1932, 
the size of the mral raion party organisation became larger due to the recmitment of 
new members in 1930 and 1931. In January 1932, a total of 75 mral raikoms were
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2750, pp. 298-299.
Biulleten ’ Leningmdskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 3, 1928, p. 30.
Partrabotnik, no. 18, 25 October 1928, p. 44.
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 123. This number did not include mral raikoms in the 
Murmansk okrug.
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supervising 2,721 rural party cells containing 45,483 communists. On average each 
rural raikom supervised 36 party cells and 606 party members. The variety in the size 
of rural raion party organisations was considerable: some large ones contained more 
than 1,000 communists, while small ones had a party membership of between 100 and 
200. The two biggest rural raikoms, Cherepovetskii and Borovicheskii, supervised 
over 100 party cells, while some eleven rural raikoms supervised between 50 and 100 
party cells. The rest supervised less than 50 party cells.
The rural raion party organisation also held party conferences where the raikom 
were elected. In raions where there were fewer than 30 active party members, raion 
party conferences were replaced by raion party general meet ings .Each  rural raikom 
had a secretaiy and a bureau.^** In general, staff numbers in rural raikoms were 
relatively small. In 1930 the average number of party workers in each raikom was 
only four to five. Each rural raikom had a secretary and two to three instructors, 
responsible respectively for organisation, agitation and propaganda, and work among 
women. The rural raikom nonnally included a person responsible for accounting and 
information.^**
3.2 Primary party cells at the lower level
Further down, at the bottom of the party hierarchy, the primary party cells 
constituted the basic units of the party. Party cells were formed in the workplace, such 
as in offices, factories and military units, where there were at least three party 
members. They were normally subordinate to the okmzhkom or raikom, and the 
formation of cells required the approval of the next higher party organ. Each cell 
elected a secretary and a bureau that served for six months. Secretaries at this level of 
the party organisation were expected to have at least one year’s party membership. As 
the party’s main linlc with the mass of the population, cells were to execute party 
slogans and decisions among the masses, and to take an active part in the economic
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 5, 1932, pp. 30-37.
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, p. 276.
The rural raikom bureau often consisted o f raikom secretary, zavorg, chaiiman of the raion executive 
committee and some o f the following; raion komsomol secretary, editor o f raion newspaper, 
chairman o f raion trade unions. The average number of bureau members varied between five and 
seven persons. See Thorniley, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Rural Communist Party, p. 62.
“  RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 123.
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and political life in the area. In addition, they were responsible for organisational and 
agitation work among the masses and for the recruitment of new members and their 
education.^*
As the party stressed the importance of extending its influence down towards the 
grassroots level, great importance was given to the establishment of the party cells and 
their role among the masses. This was particularly the case in the first FYP. As the 
party sought to organise cells in every workplace and in every workshop, the network 
of party cells expanded rapidly both in the countryside and in the city. In the 
Leningrad region, the primary cells grew substantially in the first FYP period. As can 
be seen in table 3-2, the number of party cells in the region increased from 2,265 to 
4,549 between 1928 and 1933. In Leningrad city alone, their number increased from 
786 to 1,803 in the same period.
Table 3-2. Number o f primary party cells in Leningrad oblast, 1928-1933 (1 January)
1928 1929 1930^ 193 N 1932^ 1933*
In oblast as a whole 2265 2377 2290 2663 3642 4549
In Leningrad 786 815 885 1045 1459 1803
Note: * Figures for these years did not include candidate groups.
Source: Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh (Leningi'ad: Lenizdat, 1974), p. 127.
3.2.1 Development of the party network in factories 1928-1931
The primary party cells in industrial enterprises, in particular, experienced great 
organisational development between 1928 and 1931. The change came with the 
launch of the industrialisation drive. As the industrial sector expanded rapidly, the 
party had to deal with the rapidly increasing industrial workforce. In this context, 
organisational matters within factories were regarded as one of keys to the overall 
success of industrialisation. In order to maximise the party’s influence on workers and 
to effectively mobilise the workforce around slogans calling for greater activism and 
vigilance, the party sought to reach each shop floor and shift in every factory by 
forming cells in smaller production units. The idea of the ‘breaking up’ 
(razukrupnenie) of the primary cells was strongly advocated from 1928 onwards, and
See the 1925 Paity Rules in KPSS  v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 3, pp. 483-484.
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party cells which had previously been set up at either all-factory or workshop levels 
were broken down into smaller units, which were organised at workshop, brigade or 
shift levels. It was argued that this would facilitate the recruitment of workers ‘from 
the bench’ and that this would serve the party’s need to exert the maximum influence 
on industrial workers and to efficiently guide the industrial effort at all levels within 
factories, to a greater degree.
On the eve of the first FYP, factory party organisations in Leningrad had a 
rather simple stmcture - a one-tier all-factory cell {obshchezavodskaia iacheika), or a 
two-tier party kolletiv-workshop cell {tsekhiacheika). All-factory cells were organised 
in factories where the number of party members was not large enough, and these cells 
served whole factories. In factories where there were a sufficient number of party 
members within a workshop, party cells were organised at the workshop level as well 
as at the all-factory level. All-factory cells and party kollektivy were subordinate to the 
raikoms. The party kollektivy, responsible for all party work in the factories, were 
entitled to guide their workshop cells. At the lowest level of the party organisation, a 
relatively small number of party members were grouped together as party units 
{zveno). They were normally formed within small production units such as brigades, 
and they were, in turn, subordinate to the workshop cells.
In Leningrad, the creation of workshop cells dated back to 1924. In the early 
1920s, the number of rank and file party members in the enterprises was relatively 
small, and cells could be organised only if they served whole factories, or even groups 
of factories. However, the increased enrolment that took place during the ‘Lenin levy’ 
of 1924-25 made it possible to create smaller party units in the enterprises, and by the 
end of 1924, 473 workshop cells had been created in the city.^^ Following the first 
official sanction on the creation of workshop cells in 1924, more detailed guidelines 
were laid down in the Central Committee resolution of 29 June 1925. This resolution 
specified that workshop cells could be formed within a workshop or within a group of 
small workshops which were related to each other, and that they could be fonned only 
in the presence of at least 25 full or candidate party members in large scale factories
G. P. Erkhov, ‘Sti'oitel’stvo i razvitie fabrichno-zavodskikh partiinykh iacheek’, Voprosy istorii 
KPSS, no. 4, 1974, pp. 77-86.
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employing at least 1,000 w o r k e r s . I n  the years that followed, the number of 
workshop cells gradually increased in accordance with the general increase in party 
membership within factories and on the shop-floor. Moreover, the easing of 
conditions for creating workshop cells greatly facilitated their formation. A further 
Central Committee resolution adopted in May 1927 allowed the fomiation of 
workshop cells in medium sized factories by reducing the number of workers required 
within a factory from 1,000 to 500.^ "*
During the first FYP, the workshop cell, as opposed to the all-factory cell, was 
being heralded as the vital link in the factory party structure as the party sought to 
reach every workshop. Accordingly, more workshop cells were created in Leningrad. 
In May 1928 the Leningrad obkom adopted a resolution on the status of workshop 
cells, which stipulated that workshop cells should be set up according to the territorial 
- production division. This resolution also specified that cells could be fonned within 
a workshop containing at least 300 workers and 15 full or candidate party members, 
instead of 500 workers and 25 party members, which had been the rule since 1927. 
This must have made it easier to form workshop cells. Indeed, there was a sharp 
increase in their number between 1928 and 1932. In March 1928 there were 760 
workshop cells containing within them 49,421 of Leningrad’s party members in a 
total of 123 industrial enterprises. Each workshop cell had on average 65 party 
members. However, there was a huge size differential: the smallest workshop cell 
contained only six members whereas the biggest one contained as many as 228.^^ By 
January 1929 some 1,129 workshop cells had been foimed in the city. The trend 
towards creating more workshop cells continued in 1930 and 1931. The figure had 
increased to 1,398 by January 1930, to 2,600 by January 1931 and to 3,700 by June 
1932 (see table 3-3). This means that, in effect, there was a five-hold increase in the 
number of workshop cells between March 1928 and June 1932. This was a 
magnificent increase, bearing in mind that party industrial kollektivy saw less than a
Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia: Dokumenty KPSS (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1970), p. 101.
Ibid., p. 142.
RTsKliIDNI,
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, 1928, p. 27.
 fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, pp. 202-203.
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two-fold increase in their number between October 1927 and January 1933 (see table 
3-3).
Table 3-3. Number o f primary party cells in Leningrad, 1927-1934
Kollektivy Of which industrial 
kollektivy
Worlcshop cells
Jan u a iy 1927 746 (1)
O ctober 1927 782 (2) 439 (3) 712 (4)
January 1928 786 (1)
M arch 1928 760 (5)
June 1928 798 (6) 453 (6) 879 (4)
Jan u a iy 1929 815 (1) 437 (7) 1,129 (4)
Janua iy 1930* 885 (1) 1,398 (8)
985 (9) 1,391 (9)
A pril 1930 946 (10) 552 (10)
Janua iy 1931* 1,045 (1) 617 (11)
1,045 (9) 1,917 (9)
994 (12) 2 ,600 (12)
Jan u a iy 1932 1,459 (1) 635 (11)
A pril 1932 2,838 (8)
June 1932 1,380 (12) 3,700 (12)
January 1933 1,803 (1) 710 (11) 1,823 (13)
January 1934 1,677 (1)
Note: * D iffe ren t figures w ere  g iven  for January  1930 and January  1931.
Sources: (1) Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh, p. 127; (2) Leningradskaia 
oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (L eningrad , 1929), no. 1, p. 5; (3) Biulleten’ 
Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 16 Ju ly  1928, p . 37; (4) Leningradskaia 
oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh, no. 1, p. 38; (5) Biulleten’ Leningradskogo 
oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), n o . 4 , 1928, p . 27; (6) Ibid., no. 10, A u g u st 1928, p. 30; (7) 
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh, no. 1, p. 26; (8) Partrabotnik, 
nos. 11-12, June  1932, p. 21; (9) Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 7, A pril 1931, p . 66; (10) 
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1930), no. 2, p. 13; (11) Ibid. 
(1933), no. 4, pp . 4-6; (12) Partrabotnik, nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 11; (13) Ibid., nos. 9-10, 
M ay  1933, p. 75.
At the same time, the ‘brealdng up’ of primary cells led to the creation of cells 
in smaller production units such as shifts and brigades. As early as March 1928, it was 
claimed that the stage of establishing independent party work in workshops was more
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or less completed and that the next step would be the introduction of party groups 
within subdivisions of workshops and the introduction of shift and workshop unit 
organisers. While stressing the importance of the transfer of the centre of gravity of 
party work to the workshop, the further ‘breaking up’ of workshop cells was called 
for.^  ^ It was argued that party representation in ever lower ranks would strengthen 
party organisation within the enterprises, because newly created cells within 
workshops and shifts would inevitably lead to an increase in the participation of 
workers, especially of political ac tiv ists .L ater in 1930, the sixteenth Party Congress 
finally endorsed the idea of the ‘breaking up’ of the party organisations into even 
lower ranlcs and confirmed that the lower levels of party organisation should be 
organised along production lines.
In Leningrad, the possibility of creating shift cells (smennye iacheiki) was 
already being given serious consideration in 1928.**** Although the nation-wide 
introduction of the uninterrupted working week and the seven hours working day 
came only at the end of 1929, many factories in the city, in particular the textile 
factories, ran two to three shifts by this time. This caused a serious problem in 
carrying out party work. Party members working in the second or third shifts were not 
able to participate in party meetings since they had to work when meetings were held. 
Soon it became evident that with the existing workshop cell system, party-mass work 
could not be carried out effectively in the second or third shifts. Consequently, the 
issue arose as to how to organise party cells within workshops which were rumiing 
shifts. For some, organising cells in every shift appeared to be the only solution to the 
problem. In fact, by February 1928, shift cells had been created in all large-scale 
textile factories in the Volodarskii and Moskovsko-narvskii raions and some textile 
factories in the Vyborgskii raion.
Although the idea of creating party cells within shifts was controversial, it was 
given official sanction in Leningrad in early 1928. At the March 1928 plenum, the 
Leningrad obkom approved the formation of shift cells in factories which were
Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), nos. 9-10, 26 March 1928, p. 14,
Pravda, 12 October 1928, p. 5.
XVI s ”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow; Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1930), p. 65. 
For example, see Partrabotnik, no. 3, Febmary 1928, pp. 26-29.
Ibid., p. 28.
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mnning shifts, and urged factory party organisations to create cells within shifts.**^  An 
obkom bureau resolution, adopted two months later, specified that independent cells 
could be set up in shifts which contained at least 15 full or candidate party members. 
This resolution also clarified that shift cells could be fonued only within the shifts 
where the shift personnel was stable. In shifts where the shift personnel was changing, 
party organisers were to be sent to the shifts instead of cells being created in such 
shifts.
Despite the official endorsement, the idea of shift cells did not take hold 
immediately. Although virtually all factories ran two to three shifts after the 
introduction of the uninterrupted working week and the seven hours working day at 
the end of 1929, shift cells were not formed in many of Leningrad’s factories. This 
was more the case in heavy industry factories than in light industry. Obviously some 
party officials resented the complications it involved. This caused a delay in the 
formation of shift cells and it was only in the summer of 1931 that more attention was 
paid to this matter. In the Narvskii raion, for instance, shift cells had not been created 
in many factories by April 1931. In the rubber factory no. 1 of the Ki'asnyi 
treugol’nik, shift cells had been set up only in three workshops by this time. The 
situations were similar to this in other divisions of the factory. This was a common 
feature for most factories in this r a i o n . I n  August of that year, the review of the party 
work within this raion’s factories revealed that a considerable number of shifts did not 
have party cells of their own. Only then did the question of organising shift cells come 
to the fore. Consequently, shift cells were organised in almost all factories of this 
raion in August. For instance, 16 shift cells were created at the Tyre factory and ten 
such cells at the Promtechnik factory. At Ki'asnyi putilovets, shift cells were being 
organised in the iron foundry and the tractor-assembly department. One workshop at 
Krasnyi putilovets even abolished the existing workshop cell and organised four shift 
cells instead.^^
However, the situation did not improve greatly. In March 1932 when the party 
structures of the Leningrad regional organisations were reviewed, it was revealed that
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 5, 1928, p. 4. 
”  RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 208.
Partrabotnik, no. 7, April 1931, p. 48.
Ibid., no. 15, August 1931, pp. 8-9.
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workshop cells were still predominant within heavy industry. Shift cells were rather 
rare and cells were not organised even when shifts had a stable composition of 
workers. Reportedly, there was a widespread fear that breaking workshop cells into 
smaller units would complicate the party committees’ leadership over their cells.^ *^
At Krasnyi putilovets, for instance, only 22 out of 103 workshops had organised 
shift cells. At Elektrosiia, only 11 out of 66 workshops contained shift cells. No shift 
cells were organised in the Stalin factoiy and the Mart’ shipbuilding works. In most 
cases, this was due to the fact that the shifts did not have a stable composition of 
workers. However, even when they had a stable composition of workers, cells were 
not always organised within the shifts. Some party officials disliked the idea of 
creating too many different kinds of party cells within the factory because they feared 
this would complicate the factory party committees’ leadership over their cells. All of 
these factors contributed to the sustaining of the previously established all-workshop 
cells. For instance, in the first mechanical workshop at Elektrosiia, no shift cells were 
organised despite the fact that all four shifts had a stable composition and a sufficient 
number of workers and party members. Instead, one workshop cell was preserved 
there. This was also the case in the electrical assembly workshop of the same factory. 
Although this workshop ran two shifts with a stable composition of workers, no shift 
cells were organised. Instead, there was one workshop cell, which was subdivided into 
ten shift-party units and one zveno cell. At the Stalin factory, the factory party 
committee’s organisation department stuck to the idea of preserving all-workshop 
cells because it was felt that this would make it possible to deal with questions 
concerning the whole workshop while shift cells could only deal with questions 
concerning their own shifts.
Below the workshop cell level were party units {zveno) organised in smaller 
production units such as brigades. It was this level of party organisation that was 
strongly emphasised fi*om 1930 onwards. At the third Leningrad oblast party 
conference in June 1930, Kirov emphasised that the ‘centre of gravity’ of party work 
should be transferred to even smaller party units, that is zveno^^ Accordingly, it was
Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 5, March 1932, p. 24.
Ibid., nos. 7-8, April 1932, p. 26.
Stenograficheskii otchet tret'ei Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b): Biulleten ' (Leningrad, 
1930), no. 6, p. 35.
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recommended that party units should be set up wherever there were primaiy 
production units. The regulations adopted by the obkom bureau on 24 July 1930 
specified that party units should be set up along production lines in all primary 
production units such as brigades, mills, and assembly lines, which contained ten to 
thirty workers, iiTespective of the number of party members within the unit. Party 
units came under the supervision of workshop cells or the party kollektiv if there was 
no workshop cell. Workers were to be distributed by the workshop cell bureaux in 
agreement with the party kollektiv or committee bureau, taking into account local 
conditions and the particular situation of each w o r k s h o p . A t  the same time, the 
regulations allowed party units containing no fewer than 15 party members to be 
converted into zveno cells within factories where the party committee existed.*****
The creation of zveno cells was deemed necessary because of the ever- 
increasing size of party units. Indeed, as the party membership in factories sharply 
increased from 1928 onwards, the number of full and candidate party members 
contained in one unit increased rapidly. As a result, some party units became too large 
to be served by just one unit organiser. In May 1930, some party units contained about 
80 to 100 workers of whom 20 to 30 were party members.***' In the Volodarskii raion, 
out of 1,211 party units, 530 contained more than seven party members and 218 
contained more than 11.'**^
Despite strong emphasis on the importance of party units, party units were not 
always strengthened as they should have been. This was the case in the Elektrosiia 
factory. According to a report on this factory’s party work in October 1930, party 
units were not sufficiently strengthened: they were not restructured along production 
lines in a number of workshop cells; unit organisers were poorly prepared for their 
work; and workshop cells did not rely upon unit leaders.'***^  Nevertheless, some 371 
zveno cells and 9230 party units had been created in Leningrad by the end of 1930.'**"*
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2712, p. 18.
‘“ ibid., p. 19.
The diversity in size of party units was huge, however. Some units contained only ten to 13 workers
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including two to three communists at this time. See Parti'abotnik, no. 11, May 1930, p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 45.
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2712, p. 74. 
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 7, April 1931, p. 66.
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The practice of creating zveno cells was later on confirmed by the Central 
Committee. In March 1931, the Central Committee adopted a resolution ‘on party and 
mass work in workshops and brigade’, which specified that in large scale enterprises, 
party units containing no fewer than fifteen party members should be transformed to 
zveno cells.***^  After this official endorsement, the process of converting party units 
into zveno cells was accelerated. As a result, the number of zveno cells created in the 
city had reached 797 by the end of 1931.'°^ By this time, the number of party units 
together with zveno cells reached 11,430 in Leningrad’s enterprises, which was a 
considerable increase from the June 1930 figure of 9,304.***^
However, party units were not always created along production lines as had 
been specified in party resolutions. The case of some factories in the Narvskii raion 
illustrates this. In August 1931, party units were organised along production lines in 
most workshops in this raion. In the steam workshop of the Krasnyi putilovets, for 
instance, all five shifts had on average five to six party units, and all of these units 
were formed along production lines. By contrast, in the repair-auxiliary workshop, 
one party unit had been made up of party members working in different shifts until the 
very recent past. In one evening shift at Krasnyi treugoTnik, there were no party 
units. ***^
Although the practice of forming party units which did not correspond closely 
with production lines was criticised in 1931, it carried on into 1932. The review on 
party structures of the Leningrad regional party organisation in March 1932 revealed 
that some party units were made of party members working in many different brigades 
or shifts. This practice was deemed inappropriate because of the incorrect way in 
which party units had been fonned. It was emphasised again that party units should be 
comprised of party members from one brigade working in the same shift.***** Indeed, 
many party units in Leningrad were made up of party members from more than one 
brigades or shifts. At Krasnyi putilovets, for instance, only 12 per cent of party units 
were formed in the approved manner. Some 65 per cent were made up of party
Ibid., p. 66.
Otchet Leningradskogo oblastnogo i gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b): 4-i oblastnoi i gorodskoi 
partiinoi konferentsii (Leningrad: 1932), p. 87.
Ibid., p. 87.
Partrabotnik, no. 15, August 1931, pp. 8-9.
Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 5, March 1932, p. 24.
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members from two to ten brigades, ten per cent from more than ten brigades, and 13 
per cent from three different shifts. It was argued that this made it difficult for party- 
mass work to be earned out effectively in brigades and shifts.****
In April, an article published in Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo revealed that there were 
four different kinds of party units in Leningrad: those containing party members in the 
same shift and brigade; those containing party members from one shift but many 
brigades; those containing party members from many shifts but one brigade; and those 
containing party members from many shifts and brigades. For instance, party units in 
the iron foundry of the tractor department were made up of party members working in 
one shift but in three to five different brigades. One zveno cell at the Stalin factory 
contained all 35 party members of the verticaLlathe brigade, even though they were 
working in four different shifts. Another zveno cell of the same factory was made up 
of all 29 party members of the turners’ brigade in spite of their working in four 
different shifts. Zveno cells containing party members from many shifts and brigades 
were considered the worst of all, since they were, in fact, not zveno but all-factory 
cells. Many zveno cells at Krasnyi putilovets had been formed this way. Some 191 
workers, including 30 party members, were working in the foundry-instrument 
department, and one zveno cell contained all its party members. Likewise, one zveno 
cell contained all 159 party members of the instruments workshop. This kind of zveno 
cell was common in the instruments, transport and turbine departments of the Ki'asnyi 
putilovets.***
All in all, the ‘breaking up’ of party cells resulted in the creation of far more 
complex factory party organisations during the first FYP period. Factory party 
organisations were set up in smaller production units, resulting in a sharp increase in 
the number of primary cells in the enteiprises. The rather simple party stmcture - a 
one-tier party cell, or a two-tier party committee-workshop cell system - had evolved 
into a multi-tier stmcture by 1932. However, the proliferation of experimental party 
stmctures in the industrial enterprise continued only until the summer of 1932.
""/6W .,p. 52.
Ibid., nos. 7-8, April 1932, pp. 27-28.
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3.2.2 Evolution of the party apparatus in factories 1928-1931
As with many other aspects of the structure of factory party organisations, 1928- 
31 was a formative period in the development of an increasingly complex 
administrative machinery. Due to the ‘breaking up’ of the party cells and the party’s 
increasing involvement in the economy, the party apparatus in the factories expanded 
and evolved into a more complex structure. In early 1928, a party apparatus, 
responsible for the factory’s day-to-day party work, was set up at factory-wide or 
workshop cell levels, but later within smaller party units such as shift and zveno cells. 
The introduction of a functional-sector system in 1930 also affected the stmcture of 
the party apparatus. All these factors contributed to the creation of a more complicated 
party apparatus in the factories.
The party issued detailed guidelines as to how to organise party cells and their 
apparatus. The resolutions on the status of party kollektivy containing workshop cells 
with them and on the status of workshop cells, adopted by the obkom bureau on 23 
May 1928, provide useful information on their respective structures. Party kollektivy 
were the leading party organs at factoiy level and took responsibility for all party 
work within the factories. The highest organ of the kollektiv was a general assembly of 
all party members, convened by the kollektiv bureau once a month. At the general 
assembly, delegates to the raion conference were selected, and a bureau and an 
auditing commission were elected.**^ A kollektiv bureau that served for six months 
could have a maximum of 15 full members and five candidates. A kollektiv bureau 
was responsible for preparing work plans for the kollektiv, for guiding the activity of 
the workshop cells, and for recmiting new members. It was to meet three times a 
month and was obliged to report once every tliree months to the general assembly. A 
secretary was chosen from among the bureau members.**^
Workshop cells held general meetings convened by their bureau twice a 
month.**"* Workshop cell plenums were open to everybody, irrespective of party 
status. At the plenum, workshop cell members confirmed their work plans and 
discussed production matters concerning their own workshop as well as the whole
RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 201. 
Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 202. 
"M bid .,p . 209.
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factory, disciplinary issues and questions concerning agitation work among non-party 
workers. Moreover, they heard the workshop cell bureau’s report on its work at the 
plenum. They also heard the reports of communist factions, Komsomol cells and 
individual communists, as well as the reports on work among women and the effective 
use of wall newspapers. Workshop cells were given the right to decide on questions of 
recruitment, transfer from candidate to full party membership and the promotion of 
communists ‘from the bench’ to more responsible work. A workshop cell bureau was 
elected every six months, and it was to be made of thi'ee to eleven full members and 
two to tliree candidates.**^ A workshop cell secretary was chosen from among the 
bureau memb ers. * * ^
One notable feature of these resolutions was that 1928 saw an increase in the 
number of bureau members both at the kollektiv and workshop cell levels. In 1927, the 
kollektiv bureaux could have a maximum of nine full and three candidate members, 
and the workshop cell bureaux could have a maximum of five full and two candidate 
members.**^ In 1928, both the kollektiv and workshop cell bureaux could have almost 
twice as many members as in 1927. In particular, the increase at the workshop cell 
level was considerable. This is probably because the workshop cell bureaux, rather 
than the all-factory cell bureaux responsible for the whole plant, became the focus of 
party work during the first FYP. Indeed, the importance of party work at workshop 
cell level was continuously stressed tliroughout these years. In addition, workshop 
cells were given full statutory rights (ustavnye pravcz).**  ^ By June 1930 over half of 
Leningrad’s workshop cells had been granted the right to independently recruit new 
party members.* *^  In 1931, these rights were extended to all workshop cells.*^ **
At the same time, 1928 saw a formation of the factory party committees in 
Leningrad. In 1928, instead of the ordinary party kollektiv bureaux, a number of full- 
scale party committees were set up in the city’s largest enteiprises. This move was 
given official sanction in January 1929, when these newly-fonued committees were
“ 'ib id ., p. 210.
“ M bid.,p . 209.
Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia, pp. 135 and 142.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 379.
Cited from P. O. Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan: The Case 
o f Leningrad (CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, University of Birmingham, 1983), part 2, p. 
28.
Cited from Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin, p. 280.
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given a number of wide-ranging rights and responsibilities concerning the acceptance 
of new party members.*^* Their responsibilities included monitoring the 
administration, selecting cadres and making practical decisions about important 
industrial questions. Moreover, they were responsible for the overall direction of 
party work in the enterprises by co-ordinating a number of separate cell units within 
the factoiy. At the onset of industrialisation, factory party committees were seen as 
particularly important links in the party’s chain of command, and enjoyed a status 
somewhere between that of a raikom and an ordinary kollektiv. In general, they were 
much bigger in size than the former all-factory cell bureau.
The status of the factory party committee, confirmed by the obkom bureau in 
June 1929, was as follows. The factory party committee was subordinate to the 
raikom and assumed responsibility for all party work in the factory. Its highest organ 
was either a general assembly of all party members or a factory party conference, 
which convened at least once every two months. The party committees were elected 
for a period of one year. The size of a party committee was based on the size of the 
workforce within the factory: it could have a maximum of 25 full and three to five 
candidate members in factories with fewer than 7,000 workers, and a maximum of 35 
members in factories with over 7,000 workers. Plenums of the party committee 
convened, as a rule, twice a month to discuss and make decisions regarding questions 
of industrial, mass and party work in the factory, to hear reports from other 
organisations, to confirm the formation of workshop cells and to discuss questions 
concerning party recruitment. Factoiy party committees had to report back to 
communists at plenums at least once every six months. Plenums elected a bureau 
composed of seven to nine members, and also a secretary who should have been a 
party member for at least five years. The bureau, as an executive organ, was to fulfil 
party directives and resolve practical problems.
In Leningrad, seven factory party committees had been set up by January 
1929 124 factory party committees were to be set up only in large scale
Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 4, 15 February 1929, p. 10; Biulleten' Leningradskogo oblastnogo 
komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 8 March 1929, p. 6.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 379.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 6, 1929, pp. 24-25.
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Leningrad, 1929), no. 1, p. 38.
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enterprises with more than 5,000 workers and at least 1,000 party members, according 
to a Central Committee resolution of January 1929.*^  ^ However, this stipulation was 
largely ignored in practice. By June 1929, another 17 party committees had been set 
up in the large-scale factories such as the Proletarskaia pobeda, Severnaia v e rf , 
Krasnyi vyborzhets, Krasnaia zaria, Krasnyi gvozdil’shchik, Krasnoe znamia, 
Rabochii, Metal, Karl Marx, Lenin, and Khalturin factories. The information on these 
factories showed that, of the 17 enterprises, only two (the Rabochii and Khalturin 
factories) had more than 5,000 workers, and only two (the Ki'asnyi vyborzhets and 
Goszavod no. 4 factories) had a party membership of over 1,000.*^^
In November 1929, the obkom reduced the number of workers and party 
members required for the formation of the party committee to 3,000 and 500 
respectively. In factories that did not meet these requirements, a party committee 
could be established only with the sanction of the o b k o m . L a t e r  in March 1931, the 
Central Committee confirmed the practice of organising party committees in large 
enterprises, and called for this practice to be extended to all enterprises with no fewer 
than 500 party members.
The easing of the conditions for setting up a factory party committee, together 
with the growth in both the workforce and party membership in factories, seems to 
have facilitated the formation of factory party committees. Indeed, the number of 
factory party committees increased gradually from 1930 onwards. By January 1930, 
40 such committees had been set up in the city, and they contained 47 per cent of all 
party members in enterprises which between them accounted for 41 per cent of the 
city’s industrial w o r k f o r c e . B y  January 1931 another 13 committees had been 
established in the city. In particular, 1931 saw a shaip increase in their number, 
mainly due to the Central Committee’s endorsement: the figure doubled only within a
Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1929, p. 6.
'^Nbid., no. 5, 1929, p. 14.
Ibid., no. 11, 1929, p. 15. It was also decided that a factory party committee should organise 3 units 
{chast’) - organisation, agitation-propaganda and work among femal workers - and each units 
should have a board {kollegiia), composed of 7-8 persons.
Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 7, April 1931, p. 66.
B. V. Pavlov, Rost i ukreplenie pervichnykh i nizovykh partiinykh organizatsii v promyshlennosti v 
pervye gody sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii, 1926-1932 gg. (Leningrad, 1972), p. 119.
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year (see table 3-4). By January 1933, a total of 115 party committees had been set up 
in 101 enterprises in Leningrad.
Table 3-4. Number o f factory party committees in Leningrad, 1929-1933
1929 1929 1930 1930 1931 1931 1932 1933
J a n u a iy June January A p r il J a n u a iy Ju ly J a n u a iy J a n u a iy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (5)
7 24 40 45 53 85 106 115
Sources: (1) L en ingradska ia  ob lastna ia  organ iza tsiia  VKP(b) v ts ifrakh , no. 1, p. 38; (2) 
B iu lle te n ’ L en ingradskogo  ob lastnogo  kom ite ta  VKP(b), no. 5, 1929, p. 14; (3) B. V. Pavlov, 
R ost i ukrep len ie  p erv ich n ykh  i n izovykh  p a r tiin ykh  organ iza tsii v  p ro m ysh len n o sti  v p erv y e  
g o d y  so tsia lis tich esko i in d u str ia liza tsii 1926-1932 gg. (Leningi'ad, 1972), p. 119; (4) 
L en ingradska ia  ob lastna ia  organ iza tsiia  VKP(b) v tsifrakh  (1931), no. 3, pp. 6-7; (5) Ibid. 
(1933), no. 4, pp. 4-6; (6) S o sta v  VKP(b) v tsifrakh  (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel’stvo, 1932), 
no. 11, p. 55.
Lower down, party units did not have their own apparatus. As early as 1927, it 
was established that there should be a unit organiser {zvenorg or zvenovoi 
partorganizator) in each party unit.^^  ^ The obkom bureau resolution of 23 May 1928 
gave a clearer definition of the status and role of unit organisers. An organiser was 
allotted to each unit. They were sent by the workshop cell bureaux and this was to be 
confirmed at the workshop cell general meeting. If a factory did not contain any 
workshop cell, party unit organisers were sent directly by the kollehiv bureaux, which 
was to be confirmed at the kollektiv general assembly. In principle, unit organisers 
were allocated according to production-territorial characteristics of each unit - 
shopfloor, shift and workshop. The maximum number of workers in each party unit 
was established as 30, irrespective of the number of party members within it. This 
allowed a unit organiser to deal with fewer than 30 workers.
Unit organisers’ work was supervised by the workshop cell bureaux: the latter 
were to systematically instruct unit organisers and keep them informed of the party’s 
latest decisions and invite unit organisers to the bureau meetings in order to allow 
them to discuss important questions concerning the work of unit g r o u p s . U n i t
For the number of enterprises containing factory party committees, see Ocherki istorii 
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organisers had to report on their work to the workshop cell bureaux as well as to the 
kollektiv bureaux. Unit organisers’ meetings were held once a month at the workshop 
cell level, and once every two months at the kollektiv bureau level. In kollektivy which 
did not contain workshop cells, unit organisers’ meetings were held at least once a 
month. At raion level, raikoms were responsible for organising all-raion unit 
organisers’ meetings at least twice a year.’^ "^
In July 1930, another resolution on the status of unit organisers was adopted by 
the obkom bureau. Unit organisers, who took responsibility for political leadership 
and organising party-mass work, were to be elected at party unit meetings, and their 
election was to be confinned by either the workshop cell bureau or the kollektiv 
bureau (if there was no workshop cell bureau). In the event of there being fewer than 
three party members, a unit organiser was to be chosen by the workshop cell bureau. 
In a unit group with a shift working system and containing at least five party 
members, a unit organiser could have one or two assistants. Unit organisers were 
elected every six months and they had to report on their work before a party unit prior 
to the next election. In addition, they were responsible for organising unit meetings no 
more than twice a month. At these meetings, unit members were to discuss political, 
economic, production and party questions as well as questions concerning matters in 
their own particular factory or brigade.
As had previously been the case, workshop cell bureaux were responsible for 
guiding unit organisers. This time, it was made explicit that the organisation and 
instruction sector attached to the workshop cell bureau was responsible for giving 
systematic instructions to unit organisers. Accordingly, unit organisers were asked to 
work closely in coordination with the organisation and instruction sector. Workshop 
cell bureaux were to invite unit organisers and their assistants to bureau meetings, to 
discuss important questions concerning the work of party units. Workshop cell 
bureaux were to hear the summary report of unit organisers on their work. Each unit 
organiser had to report at zveno cell meetings as well as at the kollektiv (or party 
committee) bureau meetings. Unit organisers’ meetings were to be held once a month 
at shopfloor level, and once every two months at the kollektiv (or partkom) bureau
Ibid., p. 220.
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level. All-raion meetings of unit organisers were to be held at least once eveiy six 
months. If necessary, unit organisers’ meetings could be held in a particular industrial 
sector such as metals, textiles, leather, and the railway.
In later years, as the number of party members within each unit increased, the 
workload became too heavy for a single individual to handle as a unit organiser. 
Therefore, there were debates as to whether party units should be allowed to select a 
deputy unit organiser or to have their own bureaux .Desp i te  doubts over the benefit 
of creating their own apparatus in such small units, bureaux were, in fact, created in 
some large party units in the city even before the official sanction in 1930.'^^ Later 
that year, when large units were converted into zveno cells, they were allowed to have 
their own bureau and a secretary. According to the obkom bureau resolution of July 
1930, zveno cells could elect their own three-person bureaux, including a secretary. 
These elected bureaux and zveno cell secretaries were to serve for a period of six 
months. The highest organ of a zveno cell was the general meeting of all its members. 
Zveno cells were under the leadership of workshop cells, and had rights similar to 
workshop c e l l s . I n  zveno cells as well as in party units, there was no organisational 
subdivision. Later in March 1931, the Central Committee confirmed that zveno 
cells could elect their own bureaux.
One of the most notable developments concerning the party apparatus in the 
factories was the creation of commissions in 1928-29. Commissions were formed as a 
part of the administrative organs within the cells, and their foimation was considered 
necessary to take some of the technical work off the shoulders of the cell secretary. 
Thus, commissions were increasingly seen as important for the implementation of 
decisions already taken at the bureau level. The party’s day-to-day work was 
distributed between two or three pennanent commissions attached to the factory 
kollektiv bureaux. These commissions were responsible for conducting much of the 
party’s routine work: working out work plans for the kollektiv and workshop cells;
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organising members’ party duties; supervising women’s organisers; processing 
applications for party membership; monitoring attendance at party meetings; 
enforcing party discipline, including the regular payment of party dues; and 
organising mass agitation campaigns on major holidays.
According to data from the obkom’s information-statistics section, published in 
March 1928, a commission system was spreading rapidly throughout the city. By the 
end of 1927 almost every large kollektiv bureau and workshop cell bureau had three or 
four pennanent commissions, and some larger ones had as many as seven. The most 
common were organisational, agitation, women’s, party history and conflict 
commissions. In the city as a whole there were over 500 such commissions, over
3,000 party members working within them.'"^  ^ In May 1928, the obkom bureau, in its 
resolution concerning the status of party kollektivy containing workshop cells, 
confirmed that factory kollektiv bureaux could set up three permanent commissions - 
for organisational work, agitation and propaganda work and work among women - 
and, if necessai*y, temporary commissions.
The growing importance of the workshop cell as a level of party organisation 
and the increase in their number led to much discussion concerning the possibility of 
setting up commissions attached to the workshop cell bureaux. Despite the criticism 
that they duplicated the commission system at different levels of the factory party 
organisations, commissions were set up at workshop cell level as early as 1928. In 
May, the obkom bureau confirmed that, with the approval of the kollektiv bureau, 
workshop cell bureaux could set up pennanent commissions - for instance, those for 
organisational work and work of agitation and propaganda - and temporary 
commissions. Indeed, Leningrad was the first place in the country where 
commissions were fonned at the workshop cell bureau level. For instance, in August 
1928, the two largest workshops of the Baltic shipbuilding works, containing 800 and 
1,500 workers including 120 and 230 party members respectively, had four 
commissions attached to workshop cell bureaux - three pennanent commissions for
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, March 1928, pp. 14-19,
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agitation, cultural work and conflict resolution and one temporary commission for 
production control/"^^
The creation of workshop cell commissions was justified by the role they might 
play in encouraging workshop cell bureaux to concentrate on more important 
questions without occupying themselves with minor everyday jobs.’ In an article in 
Partrabotnik, it was suggested that workshop cells with more than 70 party members 
should create commissions for organisational and agitation-propaganda work in order 
to make workshop cell bureaux’ work e a s i e r . T h e r e  was, however, some confusion 
about the work of commissions. In the Volodarskii raion, some workshop cell 
commissions did not have a clear understanding of their own roles and confused their 
responsibilities with those of other commissions, and not all commissions were able to 
plan their own work and specify the methods of their work.’"’^  Moreover, temporary 
commissions did not always operate as they should have done; some were set up 
where they were not necessary; the work was distributed unevenly; and there was no 
clear direction in the work undertaken; and some commissions made preliminaiy 
decisions on the matters under discussion.’"’^
Nevertheless, the commission system was adopted at even lower levels such as 
the shift cells. By mid-1928 the simple commission system was being affected by the 
development of shift working and an increase in the number of workshop cells. By 
November 1929, it had become the nonn to create commissions in all three shift cell 
bureaux.’ ’^’ However, this commission system was a short-lived experiment, since it 
was replaced by a sector system in early 1930.
In Januaiy 1930 the entire party apparatus was reorganised along functional 
lines and a sector system was introduced. This feature of the reorganisation was in 
turn reflected at the factory level, where the party apparatus continued to expand in 
order to keep pace with the growth in membership. In response to the establishment of 
sectors within the obkom and raikoms, factory party organisations reorganised their 
work. In the summer of 1930 a number of Leningrad’s biggest industrial enterprises
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adopted the functional-sectoral system. The main development involved replacing the 
existing system of three commissions by a much larger number of sectors. The 
functions of the previous commissions were more extensively subdivided and separate 
sectors were created for each division of work.'^‘ The introduction of a sector system 
was believed to enhance responsibility for party work, improve the quality of work, 
and draw more activists into party work by giving them concrete party obligations.’^^
There was, however, much confusion about whether sectors should be set up at 
lower levels of factory party organisations, and how many sectors should be set up at 
each level. For example, the Elektrozavod’s party committee in Moscow, which was 
held up as a model of a progressive party organisation, set up 18 sectors. It also set up 
18 sectors in larger workshop cells and five sectors in smaller ones.’^^  However, the 
Elektrozavod system with 18 sectors was considered unsuitable, even for the heavily 
industrialised Moskovskii-narvskii raion of Leningrad. Instead, a maximum of nine 
sectors was recommended: instruction; information and registration; party growth and 
recmitment; production tasks and socialist competition; propaganda; mass agitation; 
kuTturno-bytovoi work; cadres; and shefstvo, voluntary societies and work with 
national minorities.’ "^’ At the same time, criticism of the practice of setting up too 
many sectors at the factory party committee level was voiced in party journals. A 
multiplicity of sectors, it argued, created parallelism in the party’s leadership, and 
simply led to the formalistic creation of sectors which existed only on paper. It was 
accordingly suggested that a maximum of four sectors should be set up at this level: 
organisation and instruction; cadres; propaganda; and mass work. It was also advised 
that full-time officials should head the sectors created within a large scale party 
committee.
Finally, on 17 June 1930, the obkom secretariat adopted a resolution concerning 
this matter and recommended that four sectors - organisation and instruction, cadres, 
propaganda and mass work - be set up within the factory party committees. Workshop 
cell bureaux were allowed to set up a much larger number of sectors, such as six to
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eight. On 29 November 1930 the obkom secretariat adopted another resolution, which 
regulated the number of sectors in medium and small size enterprises. Party kollektivy 
and workshop cells in such enterprises could have a maximum of four sectors. In the 
kollektivy and workshop cells containing fewer than twenty party members, sectors 
should not be set up, or if it was absolutely necessary, only a minimal number of 
sectors (the suggested number was two) could be set up. Party units were not allowed 
to set up any sectors, and their various tasks were to be distributed among their 
members by unit organisers.
The obkom secretariat resolution of November 1930 gave detailed guidelines as 
to how to organise sectors in medium and small size enterprises. Heads of sectors 
should be appointed by the corresponding bureau, either from among bureau members 
or among party activists. A number of party members should be involved in the work 
of each sector and assistant heads could be chosen from among them. It was warned 
that sectors should not duplicate the work of party organisations at the level 
immediately below them or the work of other non-party organs. Sectors should carry 
out their work exclusively tlirough the kollektiv (or workshop cell) bureaux. It was 
recommended that sectors should not simply issue instructions in written documents, 
but should also, as far as possible, cany out their duties by means of personal contact 
and instmction.’^^
Each sector’s responsibilities were defined as follows. The organisation and 
instruction sector took responsibilities which reflected these objectives; self-criticism 
and inner-party democracy; checking the fulfilment of party directives such as 
promfinplan and reducing costs; the selection, education and promotion of party 
cadres; the growth and regulation of party membership; the development of mass 
social organisations such as trade unions; and monitoring the implementation of party 
decisions by party factions within non-party organisations and finally, information 
and statistics. The sector for culture, propaganda and daily life was expected to 
undertake a range of different but related tasks: organising educational networks 
within the party; work with party candidates; checking the work of the party factions 
of trade unions concerning the elimination of illiteracy; supervising the work of
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2754, p. 59. 
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factory newspapers; work with worker correspondents; and the selection, assessment 
and promotion of cultural cadres.
The main responsibilities of the mass work sector were as follows: mobilising 
workers as well as administrative and technical personnel to implement party 
directives on the promfinplan, cutting costs, improving the quality of output, 
improving labour productivity and discipline; socialist competition and the shock- 
worker movement; monitoring the work of the production-economic sectors of trade 
union factory committees; encouraging workers to participate in production meetings; 
guiding mass workers’ control on cooperation; conducting various political campaigns 
(preparing meetings, leaflets and demonstrations); guiding worker shefstvo over the 
Red Army and the countryside; and guiding mass work among national minorities. 
The cadres sector was responsible for the following objectives: keeping records on all 
factory and workshop cell cadres; monitoring the implementation of party directives 
regarding cadres and promotion (vydvizhenie); instructing the corresponding sectors of 
lower-level party organisations with regard to cadres and promotion; keeping records 
on administrative and technical cadres as well as those promoted; creating cadre 
reserves; analysing the work of individual workers and suggesting necessary changes 
in party personnel.
Despite specific guidance given by the obkom, confusion on how to set up 
sectors still continued in 1931. In March of that year, a Central Committee resolution 
confirmed that seven or eight sectors could be set up within workshop cells in order to 
carry out various work of the party. This resolution also made it clear that sectors 
should not be set up in workshops with fewer than thirty party members, nor in zveno 
cells nor in party units, and that party work should be distributed among all members 
in such cells or uni t s .Apparent ly ,  in Leningrad, there was a great deal of doubt 
about setting up too many sectors in workshop c e l l s . M a n y  were critical of 
workshop cells’ setting up too many sectors. However, there were some who argued
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that more sectors should be set up in factories. For instance, in the Narvskii raion, it 
was recommended that eight to ten sectors be set up at the workshop level.
As confusion continued in 1931, sectors were formed and structured in a 
different way in each factory. In the Narvskii raion, for instance, there was a 
considerable degree of variation across factories, although the four sector system was 
the most common at the factory party committee level. In some factories such as the 
Krasnyi Idiimik, sectors were not created at all. In the Sovetskaia zvezda factory, only 
one sector - mass work - was created. By contrast, some kollektivy created an 
additional sector which was responsible for party recruitment.”'^  At Krasnyi 
putilovets, a total of eight sectors were fonned at the workshop cell level. These 
included the sectors for organisation and instruction, party enrolment, cadres, 
information and registration, agitation, propaganda, shefstvo and kuTturno-bytovoi 
work. However, later in 1931, these were reduced to three; organisation and 
instruction, agitation, and culture and propaganda.’^ "’
On 20 January 1932, the Leningrad gorkom secretariat adopted a resolution 
which stipulated that eight sectors should be set up in large workshop cells with more 
than 30 full party members, and that workshop cells with fewer than 30 full members 
should set up a maximum of five sectors. Party kollektivy which did not contain a 
workshop cell within them were allowed to set up eight sectors. Workshop cells with 
fewer than 30 full and candidate party members or zveno cells were not allowed to set 
up any sector. Instead, the party’s day-to-day work was divided into two categories, 
each of which was assigned to one of the two cell secretary assistants.
As for the sector system, organisational matters were not the only problem. In 
spite of high expectations about the sector system, it did not always operate 
effectively, at least at factory level. In many cases, sectors were created only on paper. 
This had been a problem since the veiy beginning of the introduction of a sector 
system. As early as May 1930, it was reported that at Elektrosila, sectors were created 
only in a fonnal s e n s e . T h i s  was still the case for many sectors created within the
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factories. At the general meeting of the Central Committee organisers on 8 July 1932, 
the Leningrad gorkom reported that seven to nine sectors were formed at the 
workshop cell level, but only three to four sectors operated satisfactorily - those for 
party assigmnents, work with candidates, training and mass political campaigns. 
Subsequently, the Leningrad gorkom suggested that only viable sectors should be 
sustained. In particular, the sector for party recruitment was considered redundant 
since, in principle, all party organisations should be involved in recruitment.’^^
As the negative aspects of the sector system became evident, the over-elaborate 
sector system, which had been the nonn at all levels of the factory party organisation 
in 1930 and 1931, came to an end in 1932. In the summer of 1932, the sector structure 
became considerably simplified. Sectors which did not function properly were 
abolished and only a few sectors were retained.
3.2.3 Reorganisation of the party network in factories in 1932
The organisational changes that took place in the period 1928-31 inevitably 
resulted in a far larger and more complex party structure within industrial enterprises. 
Factory party organisations, which had a rather simple structure at the beginning of 
1928, had evolved into a multi-tier structure by 1932. This was more the case in 
Leningrad than in any other region. In particular, the city’s large-scale industrial 
enterprises had created an extremely complicated internal party structure. This was 
mainly due to the fact that most of its large-scale enterprises were made up of several 
independent production units and that they had a four-tier production structure. 
Therefore, unlike Moscow, where most factories had a three-tier party structure (a 
factory party committee, workshop cells and party units), in Leningrad many factory 
party organisations had a four-tier structure, with an additional tier for allied 
workshop c e l l s . A l r ea dy  in 1930 party organisations at Ki*asnyi putilovets, Ki*asnyi 
treugol’nik and Elektrosila had created a four-tier structure with a factory party 
committee, workshop cells, party kollektivy (uniting the workshop cells of one
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factory) or departmental kollektivy {kollektivy otdela, uniting the workshop cells of 
one department), and finally party units.
The Leningrad regional party leadership had been concerned about their 
complex four-tier party structure within factories even before the official approval of a 
three-tier structure in March 1931. As early as December 1930, the obkom secretariat 
reprimanded some party organisations within large-scale factories for having created 
an unnecessary intermediate level, which resulted in a four-tier structure. While 
conforming the necessity of setting up of a three-tier stmcture in principle, it allowed 
party kollektivy to be preserved only when they were created according to the 
production principle, i.e. within departments that operated independently in terms of 
administration and finance. In addition, the creation of departmental kollektivy needed 
the sanction of the obkom.
The proposal for restructuring the party network within the major factories, 
which was put forward in December 1930, shows how complicated the party structure 
was within each factory. For instance, at Krasnyi putilovets, party kollektivy could be 
preserved in the following departments which operated independently in terms of 
finance: tractor, metallurgical, turbine, steel and ferrous construction, instruments, 
transport, mechanical and construction. These party kollektivy were subordinate to the 
factory party committee, and workshop cells were formed within them. By contrast, in 
other divisions, workshop cells were directly accountable to the factory party 
committee. The party structure suggested for the Ki*asnyi treugoFnik was 
fundamentally different from that for the Krasnyi putilovets. In the latter, one factory 
party committee was put in overall charge of all subordinate party cells including both 
party kollektivy and workshop cells. By contrast, it was recommended that the former 
should have thi'ee party committees and three kollektivy which were directly 
accountable to Narvskii raikom. It was argued that this structure would suit most the 
Krasnyi treugoFnik, which had been formed from a combination of six independent 
factories. In the case of the Elektrosila, it was proposed that independent party 
kolleluivy with full statutory rights remain only in the machine and turbine 
departments. In other departments, party kollektivy were to be dissolved. As for the
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Skoroldiod, it was recommended that party kollektivy should be created in the 
departments which had an independent accounting system and that these party 
kollektivy should be subordinate to one factory party committee. All workshop cells in 
the sewing department were directly subordinate to the factory party committee.’^ ’
In 1931 there was a much greater variety of structures of party organisation 
within the industrial enterprises than had previously been the case. For instance, the 
Karl Marx factory had a structure of party committee, departmental kollektivy and 
zveno cells, but no workshop cells. It was argued that this strueture was more 
appropriate to the nature of this factory’s production.
Then, in March 1931, the Central Committee adopted a resolution ‘on party and 
mass work in workshops and brigade’ in which it confinned that a three-tier party 
organisation should be established in large enterprises - consisting of a party 
committee, workshop cell, and zveno cell or party g r o u p . A f t e r  this official 
approval of a three-tier structure, the need to simplify a clumsy and over-elaborate 
party structure became acute in Leningrad. However, the directive of March 1931 was 
not strictly followed in the city, and it was not until 1932 that a significant 
simplification of the factory party organisation took place.
At the begiiming of 1932, many of Leningrad’s factories still had a four-tier 
structure. Moreover, the party network within each factory was organised in a 
different and rather complicated way. By this time, it was felt that these complex four 
or five-tier structures in large-scale enterprises did not operate as intended, but 
actually prevented the party from working efficiently. As the negative consequences 
of over-elaborate party structure within factories became evident, the party’s major 
concern became how to deal with over-elaborate party stmctures within factories.
In March 1932, a review of the party stmcture of the regional organisations was 
carried out by the organisation and instruction department of the Central Committee. 
This review revealed that questions concerning the party structure had been neglected 
in many regions, and that party cells were organised in such an untidy and primitive 
way that party strength was distributed inappropriately, which led to a weakening of
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party’s guiding role. The practice of creating unnecessaiy fourth party linlcs in 
factories was considered one of the shortcomings. Subsequently, it was decided that 
la'aikoms and obkoms should be involved in question of reorganising their party 
structure and that organisation departments should examine the party structure.’ "^’
This March 1932 review also showed that the party structure within the Krasnyi 
putilovets was extremely complicated at all levels. The Krasnyi putilovets, containing
32,000 workers, was made up of a number of independent departments, and the 
structure of party organisations in each department was variegated. For instance, in 
the tractor department, a party kollektiv had been set up between the factory party 
committee and workshop cell levels, and in practice, this kollektiv assumed the role of 
the factory party committee. On the other hand, in the turbine and instruments 
departments, there was no party kollektiv and workshop cells were directly 
accountable to the factory party committee. In the metallurgical department, an 
instructor was sent from the factory party committee. This meant that the factory party 
committee had to supervise a number of small party cells that were different in nature. 
Party cells which were subordinate to it ranged from the party kollektiv of the tractor 
department to the divisional cells of the rolling workshop. This made it difficult for 
the factory party committee to supervise and give guidance to lower party cells.
A further article on the Krasnyi putilovets’ party stmcture, published in 
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo in May, showed that it still had a wide range of complicated 
stmctures within each department. In the tractor and constmction departments, party 
kollektivy had been set up at department level, resulting in a four-tier stmcture. In all 
the other departments, no party kollektivy existed and the party network was organised 
on a three tier basis. However, each department had a different party stmcture. Only in 
the metallurgical, steam-engine and mechanical departments were party organisations 
stmctured in accordance with the Central Committee resolution. In the instmments, 
turbine and transport departments, party cells immediately below the factory party 
committee were created not at workshop level, but at department level. This meant 
that, despite the name, the workshop cells of these departments were, in fact, 
department cells. The third level of the party stmcture, zveno cells or party units, were
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created in a correct way only in one department, and in other departments, they were 
formed at workshop level. For instance, in the turbine department, workshop cells 
were created at the department level, and zveno cells were created at the workshop 
level. In the instruments department, all party members were put into one department 
cell, and zveno cells were formed not at the brigade level, but at the workshop level. 
Therefore, the zveno cells of this department, unlike those of the turbine department, 
were large in size, as they were, in fact, all-workshop cells. One zveno cell in this 
department, for instance, contained as many as 159 party members. All these facts 
showed that the party network was organised as a three-tier structure only in a fonnal 
sense. In other words, a real restructuring did not take place. Here came the difficulty 
the factory party committee had to face: it had to supervise many different kinds of 
cells. These included party kollektivy, departmental cells, workshop cells, shift- 
workshop cells, and divisional cells. The biggest one was the tractor department’s 
party kollektiv, which contained 1,400 party members, and the smallest was the rolling 
workshop’s divisional cell. Inevitably, this led to difficulties in the work of the factory 
party committee.
After the extensive discussion on the Ki'asnyi pulilovets’ party structure, several 
proposals for its reform were outlined. Three options as to how to restructure party 
organisations were considered: at first, legitimating a four-tier structure and creating 
party kollektivy in all departments; secondly, dissolving the all-factory party 
committee and creating a number of party committees at department level; and 
thirdly, creating a number of party committees at department level and, at the same 
time, transforming the all-factory party committee into a sub-raion or raion 
committee. The second option was preferred to the others, since the first option 
violated the principle of a thi*ee-tier structure, and the third option turned out to be 
operating inefficiently in some other places.
Despite much emphasis put on the necessity of simplifying the party structure in 
factories, a reorganisation did not take place immediately. When the report of the 
representative from Krasnyi putilovets was heard at a general meeting of Central 
Committee organisers on 8 July, it was admitted that in the two months which had
Ibid., no. 9, May 1932, pp. 41-42. 
Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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passed since Kaganovich called for the restructuring of the party work in factories, 
they had not yet embarked on the task. The main obstacle in reorganising their party 
structure was that this particular factory had a four-tier administrative structure. At 
this time, there still existed two party kollektivy, one in the tractor department and the 
other in the Putilstroi. Altogether there were 103 workshop cells, 72 of which were 
directly accountable to the factory party committee, while the rest came under the 
supervision of two party kollektivy. Two options were considered at this time: the 
preservation of party kollektivy', and the creation of three separate party committees. If 
a decision had been made to maintain party kollektivy, there would have been, instead 
of 103 workshop cells, 49 cells which were veiy large in size. Therefore, the latter 
option - creating three separate party committees - appeared to be preferable.
When reports on the experiment carried out in five of the largest enteiprises 
were heard at the Central Committee Secretariat meeting in the summer of 1932, the 
Krasnyi putilovets was one of these five enterprises. At Krasnyi putilovets, prior to 
the restructuring, the factory party committee had been in charge of 103 workshop 
cells, uniting more than 7,000 party members. Naturally, in these conditions the party 
committee could not provide adequate leadership in practical matters to subordinate 
cells. It was reported that there had been ‘enormous bureaucratic confusion and 
excessive documentation’. The party committee workers had wasted a great deal of 
time in meetings and compiling resolutions, and they had rarely appeared in the 
workshops. However, due to the reorganisation of party structure, considerable 
improvements had been made by this time. First of all, three separate party 
committees had been set up at Ki’asnyi putilovets: one in the main site, one in the 
tractor workshop and one in the Putilstroi. All three factory party committees came 
under the supervision of the raikom. The factory party committee set up in the main 
site was now responsible for 33 instead of 86 workshop cells.
Likewise, the party structure in other enterprises was greatly simplified over the 
summer of 1932. Despite the official approval of a three-tier stmcture, many factories 
in Leningrad still had a four-tier party structure before the restmcturing. Therefore, at 
a general meeting of the Central Committee organisers held in July, an instmctor from
Ibid., no. 15, August 1932, p. 19.
Ibid., nos. 17-18, September 1932, p. 49.
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the Leningrad gorkom reported that the prime concern of the restructuring was the 
establishment of a three-tier structure.'^’’ Over the summer, serious efforts were made 
to simplify the party structures in factories. As a result, by October 1932, a four-tier 
party structure had been replaced in most of Leningrad’s enterprises.’^’
At the same time, this year saw a significant simplification of the lower party 
cell network. Unlike the previous years when the idea of ‘breaking up’ had been 
strongly advocated, 1932 saw a sudden change in direction whereby the policy of 
‘breaking up’ was reversed. From the beginning of 1932, official thinldng was moving 
away from it, as its negative aspects became evident. Indeed, articles questioning the 
advantages of ‘breaking up’ party cells began to be published in party journals from 
the end of 1931. The main argument against it was that ‘breaking up’ of the primary 
cells, rather than benefiting the organisation, was actually serving to break the party 
up into excessively small units {razmel’chenenie). Doubts were voiced as to whether 
breaking party work down into smaller units was in fact achieving better results. It 
was claimed that the excessively complex party structure led to the party spreading its 
membership too widely throughout the various cells, and that, as a result, it caused 
inefficiency. Moreover, there was a growing feeling that this system was not 
harnessing the creative power of the masses, as had been intended.
A review of the party structure, canied out by Central Committee instructors in 
March 1932, revealed that in many regions lower party cells had been created 
according to professional or territorial characteristics rather than along production 
lines. A passive attitude towards the creation of shift cells was also r e p o r t e d . I n  case 
of Leningrad, some violations were spotted in the way of creating shift cells and party 
units. In heavy industry, workshop cells were predominant, and shift cells were rare. 
Often, shift cells were not created even in shifts where the personnel were stable. The 
idea of creating shift cells was disliked by those who feared that breaking up of 
workshop cells into a number of shift cells would complicate the leadership of the 
party committee. In addition, a considerable number of party units had not been 
created as instructed: some units were made up of party members working in many
Ibid., no. 15, August 1932, p. 27.
Ibid., nos. 19-20, October 1932, p. 35. 
Ibid., no, 5, March 1932, pp. 27-28.
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brigades or in many shifts. It was confirmed again that party units should be 
comprised of party members from one brigade working in the same shift.
In the three months that followed the first general meeting of organisers in 
March, the restructuring process proceeded rather slowly in Leningrad. When the 
strueture of workshop cells and party units in the city was reviewed in the summer of 
that year, it was revealed that many cells and units were violating the party directives 
regarding their structure. For instance, at Ki'asnyi putilovets, there were 128 workshop 
cells spread among 60 workshops and at Krasnaia zaria, 37 workshop cells were 
created despite there being a total of only 30 workshops. Many party units contained 
only one or two party members, and were therefore not able to operate 
satisfactorily.’ "^’
It was in the summer of 1932 that serious attempts were made to strengthen the 
party cells, which had been poorly organised and not able to work properly. At the end 
of June, Leningrad gorkom resolved to strengthen the workshop level of the party 
organisation by transferring officials downwards from the factory party committees, 
and by abolishing those cells and party units which bore no relation to the basic 
production structure of the enterprise. Also a minimum limit of five to seven party 
members was set for party units, many of which previously contained only one or two 
m e m b e r s . T h e n ,  at the gorkom plenum on 21 July 1932 it was decided that the 
existing network of workshop cells and party units should be restructured along 
produetion lines. It was also decided that party units with elected unit organisers 
should be created only where there were five to seven communists, and that party 
units could be fonned in brigades and sites where there were fewer party members. In 
the latter case, party work was to be carried out by one of unit’s members.’^ '' This 
decision appears to have been aimed to strengthen workshop cells and party units by 
reorganising them into bigger cells or units, and by shifting full-time party officials 
into posts in the workshop cells and cutting down substantially on the number of unit 
organisers. Later a Central Committee resolution of August 1932 ‘on the work of
p. 24.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 380,
Partrabotnik, nos. 11-12, June 1932, pp. 11-12.
Mezhdu dvumia s"ezdam i: Leningradskaia partiinaia organizatsiia v resheniiakh konferentsii i 
plenumov oblastkoma i LK  VKP(b) mezhdu XVI i XVII s ”ezdami (Leningrad: Lenpartizdat, 1934), 
pp. 152-153.
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party cells in enterprises’ confirmed this tendency by clarifying that it would be 
unacceptable that the number of cells in a single enterprise should reach up to 50, 60 
or even more. ’
At the time when the general meeting of Central Committee organisers was held 
in July, the lower party cells within Leningrad’s factories were still being reorganised. 
According to a report of the representative from Ki'asnyi putilovets, party cells were 
being strengthened, while maintaining the production principle. A number of small 
cells were being amalgamated into bigger cells. Larger cells would contain 398, 356, 
290 and 200 people, while the smallest would contain 70. At the same time, full-time 
party officials were being shifted into posts in the workshop cells. Of the 16 
responsible party workers of the factory party committee, 12 had been transferred to 
workshop cells as cell secretaries. In this way 12 workshop cells had been 
strengthened by the addition of highly qualified party workers with work experience 
at all-factory level. Only four party officials remained at the factory party committee 
level.
There were, however, some difficulties in reorganising party cells, as was 
reported by a party official from the Leningrad gorkom at this meeting. In the textile 
factories, most shifts had a stable workforce, so shift cells were preserved. The 
problem was that there was not a sufficient number of people in each shift cell: only 
25 to 30 workers. Nevertheless, some improvements were already achieved by this 
time. In the Rubber factory, a total of 64 cells had been reorganised into 30. Earlier 
there had been on average 45 party members in each cell, but now, there was an 
average of 98 in each cell. Likewise, at Skoroldiod, the average number of party 
members in each cell increased from 38 to 97. It was expected that, after the 
reorganisation, the average number of party members in each workshop cell would 
rise from 50 to between 95 and 100. This size (approximately 100 party members per 
cell) was considered normal for workshop eells. Here occurred another problem. In 
some workshops or departments within large-scale enterprises, party cells would be as 
large as to contain 500 or even 600 members. This would be the case for party cells at
Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no. 16, August 1932, pp. 1-2. The effect o f this resolution was a dramatic 
reversal o f the tendency o f the previous four years towards ever larger, more complex structures in 
the factories.
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 15, August 1932, p. 19.
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the Sudoverf and Baltic shipbuilding works. It was obvious that it would be difficult 
for one secretary to work for such a big cell. Therefore, it was suggested that three to 
four people should be allotted for party work, or that big workshop cells should be 
broken up into smaller ones. Regarding lower party units, it was decided at the 
Leningrad gorkom plenum that party units should be reorganised so that each unit 
would have at least five party members. The decision seems to have been made based 
on the experience that party units which contained only two or three party members
were not, in fact, able to work properly 189
Table 3-5. Number o f party cells within factories in the light industrial sector in 
Leningrad before and after the reconstruction o f the party network, 1932
N um ber  
o fp a r ty  
m em bers
B efo re  the  
reconstruction
A fte r  the reconstruction
K rasnoe 1,927
Worlishop Zveno 
cells cells 
29
Party
units
134
Worlcshop
cells
22
O f which 
shift cells 
16
Zveno
cells
10
Party
units
109
znam ia
V olodarsk ii 1,600 20 96 26 15 15 57 15
factory
Skorokhod 3,002 78 28 235 31 23 31 131
P ro le tarskaia 716 22 12 52 12 11 8 26
p o b e d a n o . 1 
P ro le tarskaia 636 18 6 51 12 10 41
pobeda no. 2
Source: A dap ted  from  P a rtiin o e  s tr o ite l’stvo , no. 16, A ugust 1932, p. 35.
Based on the decisions made at the gorkom plenum, workshop cells and party 
units were reorganised in the following months of 1932. By August 1932 a substantial 
number of factories had already managed to complete the reorganisation of cell 
network. For instance, in the October textile factoiy, 11 workshop cells were reduced 
to eight, and the number of party units fell hom 50 to 2 1 . As table 3-5 shows, the 
number of party cells in the light industry factories had fallen considerably by this 
time. This, in turn, led to a considerable increase in the average size of cells: most 
units contained no fewer than five party members. In principle, party units were set up 
where there were five party members, and zveno cells where there were 15 party
" ^ /W .,p p .  27-28.
Ibid., no. 16, August 1932, p. 32.
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members. In the textile factories, shift cells were preseiwed. Due to the reorganisation, 
the average size of each cell increased from 50 to 100 or in some cases to 150 party 
members. At the same time, more party workers at the workshop cell level were 
qualified ones, often those who had been transferred from the factory party 
committees.’^’
Party organisations in the heavy industiy factories also earned out similar 
operations over two and a half months that followed the June obkom plenum. As can 
be seen in table 3-6, the number of workshop cells in each factory had fallen 
substantially by September 1932. No exact figures for the number of zveno cells and 
party units in heavy industry were located. However, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the party network had been greatly simplified by this time. For instance, in the 
Ki'asnaia zaria factory, weak zveno cells reverted to party units: the number of zveno 
cells fell from 30 to 23, while the number of party units increased from 70 to 112.’^^
Table 3-6. Number o f worlcshop cells within the heavy industry factories in Leningrad 
before and after the reconstruction o f the party network, 1932
Lenin Krasnyi Molotov Kirov Kulakov Sevkabel ’
factory vyborzhets factoiy factory factory
Before the reconstruction 25 25 19 27 13 20
After the reconsti'uction 12 12 13 14 7 7
Source: Partrabotnik, no. 17, September 1932, pp. 3-4.
All in all, the number of primary cells in the city’s enterprises had fallen 
considerably by September. In the city as a whole, the number of workshop cells had 
been reduced from 1,822 to 1,087. Due to the reorganisation, the average size of 
workshop cells had risen from 49 to 83 party members. At the same time, the number 
of party units had fallen from 8,032 to 3,999. Meanwhile, zveno cells were 
strengthened and increased in number from 527 to 953.’^^  The general reduction in 
size and in the degree of complexity of the factory party organisations continued in 
the latter half of 1932. By the end of 1932, the number of workshop cells had
Ibid., pp. 35-36.
G. Glazkov and E. Ivanov, V avangarde piatiletki: Rabota zveniacheek na zavode "Krasnaia 
Zaria” (Leningrad, 1932), p. 36.
Partrabotnik, no. 17, September 1932, pp. 3-4.
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decreased to 1,156 and the average size of workshop cells stabilised at about 80 party 
members.’ "^’
Table 3-7. Number offactory party cells in Leningrad, 1932, 1933 and 1934
1 January 
1932 (1)
1 April 
7932 (2)
21 June 
1932 (3)
September 1 January 
1932 (3) 1933 (1)
1 Januaiy 
7934 r/J
Workshop cells 1,536 2,838 1,822 1,087 1,156 n. d.
Zveno cells 797 2,085 527 953 n. d. 1,077
Party units n. d. 15,359 8,032 3,999 n. d. 5,363
Note: The figure for 1 April 1932 seems to have been inflated when compared to other 
figures. No reason for that was found.
Sources: (1) Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), 
vol. 2, pp. 380-381; (2) Partrabotnik, nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 21; (3) Ibid., no. 17, 
September 1932, pp. 3-4.
Reorganisation in 1932 resulted in a significant simplification of all aspects of 
the party organisations within Leningrad’s factories. The over-elaborate party 
structure was considerably streamlined, and, as a result, factory party organisations 
came to have a far simpler structure than they had had in previous years. Moreover, 
the party committee responsible for the whole plant, rather than the workshop cells, 
became once again the focus of party work. This trend continued and was once again 
confirmed at the seventeenth Party Congress in 1934. At this Congress, Kaganovich 
dealt with the problem of the number of sectors along with that of the 
mnogostupenchatost’ of the multi-tier party organisations in larger industrial 
enterprises.’^^  Both mnogostupenchatost’ and the over-elaborate sector structure were 
to be remedied by the abolition of workshop cell bureaux and the creation of 
workshop organisers, in the name of more efficiently involving the party ranlc and file 
and activists. A new set of Party Rules, adopted at this congress, confirmed the 
abolition of a whole tier of party organisation in the factories, the abolition of the 
workshop cell bureaux which were replaced by organisers and the simplification of 
other levels of party organisation beneath the workshop level.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 381.
XVII s ’ezd VKP(b), 26 ianvaria-10 fevralia 1934 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Partizdat, 
1934), pp. 556-557.
Ibid., p. 672.
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4. Party Membership and Recruitment
The first FYP was a period of massive expansion in the party’s membership. As 
the idea of the ‘mass’ party had taken hold by the end of NEP, the policy of mass 
proletarian recruitment was carried out throughout the first FYP. The recruitment 
campaign’s priority was the enrolment of workers, especially those engaged in 
production. As industrialisation gathered pace, the importance of recruiting workers 
was increasingly stressed. Undoubtedly, this recruitment policy had a visible effect on 
the size of the party membership and the party’s social composition. The Leningrad 
regional party organisation, which boasted of its high worker representation in the 
party, experienced a massive expansion of its party membership and a compositional 
change in tenns of social origin, occupation and the length of party membership.
This chapter examines in some depth the party membership changes of the 
Leningrad regional organisation during the first FYP. The analysis of the party 
membership will make clear the impact of the massive worker recruitment policy of 
this period and its consequences on the party. Emphasis is placed on the effects of the 
recruitment policies implemented, the effects for party membership size and social 
composition. Following this is an analysis of how the mass recruitment of workers 
affected the party saturation at factory levels. This analysis shows the dynamic of the 
increase in both industrial workforce and party membership in factories. Finally, the 
way party members were distributed within factories is examined in some depth.
4.1 Mass recruitment and party membership change
4.1.1 Mass recruitment policy 1927-1932
The period 1927-1932 was one of rapid expansion for the communist party.’ 
During this period, not only did the party rapidly grow, but also it became more 
proletarian. Unlike the recruitment policy in previous years, for some years after
’ While the total stiength of the party, members and candidates, was over a million and three hundred 
thousand on 1 January 1928, by 1 January 1933 the total number o f membership rose to over three 
and a half million members and candidates. See T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the 
U.S.S.R., 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 52.
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launching the first FYP, official policy followed the traditional preference for 
working-class recruits to the party. As the party put greater emphasis on the 
improvement of the social composition of the party organisation in favour of workers, 
production workers in factories were strongly encouraged to enrol in the party over 
this period.
The background and motivation of this rapid expansion and ‘proletarianisation’ 
of the party can be explained in several ways. First of all, ideology and politics seem 
to have played an important role in this turn to the party’s original preference for 
workers. Even though the communist party had always proclaimed itself to be a party 
of the working class and set the target of bench-workers’ comprising 50 per cent of 
the party membership at the thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924, worker 
representation within the party was far from sufficient throughout the 1920s.^ 
Furthermore, the recruitment policy in previous years, from 1924 to mid-1927, which 
had not given any preference to industrial workers, inevitably resulted in a drop of 
worker representation within the party.^ The party leadership must have been 
uncomfortable with a low level, and even a drop, of worker representation within the 
party, especially when faced with criticism fi'om the Left opposition. Therefore, high 
levels of worker recruitment in this period were repeatedly quoted as proof of the 
correctness of the party’s line, espeeially in answer to the challenge of the Left.
Besides, the beginning of Stalin’s drive for rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation of agriculture in 1928 seems to have necessitated better party 
representation on the factory floor and in the countiyside. To the party leadership, the 
success of industrialisation and collectivisation seemed to depend on the support from 
the masses, especially industrial workers, and the enrolment of workers in the party 
was seen as a way of involving them in its policies. In particular, in the absence of 
material incentives, it was thought that support for campaigns like industrialisation
2 For the percentage of workers in the All-Union party in the 1920s, see Ibid., p. 116,
 ^ Due to the first and second Lenin enrolment, the proportion o f production workers in the total 
membership increased from 18.8 per cent in the beginning of 1924 to 41.3 per cent in 1925, and to 
42 per cent in 1926. However, from 1926 it began to decrease and by the begimring of 1927 only 
39.4 per cent were workers. See Ibid., p. 116.
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could be gained by involving people in party life.4 This was the reason why the 
importance of worker recruitment was increasingly stressed tln-oughout this period.
The turn in this direction came in 1927 with the so-called October call-up. Early 
in 1927, the party census had shown that the proportion of bench-workers was far 
from being 50 per cent of the whole party membership. Furthermore, it had revealed 
that the growth rate of production workers among party members lagged behind the 
growth rate of the total number of workers in the whole country, which indicated that 
there were enormous reserves for an increase of industrial workers in the composition 
of the party.^ On 13 October 1927, in connection with the results of the 1927 party 
census, the Central Committee adopted a resolution on the regulation of growth of the 
party, the effect of which was to emphasise the recruitment of workers, especially 
workers from large enterprises and factories. The drive was to be focused at the 
workshop level in large plants, and the komsomol and women’s organisers were to be 
more energetic in preparing suitable candidates for admission to the party. At the 
same time, obstacles to the emolment of white-collar workers were more stringently 
enforced.A month later, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik 
revolution, the party initiated an intensified phase of mass recruitment of workers: the 
October call-up. The drive was directed first and foremost at worker activists - i.e. 
those already active in party-directed social, welfare or other programmes in the 
factories. It was emphasised that this mass recruitment of the workers would bring a 
closer relationship between the party and the masses, and reinforcement of the leading 
role of the proletariat in socialist construction.^
The attitude of the Leningrad party organisation towards the mass recruitment 
of workers appears to have been enthusiastic. Given the fact that the Leningi'ad party 
organisation led by Zinoviev had strongly advocated the mass recruitment of 
production workers in the mid-1920s,^ it was not surprising that the Leningrad party
4 Catherine Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 
117.
 ^These 1927 party census results were quoted in statistical justification of the proletarianisation o f the 
paity. See KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s ”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1984), vol. 4, pp. 210-211.
 ^Ibid., pp. 210-213.
 ^Ibid., p. 251.
 ^The Leningraders had strongly opposed to conciliatory recruitment policies towards the peasantry. As 
a consequence, the part o f Northwest Russia contioiled by Zinoviev’s Leningraders was not touched
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organisation welcomed the party’s change in recruitment policies in 1927. Indeed, the 
Leningrad party organisation was one of several organisations which had appealed to 
the Central Committee with a proposal to step up the mass recruitment of workers, 
and this led to the October call-up.^ During the October call-up, which ran from 
November 1927 till 1 February 1928, some 14,035 persons applied for party 
membership in the Leningrad r e g i o n . I n  Leningrad city alone, 11,304 persons 
applied, which was the largest number of applicants in one city in the Soviet Union.” 
Out of 11,304, about 10,300 applicants were production workers (91 per cent),’^  and 
about half of them were metal and textile workers (41 and 15 per cent respectively). 
In Leningrad, the October call-up brought in 6,251 new candidate members, of whom 
94 per cent were production workers.*4 This was a much higher percentage when 
compared to those of the all-Union level: nationally, it brought in some 108,000 
recruits, of whom 80 per cent were production w o r k e r s . T o  break down the 
‘production stages’ of the October call-up recruits, 30 per cent had been involved in 
production for over ten years, 23 per cent for five to ten years, 24 per cent for three to 
five years, and 24 per cent for less than tliree y e a r s . T h i s  suggests that a large 
number of the October call-up recruits were less skilled workers: of those workers
by the deproletarianisation process in the mid-1920s. In the Leningrad region, farming peasants 
contiibuted under 2 per cent o f the 30,000 membership increase between January and September 
1925. Meanwhile large-scale recmitment of workers continued in Leningrad, and typical of the 
measures adopted to this end was a local conference decision to enlist a further 27,000 metal­
workers, with the object o f making every second metal-worker in the city a paity member. See 
Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R, pp. 143-145.
 ^ The Moscow, Bakin, and Rostov party organisations were the others. See KPSS  v rezoliutsiiakh i 
resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, p. 251.
Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 2, 10 Febmary 1928, p. 26. The figure 
given in Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980) seems to be inflated. It says that 
15,010 applications were submitted between October and December 1927, and 93 per cent were 
from production workers. See Ocherki istorii Leningi-adskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: 
Lenizdat, 1980), vol. 2, p. 171.
”  The Leningrad oblast party organisation had the second largest number o f applications in the 
countiy during the October call-up. It was only second to the Moscow oblast, where a total of 
17,500 persons applied for party membership. However, in the city o f Moscow, 10,500 persons 
applied for party membership, fewer than those in Leningrad. See Biulleten’ Leningradskogo 
oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 10 Febmary 1928, p. 26.
Ibid., p. 26.
’3 Ibid., p. 28.
’4 /W .,p .  31.
Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 167.
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 2, 10 February 1928, p. 31.
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recruited during the October call-up, over 47 per cent had worked in industry for less 
than five yearsd'^
The procedure for workers entering the party was speeded up after 1927, in 
order to ensure an adequate shop-floor representation of party members to act as the 
vanguard for the impending industrialisation drive. In August 1928, a further review 
by Malenlcov stated that bench or production workers still made up only 41 per cent of 
the total membership, and their share of recruitment would have to be raised to 80 per 
cent and kept there for a significant period if the party’s goals - bench-workers should 
comprise 50 per cent of the party membership - were to be met.^^ Based on this 
evaluation, the Central Committee adopted a resolution at the November 1928 
plenum. In order to achieve the 50 per cent bench-worker objective by the end of 
1930, it ordered intensified recruitment of workers for the following two years, 
specifying that no fewer than 80 per cent of all recruits should be production 
w or ke r s .Two months later, the Central Committee adopted a directive, which laid 
down that manual workers must constitute 90 per cent of recruits in industrial areas, 
70 per cent in agricultural areas and 60 per cent in the non-Russian republics. 
Accordingly, under the slogan ‘every second communist a bench-worker!’, the party 
launched campaigns for the mass enrolment of workers into the party.
Interestingly, the Leningrad oblast party organisation set an even higher target at 
the October 1928 obkom plenum: two-thirds (67 per cent) of the party membership in 
Leningrad were to be production workers.2’ In May 1929, the Leningrad obkom 
secretariat confirmed the target of two-thirds of the party membership in Leningrad 
and 50 per cent of the whole party membership in the region being production 
workers by 1 January 1931. It also decided that no fewer than 95 per cent of all 
recruits in urban raions of Leningrad and Kronstadt and no fewer than 90 per cent in 
Tsentral’nyi raion should be production workers. For other areas, the minimum 
percentage of workers was set lower; in half-industrialised olcrugs such as Borovichi, 
Novgorod and Leningrad okrugs, workers and farm labourers should constitute no
32.
Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 24, 10 August 1928, pp. 1-6.
KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, pp. 387-394.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 2, 8 March 1929, pp. 3-7. 
21 Ibid.,no. 12, 1928, p. 4.
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fewer than 80 per cent, and in all the other olaugs, no fewer than 60 per cent. It also 
decided that workers of no less than three years’ industrial work experience should be 
recruited in order to keep up the quality of party m e m b e r s . 2 2  Judging from the obkom 
resolutions, the Leningrad party organisation showed great enthusiasm towards the 
mass recruitment of workers.
Later, in 1930, the party opened the door more widely for the recmitment of 
non-workers, which was provided by a Central Committee directive issued in 
February 1930, entitled ‘on further work in regulating the growth of the party’. While 
emphasising the need to recruit more workers, the directive allowed for increased 
recruitment of peasants and the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . 2 2  The relative easing off of recruitment 
from social groups other than workers resulted in both the acceleration of the rate of 
recruitment and a drop in the proportion of workers among the party intake in the 
period 1930-1932.
Table 4-1. Number o f recruits into the All-Union, Leningrad oblast, and Leningrad 
city party organisations, 1927-1932
All-Union Leningrad oblast Leningrad city
1927 176,180 10,140 7,315
1928 262,031 20,742 14,540
1929 287,630 22,855 16,178
1930 670,529 50,872 37,110
1931 997,398 84,017 63,738
1932 760,367 51,445 38,552
Sources: T he figures for the A ll-U nion  p arty  o rganisation  are adap ted  from  Leningradskaia 
oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (L eningrad: Izdanie  L en ing radskogo  ob lastkom a 
V K P(b), 1933), no. 4, p. 14; the  figures for the L en ingrad  ob last and c ity  p a rty  organ isa tions 
are adap ted  from  Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (L eningrad: 
L enizdat, 1974), pp. 114, 116.
In the Leningrad region, a total of 229,931 joined the party in the period 1928- 
1932 (see table 4-1). In Leningrad city alone, some 170,118 were recruited, about 74 
per cent of all recruits in the region. The breakdown of total recruits by year of entry 
into the party shows that the rate of recruitment accelerated in 1930 and 1931. In the 
region as a whole, about 23,000 candidates were accepted in 1929, twice as many in
22 no. 4, 1929, p. 5.
22 KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i 7'esheniiakh (1984), vol. 5, pp. 87-89.
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1930, and almost twice as many again in 1931. In 1931 alone, over 84,000 joined the 
party, accounting for about 37 per cent of all recruits of this period. The growth rate of 
recruitment in the Leningrad region conformed to the general recruitment trend of the 
All-Union party organisation. Nationally, the rate of recruitment had accelerated from 
1930; about 300,000 candidates were accepted in 1929, twice as many in 1930, and 
almost a million in 1931 (see table 4-1).
Table 4-2. Current occupation o f party recruits in the Leningrad region, 1927-1932
Year Total
recruits
Of which workers Of which peasants Of which employees
N N % N % N %
1927 10,140 8,182 80.7 1,108 10.9 850 8.4
1928 20,742 16,124 77.7 1,180 5.7 1,803 8.7
1929 22,855 19,833 1,193 5.2 1,829 8.0
1930 50,872 43,972 3,722 7.3 1,639 3.2
1931 84,017 69,619 &2.P 9,580 11.4 2,772 3.3
1932 51,445 43,798 85.1 5,348 10.4 1,685 3.8
Note: The percentages are my own calculations.
Source: Adapted from Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973^ p. 114.
As table 4-2 clearly shows, workers comprised a large proportion of those 
admitted to the party. In the region, a total of 193,346 workers were recruited in the 
period 1928-1932, accounting for 84 per cent of all recruits. However, the breakdown 
of the current occupation of party recruits by year of entry into the party shows that 
there were some fluctuations in workers’ proportion. In 1928, despite a slight decline 
in the proportion of production workers recruited after the October emolment, 
workers accounted for 78 per cent of new members, and in 1929 and 1930 the figure 
exceeded 85 per cent. This meant that the Leningrad oblast party organisation had 
overfulfilled the Central Committee’s directive of 7 January 1929, and also the obkom 
secretariat’s resolution of May 1929. However, there was a 3.5 per cent drop in the 
ratio of workers in 1931. This was due to the increasing recruitment of peasants. 
Indeed, in 1931, some 9,580 peasants joined the party, and their percentage reached 
11 per cent. In 1932, the number of total recruits decreased to 51,445 persons, and the 
ratio of workers increased to 85 per cent whereas that of peasants remained 10 per 
cent (see table 4-2).
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Table 4-3. Proportion o f  workers among total recruits in the Leningrad city and All- 
Union party organisations, 1927-1932
Leningrad city party organisation All-Union party organisation
Total
recruits
Of which workers Total
recruits
Of which workers
N N % N N %
1927 7,315 6,378 <$7.2 176,180 121,229 6&<$
1928 14,540 12,485 85.9 262,031 186,089 71.0
1929 16,178 15,250 94.3 287,630 232,167 78.0
1930 37,110 35,665 96.1 670,529 451,836 67.4
1931* 63,738 61,158 96.0 997,398 629,823 63.2
1932* 38,552 37,238 96.6 760,367 491,312 64.7
Note: * Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (no. 4) gives different 
figures for 1931 and 1932. In 1931, a total of 59,916 were recruited into the Leningrad city 
party organisation, and workers made up 57,853, which was 96.6 per cent of the total 
recruits. In 1932, the total number of recruits was said to be 35,483, of which workers made 
up 34,383 (96.6 per cent). See Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh 
(1933), no. 4, p. 14.
Sources: The figures for the Leningrad city party organisation are adapted from 
Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, p. 116; the figures for the All- 
Union party organisation are adapted from Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) 
V tsifrakh (1933), no. 4, p. 14; the percentages are my own calculations.
The Leningrad city party organisation showed even higher percentage of 
workers among new members than the figures for the oblast as a whole. Already in 
1927 and 1928, the percentage of workers among recruits in the city exceeded 85 per 
cent. In 1929 the figure increased further to 94 per cent, and in 1930, 1931 and 1932, 
it remained at 96 per cent. These figures show that, except in 1929, the Leningrad city 
party organisation fulfilled the May 1929 obkom secretariat resolution which 
stipulated that 95 per cent of the recruits should be workers. Even in 1929, the figure 
was veiy close to the target of 95 per cent. The percentages of workers among new 
members in Leningrad city were extremely high when compared with the figures for 
the All-Union party. They were ten to 15 per cent higher than the national average 
tliroughout the period. In the All-Union party, proportion of workers among recruits 
reached its peak in 1929, recording only 78 per cent. Then, the national average fell to 
67 and 63 per cent in 1930 and 1931 respectively and stabilised at 65 per cent in 1932. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that the Leningrad city party organisation boasted that 97
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per cent of its recruits in 1931 were workers from the bench. 4^ in addition, the high 
percentage of workers among recruits, which had remained the same in the early 
1930s, indicates that the recruitment pattern in Leningrad city was not affected by the 
relative easing off of nonworker recruitment in the early 1930s.
4.1.2 Party membership growth
Party membership in Leningrad oblast rapidly expanded throughout this period, 
reaching its peak in 1933. It increased from a total of 119,446 to 278,280 between 
1928 and 1933, showing a growth of 230 per cent. In Leningrad city only, party 
membership increased from 90,277 to 220,991 in the same period. The growth pattern 
of the Leningrad party organisation conformed to the general trend of massive 
expansion in the All-Union party organisation. The growth was a continuous one in 
both party organisations throughout the period, despite the 1929-30 purges. This 
implies that those newly enrolled into the party outnumbered those expelled from the 
party in 1929 and 1930. Party membership, however, began to shrinlc from 1933, both 
in the All-Union and Leningrad regional party organisations. Two factors contributed 
to a decrease in party membership: party recruitment was completely banned in 1933; 
and at the same time, the party conducted a general purge, which resulted in a massive 
expulsion.25
The growth rate of the All-Union party membership was greater than that of the 
Leningrad oblast party membership, and as a consequence, the proportion of the 
Leningrad party membership among the whole party membership slightly decreased 
over the period. At the beginning of 1928, the Leningrad party organisation contained 
about nine per cent of the whole party membership, but by the end of the first FYP 
period, it contained only about eight per cent. At the same time, party membership 
expanded more rapidly in Leningrad city than in the oblast as a whole between
^4 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad; Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 374. This 
figure for the ratio of workers among the total recruits in 1931 seems to have been calculated from 
the data given in Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Leningrad: Izdanie 
Leningradskogo oblastkoma VKP(b), 1933), no. 4, p. 14. See information given in table 4-3.
There was no party recruitment between 1933 and 1935. The Leningrad oblast party organisation 
did not recover its 1933 membership level until 1957. The Leningrad city party organisation 
recovered its 1933 membership level sooner than the oblast one: its membership reached 220,729 by 
the beginning of 1952, See Leningi'adskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Leningrad: 
Lenizdat, 1974), pp. 69-71 and 114.
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January 1928 and 1933 (see table 4-4)7<^  As a result, the proportion of the city party 
membership in the whole party membership of the region increased from 76 per cent 
to 80 per cent.
Table 4-4. Party membership in Leningrad oblast and Leningrad city, 1928-1934 (1 
January)
Leningrad oblast party organisation_____ Leningrad city party organisation
Year Members Candidates Total Members Candidates Total
1928 93,088 26,358 119,446 71,714 18,563 90,277
1929 111,323 28,314 139,637 86,731 19,768 106,499
1930 118,666 32,249 150,915 96,138 23,988 120,126
1931 134,332 55,605 189,937 107,628 40,639 148,267
1932 161,487 91,227 252,714 135,596 67,270 202,866
1933 199,760 78,520 278,280 166,592 54,399 220,991
1934 145,217 48,045 193,262 122,601 34,810 157,411
Source: A dapted  from  Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, p. 69.
A breakdown of party membership by raion reveals that party membership in 
Leningrad’s raions more than doubled in the same period (see table 4-5). In October 
1927, the Moskovsko-narvskii raion party organisation was the biggest in Leningrad, 
containing 22,515 members, and the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi organisation was the 
second largest, containing 17,597 members. Within five years’ time, the party 
membership in these two raion party organisations increased remarkably - in 
particular, that of the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi organisation trebled. Later in 1930 these 
two raion party organisations were divided into two separate organisations each: the 
Moskovsko-narvskii organisation was divided into the Moskovskii and Narvskii 
organisations, and the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi organisation was divided into the 
Oktiabr’skii and the Smol’ninskii. In January 1933, the Smol’ninskii raion party 
organisation became the biggest with 38,347 members. The Naiwskii, Oktiabr’skii, 
and Moskovskii raion party organisations contained 33,229, 20,818 and 16,530 
members respectively. Party membership in the Vyborgskii and Petrogradskii raions 
also grew rapidly over the same period. In October 1927, the Vyborgskii raion party 
organisation had only 12,694 members, but by the end of 1932, it contained more than 
33,000 members, becoming the second largest organisation in Leningrad. Party
In Leningrad city, party membership increased by 145 per cent whereas in the oblast it increased by 
133 per cent.
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membership in the Petrogradskii raion increased from only about eight thousand to 
over twenty thousand in the same period.
Table 4-5. Party membership in Leningrad’s raions, 1927- 1933
Raion party organisations 1 October 1 October 1 April 1 Januaiy
1928 (1) 1930 (2) 1933 (3)
Moskovsko-narvskii 22,515 28,035 38,637 ~
Moskovskii - - - 16,530
Narvskii - - - 33,229
T senti'al ’ no-gorodskoi 17,597 20,293 25,345 -
Oktiabr’ skii - - - 20,818
Smol’ninskii - - - 38,347
Vyborgskii 12,603 15,236 19,546 33,611
Volodarskii 12,694 14,651 18,250 24,199
Vasileostrovskii 10,779 12,922 15,014 21,096
Petrogradskii 8,096 9,388 10,859 20,132
Sources: (1) Biulleten’Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 13, 1928, p. 33; (2) 
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1930), no. 2, p. 5; (3) Ibid. 
(1933), no. 4, p. 4.
The size of the party membership outside Leningrad was relatively small, 
despite a rapid increase in membership. In the beginning of 1928, there were only 
29,169 communists in the rural area of the Leningrad oblast, about 24 per cent of the 
total party membership in the oblast. However, by the end of 1932, the number of 
rural communists reached 57,289, which meant an increase by almost 96 per cent 
when compared to that of January 1928. The growth rate of party membership in rural 
areas lagged behind the growth rate in the city of Leningrad, and as a result, the ratio 
of rural communists in the whole oblast party membership had decreased to 19 per 
cent by the end of 1932. This is probably why party membership growth in rural areas 
was considered insufficient.^^
Table 4-6. Party membership in the rural area o f Leningrad oblast, 1928-1933
Year 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Party membership 29,169 33,138 30,789 41,670 49,848 57,289
Source: Calculated from Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, p. 69.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 375.
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4.1.3 Composition of party membership
The Leningrad party organisation had been one of the party organisations with a 
strong worker representation even before the proletarianisation drive.^s In both the 
Leningrad oblast and city party organisations, the percentage of workers by social 
origin continuously grew from 1922 onwards, and reached its peak by the beginning 
of 1926. In the Leningrad oblast party organisation, those from working-class 
backgrounds accounted for only 43 per cent in January 1922, but their percentage 
increased to 58 per cent in 1923, 61 per cent in 1924, 73 per cent in 1925, finally 
reaching 79 per cent in January 1926. In the Leningrad city party organisation, the 
percentage of workers was slightly higher than in the oblast party organisation, and it 
also increased from 48 to 82 per cent between January 1922 and 1926.^9 The massive 
increase of the ratio of workers among party membership took place particularly in 
1924 and 1925, when large numbers of workers were recruited into the party during 
the first and second Lenin levy.^^
However, between Januaiy 1926 and January 1928 worker composition 
decreased from 79 to 70 per cent in the oblast party organisation and from 82 to 76 per 
cent in the city party organisation.^* The official explanation was put down to the 
former gubemii party organisations (Pskov, Novgorod, Cherepovets and others) not 
having a strong worker representation.^^ Nevertheless, the fall of worker 
representation seems to have been caused by the increasing recruitment of those from 
white-collar and peasant backgrounds in 1926 and 1927.^^
When interpreting Soviet data on the social composition, one should keep in mind what the social 
categories of party members precisely refer to, since it can be either social origin, or current 
employment. ‘W orker’ relates to social background, parentage and previous occupation rather than 
actual occupation at the time o f membership.
The percentages of workers by social origin are calculated from Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS 
V tsifrakh 1917-1973, pp. 72-73.
The first Lenin levy took place immediately after Lenin’s death in 1924. As a result, in 1924 the 
Leningrad party doubled in size, and the number o f registered workers rose from 61.2 to 72.7 per 
cent of the party membership in the oblast party organisation and from 62.9 to 74.7 per cent in the 
city party organisation. The second one took place in the first two months o f 1925, when a massive 
influx of worker members into the party transformed the composition of the party organisations. As 
a result, worker composition reached 79.2 and 81.5 per cent in the oblast and city party organisation 
respectively in January 1926.
These figures are calculated from Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, pp. 72- 
73.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 169-170.
In the Leningrad oblast party organisation, the number of party members and candidates, who were 
from peasant backgrounds, increased from 4,211 to 10,541 between January 1926 and January
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Yet, at the beginning of the first FYP period, the Leningrad party organisation 
was still one of the best party organisations in the countiy in terms of worker 
representation.34 Moreover, the ratio of those from working-class backgrounds 
increased in the first three years of this period. In the Leningrad oblast party 
organisation, the percentage of workers grew continuously from 70 per cent to 78 per 
cent between January 1928 and January 1931. Then in January 1932 and 1933, it 
stabilised at around 77 per cent (see table 4-7). On the other hand, in Leningrad, the 
increase in the ratio of workers by social origin continued until the beginning of 1932, 
when the worker composition reached 84 per cent. From then on, the worker 
composition began to decrease, and by January 1933, among the 220,990 party 
members and candidates in the city, those from the working class comprised 84 per 
cen t .Tak i ng  into consideration the fact that the average percentage of workers by 
social origin did not exceed 64 per cent in the whole country in January 1933,^^ one 
can say that, by the end of the first FYP period, both the Leningrad oblast and city 
party organisations still had a relatively high proportion of workers by social origin.
Table 4-7. Social composition o f party membership in the Leningrad region, 1928- 
1934 (1 January)
Leningrad oblast party organisation Leningrad city party organisation
Year Workers Peasants Workers Peasants
N % N % N % N %
1928 83,903 70.2 10,541 8.8 68,191 75.5 3,512 3.9
1929 103,819 74.3 12,423 8.9 84,801 79.6 4,681 4.4
1930 115,897 76.8 12,588 8.3 96,903 80.7 5,873 4.9
1931 149,004 17,817 9.4 122,771 822? 7,401 5.0
1932 196,785 77.9 29,305 11.6 169,990 83.8 10,531 5.2
1933 214,824 77.2 35,099 12.6 184,665 83.6 12,798 5.8
1934 145,289 75.2 24,031 12.4 126,570 8&V 10,799 6.9
Note: The percentages are my own calculations.
Source: Adapted from Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, pp. 72-73.
1928. As a result, their proportion in the total membership almost doubled (from 4.8 per cent to 8.8 
per cent). On the other hand, the number of those from white-collar and other backgrounds 
increased from 14,118 to 25,002 over the same period. Their proportion also increased from 16 per 
cent to 21 per cent. See Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, pp. 72-73.
^4 According to data given in Izvestiia TsK VKP(b) on 20 June 1928, the Leningrad party organisation 
had a relatively high percentage (75.3 per cent) o f workers by social origin, compared to 66.7 per 
cent o f the Moscow party organisation and to 80.3 per cent of the Baku party organisation.
In January 1934, the proportion of workers by social origin decreased further to 80.4 per cent. 
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 447.
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However, during the first FYP period, what mattered more was the proportion 
of workers by actual occupation. Under the slogan ‘every second communist a bench- 
worker!’, the party had intensively recruited bench-workers, and this recruitment 
policy had a visible effect on the party’s social composition in tenus of occupation. 
Nationally, the 50 per cent bench-worker target was to be met by the end of 1930. It 
was claimed that the quotas of recruits by current occupation set out by the January 
1929 Central Committee directive were actually met in 1929. As a consequence, the 
proportion of communists who were bench-workers was rising rapidly, from 41 per 
cent in January 1928 to 44 per cent in Januaiy 1929 and to 46 per cent in January 
1930. In April 1930, eighteen months after the two-year drive was launched, the ratio 
of production workers had reached 49 per cent, and achievement of the target then 
seemed certain.^^ However, the All-Union party never achieved the target, and the 
ratio of production workers began to decrease from April 1930. By Januaiy 1931, 
bench-workers comprised only 44 per cent and their proportion decreased further to 
41 per cent in January 1933 (see table 4-8).^^
In Leningrad, the situation was slightly different. The Leningrad city party 
organisation had already over 50 per cent of bench-worker membership at the 
beginning of 1928. Therefore, it set the target higher than the national one: 67 per cent 
of party membership in Leningrad should be workers by occupation.^^ As production 
workers were massively recruited in the city, the proportion of bench-workers 
gradually increased up to April 1930, when it reached its peak of 64 per cent.^o 
However, from April 1930 onwards, the proportion of workers from the benches 
began to decrease, and by the end of 1932, bench-workers comprised only about half 
(49 per cent) of party membership in the city (see table 4-8).
Even though the Leningrad city party organisation never achieved its target of 
67 per cent of bench-worker membership, the position of the city party as a highly 
proletarised organisation was very clear. The proportion of workers among its
Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, nos. 11-12, June 1930, pp. 14-19.
The proportion o f workers from the bench had decreased partly due to the continued tiansfer of 
worker communists to nonmanual occupations, but mainly due to the increased recruitment from 
other groups o f occupation. See Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 184. 
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 12, 1928, p. 4.
40 K XVI s ”ezdu VKP(b): Materialy k organizatsionnomu otchetu TsK VKP(b) (Moscow, 1930), no. 1, 
p. 159. This figure meant an increase from 59.2 per cent in January 1928.
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membership remained over 50 per cent throughout this period, far above the national 
average of about 40 to 48 per cent (see table 4-8). For instance, in April 1930 workers 
engaged in actual production accounted for 64 per cent of party membership in the 
city whereas only 49 per cent of the whole party membership in the country were 
workers engaged in production.^' Moreover, party organisations in some of its more 
heavily industrialised raions were the most proletarian in the country. In 1929, for 
instance, the Moskovsko-narvskii and Volodarskii raions boasted bench-worker party 
memberships of over 70 per cent.42
In the oblast as a whole, the percentages of workers by occupation among its 
party membership was slightly lower than the figures for the city. In January 1931, 
bench-workers comprised about 54 per cent of the whole party membership in the 
oblast, and two years later, the proportion decreased to 45 per cent. Nevertheless, the 
ratio of bench-workers among the oblast party membership was still higher than the 
figures for the whole party (see table 4-8).
Table 4-8. Proportion o f workers by occupation in the All-Union, Leningrad oblast 
and Leningrad city party organisations, 1927-1933 (percentages)
1 Januaiy Leningrad city party 
organisation (1)
Leningrad oblast party 
organisation
All-Union party 
organisation (1)
1927 61.4 n. d. 39.7
1928 59.2 n. d. 40.8
1929 59.9 n. d. 44.0
1930 61.6 n. d. 46.3
1931 57.6 53.9 (2) 44.2
1932 57.3 53.6 (2) 43.8
1933 49.2 45.4 (3) 40.9
Sources: (1) The figures for the All-Union and Leningrad city party organisations are from 
Partrabotnik, nos. 9-10, May 1933, p. 74; (2) Biulleten’Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta 
VKP (b), no. 5, 1932, pp. 2-3; (3) Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), 
vol. 2, p. 375.
The massive recruitment which took place in the first FYP inevitably resulted in 
a change to the make up of Leningrad’s party membership, as expressed in terms of 
year of entry into the party. A breakdown of Leningrad’s party membership by year of 
entiy into the party in 1927 and 1933 clearly reveals that both the Leningrad oblast
4' Ibid., no. 1, pp. 17, 159.
42 Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP (b) v tsifrakh (1929), no, 1, p. 16.
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and city party organisation had gone through significant changes in their generational 
composition (see table 4-9). Traditionally, the Leningrad party organisation boasted of 
party members with pre-Revolutionary party standing and experience of the 1917 
revolution. In 1927, there were 3,786 such members, including 3,417 in the city of 
L e n i n g r a d . 4 3  However, their proportions in the total membership of the Leningrad 
oblast and city party organisations were not significant: they accounted for only six 
per cent. Instead, those who had joined the party during the Civil War comprised 
about 24 per cent of party membership in the oblast as a whole, and 23 per cent in the 
city of Leningrad only. This meant that about 30 per cent of the total membership had 
joined the party before and during the Russian Revolution and the Civil War. On the 
other hand, those who had joined the party in the period 1924-1927 comprised the 
largest part (over 65 per cent) of the party membership both in the oblast and city 
party organisations.
However, incomplete figures suggest that by the end of 1932 the proportion of 
each group had significantly changed in both the oblast and city party organisations. 
First of all, the absolute number and ratio of the party members of pre-Revolutionary 
party standing and of those who joined the party in the 1917-1920 period had 
considerably decreased by this time. For instance, in the oblast party organisation, 
their percentage had dropped from 30 per cent in 1927 to 11 per cent in January 
1933.44 The decrease in their proportion was partly caused by the decrease in their 
absolute number,45 but mainly by the massive recruitment, which had drawn a large 
number of new members in the period 1928-1932.
Secondly, the proportion of those who had joined the party in the period 1924- 
1927 markedly decreased: their share had dropped from 66 to 26 per cent in the oblast 
organisation and from 68 to 27 per cent in the city organisation between 1927 and
42 Since the figures in table 4-9 does not cover the whole party membership, these numbers seem to be 
imprecise.
44 In Leningrad, their percentage had dropped from 28.3 per cent in 1927 to 10,4 per cent in January 
1933,
45 In the 1927-1932 period Leningrad probably lost in absolute terms around 4,600 party members of 
pre-1924 date o f entry, around 23 per cent o f the total number o f pre-1924 party members in 1927. 
The biggest losses came from the so-called ‘civil war generation’ who joined the party in the 1918- 
1920 period. Clearly, the process o f supplying experienced cadres to other regional party 
organisations was partially offset by the andval each year o f substantial numbers o f party members 
of long-standing membership to take up study and subsequently to find employment. However, the 
losses o f more experienced party members seems to have been inevitable in the first FYP period.
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January 1933. Therefore those who had enrolled in the party in the first and second 
Lenin call-ups (1924 and 1925) and in the 1927 October call-up were no longer the 
majority of the party membership by the end of 1932.
Thirdly, those who had joined the party in the first FYP period became the 
largest part of the Leningrad party membership by the end of 1932, making up more 
than 61 per cent of the overall number of party members and candidates in both the 
oblast and city party organisations. In particular, those who joined the party in the 
1931-1932 period accounted for more than one third (35 and 34 per cent in the oblast 
and city party membership respectively). These figures suggest that the mass 
enrolment of this period had resulted in a somewhat younger and less experienced 
p arty memb ership.
In conclusion, one can say that between 1927 and 1933 there was an extensive 
change in the make up of Leningrad’s party membership in relation to year of entry 
into the party, even though there seems to have been little change as expressed in 
terms of the varying lengths of time spent as a member. As a result, by the beginning 
of 1933, the Leningrad party organisation became a mass organisation with its 
majority having joined the party during the first FYP period.
Table 4-9. Composition o f Leningrad party membership by year o f entry into the 
party, 1927 and 1933
Leningrad oblast party organisation Leningrad city party organisation
Year of entry 1927* Jan. 1933 ** 1927* Jan. 7933**
N % N % N % N %
B efore 1917 977 1.4 870 0.6 917 1.5 759 0.6
1917 2,809 4.1 2,479 1.6 2,500 4.0 2,150 1.7
1918-1920 16,789 24.1 12,791 8.4 14,364 22.5 10,542 8.1
1921-1923 2,931 4.2 2,594 1.7 2,559 4.1 2,229 1.7
1924-1927 46,116 66.2 39,685 26.0 42,502 67 .6 34,701 26.6
1928-1930 - 41,484 27.2 35,724 27.^7
1930-1932 - 52,691 34.5 44,210 33.9
N ot ind icated 33 0.0 - 30 0.0
T otal 69,655 100.0 152,594 100.0 62,872 100.0 130,315 100.0
Notes: * T he figures for 1927 are b ased  on the data o f  the 1927 party  census; ** The figures 
for 1933 do no t cover all p arty  m em bers; T he percen tages are m y ow n calcu lations.
Source: A dapted  from  Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973, pp. 87-88.
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4.1.4 End of mass recmitment in 1933
The massive recruitment of industrial workers brought about an unexpected 
negative result: a poor quality of party members. Although the party sought to recruit 
the leading workers, with long years of industrial experience and an enthusiasm for 
party and social work, workers of poor quality joining the party could not be avoided 
in this massive recruitment period. As the proletarianisation drive of 1927-1930 
opened the way for workers to enrol into the party without much difficulty, apparently 
inappropriate persons were also allowed to enter the party, and as a consequence, the 
quality of party members deteriorated over the period.
Indeed, workers could relatively easily join the party in these years, as party 
cells were keen to accept as many workers as possible in order to fulfil recruitment 
targets.46 For instance, at the Elektrosila factoiy, workers were encouraged to join the 
party by filling out questionnaires, which simply asked why they did not want to 
join.47 Another recruitment case illustrates how easily workers could join the party at 
this time. At the Krasnyi treugoFnik factory, 60-70 activists attended at an activists’ 
meeting where a zavkom representative spoke for collective entry into the party. When 
he asked who wanted to join, some ten persons raised their hands, and in doing so, 
they were admitted into the party.48
The negative side of the mass recmitment was soon felt and criticised. In 1930, 
it was claimed that sizeable quantities of those who had joined had become ‘ballast’ - 
that is, they failed to play any active part in the organisation, or else simply dropped 
out altogether. In the Petrogradskii raion, for instance, 17 per cent of its membership 
were classified as either ‘passive’ or ‘ballast’ in 1930.49 It was also admitted that 
many workers in 73 ‘communist workshops’, which had been formed in the city by
46 The relative ease with which workers could join the party in these years is shown by the fact that 
while in 1927 in the Soviet Union as a whole, only 44 per cent o f those applying to join were 
accepted, by 1929 the figure was 84 per cent. See P. O. Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus 
in the First Five Year Plan: The Case o f  Leningrad (CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, 
University o f Birmingham, 1983), part 1, p. 2, In the period from July 1930 to December 1932, 
almost 90 per cent o f those production workers who applied to join the party were accepted in the 
country, and in Leningrad the percentage was ever higher. See Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Moscow: 
Partiinoe izdatel’stvo, 1932), vol. 11, p. 30.
47 V. Beliakov and N. Zolotarev, Partiia ukrepliaet svoi riady (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1970), p. 87.
4S Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 52.
49 Ibid., nos. 11-12, June 1930, p. 12.
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June 1930, were party members only in the most fonnal sense of the word, 
undertaking none of the duties expected of them.^o
The growing concern over the ‘quality’ of more recent recruits was expressed in 
party journals from 1930 onwards. Following a period of mass recruitment in January 
1930, coinciding with the anniversary of Lenin’s death, Stalin emphasised the need to 
keep up the quality as well as quantity of party m e m b e r s . I n  Leningrad, more 
attention was given to the quality of party members in and after 1931. In 1931 articles 
in the Leningrad party press began to stress the need for a better quality of 
membership, if necessary at the expense of quantity. However, despite warnings about 
the poor quality of party membership, no immediate action was taken and the situation 
worsen further in 1931 and 1932. When the factoiy party cells had to recmit certain 
number of workers in order to fulfil recruitment targets, they could not avoid 
recruiting workers who did not meet the qualification for party membership. Indeed, it 
remained easy for workers with little experience in industry to join the ranlcs of the 
party. At the beginning of 1932, the Leningrad party leadership again expressed open 
disquiet at local organisations’ apparent preference for ‘quantity, without taking into 
account the quality of those a c c e p t e d ’ .^2
It was only in the summer of 1932, however, that the party seriously reviewed 
the work of factory party cells in this respect. The review showed that the work with 
candidate members was poorly earned out. It was complained that factory party cells 
were keen to recmit workers to the party, but that they did not do enough work to 
educate them. Many candidate members failed to show enough enthusiasm for party 
work. Some even did not pay party dues, and did not attend party meetings for months 
on end. There were cases in which party unit organisers did not even know who were 
party members within their b r i g a d e s .
6^ ) Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 6.
6' Stalin pointed out that although ‘the desire o f whole workshops and even factories to join the party 
is a sign o f the very great revolutionary upsurge {pod’’em) o f millions o f the working masses - It 
certainly does not follow from this that we should accept into the party everyone who wants to join. 
In workshops, in factories, there are all kinds of people - Therefore the party must retain the trusted 
method of adopting the individual approach to everyone who wishes to join the party - We need not 
only quantity, but also quality.’ See Pravda, 10 February 1930, p. 1.
62 K  IV-oi oblastnoi i gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii: Otchet Leningradskogo oblastnogo i 
gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b) (Leningrad, 1932), p. 83.
65 Partrabotnik, nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 28.
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Finally, at the end of 1932 the party announced a complete ban on all 
recruitment in 1933. This decision was undoubtedly influenced by this concern over 
the quality of many of the more recent recruits. The poor quality of party members 
also acted as a powerful rationale behind the decision to purge the party of 
undisciplined elements who had wangled their way into its ranks during the years of 
mass recmitment. The party completely banned all recruitment from 1933 to the end 
of 1936, and the emphasis was put fimily on the notion of quality until 1938. It was 
only in 1938 that recmitment began to pick up and the party once again took on the 
task of encouraging workers to join its ranks.
4.2 Party saturation and distribution of communists in factories
4.2.1 Recmitment work of factory party cells
As already seen in chapter 4-1, a great number of workers were recmited to the 
party during the first FYP. Undoubtedly, the massive worker recmitments were 
triggered by the desire to improve the social composition of the party. At the same 
time, it was believed that massive worker recruitments would guarantee support for 
party policy, especially for the rapid industrialisation drive, from the worker masses. 
Indeed, without support from the worker masses, it would have been difficult to 
achieve the extremely high tasks set out for industry. Thus, just as in the mid-1920s 
economic failure and political corruption could be explained as the results of ‘lack of 
self-criticism’, so in the 1929-32 period the characteristic style of Central Committee 
resolution on the state of mass-party work in an enteiprise linked failure in plan 
fulfilment to inadequate growth in the party ‘layer’ either in the enterprise as a whole 
or in specific parts of the enterprise.
As the party sought to recmit as many workers as possible during the first FYP, 
a great burden was placed on the factory party cells that were responsible for the 
recmitment of workers and the education of new party members. Quite detailed 
directives concerning recmitment were handed down to lower party organisations.64
64 For such insti'uctions concerning recmitment, see Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta 
VKP (b), no. 3, 1928, pp. 23-29; Instruktsiia o poriadke priema v kandidaty i perevoda v chleny 
VKP(b) Leitingradskoi oblastnoi organizatsii VKP(b) (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo 
oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), 1929); and RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2750, pp. 256-257.
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Factory party cells had, above all, to implement the ambitious recruitment targets that 
were set by higher party organisations. If they failed to fulfil these tasks, they were 
criticised for their poor work. For instance, when the work of the Moskovsko-naiwskii 
raion party organisation was reviewed in May 1930, the Central Committee 
responsible instructor criticised this raikom for not being able to achieve sufficient 
membership growth, and complained that many factories in the raion did not have a 
sufficiently high level of party s a t u r a t i o n .  55
As factory party cells experienced disaggregation and developed into a multi­
tier structure, the main focus of recruitment work shifted to lower party cells. 
According to the status of party kollektivy containing workshop cells, issued by the 
obkom bureau on 23 May 1928, recruiting new party members was one of the main 
responsibilities of kollektiv b u r e a u x . 66 However, already at this time, workshop cells 
were also given the right to decide on questions of enrolment as candidates and 
transfer to full party m e m b e r s h i p . 57 Later, when party committees were created within 
large-scale factories, they were granted a number of wide-ranging rights and 
responsibilities concerning the acceptance of new party members. At the same time, 
workshop cells, which were considered the main focus of party work, were given full 
"ustavnye prava\ By June 1930, all workshop cells had been granted the right 
independently to recruit new party m e m b e r s . 5S in Leningrad, this right had been 
already accorded to over half of its workshop cells by this time. Then, from 1931 
onwards, zveno cells were expected to carry out the recruitment of new members, as 
the focus of party work was transferred further lower down to zveno cells. It was 
agreed at that time that this would revitalise the party work at factories and draw more 
workers into the party since lower party cells loiew more about their workers and 
would be able to find suitable ones. In Leningrad, some zveno cells appear to have 
carried out the work expected of them. For instance, a party worker from the Karl 
Marx factory declared that the increase in party membership which took place in 
January 1931 was due to the effective work conducted by zveno c e l l s . 59
55 Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 52.
56 RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 202.
57 Ibid., p. 210.
5  ^Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow), vol. 8, p. 303.
59 Some 211 workers joined the party within a month. See Partiinoe stroitel'st\>o, nos. 3-4, February 
1931, p. 25.
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To recruit as many workers as possible into the party, factory party cells 
undertook various methods of recruitment. Raikoms and factory party committees 
undertook intense mass-political work at workers’ conferences, rallies of shock 
workers, and other meetings. At the same time, workers were individually approached 
by communists and encouraged to join the party through discussions.60 One of the 
effective ways of recruiting workers was said to be the distribution of questionnaires 
among non-party workers, mainly activists. Workers were asked to fill out 
questionnaires, which questioned why they had not joined the party yet and whether 
this was due to a lack of understanding the tasks of the party or family obligations, 
and so on. Then, party cells discussed the problem with individual workers based on 
the questionnaires they answered. In this way, the Elektrosila factory recruited most 
workers who had answered the questionnaires into the party in January 1929.6'
However, various seasonal campaigns were the most important recruitment 
method, where workers were accepted en masse with only a few questions asked.62 
For instance, during the period of mass recruitment in January 1930, coinciding with 
the anniversary of Lenin’s death, whole brigades, workshops and factories handed in 
collective applications for party membership.65 This kind of collective enti*y into the 
party was even acclaimed as evidence of the party’s close association with the 
working class although it was against party regulations, which stipulated that each 
applicant was to be considered on an individual basis. However, later in 1930, some 
of the practices employed by party organisations to attract workers into the party, and 
thus increase the figures, were criticised by the Central Committee. In particular, the 
method of collective recruitment, where workers were accepted into the party en 
masse to satisfy some arbitraiy target issued by the raikom, was condemned as 
contrary to the spirit of the party rules. For instance, a Central Committee organisation 
instructor criticised the way in which workers were recruited en masse at the Krasnyi 
treugol’nik.64 Facing criticism from a Central Committee instmctor, a party worker 
from the Ki'asnyi treugol’nik admitted that there had been one such case, but he also
66 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 373.
61 Beliakov and Zolotarev, Partiia ukrepliaet svoi riady, p. 87.
62 K X V I s ”ezdu VKP(b), no. 1, p. 9.
65 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 374. 
64 Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 52.
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claimed that collective admission was a rather exceptional way to recruit new
members.65
4.2.2 Composition of workers recruited to the party
During the first FYP analysts of party recruitment focused upon two variables: a 
worker’s social background; and his production experience and level of skill. As the 
party aimed to recruit leading workers, the party put great emphasis on drawing 
skilled workers with long years of industrial experience into its ranks. In the 
Leningrad region, workers who had worked in industry for at least three years were 
encouraged to join the party.66 However, the figures available show that variations in 
the composition of the workers admitted to the party in terms of the length of work 
experience were rather great among different raions at different periods (see table 4- 
10). For instance, in the Petrogradskii raion, only a few who were admitted into the 
party in 1929 had less than three years’ work experience. Furthemiore, the majority of 
those admitted into the party (79 per cent) between 1 July 1928 and 1 April 1929 were 
classified as skilled workers with long periods of industrial experience.6? However, 
not every raion managed to achieve the same level of quality among the intake. For 
instance, in the Volodarskii raion, among those admitted into the party in the fourth 
quarter of 1929, those who had worked in industry for less than three years accounted 
for as much as 27 per cent, while those who had worked for more than ten years 
accounted for only 16 per cent. However, the trend was completely reversed in the 
following quarter: only 12 per cent had worked in industry for less than three years, 
while 20 per cent had worked for more than ten years.
As the party sought to recruit workers with a long period of industrial 
experience, workers who entered industry before the Revolution were considered to be 
the party’s ‘foremost reserve’ for recruitment. In February 1930 those workers who 
entered industry before the Revolution accounted for as much as 50 per cent of the 
industrial working class in the country as a whole. However, too few of these cadre 
workers, it was claimed, were found in the ranlcs of the party. Among Leningrad 
workers, only 29 per cent of those who entered industry before 1913 were party
65 Ibid., p. 54.
66 Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, 1929, p. 4.
67 Partrabotnik, no. 12, June 1929, p. 35.
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members, and 37 per cent of those who began work between 1914 and 1917 were 
party members. Furthermore, four-fifths of Leningrad’s pre-1905 metalworkers still 
remained outside the party.66 Therefore, in 1930 much emphasis was placed on 
recruiting workers who had begun to work before the Revolution. In Leningrad, some 
30 per cent of those admitted to the party in the first quarter of 1930 were workers 
who began to work before the Revolution. In the second quarter, the figure increased 
to 32 per cent.69 All in all, workers who began to work before the Revolution 
accounted for some 26 per cent of those admitted to the party in 1930.76 In the 
Moskovsko-narvskii raion, workers with over 15 years’ work experience accounted 
for 17 per cent of those admitted to the party in 1930, a big increase from the 1929 
figure of five per cent.7'
However, the general picture presented by table 4-10 could not be considered a 
very positive one from the party’s viewpoint. When we consider the proportion of the 
workers had worked in industry for more than five years, the figures for Leningrad 
read: 56 per cent in 1930, 58 per cent in 1931, and 58 per cent in the first half of 
1932.72 These figures were much lower than the national figures, which were put at 68 
per cent in 1931 and 62 per cent in the first half of 1932. This suggests that a 
considerable number of workers who had a relatively short period of work experience 
in industry were also recruited into the party, and that their percentage among all 
recruits in Leningrad city was larger than the average percentage for the All-Union 
party. Indeed, workers who had less than five years’ experience in industrial labour 
accounted for over 40 per cent of those accepted into Leningrad’s party organisation 
in 1930, 1931 and 1932 (see table 4-10).
In particular, workers who had been working in the industrial sector for less 
than tluee years accounted for as many as 15 per cent of workers admitted into the 
party in the first quarter of 1930.75 In 1931 the ‘quality’ of new recruits worsened 
appreciably. In the first nine months of 1931, 17 per cent of those workers joining the
6  ^Partiinoe stro itel‘st\>o, nos. 3-4, February 1930, pp. 35-36. 
69 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 108.
76 Ibid., fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2713, p. 7.
7' Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1932, p. 52.
72 Partrabotnik, no. 17, September 1932, p. 24.
75 Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 27.
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party had an industrial work experience of less than three years and almost half of 
these had not even gone through the Komsomol, a situation considered to be
Table 4-10. Length o f industrial work experience o f workers admitted to the party, 
1928-1922 (percentages)
Less 
than 3 
years
Between 
3 and 5 
years
Between 
6 and 10 
years
Between 
11 and 
15 years
More 
than 15 
years
Petrogradskii raion
July 1928-March 1929 (1) 5.5 46.5 28.0 20.0
January-March 1929 (2) 2.6 45.1 26.4 11.5 14.4
July-September 1929 (2) 6.0 48.0 30.0 8.7 7.2
Volodarskii raion
October-December 1929 ( 3 ) 26.9 36.2 26.8 8.0 7.9
January-March 1930 ( 3 ) 12.3 18.3 31.5 17.4 20.3
Moskovsko-narvskii raion
1929 (4) n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. 5.0
1930 (4) n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. 17.0
Narvskii raion
January-March 1931 (5) 22.8 22.3 31.6 13.1 10.2
April 1931 (5) 20.0 24.5 32.2 12.8 10.5
May 1931 (5) 16.4 30.5 30.7 11.5 10.9
Vyborgskii raion
1931 (6) 18.1 23.1 27.6 17.2 13.9
Leningrad as a whole
January-March 1930 (7) 15.4 n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d.
J anuary- S eptember 1931 (8) 17.0 n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d.
July-September 1931 (9) n. d. n. d. n. d. 58.0
1930 (10) n. d. n. d. 56.0
1931 (10) n. d. n. d. 58.0
January-June 1932 (10) n. d. n. d. 57.6
All-Union
1930 (11) 15.4 20.1 29.6 18.4 19.5
January-June 1931 (11) 16.5 21.8 27.6 17.3 16.8
Sources : (1) Partrabotnik, no. 12, June 1929, p. 35; (2) Ibid., no. 1, January 1930, p. 23; (3) 
Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 31; (4) Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 52; (5) P. 
Lysakov, Partrabota v promyshlennom raione: Opyt perestroiki partraboty v nai'vskoi 
organizatsii (Leningrad, 1931), p. 75; (6) Partrabotnik, nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 62; (7) 
Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 27; (8) Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 44; (9) Ibid., nos. 21-22, 
November 1931, p. 133; (10) Ibid., no. 17, September 1932, p. 24; (11) Sostav VKP(b) v 
tsifrakh (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel’stvo, 1932), vol. 11, p. 16.
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intolerable.74 Although the figure decreased slightly to 14 per cent at the beginning of 
1932,75 it is evident that the quality of new recruits did not improve considerably in 
1932. Taking into consideration that a considerable number of peasants arrived in 
Leningrad and found jobs in a rapidly expanding industrial sector from 1930 onwards, 
some of the party recruits between 1930 and 1932 might have been linked, directly or 
indirectly, to the country side. 7 6 It was believed at that time that peasant elements 
among industrial workers in general and party membership in particular, had 
increased over the first FYP period.
The party sought to recruit as many skilled workers as possible during the 
massive worker recruitment campaigns. No comprehensive data exist, but those that 
are available suggest that in the early period of the massive worker recruitment the 
majority of those admitted to the party were skilled workers. For instance, some 79 
per cent of those admitted to the Petrogradskii raion party organisation between 1 July 
1928 and 1 April 1929 were classified as skilled workers.77 Likewise, skilled workers 
accounted for 92 per cent of the workers who were admitted to the party at Krasnyi 
putilovets between 1 October 1929 and 15 April 1930.7  ^As a result, by October 1931, 
the Leningrad party organisation achieved a higher party saturation level among 
skilled workers than the average party saturation level in its total workforce: 26 per 
cent as against 18 per cent.79
However, the ‘quality’ of the new recruits deteriorated considerably in 1932. A 
national survey of 551 enterprises employing 1,313 workers showed that unskilled 
workers comprised about one third of workers admitted to the party in the second 
quarter of 1932: only 16 per cent were skilled, while 30 per cent were unskilled. 
Likewise, in Leningrad a considerable number of unskilled workers were admitted
74 Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 44.
75 Ibid., nos. 3-4, Febniary 1932, p. 36.
76 In particular, in 1931 and 1932, most new workers were drawn from the countryside. See chapter 2 
of this thesis.
77 Partrabotnik, no. 12, June 1929, p. 35.
7  ^Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 51.
79 Ibid., nos. 21-22, November 1931, p. 133. In February 1930 one third o f the working class in the 
countiy was fomially classified as skilled workers, the party saturation among these workers varied 
from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. Among the semi-skilled workers it varied from 7.6 per cent to 26.2 
per cent (among Leningrad metalworkers). See Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, nos. 3-4, February 1930, p. 
35.
6^ Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 21, November 1932, p. 47.
170
into the party in 1932. During the first half of 1932, for instance, unskilled workers 
accounted for as many as 74 per cent of workers admitted to the party at the Krasnyi 
vyborzhets factory and for 60 per cent at Goszavod no. 4.^' Not surprisingly, there 
were complaints about the poor quality of new recmits in the city.
Table 4-11. Proportion o f shoclçworkers among total workers admitted into the party 
(percentages)
Proportion of shoclcworkers
Narvskii raion July-September 1930 81.2 (1)
October-December 1930 79.8 (1)
January-March 1931 84.7 (1)
April 1931 38.1 (1)
May 1931 95.5 (1)
Vyborgskii raion 1931 95.0 (2)
Leningrad July-September 1931 84.4 (3)
January-June 1932 89.5 (4)
All-Union October-December 1930 56.2 (5)
January-March 1931 70.6 (5)
April-June 1931 73.0 (5)
1931 76.0 (6)
January-June 1932 82.4 (6)
Sources: (1) Lysakov, Partrabota v promyshlennom raione, p. 75; (2) Partrabotnik, nos. 11- 
12, June 1932, p. 62; (3) Ibid., nos. 21-22, November 1931, p. 133; (4) Ibid., no. 17, 
September 1932, p. 24; (5) Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1932), vol. 11, p. 16; (6) Partiinoe 
stroitel’stvo, no. 21, November 1932, p. 46.
From 1930 onwards, shock work was widely used as a means of identifying 
potential party recruits. In recruiting workers into the party, the party laid special 
emphasis on shock workers. In its February 1930 resolution concerning recruitment, 
the Central Committee declared that ‘the active participation of workers in shock 
brigades and socialist competition and their genuinely progressive role in production 
are to be considered a major criterion of admission into the p a r t y F o l l o w i n g  the 
sixteenth Party Congress in 1930, the main criterion for applicants became that of 
shock-work, and factory party organisations attempted to attract the maximum
Partrabotnik, no. 15, August 1932, p. 76.
KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 5, p.
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number of shock workers into the p a r t y . 5^ The extent to which a worker participated 
in shock work was regarded as sufficient evidence of a worker’s suitability for party 
membership. Therefore, the meaning of party membership came to be bound up with 
shock work, and shock work became not merely a factor in labour productivity but 
also a system of political values.
In the country as a whole, 56 per cent of workers who joined the party in the 
fourth quarter of 1930 were classified as shock workers. This figure had inereased to 
72 per cent by July 1931 and it further increased to 82 per cent by July 1932.^4 in 
Leningrad, the proportion of shockworkers among those admitted into the party was 
higher than the national figure. Some 84 per cent of those admitted into the party 
between July and September 1931 were shock w o r k e r s , ^ 5  and in the first half of 1932, 
90 per cent.^6 in particular, the Vyborgskii raion showed an exceptionally high 
percentage of shockworker recruitment: 95 per cent of workers who joined the party 
in 1931 (a total of 13,131 workers) fell into this category (see table 4-11).^ 7
All in all, the available material we have of the composition of the newly 
admitted suggests that from 1930 onwards the quality of party recruits deteriorated in 
terms of length of industrial experience and skill level. As workers could enrol in the 
party without much difficulty during the massive worker recruitment period, workers 
of poor quality joining the party could not be avoided. Moreover, the party’s emphasis 
on the participation of workers in shock movement and socialist competition as a 
criterion of admission into the party did not guarantee that the best workers would join 
the party, since almost 70 per cent of all workers in Leningrad claimed to be engaged 
in shock movement and socialist competition by 1931.^^
4.2.3 Party saturation in factories
At the begimiing of the first FYP, Leningrad had a considerable party saturation 
level within its factories. In July 1928, as many as 18 per cent of Leningrad’s 
industrial workers were communists and the figure increased to 20 per cent by January
5^ Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 21, November 1932, p. 46.
4^ Ibid., p. 46; and Beliakov and Zolotarev, Partiia ukrepliaet svoi riady, p. 118. 
5^ Partrabotnik, nos. 21-22, November 1931, p. 133.
Ibid., no. 17, September 1932, p. 24.
7^ Ibid., nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 62.
See chapter 7 of this thesis.
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1929 (see table 4-12). In the following years, Leningrad was expected to increase 
further or at least to maintain its high party saturation level. However, despite the 
sharp increase in party membership within factories, it was not always easy to keep 
this level. Leningrad’s workforce expanded extremely fast during the first FYP (see 
chapter 2-3), and its growth rate often exceeded the growth rate of party membership 
within factories, which led to a fall in the party saturation level. As both the workforce 
and party membership expanded rapidly, the party saturation level fluctuated every 
quarter, though the fluctuation was not very great. Nevertheless, Leningrad 
maintained its 20 per cent party saturation level in January 1930, which means that 
approximately one in every five industrial workers were party members at this time. 
When we consider the fact that the national figure for party saturation level was only 
12 per cent in July 1928 and 14 per cent in January 1930,^^ one can say Leningrad had 
a considerable party saturation level within its factories.
However, the party saturation level in Leningrad’s factories began to fall from 
January 1930 and it had fallen considerably to 15 per cent by July 1931. In the latter 
half of 1931 the party saturation level gradually increased again, but it reached only 
17 per cent by Januaiy 1932. The main cause of such a fall was the massive and rapid 
expansion of Leningrad’s workforce which took place between January 1930 and 
January 1932: the workforce almost doubled, from 285,553 to 532,137. The party 
membership did not increase as fast as the workforce did: it increased from 120,126 to 
202,866, an increase of almost 69 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion of industrial 
workers among party membership decreased slightly from 62 per cent to 57 per cent 
over the same period. All these factors contributed to lowering the party saturation 
level within factories. However, the gradual increase took place in 1932, and by 
January 1933 it had reached 18 per cent (see table 4-12).
The party saturation level varied among Leningrad’s urban raions, as can be 
seen in table 4-12. For instance, in October 1928 the Vasileostrovskii raion showed a 
24 per cent party saturation, the highest figure in Leningrad at this time.^o In April
1930 party saturation among the Volodarskii raion’s industrial workers reached 24 per 
cent, which was much higher than Leningrad’s average party saturation level.
XVI s ”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet {bAo^cow. Gosudarstvennoe izdatefstvo, 1930), p. 84. 
^6 Partrabotnik, no. 2, January 1929, p. 50.
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Table 4-12. Party saturation in industrial worltforce in Leningrad and the All-Union 
(percentages)
Leningrad All-Union Volodarskii Petrogradskii Moskovsko-
raion raion narvskii raion
October 1927
January 1928 
July 1928 
October 1928
January 1929 
July 1929 
October 1929 
1929
January 1930 
April 1930 
July 1930
Januai*y 1931 
July 1931 
Oetober 1931
January 1932 
July 1932
January 1933
18.8 (1) 
18.0 (2)
20.1 ( 1) 
19.8 (3) 
19.2 (3)
20.1 ( 1)
16.0 (4) 
15.2 (4)
16.5 (1)
17.6 (5)
17.1 (1) 
18.0 (6)
18.1 (1)
11.9 (7)
19.0 (9)
20.0 (9) 
19.8 (10)
16.0 (13)
19.3 (11) 18.7 (13)
20.6 (12)
19.6 (12)
14.3 (7)
12.8 (8) 
13.9 (8)
23.5 (10)
18.6 (14)
18.3 (14)
Sources: (1) Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1933), no. 4, p. 33; 
(2) Biulleten' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 10, 1928, p. 33; (3) 
Partrabotnik, no. 22, December 1929, p. 58; (4) RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2754, p. 
71; (5) Partrabotnik, nos. 21-22, November 1931 p. 133; (6) Ibid., no. 17, September 1931 p. 
23; (J) XVI s"ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 
1930), p. 84; (8) Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1932), vol. 11, p. 60; (9) Partrabotnik, no. 2, 
January 1929, p. 28; (10) Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 29(11) Ibid., no. 2, January 1929, p. 14; 
(12) Ibid., no. 1, January 1930, p. 23; (13) Ibid., no. 2, January 1929, p. 37; (14) Partiinoe 
stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 55.
Meanwhile the Moskovsko-narvskii raion did not show a sufficiently high level of 
party saturation within its factories. For instance, the party saturation level of this 
raion was recorded as 19 per cent in 1929. Given the large size of industrial workforce 
within this raion and the importance of its factories for Leningrad’s industry, this 
party saturation level was not considered to be sufficient. Furthermore, despite the 
massive enrolment of workers into the party, especially during the ‘Lenin levy’ in
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1930, the party saturation level of this raion fell to 18 per cent by April 1930.^  ^ The 
insufficient level of party saturation of this raion was explicitly criticised by Central 
Committee instructors in May 1930.^2
Table 4-13. Party saturation in Leningrad’s industrial unions, 1 July 1928
Union Total
workforce
Among
whom
party
members
Total 
number of 
men 
workers
Among
whom
party
members
Total 
number of 
women 
workers
Among
whom
party
members
N % N % N %
Metalworkers 93,724 22.7 84,537 22.8 9,187 21.4
Chemical workers 26,169 16.1 13,384 21.0 12,785 10.9
Printers 12,351 21.5 7,313 24.2 5,038 17.6
Woodworkers 8,682 15.4 7,284 15.0 1,398 17.5
Leatherworkers 14,663 17.5 8,605 21.4 6,058 12.0
Paperworkers 2,935 22.5 2,242 24.0 693 17.6
Textile workers 60,297 11.4 18,241 17.9 42,056 8.6
Sewingworkers 13,198 10.9 3,679 15.4 9,519 9.2
Foodworkers 18,662 21.9 10,691 23^ 7,971 20.2
Total 250,681 18.0 155,976 21.6 94,705 12.1
Source: Adapted from Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 10, 1928, 
p. 33.
The variation in party saturation level across different branches of industry was 
rather great. As can be seen in table 4-13, in July 1928 party saturation levels within 
Leningrad’s industrial unions ranged from 11 to 23 per cent. The metalworking 
industry, which was normally hailed as the leading branch of industry, showed the 
highest level of party saturation. Party saturation levels among printers, paperworkers 
and foodworkers were also considerable. By contrast, textile workers and sewing 
workers showed low party saturation levels: only 11 per cent of them were party 
members. Such low party saturation levels seem to have caused by the fact that 
women workers, who showed an extremely low level of party saturation, comprised 
the majority of the workforce in those industrial branches. Indeed, women workers 
showed a lower level of party membership more generally than those male 
counterparts. In July 1928 the party saturation level among women workers was lower
The party saturation level decreased mainly because the workforce o f this raion expanded faster than 
the party membership within its factories did. See Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 55. 
Ibid., pp. 52 and 55.
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than among men workers in all branches of industry, except in woodworking. In 
particular, those working in the textile and sewing industries showed extremely low 
party saturation levels: about nine per cent.
A further breakdown of these figures by Leningrad’s raions shows that there 
was also a great variation across the districts. For instance, as many as 26 per cent of 
metalworkers of Petrogradskii raion were communists, while in the Moskovsko- 
narvskii raion the figure was only 20 per cent. Among textile workers, the 
Vasileostrovskii raion showed the highest party saturation (19 per cent), while the 
party saturation level in the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi raion was as low as 11 per cent.^^
Table 4-14. Party saturation in Leningrad by branch o f industry (percentages)
Branch of 1929 Feb. Jan. April July Oct. 1931 Oct. July
industry (1) 1929 1930 1930 1930 1930 (1) 1931 1932
(2) (3) (4) (4) (3) (5) (6)
Metalworking 24.6* 23.6 23.1 20.3 17.9 17.1 21.4* 22.1 21.0
Textiles 11.7 n. d. 15.4 n. d. n. d. 15.2 12.6 17.4 n. d.
Leather n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. 17.7 n. d.
Chemicals n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d. 13.8 n. d.
Note: The figures marked with an * include those working in the electrical engineering 
industry.
Sources: (1) XV let diktatury proletariata: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii sbornik po gorodu 
Leningradu i Leningradskoi oblasti (Leningi'ad: Izdanie oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932), 
tables, p. 90; (2) Ko 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b): Otchet oblastnogo 
komiteta VKP(b), noiabr’ 1927 g.-fevral' 1929 g. (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningi'adskogo 
oblastkoma VKP(b), 1929), p. 132; (3) Partrabotnik, no. 26, October 1930, p. 39; (4) 
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2754, p. 71; (5) Partrabotnik, nos. 21-22, November 
1931, p. 133; (6) 76W., no. 17, September 1932, p. 23.
In Leningrad, the largest party membership continued to be found in the 
metalworking industry in the following years. "^  ^ As can be seen in table 4-14, the 
metalworking industry maintained a considerable party saturation level throughout the 
first FYP. Its party saturation level remained over 20 per cent except the latter half of 
1930, when its saturation level was recorded as 18 per cent in July and 17 per cent in
Partrabotnik, no. 15, 1 September 1928, p. 6.
It is not clear whether this means that the metalworkers were politically more activated than any 
other groups of workers, or whether it is because more priority was given to the metalworkers.
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Oct ober .The  textile industry still had a much lower party saturation level than the 
metalworking industry, even though its party saturation level had increased 
considerably between 1929 and 1931. For instance, in October 1931 as many as 17 
per cent of textile workers were party members, which was a significant increase from 
the 1929 figure of 12 per cent. In the Moskovsko-narvskii raion, party saturation 
among its textile workers was recorded as 15 per cent in July 1928,^ <^  and it had 
increased to 17 per cent by April 1930.^^ This was positively evaluated by the Central 
Committee instmctor in May 1930, when the party work of the Moskovsko-narvskii 
raikom was reviewed.
In 1929, party saturation within the large-scale industrial enterprises was 
generally lower than in medium or small sized enterprises. At the giant metalworking 
factories employing over 6,500 workers, party saturation stood at 19 per cent in 
February 1929, while medium sized ones employing a workforce of between 1,000 
and 2,000 workers, it was as large as 26 per cent. At the largest textile factories 
employing over 6,000 workers, party saturation was ten per cent, while at medium 
sized ones employing a workforce of between 1,000 and 3,000 workers it was 13 per 
cent. Likewise, within the factories, the larger the workshop was, the smaller the party 
saturation. For instance, in metalworking factories where on average 24 per cent of the 
workers were communists, workshops containing over 600 workers had a 18 per cent 
party saturation, while smaller ones containing a workforce of between 100 and 200 
workers had a 28 per cent party saturation. In the textile factories, workshops 
containing over 600 workers had an 11 per cent party saturation, while medium sized 
ones containing workforce of between 300 and 600 workers had a 15 per cent party 
saturation, and smaller ones containing a workforce of below 300 workers had a 25 
per cent party saturation. At Ki’asnyi putilovets, workshops with a stable workforce 
had a 22 per cent party saturation, while workshops running shifts had a 19 per cent 
party saturation. At the Baltic shipbuilding works, workshops with a stable workforce
Even in the metalworking industiy there was great regional variation; in the Moscow and Leningrad 
oblasts the party saturation in 1931 was 20.5 per cent and 21.8 per cent respectively, while in the 
Ural it was only 12.6 per cent. Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, nos. 9-10, May 1931, p. 19.
Partrabotnik, no. 15, 1 September 1928, p. 6.
Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 52.
9 8 /W .,p . 52.
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had a 27 per cent party saturation, while workshops running shifts had a 16 per cent 
saturation.
As the party aimed to develop party work at large-scale enterprises which were 
considered the basic proletarian centre, the possibility of party membership growth at 
Leningrad’s gigantic enterprises was assessed to be considerable in 1 9 2 9 Later in 
February 1930 the Central Committee also specified, in its resolution concerning 
recruitment, that ‘in any recruiting effort large enterprises must be the object of 
special attention’.'®’ Afterwards, much emphasis was placed on party membership 
growth at large-scale enterprises, and during 1930-31 it became a general rule that the 
larger the enterprise the larger the party saturation.'®^ As can be seen in table 4-15, 
party saturation at large-scale enterprises grew rapidly between 1930 and 1931, and by 
January 1931 the saturation level achieved at the major large-scale enterprises in the 
country had become higher than the average party saturation among all factories: 14 
per cent as against 13 per cent. Both metalworking and textile industries showed an 
increase in their party saturation levels; in particular the latter showed a considerable 
increase fi*om ten per cent to 12 per cent. However, in the Leningrad region, many 
large-scale enterprises failed to raise the party saturation level in 1930. Indeed both 
large metalworking and textile factories showed a decrease in their party saturation 
levels, in particular the former showed a significant decrease from 24 to 20 per cent 
between January 1930 and 1931. It is tme that at the beginning of 1930 the large-scale 
enterprises of the Leningrad region already had a considerable party saturation level, 
far higher than the national average. Therefore, one can assume that it might have 
been very difficult to raise or even to maintain the relatively high party saturation 
levels within Leningrad’s large scale factories.
However, it appears that the decrease in the party saturation level was caused by 
the massive expansion of the workforce within large-scale enterprises. For instance, 
the industrial workforce at Krasnyi putilovets increased by 128 per cent between June 
1928 and April 1930, while its party membership grew only by 43 per cent. This led
Ko 2-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b): Otchet oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), noiabr' 
1927 g.-fevral’ 1929 g. (Leningrad; Izdanie Leningradskogo oblastkoma VKP(b), 1929), pp. 131- 
132.
'®®7W.,pp. 131-132.
'®' KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 5, p. 88.
'®2 Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 13, July 1931, p. 5.
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to the party saturation level at Ki'asnyi putilovets being reduced to 24 per cent. 
Likewise, many factories in the Moskovsko-nai*vskii raion failed to raise their party 
saturation level, and only a few factories had managed to increase it by April 1930.'®  ^
However, Leningrad’s large-scale factories managed to raise their party saturation 
levels from January 1931, even though the growth rate was not as impressive as in the 
country as a whole (see table 4-15).
Table 4-15. Party saturation at large-scale enterprises in the Leningrad region and 
the All-Union (percentages)
Number of 
enterprises
January 1930 
%
January 1931 
%
April 1931
%
Entire industry
All-Union 355 12.9 14.0 14.8
Metalworking
All-Union 100 15.9 16.2 17.3
Leningrad oblast 13 24.2 20.0 21.8
Chemicals
All-Union 14 14.9 13.6 16.3
Leningrad oblast 1 18.7 18.6 19.2
Textiles
All-Union 88 9.8 12.2 14.2
Leningrad oblast 10 13.5 12.6 14.6
Clothing
All-Union 18 15.6 14.3 16.2
Leningi'ad oblast 5 16.8 15.5 17.7
Source: Adapted from Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1932), vol. 11, pp. 60-64.
By October 1931 some large-scale factories, especially metal-working factories, 
had considerably raised their party saturation level (see table 4-16). For instance, 
between October 1927 and April 1930, the party saturation level at Krasnyi putilovets 
increased from 18 per cent to 29 per cent, and at the Lenin factory the figure jumped 
from 20 per cent to 30 per cent.'®^ Later, at the sixteenth Party Congress held in June 
1930, the Krasnyi putilovets was singled out for its high party saturation rate: 27 per
'®^ Ibid., no. 9, May 1930, p. 52.
'®4 RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 29.
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cent as on 1 April 1930J°^ In 1931 exceptionally high levels of party saturation were 
reached in some of the city’s giant metalworking factories, where entry into the party 
was particularly easy. At the Stalin factory, as many as 41 per cent of its workers were 
communists in Januaiy 1931,^^6 ^nd the figure had increased to 42 per cent by May of 
that year.^O”^ In October 1931, as many as 39 per cent of workers at the Stalin factory 
and 30 per cent at Krasnyi vyborzhets were party members. Approximately one in 
every four workers at the Baltic shipbuilding works and the Karl Marx factory were 
either party members or candidates.
4.2.4 Distribution of communists inside factories
To maximise the party’s influence on the mass of workers, the distribution 
{raspredelenie or rasstanovka) of the party membership tlnoughout the appropriate 
sections of the work of the enterprises became the major concerns of the factory party 
cells in the first FYP period. With the substantial growth of party membership in 
factories, emphasis was given to the appropriate distribution of communists inside the 
factoiy and workshop. Indeed, Kaganovich emphasised the importance of distributing 
communists within each enterprise in his speech at the sixteenth Party Congress in 
1930. He stated that ‘the distribution of communists in production has an importance 
in the party cell’s turning its face to production. Already the ninth Party Congress 
pointed out that it was necessary to organise party work in such a way that every 
enterprise would be provided with a minimum number of communists. However, by 
now, comrades, it is not a question of each enterprise. It is a question of each 
workshop, each corner, each unit, and each brigade, so that there should be the 
appropriate number of party members’.
However, it was not until 1931 that serious attention was paid to this issue. In 
May 1930 when the work of the Moskovsko-narvskii raion party organisation was 
reviewed, Pastulchov, the Central Committee organisational instructor, spotted that the
Other factories which were singled out for the high party saturation included the Kolomensk 
factory (48 per cent of its workers were communists), the Kramatorsk factory (21.2 per cent), and 
the Lys’vensk factory (20.1 per cent). These factories also had notably high proportions o f workers 
from the bench. See X V I s ”ezd VKP(b), p. 84.
Partiinoe stroiteVstvo^ nos. 3-4, February 1931, p. 29.
'07 Ibid., nos. 9-10, May 1931, p. 31.
'08 Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1932), vol. 11, pp. 66-67.
'09 X V Is"e zd  VKP(b), p. 65.
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Moskovsko-narvskii raikom did not provide factory party organisations with specific 
instructions regarding such questions as how to distribute party members."o As a 
result, party members were frequently distributed without prior planning, and some 
party cells had either too many or too few communists within them. Furthermore, 
there were often too few communists in the most important and decisive sector of 
production and too many were involved in administrative work and the like.*"
From the beginning of 1931, great emphasis was placed on the ‘correct’ 
distribution of party membership within the factory. The growing influence of 
communists on the rest of the workers, it was suggested, would lead to better 
economic results. In January 1931, while calling for the factory party organisations’ 
more effective leadership in production matters, the party explained that effective 
party leadership entailed the distribution of the party membership in the most 
important sections of the enterprise and the mobilisation of non-party activists and the 
entire mass of workers, so that each section of the enterprise could meet production 
targets within a set period of time."^
It should be noted that by 1931 the meaning of ‘correct’ distribution had 
changed. Earlier, there was supposed to be a roughly equal number of party members 
in each workshop that formed part of the enterprise. However, by 1931, more 
communist-workers were supposed to work in the ‘decisive’ sectors of the factory 
than in less important sectors. This was clearly stated in the Central Committee 
resolution of March 1931: the party strongly recommended that the party stratum in 
the priority workshops and major production sectors be strengthened.
Accordingly, the factory party organisations, from party committee down to 
zveno cells, carried out the work of distributing or re-distributing of their communists 
inside the factory and workshop. According to an article on the work of the Narvskii 
raion party organisation published in Partiinoe stroiterstvo in September 1931, in 
many factories communists were being distributed among workshops and brigades in 
order to ensure the fulfilment of the plan in the ‘decisive’ sectors of the factory. 
Factoiy party organisations were placing leading worker-communists in the most
110 Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 53. 
Ibid., no. 1, January 1931, p. 53.
Ibid., no. 2, January 1931, p. 43.
Ibid., no. 7, March 1931, p. 65.
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important units of production, in order to raise the quality of work and to mobilise the 
masses into the fight for a ‘militant tempo’.**"*
According to the examples given in this article, some factory party 
organisations had distributed party members as instructed by this time. For instance, 
in the third mechanical workshop of the Krasnyi putilovets, its communists had been 
distributed so that more communists worked in the decisive production sectors. In this 
workshop, which produced important machinery, communists accounted for 38 per 
cent of workers. Among the brigades which made up of this workshop, only two had a 
party saturation of between seven and 17 per cent. In all the other brigades, 
communists accounted for between 30 and 40 per cent of their workers, and in the 
metalworkers’ and fitters’ brigades, on which the tempo and quality of assemblage 
depended, as much as 43 per cent of workers were communists. The case of the 
turbine department at the same factoiy provides another example. On average, 29 per 
cent of workers in this particular department were party members. The assembly and 
mechanical workshops, which were considered to be more important than others, had 
a higher percentage of communists among their workers: 43 per cent and 32 per cent 
respectively. Other workshops had a lower percentage. Communists were distributed 
in a similar way among brigades. In brigades such as metalworker-motor carters, 
paper-hangers, and turbine workers, almost half of the workers were communists. In 
other less important brigades, there were fewer. In this way, the majority of 
communists were concentrated in the most decisive sectors of production. There were 
many other such examples, and this was interpretated that factory party organisations 
understood the important role that correctly distributing communists played in the 
process of implementing the plan in workshops and factories.* *^
Furtheimore, some factories in the Narvskii raion already distributed party 
members appropriately in each shift. At this time, most workshops were running two 
to three shifts, sometimes four shifts. To influence all of the workers, it was necessary 
to distribute party members in each shift. For instance, at the Regenerator factory, 
which ran thi*ee shifts, each shift had a substantial number of party members: in the 
first shift containing 84 workers, 28 were party members; in the second shift
* *"* Ibid., no. 17, September 1931, p. 11. 
**^7W .,pp. 11-12.
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containing 57 workers, 24 were party members; and in the third shift containing 49 
workers, 14 were party members. However, in many other factories, not enough 
attention was paid to the proper distribution of party members in each shift. For 
instance, at the Sevemyi verf shipbuilding works, the first shift, which contained 
5,420 workers, had 1,107 party members, while in the second shift, which contained 
620 workers, only 163 were party members and in the third shift, which contained 230 
workers, only 54 were party members.*'*^
Towards the end of 1931, further work was done in this sphere. By November 
1931, more factories in the Narvskii raion had distributed their party members as 
instructed. For instance, at Krasnyi putilovets 19 per cent of its workers were party 
members. However, the most important and vital sectors of factory had a much higher 
level of party saturation: party members accounted for 38 per cent of workers in the 
third mechanical workshop and 60 per cent of workers in the tractor-assembling 
workshop. At the Kirov factory, 34 per cent of its total workforce were party 
members, but the percentage was much higher in a leading mechanical workshop 
within the factory: 61 per cent. "7
At the same time, the party made every effort to maximise its influence on the 
workers of leading professions. The party recruited as many of them as possible, and 
simultaneously, it allocated party members to the most important positions within the 
factory. The article on the work of Narvskii raion party organisation showed that by 
September 1931 important posts of economic management had been occupied by 
party members. At Krasnyi treugoFnik, all factory managers and many workshop 
managers were party members. At Krasnyi putilovets, almost all departments were 
headed by communists who were also experienced economic managers. In workshops 
such as car-manufacturing, mechanical-assembly, and repairs, highly qualified 
workers with a long period of work experience became the workshop managers. In 
many workshops 50-60 per cent of junior managers were party members.*
The case of the Stalin factory illustrates how the factory party organisation 
increased its influence by redistributing party members into the leading sectors. In
* * ^ /W .,p . 12.
* *7 Ibid., no. 22, November 1931, p. 43.
* *^  Ibid., no. 17, September 1931, p. 11.
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October 1931, the turner machines were one of the causes of a ‘bottle-neck’ in 
production in the turbine workshop. Therefore, the workshop cell paid special 
attention to this seetor’s work. The workshop cell launched a recruitment campaign 
and as a result, the number of party members working in this sector increased to 30, a 
big increase from two to three party members at the beginning of 1931. Among those 
admitted to the party, many were classified as leading shockworkers. In this way, the 
workshop cell increased ‘party influence over every machine’. Moreover, in this 
factory, party members had already been put to work in the most decisive sectors, 
where the work was most highly skilled. For instance, in the turbine workshop, a 
higher percentage of party members worked with the most important machines than 
with other machines, 62 per cent as against 15 per cent.**9
However, not all factories managed to distribute party members as instructed. In 
a number of factories, party organisations did not have much influence on distributing 
party members and did not recmit enough workers into the party. As a result, they 
failed to strengthen the party core in the leading sectors and also among the leading 
groups of highly qualified workers. In November 1931, at the Sovetskaia zvezda 
factory, the party membership was not appropriately distributed. Even though the 
fulfilment of the industrial-production plan of the whole factory depended on the work 
of the spimring workshop, only six per cent of workers in this workshop were party 
members. This figure was actually lower than the figures for other workshops, where 
party members accounted for between eight per eent and 13 per cent of the workers. 
Likewise, at Krasnyi Ichimik, the proportion of party members reached 67 per cent 
among diggers, 31 per cent among carpenters, and 34 per cent among stove-makers. 
However, there was not a single party members among workers in the most important 
professions such as boiler-makers.*^^
One of the problems factory party organisations faced while redistributing party 
members inside a factory was that foremen and brigade leaders sometimes refused to 
reallocate their workers. The case of the model workshop in the Stalin factory clearly 
illustrates this issue. When this workshop failed to meet the economic target and 
showed no increase in party membership, factory party organisations attempted to
* * 9 W., nos. 19-20, October 1931, pp. 25-26.
*79 Ibid., no. 22, November 1931, p. 43.
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redistribute party members within it. The uneven and incorrect distribution of party 
members within this workshop was, it was said, the main cause of such problems. A 
substantial number of party members - almost all party activists - were working in the 
upper part of the workshop, while only two of them were working in the lower part. 
The latter could not exert any influence on the workers, especially when some 
workers showed a reluctance to fulfil the party directives set for this workshop. The 
two members suffered from the hostile attitude of some workers towards them, and 
anyone who wanted to join the party faced maltreatment from other workers. 
Therefore, it was felt absolutely necessary to redistribute party members within the 
workshop in order to increase party influence on workers. However, in doing so, the 
party cells faced serious opposition from economic managers. Foremen and brigade- 
leaders refused to redistribute their workers on the grounds that the transfer of workers 
would cause dismption to production. Party members could be redistributed only after 
the party cells overcame the strong opposition of managers. Later on, it was claimed 
that communists who had been transferred to the lower part of the workshop fonned a 
strong party core in every sector of production, and that, due to the ‘correct’ 
redistributing of communist-workers, the industrial-financial plan was fulfilled and 
more workers, especially shockworkers, were recruited to the party.*7i
This was just one of many cases where the party organisations faced opposition 
from industrial managers while redistributing communist-workers. In the turbine 
workshop of the same factory, foremen strongly opposed the redistribution of 
workers. Therefore, the zveno cell had to call a general meeting, where the foreman’s 
report on the distribution of workers was heard. At this meeting, the foreman was 
severely criticised by communists. After this event, it was claimed, party influence 
reached all shifts and the factoiy obtained many successes in all aspects of
production. *72
Nevertheless, by 1932, many factory party organisations in Leningrad had 
allocated their members as instructed. For instance, in March 1932 it was agreed that 
in most factories of the Narvskii raion, party members were distributed appropriately 
within the factory. At the Krasnyi putilovets, whose party saturation was put at 17 per
*7* Ibid., nos. 19-20, October 1931, p. 25.
*77 Ibid., p. 25.
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cent by this time, the leading sectors had more than 20 per cent party saturation. Party 
members accounted for 20 per cent of the workers in the tractor department, 38 per 
cent in the third mechanical workshop, and 24 per cent in the rolling-mill workshop. 
At the Molotov factory, as many as 48 per cent of the workers in the no. 2 iron 
foundiy were party members while the average party saturation was only 30 per cent. 
At Promteldmik and Krasnyi treugoFnik, 25 per cent of the workers in the rolling-mill 
were party members while the average party saturation in the factory was only 16 per 
cent. There were many other such examples. In addition, most factory party 
organisations managed to distribute comparatively evenly the party strength at each 
shifts. For instance, in the tyre factoiy of the Krasnyi treugoFnik, each shift had a 
roughly even proportion of party members. The figure for the first shift were 15 per 
cent, and for the second and third shifts it was 16 per cent. Likewise, in many other 
factories of this raion including the Sevemyi verf shipbuilding works and the 
Regenerator factory, party members were distributed so that each shift had an equal
proportion. *73
Table 4-17. Party saturation within each shift at the SevkabeV factory, March 1932
First shift Second shift Third shift
<1> <2> <3> <1> <2> <3> <1> <2> <3>
N N % N N % N N %
Workshop no. 1 180 152 84.4 54 8 14.8 78 14 17.9
Workshop no. 2 127 51 40.2 84 22 26.2 50 12 24.0
Workshop no. 3 150 31 20.7 125 18 14.4 110 15 13.6
Workshop no. 4 130 23 17.7 114 17 14.9 42 8 19.0
Workshop no. 5 151 31 20.5 48 11 22.9 32 6 18.8
Notes: Column <1> is for the total number of workers; column <2> is for the total number of 
party members; column <3> is for the proportion of communists in the total workforce; the 
percentages are my own calculations.
Source: Partrabotnik, nos. 5-6, March 1932, p. 68.
In the factories of other raions, the situation was more or less similar to the 
examples given above. For instance, at the Svetlana factory of the Vyborgskii raion, 
party saturation in the brigades of decisive production sectors reached up to 70 per 
cent, while in the remaining brigades it fluctuated at about 35 per cent. *7"* At the
*73 Partrabotnik, nos. 5-6, March 1932, pp. 47-48.
*74 p. 52.
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SevkabeT factory of the Vasileostrovskii raion, the more important the workshop was, 
the higher the party saturation. As can be seen in table 4-17, workshop no. 1 and no. 2, 
which were the most important production sectors, had a higher party saturation than 
other workshops. In particular, in the first shift of workshop no. 1, party saturation 
reached 84 per cent. By concentrating communist-workers in the most decisive 
production sector, it was claimed, this factory could achieve the fulfilment of the 
production tasks.*75
However, the ‘correct’ distribution of party members did not always guarantee 
the degree of influence that the party had hoped for. For instance, in the building- 
constmction workshop of the Mart’ shipbuilding works, party members were 
distributed appropriately. In this workshop, the average party saturation was 22 per 
cent. The party saturation among workers of leading professions was higher than in 
the other groups of workers: it was 48 per cent among sorters, 25 per cent among 
crane-operators and among planers, 22 per cent among inspectors, and 16 per cent 
among ship-assemblers. However, party influence on non-party workers was 
completely unsatisfactory, due to the fact that the party cell of this workshop did not 
undertake mass-agitation and explanatory work seriously enough. *7^
Therefore, by the time that party work was being restructured and the emphasis 
was shifting from economic to mass-political work, it was commonly accepted that 
the ‘mechanical’ distribution of party members would not always lead to an 
improvement in party work or increased party influence. As Ugarov, the Leningrad 
gorkom secretary, pointed out, in his speech to the all-city meeting of workshop cell 
secretaries on 16 September 1932, ‘allocating communists was not the end of the task, 
but the first stage of party work’. As he emphasised, the question was not that an 
appropriate number of party members should be distributed among workshops, but 
that party members should be distributed so that they would exercise party influence 
on major sections and so that this influence would actually reach workers. *7? 
Henceforth, less attention was paid to the issue of the distribution of party members 
than in previous years.
*73 Ibid., p. 68.
*79 Ibid., nos. 11-12, June 1932, p. 27.
*77 Ibid., no. 17, September 1932, p. 8.
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5. Party Purges in 1929-30 and 1933
This chapter concerns two party purges: one carried out during the first FYP and 
the other launched immediately after the end of the first FYP. Although a purge 
became a regular feature of party life and standard practice in the 1920s, no full-scale 
campaign had been held since 1921. It was only in 1929 and 1930 that the general 
party purge was conducted in a national scale for the first time since 1921. The 1929- 
30 party purge, the first as such under Stalin, was carried out in conjunction with an 
enthusiastic recruitment campaign. The second purge under Stalin came two and a 
half years after the completion of the first purge, and this time the purge was earned 
out in a completely different atmosphere: with the imposition of a ban on further 
recruitment. Nevertheless, both party purges had a discernible effect on the size and 
composition of party membership.*
This chapter examines the conduct of the 1929-30 and 1933 party purges in the 
Leningrad region and their impact on the Leningrad party membership. After the 
general background of each purge is briefly looked at, the conduct of purges at the 
local level is considered. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the effects of the
The party purges have been an interesting subject for researchers, and a considerable amount of work 
has been done on this subject. However, main focus of research has been normally placed on the 
purges in the mid-1930s, and the 1929-30 and 1933 purges have drawn relatively little attention. 
Rigby’s work on the communist party membership in the period 1917-1967 provides a general 
background infoimation on party membership change at the national level, including some 
information on the 1929 and 1933 party purges. J. A. Getty’s book on the party purges in the 1930s 
provides useful information on the 1929 and 1933 purges at the All-Union level. He focused more 
on the organisational aspects, and argued that the organisational confusion was the main cause of 
the conducting of party purges in the 1930s. See T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the 
U.S.S.R., 1917-}967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); and J. Arch Getty, Origins o f  
the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). Party purges conducted at the local level were relatively untouched. 
Fainsod’s work on the Smolensk region is of special interest since it contains a detailed information 
on the 1929-30 party purge. However, it provides less information on the 1933 purge. P. O. 
Gooderham’s discussion paper illustrates the impact o f the 1933 purge on the Leningrad party 
organisation. Both Catherine M enidale and Nobuo Shimotomai dealt with the party purges in the 
Moscow region. The former considered mainly the 1929 purge and the latter the 1933 purge. See 
Merle Fainsod, Smolensic under Soviet Rule (London: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 210-222; P. O. 
Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan: The Case o f  Leningrad 
(CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, University of Birmingham, 1983), part 2, pp. 13-23; 
Catherine Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin: The Communist Party in the Capital, 
1925-32 (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 174, 180, 211, 213-216; and Nobuo Shimotomai, Moscow  
Under Stalinist Rule, 1931-34 (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 16-21. For the effects o f the 1929-30 
and 1933 purges on the mral communists, see Daniel Thorniley, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet 
Rural Communist Party, 1927-39 (London: Macmillan, 1988), chapters 3 and 9.
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party purges for party membership size and social composition. The political aspects 
of two purges are not dealt with extensively in this chapter since the focus of the 
analysis is limited to the effect of the purges on party membership.
5.1 The 1929-30 party purge
5.1.1 The general background of the 1929-30 party purge
In 1929 and 1930, the mass recruitment of workers into the party was 
accompanied by a general purge of the party. The 1929 general purge of rank-and-file 
party membership, referred to as both chistka (sweeping, cleaning) and proverka 
(verification), was initiated at the sixteenth Party Conference of April 1929 and lasted 
till May 1930. In accordance with the resolution ‘On the Purging and Verification of 
Members and Candidates of the CPSU,’^  that was adopted at the sixteenth Party 
Conference, ordinary ranlc and file party members were subjected to review and 
allegedly unfit members were expelled from the party.
In general, a membership purge was initiated in response to a specific situation, 
and the 1929-30 purge was no exception. As widely known, socio-political upheavals 
caused by grain procurement difficulties at the beginning of 1928 brought about the 
abandonment of NEP policies and led to a change in the general line of the party, from 
NEP to rapid industrialisation and collectivisation. Although the party leadership tried 
to hide the division between the Stalinists and the Buldiarinist ‘Right’ over the pace 
and methods of collectivisation and industrialisation, an intense power struggle 
between the Stalin group and the Right opposition had been developing since April 
1928. In connection with the struggle against the Right opposition, the purge of the 
Moscow party organisation ran from October to December 1928. Party leaders who 
had the right-wing view were dismissed from the Moscow organisation: Uglanov, 
secretary of the Moscow organisation, and his subordinates were removed from their 
posts.7
7 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenwnov TsK (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatiiry, 1984), vol. 4, pp. 484-493.
 ^ The Right oppositionists had a strong hold in the Moscow oblast party organisation. For more 
information on the 1928 party purge in the Moscow region, see Leonard Schapiro, The Communist 
Party o f  the Soviet Union (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 368-371; M enidale, M o s c o m >  Politics and
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Meanwhile, piecemeal purges of some regional party organisations and the 
purges of state and economic institutions took place in 1928. The grain crisis led to 
the screenings of seven oblast and gubemiia party organisations and alleged 
‘bureaucrats’ and ‘corrupt elements’ were expelled from the party in those regions."* 
On the other hand, the Shakhty affair was followed by a purge of the administrative 
and managerial persormel within the government and industrial institutions. No 
overall data on the results of this purge are available, but according to the data given 
at the sixteenth Party Conference, approximately 20,000 officials had been removed 
from their posts by the beginning of 1929.^
It was against this political background that the desire to launch a general purge 
was first expressed at the November 1928 Central Committee plenum.^ While calling 
for an extensive recruitment of workers into the party, the Central Committee declared 
that ‘the broad recruitment of workers must be combined with strict verification of the 
cunent party compositions and with the most resolute purge of socially alien, 
bureaucratised, degenerate elements, and other hangers-on.’ In the same resolution, it 
was also declared that ‘intensified measures, considerably stronger than those of 
recent years, must be applied to purge the party organisations of elements who exploit 
their membership in the ruling party for their own selfish and careerist goals, 
degenerate bourgeois naiTOW-minded elements, which have fused with the kulaks.’7 It 
appears that the party leadership intended to proletarialise the party membership by 
means of extensive working-class recruitment as well as purging at the same time.
Soon after the decision on the general party purge was taken at the November 
1928 plenum of the Central Committee, preparations for a general purge of the party 
were under way under the direction of E. M. laroslavskii. Secretary of the Party 
Collegium of the Central Control Commission. In a statement published in March 
1929, laroslavskii called for a careful re-examination of the party’s ranks in order to
the Rise o f  Stalin, pp. 57-59; and Nobuo Shimotomai, ‘Defeat o f the Right Opposition in Moscow 
Party Organization: 1928’, Japanese Slavic and East European Studies, vol. 4, 1983, pp. 15-34.
4 During these screenings an average of 12-13 per cent o f their party members were expelled. XVI 
konferentsiia VKP(b), apreV 1929 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvemioe 
izdatel’stvo, 1962), p. 592.
 ^Ibid., p. 461.
 ^ For the background leading up to the decision to launch the purge, see E. H. Carr, Foundations o f  a
Planned Economy (London: Macmillan, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 142-147.
7 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, pp. 392-393.
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counter petty bourgeois influences hampering the advance to socialism.^ laroslavskii’s 
‘thesis’ was endorsed by a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission held on the eve of the sixteenth Party Conference,^ and formed 
the basis of the conference resolution that had already been mentioned.
At the sixteenth Party Conference, the party approved a general party purge by 
adopting the resolution formulated by laroslavskii. In the resolution, the official 
reasons for the launching of the party purge were stated as follows: ‘in the period of 
the reconstruction of the socialist economy of the country, which is bound up with a 
socialist attack on capitalist elements in both city and country and with a shaipening 
of the class struggle, the party must re-examine its ranks with special care in order to 
strengthening resistance to the influence of petty-bourgeois moods, to make the party 
more homogeneous, and better able to fight in overcoming the difficulties of the 
socialist reconstmction of the national economy.’*** It is quite clear from the passage 
above that its main purpose was to cleanse party ranlcs of elements who were opposed 
to the programme of collectivisation and industrialisation to which the party was now 
committed. Anyone who had doubts about the new direction of party policy could be 
subject to expulsion from the party. In other words, the 1929-1930 purge was 
necessitated in order to compel party members to adjust to the new task of the rapid 
industrialisation and collectivisation drive.
According to the same conference resolution, the party needed a general purge 
because ‘there had been a penetration of party ranks by petty bourgeois elements, by 
carriers of rot in everyday life, people who were bringing corruption to the party ranks 
by the example of their personal and public life, people who held the public opinion of 
the workers and toiling peasants in contempt, self-seeking and careerist elements of 
which the party was not sufficiently ridding itself through regular, day-to-day work by 
the control commissions.’** Therefore, the party declared that ‘the purge must 
pitilessly eject from party ranlcs all elements that are alien to the party, that constitute 
a danger to its successes and that are indifferent to its struggle; it must eject incurable 
bureaucrats and hangers-on, those who are in league with the class enemy and are
 ^Pravda, 31 March 1929.
** KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, p. 429.
*** Ibid., vol. 4, p. 485.
* * XVÎ konferentsiia VKP(b), p. 659.
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helping him, those who are cut off from the party by virtue of economic and personal 
aggrandisement, anti-Semites, and covert adherents of religious cults; it must expose 
covert Trotskyites, adherents of Miasnikov, and Democratic Centralists, and adherents 
of other anti-party groups and cleanse the party of them. "7
Although the resolution was worded so as not to mention the Right opposition 
directly, it appears that the purge was primarily directed against the right-wing 
followers of Bukharin, Tomsky and RykovJ^ Indeed, the comiection between the 
purge and the campaign against the Right was clearly indicated in the resolution ‘On 
Intra-Party Affairs,’ adopted at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee just 
before the sixteenth Party Conference. While analysing the alleged right-opportunist 
fractional activity of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, the resolution suggested the need 
for a general purge of the party in order to remove such opposition.*"* Taking into 
consideration the fact that it was not until the sixteenth Party Conference that the 
defeat of the Right opposition became apparent, it must not have been a coincidence 
that the main attack on the Right opposition was launched openly at this Conference, 
where the launch of the general party purge was announced. Even though the 
resolution authorising the party general purge did not cite ‘rightists’ among the 
elements to be eliminated, passages like ‘concealed Trotskyites, Miasnikovites, 
Democratic Centralists and protagonists of other anti-party groups’ who were to be 
‘mercilessly ejected from the party’ indicated that the removal of the political 
opposition was one of the main purposes of the purge. Taking into consideration the 
fact that the power struggle between the Stalin group and the Right opposition was not 
yet being openly conducted, it is not suiprising that the resolution avoided mentioning 
‘Right opposition’ implicitly.
*7 Ibid., p. 662.
*^  The 1929 purge was often understood as an attempt to remove the Right Opposition from the party. 
Rigby, for instance, regards the 1929-30 purge as an elimination o f the Right Opposition, 
emphasising the political aspect of the 1929 purge. In his view, the Stalin group, being challenged 
by the Right opposition, needed reliable supporters in state and economic institutions as well as in 
paity organisations to successfully cany  out the industi'ialisation drive. By conducting purges of 
those sections o f the party and the bureaucracy where the opposition was strongest, and at the same 
time by carrying out mass recruitment, the Stalin group was able to secure a majority of votes for 
the party’s nominees and resolutions, and was able to ensure that cadres who accepted their orders 
would replace those purged. See Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 176.
*4 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, pp. 429-436.
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Despite the fact that there were obvious political motives behind this purge (in 
particular, the wholesale removal of the Right opposition, and bureaucrats and kulak 
elements in the countryside who stood in the way of the general line), however, it 
should be stressed that it also aimed to rid the party of corrupt, inactive, undisciplined, 
class-alien, or criminal persons.'^ The purge was also to kick out the ‘rubbish’; those 
guilty of drunlcenness and debauchery, religious practices, squabbling, and self- 
interest; and those who had links with alien elements, speculators, and forgers.*^
Moreover, the purge categories indicated that any party members who did not 
show sufficient enthusiasm for the implementation of the party policy, either 
industrialisation or collectivisation, could fall a victim of the purge. For instance, 
anyone who did not take an active part in increasing labour discipline in a factory ran 
the risk of being condemned as a self-seeking element. Likewise, those who were not 
enthusiastic in implementing measures for collectivisation or who were not able to 
carry out the party’s directives in the countiyside could be expelled from the party.*7
5.1.2 The conduct of the party purge in the Leningrad region
In the Leningrad region, careful preparations for a general purge began already 
in February 1929, even before the approval of a party purge at the sixteenth Party
In general, revisionists agreed that despite the obvious political motives behind the decision to 
launch a general purge, the aim o f the 1929 purge was larger than just getting rid o f the Right 
opposition. Hiroaki Kuromiya, for instance, regarded the 1929 purge mainly as a method to 
strengthen the party’s ‘mobilisation readiness for the socialist offensive,’ and argued that ‘with or 
without the Bukliarin faction, the Stalinist leadership would have resorted to a general purge of the 
party to strengthen “mobilisation readiness for the socialist offensive”.’ Although he agreed that ‘the 
Stalin group directed the general purge against the Bukharin sympathisers within the party,’ he 
argued that the purge affected far wider circles than those deemed ‘Rightists.’ Likewise, Catherine 
Merridale claimed that ‘the threat of being expelled from the party for having a passive attitude 
towards the new policies of socialist offensive was expected to raise the consciousness and vigilance 
of party members. It was hoped that the purge would raise the profile o f the party by showing that 
the party took personal and public discipline seriously.’ However, the most serious challenge to the 
totalitanianist view has been put forward by J. A. Getty. While analysing the purges of the 1920s 
and 1930s, he argued that the 1929-30 general purge was typical of a 1920s-era purge in its causes 
and criteria for expulsion. In his view, examination of the membership, as an ordinary cleasing, had 
been implemented so as to rid the party of corrupt, inactive, undisciplined, class-alien, or criminal 
persons. In other word, it was not intended, at least explicitly, to rid the party of all ideological 
dissenters or suspected oppositionists, although such persons might have seemed to a purge 
commission to be outside the aforementioned personal code. See Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin's 
Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 38; Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin, p. 213; and Getty, Origins o f  the 
Great Purges, p. 47.
Stenograficheskii biulleten’ II-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (Leningrad, 1929), p. 30.
*7 konferentsiia VKP(b), p. 660.
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Conference. In February, a circular was sent out from the Central Control 
Commission to local commissions informing them that the question of a purge would 
be considered by the forthcoming sixteenth Party Conference, and instnicting them to 
prepare for it, and to pay special attention to the selection of the local commissions 
which would be set up to conduct it.'^ Accordingly on 6 Februaiy 1929 the Leningrad 
obkom bureau adopted a resolution, which called for the party to make preparations 
for the checking and purging of its m em bers.W liile  setting the start of the purge 
operation at the beginning of April 1929, the resolution called for maximum 
mobilisation of the masses into this purge operation. It encouraged to discuss 
information about the purge, its political significance and aims, and the decision of the 
Central Committee plenum in November 1928. At the same time, it asked local 
verification commissions (proverkomissii) to be set up at each level of the party, under 
the leadership of the Control Commission, together with the party committee.7o A few 
months later, in June 1929, the joint plenum of the obkom and oblast control 
commission declared that, in general, the organisational and political preparation for 
the checking up of the party had been conducted satisfactorily.7* It was also claimed 
that questions on the purge had been widely discussed and about 2,200 members of 
local verification commissions had been selected for this operation.72
It appears that special attention was paid to the selection of the local verification 
commissions, which would conduct the verification and purge operation. The oblast 
control commission, together with the oblast committee, was to select members of the 
verification commissions. Leningrad obkom bureau also ordered a preliminary 
verification of those communists selected as members of the local verification 
commissions in order to ensure that their suitability could be guaranteed. In particular, 
it was urged that podpol ’shchiki should be drawn to this important position. The lists 
of members of local verification commissions were to be confinned by the oblast 
control commission and also co-ordinated by the o b k o m . 7 3  An article in Partrabotnik 
demanded that members of local verification commission should be staunch
Pravda, 6 February 1929.
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1929, pp. 6-8. 
70/W ., pp. 7-8.
7* /bid., no. 5, 1929, pp. 3-6.
77 ibid., p. 3.
72 ibid., no. 2, 1929, pp. 7-8.
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communists who had been in the party at least ten years, although it said that in some 
exceptional cases, those of eight years’ party membership should be allowed to be 
selected as members.7"*
In accordance with the obkom bureau resolution, local verification commissions 
were set up at all levels of the party organisation. Each verification commission was 
composed of thi*ee members and it had to verify about 200 communists. In order to 
verify 140,000 party members and candidates in the Leningrad region, about 2,500 
communists needed to be s e l e c t e d . 7 5  By June 1929 about 2,200 members had been 
selected and it was said that their names had been published in newspapers and wall 
newspapers and their suitability had been widely discussed at party m e e t i n g s . 76 Most 
of those selected as members of the local verification commission in the region were 
workers with a long period of party membership. According to the results of the 
verification of the 2,200 members selected as members of the verification 
commissions, 22 per cent were podpoVshchiki, and 72 per cent were party members 
from 1917-1919. Those who were of worker background comprised 87 per cent, and 
bench-workers comprised as much as 50 per c e n t . 7 ?
Not much detailed infonnation is available regarding the composition of the 
verification commissions apart from a list of the 30 members who were to verify the 
leading party officials at the olamg and raion levels. They were selected from among 
members of the oblast control commission and the obkom. Most of them had a party 
membership of more than ten years: 11 were podpol’shchiki; 18 had joined the party 
in the period 1917-1920; and only one had joined the party in 1923. The majority of 
them were workers by social origin: 27 were of worker background. They included 
party secretaries, either at the partkom or party kollektiv level, from one of 
Leningrad’s biggest factories such as Ki*asnyi putilovets, Krasnyi treugoFnik, 
Elektrosila, BoFshevik, Ki'asnaia zaria, and the Metal, Baltic, and Karl Marx factories. 
A number of bench-workers were also included: workers, either fitters or foremen, 
from Krasnyi treugoFnik, Elektrosila, Krasnyi putilovets, and the Baltic factory. Two 
factory directors (one from the Krasnyi putilovets and the other from the Proletarskii
74 Partrabotnik, no. 7, 10 April 1929, p. 9.
76 Ibid., p . 9 .
76 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 5, 1929, p. 3.
77 Ibid., no. 7, 1929, p. 8.
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factory), a chairman of the Krasnyi putilovets, and a manager of the Bol’shevik were 
also included.78
The 1929-30 purge differed from that of 1921 in that the verification 
commissions first examined the party organisation, and then its individual members. 
At first, leading party officials of party committees, control commissions, and 
auditing commissions at the oblast, olcrug, and raion levels were checked. This 
operation started from 29 May and about 336 leading party officials at the oblast 
level, 700 party workers at the raion and ola*ug level, and 2,200 members of the 
verification commissions were subject to this operation.7** By 27 July, almost 90 per 
cent of them had gone through the purge process.2**
The verification of the rural, soviet, and VUZ cells was to start from the 
beginning of April 1929. By 1 November 1929, a total of 86,692 party members and 
candidates (53 per cent of the whole party membership in the region) had gone 
tlirough the verification process. Some 93 per cent of party cells within anny units, 88 
per cent of the rural cells, 87 per cent of the soviet cells, 38 per cent of the production 
cells, and 27 per cent of the VUZ cells had been checked up by this time.2* Different 
deadlines were set up for the verification of particular types of party cells. The 
verification of rural cells was to be completed by 15 November and that of the soviet 
cells by 5 December, that of the VUZ cells by 1 December, and that of the production 
cells by 15 D e c e m b e r . 2 7  However, it took a longer time to complete the verification of 
the various cells in the region. According to the preliminary results published on 22 
December 1929, the verification of the cells had not yet finished, although the purge 
operation within the soviet cells as well as the medium and small production cells had 
already finished. The purge and verification of cells within okmgs were also about to 
finish and almost all the major production cells in Leningrad had been checked up by 
this t i m e . 22
Mass participation in the purge process was emphasised throughout the purge 
process. The November 1928 and April 1929 joint meetings of the Central Committee
78 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2747, p. 149.
79 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 7, 1929, pp. 7-8. 
20 Partrabotnik, no. 7, 10 April 1929, pp. 10-11.
2* Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 11, 1929, p. 20, 
27 Ibid., p. 21.
22 Partrabotnik, nos. 23-24, 22 December 1929, p. 118.
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and the Central Control Commission called for participation by non-party workers and 
peasants and encouraged party organisations to attract them to this work. However, 
the directives from the centre regarding the level of popular participation and the 
intensity of the 1929 purge were ambiguous. On the one hand, the Central Committee 
had called for a purge ‘irrespective of person’ and with maximum rank-and-file 
criticism of bureaucratism and corruption. On the other hand, most subsequent 
clarifications by the Central Control Commission had sought to limit the possibility of 
popular participation in the purge. These contradictions might be explained simply as 
the result of a high level of confusion and indecision regarding the purge.24
Nevertheless, the 1929-30 purge had a strong anti-bureaucratic emphasis. The 
purge was merged with the self-criticism campaign which was already well underway 
at the party meetings. During the self-criticism campaign, lower level rank-and-file 
members were allowed to reveal and criticise the work by leading party officials. It 
appears that the party leadership sought to use the self-criticism campaign together 
with the purge to uncover local corruption, bureaucratism, and malfeasance. It 
encouraged lower-level mass input as a check against intrenched local party 
machines.25
In the Leningrad region, the importance of mass participation was emphasised 
in the Leningrad obkom resolutions, which repeated same calls. Much ostensible 
encouragement to talk freely and to criticise the shortcomings of the party work was 
given to non-party workers and peasants as well as party members. For instance, in 
order to ensure maximum mobilisation of the masses into this purge operation, the 
Leningrad obkom bureau ordered on 6 Februaiy 1929 that informations about the 
purge, its political significance and aims, the decision of the Central Committee 
plenum in November 1928, should be discussed prior to the actual purge process. A 
few months later, it was reported that questions concerning the purge had been 
discussed at open plenums of the kollektivy, workshop cells and rural cells as well as 
at the non-party conferences of workers, farm labourers, and poor p e a s a n t s . 26 In 
addition, any one who doubted the suitability of those selected as a member of the
24 Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p.45.
26 Ibid., p.43.
26 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 5, 1929, pp. 3-6.
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verification commission was given a chance to raise the issue of suitability and to 
challenge the decision. Indeed, the names of members were published in newspapers 
and wall newspapers and their suitability was widely discussed at the party 
meetings.
It was reported that the purge were carried out with the active participation of 
non-party members in the Leningrad region. The purge was said to have been 
conducted in conditions of sharp criticism and of unreconcilable struggle against all 
manifestations of anti-party deviation in the reg ion .A ccord ing  to the official 
estimate, the level of mass participation in the purge process in the Leningrad region 
appears to have been high. For instance, during the checking up of the work of the 
city’s leading party officials at the oblast level, some 214 open party meetings were 
held and a considerable number of people took part in it. It was estimated that a total 
of 102,100 people participated in the meetings, including 65,100 Komsomol members 
and candidates, and 37,000 non-party people. During the purge process, altogether 
about 6,000 party meetings were held in Leningrad, and some 135,000 non-party 
members attended the meetings. Some 65,000 of them were said to have advanced 
various criticisms and proposals.
Despite the declaration that the purging process was proceeded with a high level 
of mass participation, it appears that the masses were not as enthusiastic as they were 
supposed to be, in particular at the initial stage. According to the Central Control 
Commission report, the purge process took place in some places without sufficient 
attention from party members and also without appropriate attention and guidance 
from party committees. Especially, at the begimiing of the purge process, the mass 
participation was reported to be weak. In particular, the soviet cells were singled out 
as having a weak mass participation in the purge process. This, in turn, resulted in the 
expulsion rate from the soviet cells being lower than that within the production cells. 
In addition, some party committees approached the purge rather fonnally, entrusting 
all the work to the control commissions: they did not sufficiently mobilise and guide 
the masses during the purge process.'^® This was also the case for the Leningrad
Ibid., p. 3.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad; Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 373. 
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1980), vol. 2, p. 172. 
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 10, 1929, pp. 24-25.
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region. Despite the declaration that the purge was carried out successfully as a 
political campaign in the region, the masses were not enthusiastic about taking part in 
the purge process, in particular at the initial stage. According to the report of the 
Leningrad oblast control commission, for instance, passivity and fear of criticising the 
shortcomings of party work were reported in a number of party kollektivy."^^
Another problem which hindered the successful implementation of the purge 
was that local party officials were protecting each other against self-criticism. 
Nepotism {semeistvennost’) and mutual protecting {krugovaia poruka) were often 
r e p o r t e d . ' ^ ^  As a result, the purge process could not reveal the cases in which the party 
line was not properly followed. Shortcomings of party work either in the party 
kollektivy or on the part of certain party members were not fully d i sc l os e d . In  
particular, this was the case in some soviet institutions such as Sevzaptorg (the north­
west trade), Pishchetrest (the food trust), and Otkomkhoz (the oblast department of the 
communal fann economy). This led to a sharp criticism from Pravda. On 1 September 
1929, Pravda published a number of articles which criticised shortcomings in the 
work of Sevzaptorg, Pishchetrest, and Otkomkhozd'^ It published the results of an 
investigation which revealed the aforementioned abuses along with evidence of right 
opportunist attitudes in a number of state institutions in Leningrad’s Tsentral’no- 
gorodskoi raion. It advanced criticisms against certain institutions within Leningrad 
such as Otkomkhoz and Sevzaptorg for the suppression of self-criticism, for 
bureaucratism, and for the distortion of the class line regarding the selection of 
cadres."^  ^ It also criticised shortcomings in the work of the Leningrad oblast control 
commission and the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi raikom. These two organs were criticised 
for their mistakes in carrying out the purges. In particular, the former was heavily 
criticised for failing to uncover those who had sought to stifle self-criticism, had 
created family circles, and had indulged in favouritism.^^
Ibid., no. 11, 1929, p. 20.
42/W .,  p. 20.
42 Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 11, 1929, p. 20.
44 Pravda, 1 September 1929. Pravda continued to publish articles on this event in the following week.
See Pravda, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 September 1929.
42 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 330.
4  ^Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 1, p. 17.
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This led to the repeating of the purge process in a number of the soviet party 
cells, in particular in Sevzaptorg, Pishchetrest, and Otkomkhozd'^ Furthermore, entire 
members of the Leningrad oblast control commission were replaced on 8 September. 
G. A. Desov, the chairman of the oblast control commission, was r e m o v e d , ^ ^  and 
replaced by P. B. Bordanov, a worker from the Baltic shipbuilding works. Both the 
members of the presidium and the party board {kollegiia) of the Leningrad oblast 
control commission were r e p l a c e d . 49 It was reported that the Leningrad oblast control 
commission admitted that they had approached too softly bureaucratism and the 
suppression of criticism, and they began to reconsider the decisions they made 
previously.20
5.1.3 The result of the 1929-30 purge
From May 1929 to May 1930, a total of 1,530,000 members across the entire 
country were subjected to review and some 170,000 (or approximately 11 per cent of 
the cuiTent membership) were expelled from the party.2' Subsequently, however, 
36,600 of those purged (about 22 per cent) were reinstated on appeal, reducing the rate 
to 8 per cent.22 In the Leningrad region alone, 7444 persons were expelled from the 
party during the 1929-30 party purge, resulting in an expulsion rate of 5.1 per cent.22 
The expulsion rate within the Leningrad oblast party organisation, which was much 
lower than the national average, shows that the Leningrad party organisation was not 
severely affected by the 1929-30 purge. This is probably because, in general, the 
purge fell more heavily on party organisations where rural cells were predominant 
than on party organisations where production cells were predominant.24 Yet the
42 Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 11, 1929, p. 20.
4S He had already come in for criticism at the second oblast party conference in March 1929 for 
declaring him self satisfied with the progress of the self-criticism in 1928 and for failing to combat 
bureaucratism in the state apparatus. See Stenograficheskii builleten ' !I~oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi 
konferentsii, no. 4, pp. 33, 40-44.
49 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 8, 1929, pp. 5-6.
29 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 331.
2^  Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, nos. 11-12, June 1930, p. 26.
22 Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., pp. 178-179. Subsequent clarifications show 
that the vast majority o f those reinstated to membership had been expelled for ‘passivity’ and that 
most o f these were rank-and-file members of working-class origin. See Getty, Origins o f  the Great 
Purges, pp.47-48.
22 Otchet o rabote Leningradskoi oblastnoi kontrol’noi komissii VKP(b) i raboche-krest’ianskoi 
inspektsii 111 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (Leningrad , 1930), p. 9.
24 According to the data given in Partiinoe stro itel’stvo in May 1930, the expulsion rates within the 
regions where production cells were predominant were lower than those within the predominantly
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expulsion rate of the Leningrad party organisation was the lowest in the country, even 
when compared with other regional party organisations where production cells were 
p r e d o m i n a n t . 22 For instance, about 14,000 party members and candidates were 
expelled in the Moscow region, the expulsion rate being about 6.9 per cent.29 This 
shows that the impact of the 1929-30 purge on the Leningrad oblast party organisation 
was far less severe than any other party organisation, including the Moscow one. It is 
no wonder that this fact led Leningraders to the conclusion that ‘the Leningrad party 
organisation was healthy and followed in Lenin’s footsteps, enjoying the trust of the 
workers and the poor and middle peasants {bedniaki and seredniaki).'^'^
Table 5-1. Expulsion rates in the All-Union, Leningrad, and Moscow party 
organisations, 1929-1930
Leningrad oblast Moscow oblast All-Union
Number of those expelled 7,444 13,953 170,000
Expulsion rate 5.1% 6.9% 11%
Note; Different figures were given in Partiinoe stroitel’stvo in May 1930. The figures were 
somehow lower than the figures given in table 5-1, the national average expulsion rate being
10.4 per cent, the expulsion rate for the Leningrad party organisation being 4.8 per cent and 
that for the Moscow party organisation being 6.6 per cent.
Sources: Figures for the Leningrad oblast party organisation are from Ocherki istorii 
Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 373; figures for the 
Moscow oblast party organisation are from Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS 
1883-1965 (Moscow. Moskovskii rabochii, 1966), p. 454; and figures for the All-Union party 
organisation are from Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, nos. 11-12, June 1930, p. 26.
Table 5-2 provides a breakdown of the expulsion rate by type of party cells. It 
clearly shows that the rural cells were the hardest hit. Both in the All-Union and 
Leningrad party organisations, the highest rate of expulsion occurred within the rural 
cells. In the Leningrad region, 13 per cent of rural party members were removed, 
while only six per cent of party members within the industrial plants were expelled.
agricultural regions: the former ranged from 4.8 per cent to 10.1 per cent, whereas the latter ranged 
from 11.3 per cent to 12.7 per cent. This led the party leadership to the conclusion that production 
cells within large indushial centres turned out to be the strongest and most effective. See Partiinoe 
stroitel'st\>o, no. 10, May 1930, p. 16.
22 For instance, the expulsion rate was 8.2 per cent in the Nizhegorod party organisation, 8.9 per cent 
in the Ural organisation, and 10.1 per cent in the Ukraine organisation. See ibid., no. 10, May 1930,
p. 16.
29 Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS 1883-1965 (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1966), p. 
454,
22 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 8, 1930, p. 5.
202
This shows that the majority of those expelled came from the rural cells,^^ while only 
a small proportion of party members and candidates from the factory party cells were 
expelled.
Table 5-2. Expulsion rates by type o f party cells in Leningrad, Moscow and Western 
oblasts in comparison with All-Union figures, 1929-30 (percentages)
Leningrad
oblast
Moscow
oblast
Western
oblast
All-Union
Production cells 6.0 6.7 12.2 8.0
Rural cells 13.0 12.2 16.9 15.7
Administrative cells 5.8 7.2 11.9 n. d.
Educational cells 4.4 4.6 6.7 n. d.
Non-production cells* - - - 9.5
Note: * Non-production cells included cells in administrative bodies and educational 
establishments.
Sources: Figures for the Leningrad oblast party organisation are from RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, 
opis’ 21, delo 2711, p. 62; figures for the Western oblast party organisation are from Merle 
Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (London; Macmillan, 1959), p. 217; and figures for the 
Moscow oblast and All-Union party organisations are from F. M. Vaganov, ‘O regulirovanii 
sostava partii v 1928-29 gg.% Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 6, 1964, pp. 69-70.
One notable feature of table 5-2 is that the party cells within the administrative 
bodies and the educational establishments in the Leningrad region showed extremely 
low expulsion rates. In the country as a whole, non-production cells showed a 9.5 per 
cent expulsion rate, having a higher expulsion rate than production cells. However, in 
the Leningrad region the expulsion rates within the administrative bodies and the 
educational establishments were as low as 5.8 per cent and 4.4 per cent respectively. 
These figures were significantly lower than the national average expulsion rate for 
non-production cells, which suggests that the non-production cells in the Leningrad 
region were much less severely affected by the purge than those in other regions. 
Moreover, the expulsion rates for the administrative and educational cells were lower 
than the expulsion rate for production cells of the Leningrad region. This is why the
2S It was evident from the very beginning o f the purge that rural cells were the main target. According 
to the resolution o f the Leningrad obkom bureau of 6 February 1929, the social situation of the 
peasant-communists in the niral cells was to be examined. In addition, the political activity of rural 
cells was to be checked by the okmg committees and control commissions. The resolution adopted 
at the joint plenum o f the obkom and oblast control commission of June 1929 also emphasised that 
particular attention should be given to the checking of rural cells. See ibid., no. 2, 1929, p. 7; no. 5, 
1929, pp. 3-6; and no. 8, 1930, p. 5.
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verification commissions within these institutions were criticised for not being able to 
fully disclose ‘symptoms of decay’ and develop self-criticism on all shortcomings in 
party w o r k . 29 This might suggest that the purge was not as thorough as it was intended 
to be within the non-production cells in the Leningrad region. It appears that some 
party members managed to avoid expulsions during the 1929-30 purge.
No comprehensive data were found regarding the occupational composition of 
those purged during the 1929-30 purge. However, table 5-3 provides some 
information on those purged in 1929 in the Leningrad region. Although more workers 
were purged than peasants by this time, the expulsion rates broken down by 
occupation shows that peasants were affected most severely than any other 
occupational groups. About 10 per cent of the peasant communists were purged, while 
only 4.9 per cent of the worker communists and 4.4 per cent of the white collar 
worker communists were purged.
Table 5-3, Party purge in the Leningrad region, broken down by occupation, 1929
Those who 
had gone 
through 
purge
Those
expelled
Expulsion rate 
in the Leningrad 
region 
as a whole
Expulsion 
rate in 
Leningrad 
city
Expulsion 
rate in the 
rural area
N N % % %
Workers 62,569 1,296 4.9 3.8 8.5
White collar workers 24,239 1,081 4.4 3.7 6.2
Peasants 3,274 333 10.2 - 10.2
Others 4,864 167 3.4 3.3 3.8
Note: Figures above covered only those purged in 1929.
Source: Partrabotnik, nos. 23-24, December 1929, p. 119.
In the Leningrad region the leading party officials at the oblast, okrug, and raion 
levels were barely touched by the purge operation. According to the preliminary purge 
results published in August 1929, out of the 336 leading party officials at the oblast 
level, only 12 received party censures, and none were p u r g e d . 99 In the country as a 
whole, among leading party officials who were members of the party committtees at 
the oblast, krai, and respublic levels, 0.9 per cent were purged and 6.6 per cent were
29 RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2711, p. 63.
^^Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 7, 25 August 1929, p. 7. This implies 
that only 3.2 per cent o f those checked up were subject to party reprimand.
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reprimanded; and among party officials at the olcrug level, 1 per cent were purged and 
8.8 per cent received a reprimand.9) This shows that leading party officials in the 
Leningrad region fared better than those in other regions.
However, the party officials in the countryside were much more severely dealt 
with. At the initial stage of the 1929 purge, 15.4 per cent of all rural party workers in 
the Soviet Union were removed, and a fifth of them were described as ‘class-hostile 
elements’.92 In the Leningrad region, party officials in the countryside fared no better. 
In 1930, party officials in the rural areas, especially rural raikom secretaries, were 
criticised for their poor work in comiection with the collectivisation drive. 
Subsequently many of them were replaced. For instance, in May 1930, about 21 per 
cent of the rural raikom secretaries under review were replaced. Some 9.4 per cent 
were replaced because of their poor work and not fully carrying out the party’s policy 
in class lines.92 It appears that, during the 1929-1930 purge, it was the party officials 
in the countryside who were dealt with more severely.
In Leningrad region as well as in the whole country, the reasons for expulsion 
ranged from political passivity, being or being related to an alien element, defects in 
personal life and conduct (drunkenness, anti-Semitism, participation in religious rites), 
or involvement in criminal activity, to fractional activity and other violations of party 
discipline. In December 1929, when the preliminary results of the purge were 
published in the Leningrad party journal, the following information regarding the 
reasons for expulsion was given: almost 40 per cent of those expelled from the 
Leningrad party organisation were purged for political passivity, 33 per cent for 
drunlcenness, 25 per cent for being or having connections with an alien element, and 
20 per cent for violations of party discipline (see column 2 of table 5-4).94 Although 
these figures did not cover those purged in 1930, they clearly show that the 1929 
purge affected far wider circles than those deemed Rightists. The majority of those
91 F. M. Vaganov, ‘O regulirovanii sostava partii v 1928-29 gg.% Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 6, 1964, p. 
68 .
92 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 1, p. 19.
92 Partrabotnik, no. 12, May 1930, p. 42.
94 Ibid., nos. 23-24, December 1929, p. 119. Since many were expelled from the party on the basis of 
multiple reasons, the total number of reasons was almost double the number o f those purged. By 
December 1929, 2,876 had been purged in the Leningrad region for 4,815 reasons. That is why the 
figures given in column 2 o f table 5-4 exceed 100 per cent.
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purged were expelled from the party not for their political convictions, but for not 
having shown enough enthusiasm for party work or having been drunk.
Table 5-4. Reasons for expulsion in the Leningrad region in comparison with the 
Western region, 1929-30
Reasons for expulsion Leningrad oblast Leningrad oblast Western oblast
(1) (1) (2)
% of total number of % of total number % of total number
reasons for expulsion of those expelled of those expelled
Alien elements or connection 15.5 25.1 25.0
with alien elements
Official crimes 9.6 16.5 19.3
Drunkenness 19.9 33.3 36.8
Passivity 23.8 39.8 40.4
Violations of party discipline 12.3 20.6 7.0
Distortions of the party line n. d. n. d. 4.7
Carrying out religious rites 3.2 5.4 10.9
Violations of labour discipline 4.4 7.4 6.5
Bureaucratism 0.8 1.4 n. d.
Refusal to enter kolldioz n. d. n. d. 9.8
Note: Figures for the Leningi’ad region covered only those purged in 1929.
Sources: (1) Partrabotnik, nos. 23-24, December 1929, p. 120; (2) Fainsod, Smolensk Under 
Soviet Rule, p. 218.
One notable feature of table 5-4 is that there was a surprisingly remarkable 
resemblance in the composition of those purged in relation with the reasons for 
expulsion between the Leningrad and Western oblasts. It is true that there were some 
differences in the pattern of the purge in these two regions. For instance, the 
Leningrad oblast showed a much higher percentage of expulsions on the ground of 
violations of party discipline than the Western oblast. On the other hand, in the 
Western oblast the percentage of those expelled for conducting religious rites was 
almost double that of the Leningrad oblast. However, apart from these, both regions 
showed a similar pattern of the purge. In both regions, those who were expelled for 
political passivity comprised the biggest group, accounting for about 40 per cent. 
Those expelled for drunlcenness comprised the second largest group, accounting for 
about 35 per cent. Then, those expelled for being or having connections with an alien 
element accounted for 25 per cent in both regions. Given the difference in the
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economic and social characteristics of these two r e g i o n s , 9^ it is rather surprising that 
these two regions showed a similar pattern of the purge. It is not quite clear whether 
this implies the existence of orders from above indicating the proportions of those to 
be purged, or whether this was a simple coincidence.
Table 5-5 shows figures for the All-Union party, given at the sixteenth Party 
Congress in July 1930. Although figures for the Leningrad region and those for the 
All-Union party are not directly c o m p a r a b l e , 99 a comparison suggests that in the 
Leningrad region ‘passivity’ and ‘violations of party discipline’ claimed far larger 
proportions of those purged than at the all-Union level (see tables 5-4 and 5-5), 
However, it is not clear whether this is due to the peculiarity of the purge conducted in 
the Leningrad region, or due to the different methods of calculation.
Table 5-5. Reasons fo r  expulsion in the All-Union party organisation, 1929-30
Reasons for expulsion % of total number of those expelled
Alien elements or connection with alien elements 16.9
Passivity 17.0
Violations of party discipline 10.0
Defects in personal life and conduct 21.9
Criminal offences 12.3
Source: XVI s ”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
izdatel’stvo, 1930), p. 340.
No comprehensive data were found regarding the reasons for expulsion among 
the different types of party cells. However, material available shows that there were 
some interesting variations in the grounds for expulsion from the party among the 
different types of party cells. In the production cells, political passivity and 
druhkeimess were the most important factors in contributing to the purge, accounting 
for 44 per cent of those expelled. Some party members were expelled for having been 
influenced by ‘unhealthy petit bourgeois and kulak attitudes’ and for showing a 
conciliatory attitude towards them. Self-seeking attitudes, lack of enthusiasm for the
99 The Western oblast was mainly an agricultural region, while the Leningrad oblast was an 
industiialised region. For more information on the Western oblast, see Fainsod, Smolensk Under 
Soviet Rule, chapter 1.
99 First o f all, both figures did not cover all those purged. Figures for the Leningrad region did not 
cover those purged in 1930, while the figures given at the sixteenth Party Congress covered only 
130,000 out of the total 170,000 members and candidates expelled during the 1929-1930 purge.
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shock-brigade movement, and also violations of party and state discipline accounted 
for numerous expulsions in factories.
In the soviet cells, the main reasons for expulsion were reported to be right 
opportunist attitudes, nepotism {semeistvennost’), mutual guarantee (Icrugovaia 
poruka), and not fully understanding the main tasks of the party in the reconstruction 
of the soviet apparatus. The soviet cells were criticised for failing to guide strongly 
the soviet apparatus, and also for limiting themselves narrowly to educational work. 
Reticence and poor development of self-criticism were said to be the main reasons for 
that a number of sick phenomena remained un-revealed. In a number of places, this 
led to the repetition of the purge process.
Rural cells showed different patterns: not fully implementing the party’s class 
line, the ‘right opportunistic’ practice, and poor work with poor peasants and farm 
labourers were listed as the main shortcomings in the work of the mral cells. In 
addition, rural cells were criticised for not having been able to lead a mass movement 
of farm labourers, and poor and middle peasants, while conducting the agricultural 
reconstruction at the initial period of collectivisation and in the party’s struggle 
against the kulaks. In some cases, whole rural raikoms were dismissed due to their not 
following the party’s line regarding class. Apparently many rural communists were 
expelled due to their resistance to collectivisation. In general, the political and cultural 
level of rural communists was evaluated very low, which led to serious shortcomings 
in party work in rural areas.
5.2 The 1933 party purge
5.2.1 The general background of the 1933 party purge
The second general purge under Stalin came only two and a half years after the 
completion of the first purge of 1929-1930. The desire to launch the general purge of 
rank-and-file party membership was first expressed by the Central Committee in 
December 1932. Its short decree contained the basic decision to undertake a purge of
Secondly, the first counted multiple reasons, leading the total sum more than 100 per cent, whereas 
the latter seems to have counted a single reason for each expulsion.
97 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2711, p. 63.
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party membership in 1933 and to halt temporarily new admissions to the p a r t y . 98 The 
Central Committee’s decision to launch a general purge was approved at a joint 
plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on 12 January 
1933. However, the January plenum had only approved the purge in principle, leaving 
its organisation to the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control 
C o m m i s s i o n . 99 Jt was not until April that a decree concerning the details of the purge 
was issued in the name of the Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commissi on. 70
The official reasons for the launching of the mass purge were embodied in a 
decree issued in April. The decree noted that ‘during the mass acceptance into the 
party, which at the local level was frequently indiscriminate and lacking the necessary 
verification, alien elements penetrated into the ranks of the party and are using their 
sojourn in the party for careerist and self-seeking purposes; double dealers made their 
way in - persons who swear fidelity to the party but are in fact trying to undermine the 
conduct of its policy. On the other hand, the unsatisfactory state of the marxist-leninist 
education of party members has meant that the party contains not a few comrades 
who, although honest and prepared to defend the Soviet Union, are either 
insufficiently stable - failing to understand the spirit and the demands of party 
discipline - or are politically almost illiterate, do not know the Programme, the Rules, 
and the fundamental decisions of the party, and for this reason are not able to caiTy out 
its policy actively.’71 It was also proclaimed that the purge was ‘to ensure iron 
proletarian discipline within the party and to cleanse the party’s ranlcs of all unreliable 
and unstable elements and h a n g e r s - o n . ’72
Judging from the passage above, it appears that the main focus of the 1933 
purge was on weeding out the undesirables who had flooded into the party since 1929. 
To the party leadership, it seemed that many of recent recruits had been taken into the 
party without proper verification, and as a consequence, a considerable number of 
what party leaders called ‘alien,’ ‘parasitic,’ and ‘unreliable’ persons had entered the
98 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 5, p. 440.
99 The same resolution also announced the halt of the recruitment of party members until the purge 
was over. See ibid., (1985), vol. 6, p. 32.
79 Ibid., pp. 45-50.
7' Ibid., p. 45.
72 Ibid., p. 46.
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party. Moreover, in the eyes of the party leadership, these new members were often 
‘insufficiently stable’ and ‘politically almost illiterate’. Therefore, it seems that the 
1933 purge was supposed to pmne the swollen ranks of the party after the huge influx 
of 1929-32.
There might be some truth in the claim that mass admission had allowed 
undesirable elements to join the party. Indeed, the whole party membership had grown 
by 1.4 million since 1931, and to recmit as many as 1.4 million people in only two 
and a half years’ time, the recruitment procedure could not have been as strict as in 
previous years. As shown in the previous chapter, from 1930 onwards the quality of 
party recruits deteriorated in terms of length of industrial experience and skill level 
both in the All-Union and Leningrad party organisations. Workers who had just 
started to work in industry could join the party without much difficulty. Taking into 
consideration the fact that a considerable number of workers were drawn from the 
countryside and many of them still retained ties with the countryside, one might safely 
assume that it was these particular workers who expressed discontent with the party’s 
policy in the countryside.
Another problem caused by mass admission was the poor party education. Even 
though the party tried hard to educate new recruits by establishing various kinds of 
party educational system, it was far from sufficient to cover the rapidly growing 
candidate group. The size of candidate group had increased enonnously by 1932 
partly due to the massive recruitment and partly due to the delay in transferring 
candidate members to full members. Many remained candidate members long after 
the recommended probationary period, which, in the case of industrial workers, was 
six months. This, in turn, led to the increase in the proportion of candidate members of 
the total membership. In Leningrad, for instance, the actual number of candidate 
members had almost trebled in two years by the beginning of 1932, and in some 
industrial raions candidate members accounted for as much as 40 per cent of the total
membership. 7 3
There were plenty of evidence that the party leadership was not satisfied with 
the quality of party membership, especially those who were admitted to the party
73 Partrabotnik, no. 4, Febmary 1932, p. 41.
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during the years of mass admission. Throughout 1932, complaints about the poor 
quality of party membership were often expressed in party journals and newspapers, 
and there were voices which argued that a smaller, qualitatively purer, more 
disciplined and better organised party organisation was preferable to the current 
organisation, which appeared to be large in teims of size, but was much diluted in 
terms of the quality of membership.
The complaints about the poor quality of party members and candidates were 
also expressed in Leningrad. In the early months of 1932 articles began to appear 
complaining about the vast number of candidates, and stating that many candidates 
played no practical role, failed to observe elementary party rules, such as the regular 
paying of dues, or else had a poor record of party education.74 Thus they requested 
that candidates should demonstrate in their daily lives that they were worthy of 
honour in order to become full party members. Later, in September 1932, another 
article in Partrabotnik, calling for significant improvement in party work and 
discipline, complained about those who failed to pay party dues. The article went on 
to stress: ‘we cannot have a party member who, according to his own wishes, takes 
part only occasionally in our work; he must work systematically under the control of 
the party. He must fulfil party duties, and must be answerable for them before the 
party’.75 It was also admitted that ‘at the moment there is a certain amount of foot- 
dragging, party members who are indistinguishable from non-party workers, waverers 
who are either supporters of “liberalism” and conciliation, or else are remnants of 
counter-revolutionary Trotskyism’.79 it was argued that a weakening of control from 
1929 onwards had undone the work of the 1929 purge, and had allowed careerists, 
hangers-on and outright alien elements and class enemies to enter the party. Too many 
‘waverers’, a large number of whom were from dubious class backgrounds in the 
countiyside, had slipped into the party during the years of mass entry, and they had to 
be watched much more closely to ensure that they remained faithful to the party’s 
cause.77 In particular, the quality of the newly recruited proletarian aktiv was
74 See, for instance, ibid., no. 9, May 1932, p. 2; and nos. 11-12, June 1932, pp. 14, 21.
75 Ibid., no. 17, September 1932, p. 8.
79 Ibid., p. 10.
77 Ibid., p. 25.
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questioned, and it was claimed that bourgeois and petit bourgeois elements had 
slipped into the factory-plant ce lls .78
All of the following concerns - the easing of entry to the party since 1928, the 
surfeit of candidate members, the large percentage of candidate members with little 
experience of industrial labour, the shortcomings of the party’s educational functions, 
and the appearance of discontent (or, at least, disillusionment) within the ranks - seem 
to have led the party leadership to call a halt to all recruitment into the party and to 
announce a mass purge of the party at the end of 1932.
Although there might have been a political motive behind the decision to launch 
party purge in 1933,79 it was, after all, a mass purge and so aimed to remove not only 
‘conscious opponents’ but also ‘unconscious and backward elements’. It appears that 
the leadership intended to use the purge as a means to remove political opposition to 
Stalin’s policies, on the one hand, and to strengthen party discipline and labour 
discipline, on the other hand. It was claimed at that time that by the launching of the 
mass purge, the party leadership attempted ‘to strengthen the party, to raise the 
ideological level of its membership, and to increase the authority of the party among 
the masses’ by purging itself before them. 9^ The official history of the Leningrad party 
organisation, making a similar remark on the purpose of the purge, stated that the
78 Ibid., nos. 23-24, December 1932-January 1933, p. 31.
79 Undoubtedly, as in 1929, there was a political element to the purge in 1933. The question is whether 
the politieal motive was the sole or the most important motive of the purge. Two different 
inteipretations have been put forward. Emphasising the politieal side, T. H, Rigby regards the 1933 
purge as a first step towards the elimination of the ‘Old Bolsheviks’, whieh came to a head in the 
great purge of 1937-1938. Vadim Rogovin has a similar opinion about the 1933 purge, and in his 
book Stalinskii NeoNEP  explained that the 1933-36 purge was launched to get rid o f the possible 
opponents to Stalin’s power and that it was not a mere technical and office procedure, but a 
preparation for the forthcoming Great Terror. In his opinion, the main victims of the purge were the 
old party members, espeeially those who had been in the opposition faction. J. A. Getty, by conbast, 
considers the 1933 purge to be a continuation o f that o f the 1920s, and to be an organisational- 
administrative operation rather than a political witch hunt. In his study on the purge in Smolensk, he 
emphasised the apolitical character o f the purges prior to the police terror o f 1937-1938. P. O. 
Gooderham put forward a similar intei-pretation. He emphasised the chronic organisational 
confusion into which the party apparatus had been thrown during the years of mass recruitment, and 
argued that a major element o f the successive party purges in the mid-1930s was to by  to sort out 
this mess and thus help to re-establish a more efficient nomenklatura system. See Rigby, Communist 
Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 52; Vadim Rogovin, Stalinskii neoNEP  (Moscow, n. p., 1994), 
pp. 149-158; Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, chapter 1 and 2; and Gooderham, The Regional 
Part)’ Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 9.
89 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1985), vol. 6, p. 46.
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mass purge aimed at increasing the efficiency of the party by fortifying it in political 
and ideological terms.
Indeed, facing the successive agricultural crises and the intense pressures of the 
industrialisation drive, the leadership could maintain the necessary degree of control 
only by increasing discipline further. In fact, party discipline had worsened and party 
records were in a mess during the years of mass entry and of enomious membership 
turnover. Thus the central leadership instructed lower level organisations to amend the 
situation by conducting a mass purge and it seemed that the mass purge was to 
establish stricter and more centralised control of the ranlc-and-file m e m b e r s h i p . 82
At the same time, it appears that the party leadership had been concerned about 
maintaining labour discipline. The ambitious economic targets and over-optimistic 
expectations that characterised these years ended up with disillusionment with the 
results of the first FYP. This made it more difficult to compel workers to endure the 
economic hardship of the industrialisation period. Another factor that thieatened 
labour discipline was that the rapid industrialisation drive had engendered a transient 
and increasingly non-proletarian labour force who had little work experience and were 
not prepared to uphold strict labour discipline. Many of them had failed to come to 
terms with the rigours of ‘socialist transfonnation’ and had found labour discipline to 
be too strict. It appears that the purge was used as a method of raising standards of 
labour discipline within the factories.
In the countryside, the purge was used as a means to seeure the implementation 
of collectivisation and of other tasks set by the central party leadership. Taking into 
consideration that resistance and conscious opposition against the forced 
collectivisation was quite strong in the countryside, it appears that the 1933 purge was 
aimed, at least partly, at rural cadres who were unwilling to implement the harsh 
policies directed at peasants.83 In particular, the party leadership used the exposure of
8' Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 242.
82 At the same time, there were voices that demanded relaxation of party discipline and greater party 
democracy. Riutin was one o f those who were against stricter party discipline.
83 Between 1930 and 1933 a number of regional purges had already taken place to remove ‘right 
opportunists’ and ‘deviationists’ in regions such as Georgia, Voronezh, the middle Volga and 
Western Siberia. Indeed, those areas of the countr y which were considered to be particularly rotten 
with kulak and right opportunist elements were actually purged at the end o f 1932, before the main 
purge started: the North Caucasus, to remove ‘organisers of kulak sabotage’, the Ukraine
213
the so-called Riutin platform in the autumn of 1932 as the justification for the 
launching of purges in the countryside. 84
According to a further decree issued in April, the categories for expulsion were 
detailed as follows: class alien and hostile elements who made their way into the party 
by deceit and tried to deceitfully demoralise the party; double dealers who deceitfully 
undermined party policy; violators of discipline who failed to carry out party 
decisions and who were pessimistic about the ‘impracticability’ of party measures; 
degenerates who merged with and did not struggle against kulaks, loafers, thieves; 
careerists and self-seekers who were isolated from the masses and who disregarded 
the needs of people; and moral degenerates whose unseemly behaviour discredited the 
party.85
People who hid their class origin in order to get into the party were purged as 
class alien or hostile elements, those unwilling to struggle against the class enemy 
were classified as degenerates, and those having taken part in oppositional activity, 
especially between 1925 and 1927, were purged as double-dealers. Persons who were 
unwilling to cany out collectivisation, those who did not understand the policies of 
the party, and those non-political persons who simply joined the party for the 
patronage, position, or power associated with membership were also to be e x p e l l e d . 86
In factories, any member who had failed to come to terms with the rigours of 
‘socialist transfonnation’ fell a victim of the purge. As one article in Partrabotnik had 
put it, any worker who failed to pull their weight such as ‘the absentees and shirkers, 
bad workmen, loafers and rolling stones’ was to be gotten rid of.8?
In the countryside, any members who failed to show sufficient enthusiasm for 
the party’s policies in collectivisation ran the risk of being condemned as a political 
opponent of the party. Anyone who refused to ‘struggle against the kulak,’ could be 
expelled for being a ‘double dealer,’ ‘underminer,’ or ‘violator of discipline’. Indeed, 
in an article in Partrabotnik it was claimed that the general purge was launched to 
eliminate all kulak elements and right opportunists from the rural cells. It suggested
( ‘bourgeois nationalists’), Eastern Siberia ( ‘remnants of old white-guardists’), the middle Volga, 
Kazakhstan, some cells in the Donbass, and the rural raions of Leningrad and Moscow oblasts.
84 Partrabotnik, nos. 21-22, November 1932, p. 6.
85 KPSS  V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, pp. 46-47.
86 Partrabotnik, nos. 23-24, December 1932-January 1933, p. 31.
87 Ibid., p. 32.
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that each communist should be judged by how seriously one implemented the 
obligation of grain and meat procurement, how actively one had fought against the 
kulaks and kulak’s henchmen, and how eagerly one had participated in kolldioz 
production.88 Rural cadres who were unwilling to implement the harsh policies 
directed at peasants were condemned as being kulaks who had somehow sneaked into 
the party and had attempted to wreck the party’s procurement policies in the
kolldioz. 89
Purge categories such as ‘degenerates,’ ‘careerists,’ and those ‘isolated from the 
masses’ seemed to target full-time party officials. Attacks on bureaucratism were one 
of the constant themes in party purges in the 1920s, and the 1933 purge was no 
exception.99 Even though there were some worries about excessive attacks directed 
against the bureaucracy, the central leadership passed strictures on local bureaucracies 
by means of rank-and-file criticism during the purge, calling for the denouncing of 
bureaucrats who discredited the party among the masses. The official announcement 
called for ‘open and honest self-criticism of party members’ and a verification of the 
work of each party cell, suggesting obliquely that the work of party leaders would be 
scrutinised. 91
In non-production party cells, the purge aimed to root out the careerists who had 
used their party cards to further their own ends, the bureaucrats and double-dealers - 
that is, those who pretended to carry out party directives without actually doing so - 
the politically and morally corrupt, degenerates, and alien elements. Amongst state 
and economic administrators those guilty of lax attitudes towards the spending of state 
money, employing excessive numbers of staff, heartless bureaucratism and lack of 
attention to the needs of the workers, and ‘turning a blind eye’ were all to be
removed. 92
At the same time, the leadership showed a cautious attitude towards the purge of 
the ranlc and file members, in order to prevent some of the abuses encountered in 1929
8 8 /W .,p . 32.
89 These people were to be removed and replaced by new, highly-qualified technical graduates from 
the higher party schools, and by experienced urban officials who would man the new politotdely that 
were to be set up in MTS and sovkliozes. See ibid., nos. 21-22, November 1932, pp. 3-5.
99 Getty claimed that the 1933 purge had a stionger antibureaucratic emphasis than its predecessors. 
See Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 52.
91 Ibid., p. 50.
92 Partrabotnik, nos. 23-24, December 1932-January 1933, p. 32.
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relating to unjustified e x p u l s i o n s . 93 Local purge officials were warned not to expel 
large numbers of rank-and-file members on such flimsy pretexts as ‘passivity’ or 
simple political illiteracy. The 1933 announcement enjoined those conducting the 
purge to take into account the ‘overall development’ of the member - not to try to trick 
him or her with technical questions on the intricacies of the party programme and not 
to expel loyal workers and collective fanners just because they had not had time to 
improve their level of political education. Moreover, a member found to lack 
sufficient political loiowledge or discipline was to be demoted from a member to a 
candidate, or from a candidate to a s y m p a t h i s e r . 94 The creation of the sympathiser 
category meant the establishment of a ‘half-way house’ for party members who were 
considered to be politically trustworthy, but who lacked the discipline which the party 
was now demanding of its membership and who could benefit from further party 
education. It is therefore tempting to see the whole notion of the sympathiser as a 
compromise solution arrived at between proponents of an all-out attack on ‘passive’ 
party elements who had failed to demonstrate their devotion to communism in some 
positive way, and more ‘moderate’ purgers, who wanted only the politically suspect 
and undisciplined to be singled out for treatment.
5.2.2 The conduct of the partv purge in the Leningrad region
In spite of the central leadership’s effort to conduct the purge effectively and 
thoroughly, the purge process was quite slow. Although the launching of the mass 
purge was announced in January 1933, the purge did not officially get under way until 
June, The original instruction had ordered that the purge should run from June in 
seven oblasts, two krais, and one republic and finish by the end of November 1933.95 
The Leningrad region was one of those regions where the purge had started in June
93 Pravda, 28 April 1933.
94 Sympathiser was a category regularised at the seventeenth Party Congress in January 1934 primarily 
as a staging ground for would-be recmits unable to be admitted as candidates because o f the ban on 
recruitment during the purge. Later on, however, the rationale lying behind the sympathiser category 
had been constantly attacked until 1939, when Zhdanov announced its abolition and the return to 
mass recruitment campaign.
95 A joint resolution of the Centi'al Committee and the Central Control Commission, dated 23 April 
1933, named those ten party organisations: Moscow, Leningrad, Urals, Donets, Odessa, Kiev and 
Vinnitsa oblasts. Eastern and Far Eastern krais and the White Russian Republic. See KPSS v 
rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1985), vol. 6, p. 50.
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1933. The purge of the Leningrad party organisation actually lasted till December 
1933.96
The organisation of the 1933 purge differed from the previous purges in the 
1920s in that responsibility for the conduct of the purge was taken out of the hands of 
the Central Control Commission, and entrusted to a specially foimed Central Purge 
Commission, which was to head a hierarchy of ad hoc purge commissions down to the 
raion level of the party.9? A specially organised Central Purge Commission, which 
had eight members, was headed by la. E. Rudzutak, and by the order of the Central 
Committee, local purge commissions were to be composed of staunch communists 
who had been in the party for at least ten years, had never been in the opposition or in 
other parties, and enjoyed authority among m e m b e r s . 98 The names of members were 
to be published in advance of the purge process and challenges to the suitability of the 
purge commission members were to be a l l o w e d . 9 9
In mid-May 1933, the Leningrad oblast purge commission was set up by the 
Central Purge Commission. Its members were as follows: V. I. Shestakov, chairman 
of the oblast control commission; M. V. Bogdanov, chainnan of the city control 
commission and also a member of the Central Control Commission; I. A. Kiselev, 
secretary of the city control commission; A. N. Petrovskii, chairman of the Leningrad 
oblast union of machine-builders and a member of the oblast committee. All these 
members had joined the party before the October revolution in 1917. At the lower 
levels ten purge commissions were set up within raions and nine purge commissions 
were set up at the following factories - the Izhorskii, Ki'asnyi putilovets, Galoshnyi, 
Elektrosila, Metal, Baltic, Bol’shevik and Skoroldiod factories - and at Torgovyi 
p o r t . ’90 The following were chaiimen of the raion party commissions: P. A. Alekseev 
(Narvskii raion, the Central Committee member, year of enrolment to the party: 
1914), G. N. Pyraev (Moskovskii raion, the Central Control Commission member and 
a plenipotentiary of the national commissariat of heavy industry: 1912), B. P. Pozem 
(Vyborgskii raion, candidate member of the Central Committee and secretary of the
96 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 448.
97 Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 51.
98 KPSS V resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, p. 49.
Pravda, 28 April 1933.
’99 Leningradskaia pravda, 28 May 1933.
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Leningrad oblast: 1903), I. V. Vasil’ev (Prigorodnyi raion, obkom bureau member: 
1912).’91 Out of 57 members within these raion and factory purge commissions, 38 
had joined the party before the Revolution. Purge commissions in rural raions were 
organised a little later. They were composed of a total of 234 people, made up 
predominantly of workers who had been party members for more than 13 years. The 
majority of chairmen of these rural purge commissions were said to be old 
communists.’92 it was claimed that local purge commissions were manned with 
communists who had proved capable of dealing with practical work. More than 75 per 
cent of the members of cell commissions were workers who had been in the party for 
at least 10 years, and chairmen of commissions had been party members for at least 13 
years.‘93 Moreover, in Leningrad, of the 1,932 members of the city’s purge 
eommissions, three-quarters were industrial workers with a party membership dating 
back to before 1921.‘94
In other words, it was the ‘old Bolsheviks’ who were put in charge of purging 
the party, and they were given spécifié instruetions to pay particularly close attention 
to members who had joined since 1928. This gave the impression that newly recruited 
proletarian activists were to be attacked and disciplined by the old red Bolsheviks who 
had gone tlrrough the hardships of the Revolution, the Civil War and the retrenchment 
that followed. However, it is not quite clear whether it meant that a generational 
conflict arose between younger and more senior members during the course of the 
purge.
It was claimed that the purge was conducted in a well-organised manner in the 
Leningrad r e g i o n . ‘ 9 5  Unlike previous purge operations, the 1933 purge commissions 
not only scrutinised the behaviour of individual communists and decided their fate, 
but also investigated the performance of party organisations by analysing the 
materials which had been accumulated during the purge process. The results of their 
analysis were formulated as concrete eonclusions and proposals, and members of 
purge commissions were associated with the very organisations where they were
‘9‘ Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 449.
’92 Leningradskaia pravda, 17 August 1933.
‘93 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 449.
‘94 Itogi chistki Leningradskoi oblastnoi organizatsii VKP(b) (Leningrad; Izdanie Leningradskoi 
oblastnoi komissii po chistke, 1934), p. 14.
‘95 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 451.
218
conducting purges, in order to implement the decisions of the purge c o m m i s s i o n s . ‘ 96  
Although the purge was conducted by the purge commissions organised at various 
levels of the party, the whole process was under the eontrol of the party committees. 
The oblast and city committees had constantly monitored the course of purges, and 
they intervened whenever any serious negligence was reported.
During the 1933 purge process, the importance of public scrutiny and maximum 
party and non-party participation was frequently emphasised. It was agreed at that 
time that mass participation in the purge process would uncover alien elements, reveal 
shortcomings and demonstrate examples of good work.‘9? The purge process took 
place at open party cell meetings where each party member and candidate in turn was 
obliged to give an account of his background, career and perfonnance in his job and 
party activities.‘98 Non-party members were informed of the aims and functions of the 
purge in advance of the party cell meetings‘99 and also allowed to take part in the 
purge process. Any party member or candidate could be questioned or criticized by 
anyone present.
Reportedly, the purge was carried out with the active participation of party and 
non-party masses in the Leningrad region. The first party meeting on the purge which 
was held to hear the reports of party secretaries on 1 June 1933, for instance, was an 
open meeting with extensive participation of non-party workers. In general, the degree 
of participation of those who attended the party purge meetings was assessed as being 
quite high. For example, more than 25 per cent of those present spoke out about the 
secretaries and communists who were going through purges. Support from the 
Komsomol and non-party members played an important role in the purge. The 
percentage of Komsomol members attending purge meetings was about 50 per cent in 
June and it had risen to 67 per cent by October. The percentage of non-party members 
present ranged from 29 to 42, and moreover, one tenth of them spoke out at the 
meetings with critical remarks and proposals. In rural areas, the participation of non- 
party members was even higher. At 1375 party meetings held in 50 raions, in which 
10,000 communists had to account for themselves, 10,500 Komsomol and 31,000
‘96/W ., p. 452.
‘97 Ibid., p. 450.
‘98 pj-avdci, 29 April 1933. 
‘99/6/f/., 28 April 1933.
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non-party members attended. Moreover, 10,000 party members, 1,200 Komsomol 
members and 6,500 non-party members participated actively in the d i s c u s s i o n s .  “ 9
However, the purge was not always earried out with sufficient mass 
participation and criticism. For instance, some party meetings within state 
administrative sector reportedly took place without sufficient criticism. ‘Turning a 
blind eye’ was reported at the Prigorodnoi raion and the Ostrovskii and Miaksinskii 
raions of the oblast. These reports led to the cancellation of the purges which were 
currently being carried out and the initiation of new purge process within these 
a reas . However ,  this was a rather exceptional case.
5.2.3 The result of the 1933 purge
The purge process went slowly in 1933. Although the original instruction had 
specified that the purge should be completed by the end of November 1933, less than 
half the membership had been dealt with by the scheduled completion date. ” 2 Only in 
eleven regions, the purge had been completed by December 1933, and the Leningrad 
region was one of these eleven regions. In other regions the purge dragged on for up 
to two years. In another 14 regional organisations and some organisations in the Red 
Anny and in the transport sector, the purge process started only after the seventeenth 
Party Congress in 1934. The purge process was not officially concluded and its 
commissions were not disbanded until December 1935, when the purge was 
superseded by the ‘verification of party documents’. Even then, the purge had not yet 
begun in seventeen territorial organisations, and some parts of the Red Anny and of 
the transport sector. ” 4
Nevertheless, the 1933 purge had a far-reaching impact on the party 
membership. At the seventeenth Party Congress, it was reported that 93.2 per cent of
“ 9 Leningradskaia pravda, 14 September 1933.
’ ’ ‘ Ibid., 26 September and 3 October 1933.
“ 2 Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 202.
” 2 p. N. Pospelov et al., Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1971), vol. 4, part 2, p. 283.
” 4 The dragging on of the purge served as an evidence for local party officials’ resistance to the purge 
in order to protect their machines. That was the reason that Rudzutak, chairman o f central control 
committee and W orkers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, blamed local party officials. According to him, 
many party leaders had not helped with the organisation and implementation o f the purge, and even 
more, some of these leaders had actually obstructed the successful conduct o f the purge. See Getty, 
Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 52.
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the entire party membership (or 1,149,000 members and candidates) had been 
examined by the end of 1933. Nationally 17 per cent of those examined were 
expelled, 9.8 per cent were transferred to candidate status, and 6.3 per cent were 
reclassified as sympathisers. “ 5 However, figures given in later years were slightly 
different: they showed that in the country as a whole the purge had resulted in the 
expulsion of 16.3 per cent of the party membership, the demotion of 6.2 per cent from 
full to candidate membership and the demotion of a further 5.8 per cent to the status 
of sympathisers. ’ ‘6
In the Leningrad region, 19,484 party members (10.4 per cent of the total) and 
11,169 candidates (20.5 per cent) were expelled from the party, resulting in an average 
expulsion rate of 12.7 per cent. Out of the 30,653 expelled, 22,071 were expelled from 
the Leningrad city party organisation, and the rest (8,582) from the rural raion party 
organisations. In other words, Leningrad city party organisation lost 11.6 per cent of 
its membership, while the rural raion organisations lost 16.8 per cent of their 
membership. However, subsequent rehabilitations reduced these figures to 8 per cent 
and 15.2 per cent respectively. This, in turn, resulted in the average expulsion rate 
being reduced to 9.5 per cent.“ 7
Table 5-6. Expulsion rates in Leningrad oblast, 1933 (percentages)
Full members expelled 
from the party
Candidate members 
expelled from the party
Total
Leningrad city n. d. n. d. 11.6 (8.0)
Rural districts n. d. n. d. 16.8 (15.2)
Total 10.4 20.5 12.7 (9.5)
Note: Figures in brackets are the expulsion rates after appeals.
Source: Itogi chistki Leningradskoi oblastnoi organizatsii VKP(b) (Leningiad: Izdanie 
Leningradskoi oblastnoi komissii po chistke, 1934), pp. 53 and 69.
In addition, a total of 16,425 party members (or 8.8 per cent) were demoted to 
candidate status, 1,800 party members (or 1 per cent) to sympathisers, and 7,369 party
“ 5 These are incomplete figures given by laroslavskii in his speech to the seventeenth Party Congress 
in early 1934. See XVII s ”ezd VKP(b), 26 ianvaria-IO fevralia 1934 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet 
(Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), pp. 287 and 299.
“ 6 Partiinaia zhizn', no. 20, October 1947, p. 79, Different figure (18.3 per cent expelled) was given 
in Pospelov, et al., Istoriia KPSS, vol. 4, part 2, p. 283.
* ’7 Itogi chistki, p. 53.
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candidates (or 13.5 per cent) to sympathisers in the Leningrad r eg i on .Fol lowi ng  
the appeals from the expelled members to the oblast and raion purge commissions, the 
figures changed to 7.5 per cent of party members demoted to candidate status, 0.8 per 
cent of party members reclassified as sympathisers, and 12.6 per cent of candidates 
reclassified as sympathisers. ” 9 As can be seen in table 5-7, in general the demotion 
rates in rural raions were higher than in Leningrad city, which suggests that the purge 
was more severe in rural raions than in the city. This table reveals that rural 
communists did indeed suffer more heavily than urban ones. The total percentage of 
those expelled in rural organisations was almost twice as high as in urban 
organisations, and the percentage of those converted to candidate or sympathiser in 
rural organisations was also much higher. This shows that urban party organisations in 
Leningrad got off much more lightly than mral organisations.
Table 5-7. Demotion rates in Leningrad oblast, 1933 (percentages)
Transferred from full to 
candidate membership
Transferred from full 
membership to 
sympathiser
Transferred from 
candidate membership 
to sympathiser
Leningi'ad city 
Rural disti'icts
8.3 (6.9) 
10.8 (10.4)
0.8 (0.6) 
1.7 (1.6)
12.1 (10.9) 
16.4 (16.1)
Total 8.8 (7.5) 1.0 (0.8) 13.5 (12.6)
Note: Figures in brackets are the demotion rates after appeals.
Source: As for table 5-6.
All in all, the figures for the Leningrad region were much lower than the figures 
for the all-Union party, showing that as a whole the Leningrad party organisation had 
been relatively less severely affected than other regional organisations. In fact, similar 
to the 1929 purge, the 1933 purge was markedly more severe in other mral regions, 
especially in the national republics. According to data given at the seventeenth Party 
Congress, which covered ten regions, the expulsion rate in the Leningrad region was 
one of the lowest, together with the Moscow region where an expulsion rate of 13.6 
per cent was recorded, whereas in five other regions the expulsion rate had exceeded
Ibid., p. 53. 
’9 /W .,p .  69.
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20 per cent.'20 This is why at the seventeenth Party Congress the Leningrad and 
Moscow party organisations were singled out as the strongest and most stable ones.'21 
It is accordingly no wonder that the official history of the Leningrad party 
organisation stated that ‘the purge showed that party kollektivy in industrial 
enterprises and the overwhelming majority of rural party organisations [in the 
Leningrad region] were healthy, solid and eagerly fighting for the implementation of 
the party policies.’‘22
What is noteworthy here is the fact that the significance and the gravity of the 
1933 purge had been much greater than in 1929-30 purge. While the latter resulted in 
an expulsion rate of 11 per cent nationally in its initial stages, the expulsion rate in 
1933 reached 17 per cent.'23 This was also the case for the Leningrad party 
organisation. In the Leningrad region, the 1929 purge had resulted in 5.1 per cent of 
the party membership being removed,'24 however, in 1933, prior to hearing appeals 
from members, almost 23 per cent of 208,000 party members had been affected in 
some way by the purge. Furthennore, unlike the 1929 purge which was conducted in 
conjunction with an enthusiastic recruitment campaign, the 1933 purge was conducted 
in a different atmosphere, with the imposition of a ban on further recruitment. 
Therefore, while the 1929 purge had barely affected the growth of the party’s 
industrial membership in the region, the 1933 purge had a far more serious effect on 
the membership generally, at least in absolute terms. Indeed, the total membership in 
the Leningrad region shranlc from 278,280 to 193,262 within a year.
The 1933 purge resulted in a slight increase in the proportion of party members 
classified as workers. At the seventeenth Party Congress, Rudzutak, speaking for the 
Central Control Commission, indicated that 23 per cent of those expelled were from a 
peasant background and 14.6 per cent were from a white eollar background at the
'20 The regions where their party organisations were severely hit by the 1933 purge were as follows: 
East Siberian krai (the expulsion rate 25.2 per cent), Urals oblast (23.1 per cent), Far Eastern krai 
(21.9 per cent), Odessa oblast (21,9 per cent), Karelian Autonomous Republic (20.3 per cent). See 
X V I I s ”ezd VKP(b),p. 287.
'2 ' Rudzutak stated, in his speech to the seventeenth Party Congress, that the expulsion rates in the 
Leningrad and Moscow regions were lower than the average of ten other regions. See ibid., p. 287.
'22 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 451.
'23 In the first month of the purge, the expulsion rate was over one-third, and then it had been cut in 
half by the end o f the year. See Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 53.
'24 Otchet o rabote Leningradskoi oblastnoi kontrol’noi komissii VKP(b) i raboche-krest’ianskoi 
inspektsii III Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (Leningrad, 1930), p. 9.
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national level. Although giving no figure for workers, he noted that in some areas 
where mass admissions had been most flagrant, large numbers of workers had been 
e x p e l l e d . '25 It seems reasonable to sunnise that around 62.4 per cent of those expelled 
were workers by social situation. Later, laroslavskii, also speaking for the Central 
Control Commission in a supplemental^ speech to Rudzutak’s, noted that after the 
1933 purge, the proportion of workers in the party had increased by 2 to 4 per cent, 
depending on the organisation, and that, in the ten regions for which data were 
available, the proportion of workers had increased from 67.7 per cent to 69.4 per 
c e n t . '2 6  These reports together suggest that a large number of workers were expelled, 
but that their percentage in the party actually increased because of higher rate of 
attrition among other, less numerous groups.'2?
Table 5-8. Social composition o f those expelled in Leningrad oblast, 1933
Those who 
had gone 
through the 
purge
Those 
expelled from  
the party
Those 
transferred to 
candidate
Full members 
transferred to 
sympathiser
Candidate 
members 
transferred to 
sympathiser
W orkers 177,549 17,655 11,366 1,183 4,421
(7%0%% (05.0% ;
Peasants 34,731 5,785 2,144 269 2,281
(22 .5% ; (74.7% ; ( 7 7 . 5 ^ (52 .5% ;
W hite-co llar 32,471 2,197 1,046 85 313
w orkers (13.3% ) ( 7 . 2 ^ (5 .5% ; (4 .5% ;
Total 244,750 25,634 14,556 1,537 7,015
(7 0 0 9 ^ (700% ; ( 7 0 0 ^ (700% ;
Note: P ercen tages are m y  ow n calcu lations.
Source: A dap ted  from  Ito g i ch istk i, pp. 72-73.
As can be seen in table 5-8, this was also the case for the Leningrad region. Out 
of the 25,634 expelled, those from a working class background comprised 68.9 per 
cent and those from a peasant background 22.5 per cent. At first glance, it seems that 
those from a working class background were more severely purged. However, taking 
into the consideration the fact that those from a working class background comprised
72.5 per cent of those who had gone thi'ough the purge, it is no wonder that they
'25 XVII s ‘ ezd VKP(b), p. 287.
'2 6 /W ., p. 299.
'22 Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 53.
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comprised the largest group among those purged. In actual fact, those who were from 
a peasant background were much more severely affected. Interestingly, those who 
were from a white collar background were purged relatively lightly.
Although there are no exact figures of those purged broken down by occupation 
at all-Union level, it appears that most of those purged were workers or peasants. In 
the Leningrad region, almost half of those purged were production workers or 
agricultural workers, and one fourth were white collar workers. Peasants accounted 
for nine per cent of those purged. Rural leaders, party and Komsomol officials, and 
specialists comprised seven per cent of those expelled (see table 5-9). This clearly 
shows that the majority of those expelled were either workers or peasants.
Table 5-9. Occupational composition o f those expelled in Leningrad oblast, 1933
Occupation Those expelled
N %
P roduction  and ag ricu ltu ra l w orkers 12,521
K olkhozn iks 2,221 8.6
Ind iv idual peasan ts 124 0.4
Kollchoz, rural sov ie t and  ru ra l consum er socie ty  chairm an 908 3.5
Party  and K om som ol offic ia ls 230 0.9
S pecialists 663 2.6
W hite  co llar w orkers 6,662 26.0
Students 1,296 5.0
A ll o thers 1,089 4.2
T otal 25 ,634 100.0
Note: P ercen tages are m y ow n calcu la tions.
Source: A dap ted  from Itogi chistki, p. 71.
A further breakdown by area also confirmed that workers and peasants were the 
most severely affected by the purge (see tables 5-10 and 5-11). In the city of 
Leningrad, production workers had the highest rate of expulsion and demotion,'28 
whereas party and Komsomol workers were least affected by the purge. In the rural 
areas, individual peasants showed the highest expulsion rate (51.5 per cent), followed 
by kolldiozniks (29.6 per cent). Production and agricultural workers also showed a 
high expulsion rate, 18.9 per cent and 22.7 per cent respectively. On the other hand,
'28 Those reclassified as sympathisers were mostly of worker candidate members who had only 
recently joined the party
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party officials and personnel in the Soviet, trade union, and other institutions showed a 
relatively low expulsion rate, less than 10 per cent. As for transfer to candidate or 
sympathiser status, workers and peasants also showed a higher expulsion rate than 
other occupational groups. Here, again, party and Komsomol officials showed the 
lowest demotion rate. This suggest that the 1933 purge was more like a mass purge 
than a purge to attack officials or bureaucrats.
Table 5-10. Party purge in Leningrad, broken down by occupation, 1933
Those w ho  
h a d  gone  
th rough p u rg e
Those
exp e lled
Those  
tra n sferred  
to candidate
Those tra n sferred  to 
sym p a th iser
Members Candidates
N % % % %
Production workers 86,752 11.8 9.4 1.0 12.5
Party and Komsomol 3,081 2.8 0.7 - 3.1
workers
Specialists 9,727 5.3 3.0 0.2 4.8
Students 26,120 4.8 4.6 0.4 9.4
White-collar workers 62,041 6.6 6.1 0.3 8.5
Others 5,625 13.7 7.1 0 .8 10.0
Total 193,346 8.8 7.0 0 .6 11.0
Source: Adapted from Ito g i ch istk i, p. 72.
Table 5-11. Party purge in the rural raions o f Leningrad oblast, broken down by 
occupation, 1933
Those w ho ha d Those Those Those tra n sferred  to
g o n e  through  
p u rg e
expe lled tra n sferred  
to cand ida te
sym p a th iser
Members Candidates
N % % % %
Workers 10,680 18.9 16 .6 3.0 16.5
Agricultural workers 1,020 22 .7 23.1 5.0 25.0
Kolkhozniks 7,362 29 .6 20 .4 4.0 220
Individual peasants 241 51.5 17.2 2 .0 229
Rural chairmen 5,502 16.2 7.7 1.0 11.1
Party and Komsomol 2,417 6.0 2.2 0.2 6.7
officials
Personnel in Soviet, 4,925 9.3 3 .6 0.2 7.8
trade union and
economic organs 
All others 19,257 n. d. n. d. n. d. n. d.
Total 51,404 16.8 10.8 1.7 16.3
Source: Adapted fro m  Ito g i ch istki, p. 73.
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The purge took its main toll upon workers and peasants who had entered the 
party during the mass recruitment drive of the first FYP era and scarcely touched 
those older party members from whom most of the party’s cadres were drawn.'29 
According to Rudzutak’s speech to the seventeenth Party Congress, the 1933 purge 
had affected mostly those who had joined the party during the previous three to four 
years.'20 As we have seen, the purge resulted in a 17 per cent expulsion rate at the 
national level, and about two-thirds of those expelled had joined the party since
1928.'21 Figures released in 1935 indicated that approximately one-half of those 
expelled had joined after 1929,'22 The data on the purge in the Leningrad region also 
confirm that the purge fell particularly heavily on the most recent recruits. As can be 
seen from the table 5-12, the longer the party membership, the less likelihood one had 
of being purged. While only 3.5 per cent of those who had joined the party before 
1921 were expelled, the figure was 10.9 per cent for those who had joined in 1932.'23 
Likewise, about 13 per cent of those who had joined the party in 1932 were 
transferred to candidate status and about 1.6 per cent of them were transferred to 
sympathiser status, whereas less than 2 per cent of those who had joined the party 
before 1923 were transferred either to candidate or sympathiser status. Altogether 
those who had joined the party after 1929 comprised approximately two-thirds of 
those expelled, 77.3 per cent of those transfeiTed to candidate, and 78.7 per cent of 
those transferred to sympathiser. In Leningrad itself, out of the 30,653 expelled, as 
many as 62 per cent had joined the party only after 1929.'24
Candidate members were most severely dealt with during the 1933 purge. 
Almost 20 per cent of them were expelled and 12.7 per cent were demoted to 
sympathiser status. Of the candidate members expelled, as many as 48 per cent had 
joined the party in 1932. Although no further breakdown is available, it seems 
reasonable to assume that most of those candidates expelled had joined the party after
'29 Cited from Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 203.
' 20 XVII s ' ezd VKP(b), p. 287.
'2 ' Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 53.
'22 N. A. Zolotarev, D eiatel’n ost’ kommunisticheskoi partii po ulushchenii sostava svoikh riadov v 
period stro itel’stva sotsializm av SSSR, 79 /7 -/939  (Moscow, 1970), p. 199.
'22 Itogi chistki, p. 70.
'24 Leningradskaia pravda, 12 December 1933.
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1929. Here again, it is clear that most recent recruits were severely affected by the 
purge.
Table 5-13. Composition o f party candidate members expelled in Leningrad oblast, 
broken down by year o f entry into the party, 1933
Those who had 
gone through 
purge
Those expelled from the 
party
Those transferred to 
sympathiser
N % N % % of total 
candidates 
expelled
N % % of total 
candidates 
transferred to 
sympathiser
Candidates 55,104 100.0 10,476 19.0 100.0 7,015 12.7 100.0
The 1932 
recruits
31,444 57.1 5,072 16.1 3,865 12.3 55.1
Source: As for table 5-12.
The higher expulsion rate of the 1929-1932 recruits can be explained in several 
ways. In general, all party purges tended to result in greater proportions of new party 
members being removed and the 1933 purge was not an exception. Moreover, as the 
1930-1932 recruits had not been through a purge before, it was more likely that they 
suffered most. It is not surprising that the 1929-1932 recruits were most closely 
examined during the 1933 purge, because from the official decree it was quite clear 
that these new members were the main target of the purge.
More importantly, the 1929-1932 recruits joined the party during the years that 
the leadership subsequently described as ones of ‘mass, indiscriminate recruitment’ 
into the party. Therefore, the heavy rate of attrition that newer members suffered was 
the price that the party was paying for the years of ‘mass, indiscriminate recruitment’ 
into the party. Young communists who had only recently joined the party were 
blamed for not possessing a ‘Bolshevik’ character, and many lacked a political 
training. Therefore, it is not surprising that they were among the first victims of the 
1933 purge. Some of the recent recruits who needed political training were transferred 
from member to candidate status, or from candidate to sympathiser status.
In addition, it is necessary to point out that those who had joined in 1929-1932 
made up a sizeable proportion of the total membership in 1933. For example, in the 
Leningrad region, 1931-1932 members alone accounted for about 20 per cent of the
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total membership, and those who had joined the party after 1929 for about 55.5 per 
cent.'25 Among candidates, those who had joined the party in 1932 alone comprised 
57 per cent.'26 This alone contributed to the high proportion that they represented 
among those expelled and among those transferred to candidate or sympathiser status. 
Nevertheless, the Leningrad party organisation had a particularly high percentage of 
expulsion of recent recruits, higher than the national average. This presumably means 
that either recruitment methods had been particularly lax in Leningrad from 1929'22 or 
that the purge commissions in the city had been abnormally severe in their assessment 
of those newer members.
Table 5-14 gives a breakdown of the total figures of those purged into the 
various categories of reasons for expulsion. For the Leningrad region, two different 
figures are presented in column 1 and 2. It is not clear why these figures are different. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy between them is not so big that it is ignorable. For the 
analysis and comparison, the figures given in column 1 will be used. No official 
breakdown at the all-Union level is available regarding the grounds on which 
expulsions were made in the 1933-1934 p u r g e . '28 As presented in column 4 and 5, 
only incomplete data were given. However, the all-Union figures presented in column 
4 and 5 seem to derive from the same source, and this makes it possible to deduce the
all-Union figures for each expulsion category. The categories were more or less
similar to the classification of those identified for expulsion under the April 1933 
decree, and there was not so much difference between the purge categories in 1933 
and in 1929-30,
As can be seen from table 5-14, those expelled for so-called ‘passivity’ 
comprised the largest single group both in the country as a whole and in the Leningrad 
region, despite the fact that passivity had not even been listed as a criterion in the 
original purge instructions. At the national level, more than seventy thousand
members, including many workers and peasants, were excluded for so-called
passivity,'29 and passivity accounted for 23.2 per cent of those expelled.'40 In the
'25 Jtogi chistki, p. 70.
'2 6 /W ., p. 70.
'27 It is very likely since Leningrad party organisation had been in the forefront o f the collective 
recmitnient o f whole workshop cells.
'28 Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 203.
'29 Getty, Origins o f  the Gi'eat Purges, p. 54.
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Leningrad region the percentage was even higher, reaching 33.6 per cent. Those 
expelled for violations of party and state discipline comprised the second largest 
group in the Leningrad region as well as in the country, accounting for one in five of 
those expelled from the party. Those purged as class alien or hostile comprised the 
third largest group, accounting for 16.5 per cent in the country and 13.8 per cent in 
Leningrad region.
Table 5-14. Reasons fo r  expulsion in the Leningrad region in comparison with All- 
Union figures, 1933 (percentages)
Leningrad Leningrad Leningrad All-Union All-Union
oblast oblast oblast
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Violations of party and 20.1 21.3 17.0 20.9 20.9
state discipline
Class alien elements 13.8 14.0 13.0 16.5 16.5
Passivity 33.6 31.8 27.0 n. d. 23.2
Moral conuption 12.6 n. d. 18.0 n. d. 21.5*
Careerists, self-seekers, 7.7 n. d. 8.0 n. d. n. d.
bureaucrats etc.
Degenerates 5.7 n. d. 11.0 10.2 n. d.
Double-dealers 4.4 n. d. 5.0 4.7 n. d.
All others (those not 2.1 32.9 1.0 47.7 14.9
accounted for)
Notes: Figures in column 1 did not take appeals into consideration; figures in column 3 cover 
only those expelled in the rural raions of the oblast; figures in column 4 are based on national 
data excluding 17 party organisations where the purge did not take place seperately, but 
merged with the verification of party documents of 1935; the figure for those expelled for 
being morally corrupt in column 5 includes those expelled for being careerists and 
bureaucrats.
Sources: (1) Adapted from Itogi chistki, p. 71; (2) Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii 
KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 452; (3) Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 1, January 1934, p. 22; (4) V. 
Beliakov and N. Zolotarev, Partiia ukrepliaet svoi riady (Moscow; Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1970), p. 133; (5) P. N. Pospelov et al., Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii 
Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatuiy, 1971), vol. 4, part 2, p. 
283.
Figures only for the rural districts of the Leningrad region show some 
interesting variations (see table 5-14, column 3). In the rural areas, passivity and 
violations of party and state discipline operated as important factors in contributing to 
the purge. However, the figures for these two groups in rural districts were much
*40 Istoriia KPSS, vol. 4, part 2, p. 283.
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lower than the figures for the oblast as a whole, accounting only for 27 per cent and 
17 per cent of those expelled respectively. Instead, the proportion of those expelled for 
being morally corrupt and being degenerate were larger than the average percentages 
for the oblast. They accounted for as much as 18 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. 
Those not accounted for were expelled for other reasons including violations of inner- 
party democracy, chauvinism, nationalism and anti-Semitism.
One notable feature of table 5-14 is the fact that the Leningrad region had a 
much higher expulsion rate of those purged for being passive than the national 
average, 33.6 per cent as against 23.2 per cent. Taking into the consideration the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of the first two largest groups of those expelled - 
those expelled for passivity and violations of party discipline - was made up by party 
members who had only recently joined the party,*4! it appears that ordinary rank-and- 
file members, especially recent recmits, were more harshly treated in the Leningrad 
region than other regions in the countiy. This might suggest that the recruitment 
process had been particularly loose in the Leningrad region in the previous years or 
that the purge commissions had been severe in their assessment of their rank-and-file 
members.
Nevertheless, it shows that the 1933 purge led to the mass expulsions of rank- 
and-file members at least in the Leningrad region, despite specific warnings not to 
expel them en masse on the grounds of passivity. It is not clear who should be blamed 
for the mass expulsions of rank-and-file members in the 1933 purge. First of all, the 
directives issued by central organs were rather confusing: on the one hand, they 
ordered not to expel rank-and-file members en masse; on the other hand, they also 
called for the removal of party members who lacked enough political training or 
enthusiasm. At the same time, one can not deny that local party secretaries were more 
ready to purge ranlc-and-file members than to purge more highly placed officials. 
Local party leaders probably wanted to protect any skilled administrators they had in 
order to fulfil the p l a n .  *42 Nevertheless, there were complaints about the excesses of 
the 1933 mass purge later on, in that the purge had removed good, honest communists
*4* Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 452.
*42 Getty, Origins o f  the Great Purges, p. 54.
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solely on the grounds of passivity although in reality a majority of them were staunch 
party people.
All in all, it appears that the 1933 purge was mainly a sort of membership 
cleansing rather than a means of getting rid of political opponents. Figures available 
suggest that political considerations played a relatively small part in the 1933 purge. 
Even though there was a strong emphasis on removing ‘enemies of the party’ who 
were trying to damage its interests and to obstruct its policies as set out in the April 
1933 decree, the great majority were removed either because they made unscrupulous 
use of their party membership to secure personal benefits, were immoral or 
undisciplined in their personal lives or at their job, or simply failed to participate in 
party activities. *43
Table 5-15 gives more detailed data about the reasons for expulsion in the 1933 
purge, broken down by occupation. An analysis of this table reveals some interesting 
variations in the grounds for expulsion from the party among the different types of 
occupation. Among production and agricultural workers, passivity and violation of 
party discipline were particularly important factors in contributing to the purge, 
accounting for 44.4 per cent and 23.5 per cent of expulsions respectively. Among 
kolldiozniks and individual peasants, passivity was also the major factor in 
contributing to the purge, accounting for 31.7 per cent and 37.9 per cent respectively. 
However, the percentage of those expelled for violations of party discipline among 
these groups was rather low. In particular, individual peasants showed the lowest 
percentage of those purged for violations of party discipline (12.1 per cent). On the 
other hand, a substantial proportion of the kolkhozniks were purged for degeneration 
and for corruption. Individual peasants showed a slightly different pattern. A sizable 
proportion of them were purged for degeneration, but corruption claimed only a small 
proportion. Instead, they had the highest percentage of those purged for being double- 
dealers. Rural leaders such as the chairman of the kolldioz, the rural soviet, and the 
rural consumer society showed a greater propensity to be purged for degeneration 
(21.2 per cent) and for corruption (20.5 per cent). However, only a few of them were 
purged for passivity. Among party and Komsomol officials, violation of party
*43 Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., p. 204.
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discipline, class hostile and dangerous elements and double-dealing were the most 
important factors, accounting for 23 per cent, 19.6 per cent and 12.2 per cent 
respectively. Specialists and students showed a similar pattern: they had the highest 
percentage of those purged as being class hostile and dangerous (23.5 per cent and 
34.9 per cent respectively) and had a relatively high percentage of those purged as 
careerists (14.2 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively). On the other hand, they 
showed a relatively low percentage of those purged as violators of party discipline 
(15.3 per cent and 13 per cent respectively) and of those purged for corruption (8.2 per 
cent and 6.3 per cent respectively). Among white collar workers, passivity, violation 
of party discipline, class hostile elements, cormption, and careerism were the most 
important factors.
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6. Party Personnel
As the party membership expanded rapidly and the party experienced 
organisational developments during the first FYP, the party faced a problem of 
supplying a much larger number of party workers to the party organisations at all 
levels. As the party intended to restrict the expansion of the number of salaried full­
time officials, the party tried to mobilise and make use of non-paid, volunteer party 
activists for the party work, especially at the lower level party organisations. This 
policy inevitably brought about a change in the composition of party workers. By the 
end of the first FYP, the party workers constituted a mixture of, on the one hand, full­
time, salaried officials who manned positions of responsibility in the party committees 
and bureaux, and on the other, unpaid, volunteer party members who carried out 
important duties in the organisation, the so-called aktiv.
The pressure put on the Leningrad party organisation to recruit party workers 
was rather great during the first FYP. Even though Leningrad possessed a relatively 
large number of party activists, it was not always easy to find suitable personnel for 
the rapidly expanding party organs, especially those at factories. Furthermore, 
Leningrad was expected to supply party workers not only for their own party 
apparatus, but also for the party organisations in other parts of the country. Therefore, 
the pressure to recruit new party workers was even greater than any other regions in 
the country. A substantial number of Leningrad’s party activists were recruited for 
party work and many of them promoted into more responsible posts within the party, 
in some cases to the posts in other regions. As a result, the composition of 
Leningrad’s party workers experienced a serious change in tenns of education, social 
origin, occupation and work experience over the first FYP.
This chapter examines how the Leningrad party organisation coped with the 
pressure on recruiting party workers during the first FYP. It also investigates the 
compositional change of Leningrad’s party workers caused by the massive 
recruitment of party activists for party work. The composition of the party workers 
from the obkom level down to the party cells is considered, with special attention 
given to those at the factory party organisations. The emphasis is on whether the
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recruitment of party activists prevented the party hom being bureaucratised, as the 
party hoped.
6.1 Party personnel at the oblast, city and raion levels
6.1.1 The expansion of the party apparatus
In the first tliree years of the first FYP period, much effort was made on 
restricting the overall growth of the party apparatus. From 1927 onwards, restricting 
the overall growth of the party apparatus became official policy. This was triggered by 
the campaign for the so-called ‘regime of economy’, which got under way in 1926 
following the fourteenth Party Congress.^ Even though the Soviet apparatus, the 
industrial organisations and the enterprises were the main target of the ‘regime of 
economy’ campaign, the party’s own bureaucratic apparatus was also subject to the 
‘regime of economy’, and furthermore, it was compelled to take the lead in the 
‘regime of economy’ campaign, and to set an example to other administrations.^
Then, in the period immediately following the fifteenth Party Congress, the 
notion of reducing and simplifying the apparatus was discussed as one of the 
‘rationalisations’ of the apparatus. A Central Committee Commission had been set up 
at the beginning of 1927 to look at ways of ‘rationalising’ the party apparatus at all 
levels,^ and over the next three years the need to make the structure more streamlined, 
and therefore more cost effective, became of key importance in all discussions of the 
party apparatus."^ Then the Central Committee resolution of 9 August 1928 on the 
party apparatus gave official approval to many of the ideas discussed earlier in the 
year - reducing the total size of the apparatus, introducing the principle of part 
payment for party work, increasing the amount of unpaid work and the number of
' For the conduct o f ‘regime o f economy’ campaign at the shop-floor level, see John Hatch, ‘The 
Politics o f Industi’ial Efficiency during NEP: The 1926 Rezhiin Ekonomii Campaign in M oscow’, in 
Stephen White, ed., New Directions in Soviet Histoiy  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).
2 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 2, February 1928, p. 21.
 ^ Organizatsionno-partiinaia rabota: Iz istoriipartiinogo stroitel'stva (Moscow, 1969), vol. 1, p. 240. 
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 323.
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nagruzki on party members, reducing the time of decision-making, simplifying the 
statistical and accounting system and eliminating superfluous sub-departments.^
In terms of the size of the party apparatus, the Central Committee resolution of 
9 August 1928 established standard staff levels for party organisations according to a 
number of factors such as population and size of party membership.*^ This resolution, 
as well as recommending the dismissal of 2,500 party bureaucrats (around nine per 
cent of the total), called for the greater proportionate reductions in staff levels to be 
borne by the regional and urban district party organisations. The Leningrad obkom 
was one of the largest committees in the country and the number of its staff was 
specified in the resolution. For instance, it was suggested that the Leningrad obkom 
have a maximum of 105 staff including 51 technical staff (see table 6-1).”^ When 
compared to the staff number suggested for the Moscow committee, the Leningrad 
obkom was to have about 35 fewer staff. However, the main difference was in the 
number of teclmical staff they could employ: the Moscow committee was allowed to 
have a much larger number of technical staff. When compared to other obkoms, it is 
obvious that the Leningrad obkom could have a much larger number of staff (see table 
6- 1).
Table <5-7. Standard number o f party staff suggested for the Leningrad, Moscow and 
Ural oblast committees, September 1928
Leningrad obkom Moscow committee Ural obkom
Secretaries 2 2 2
Managers 4 5 3
Managers * 43 72 30
Orgraspredotdel 23 23 12
Orgraspredotdel * 5 9 4
Agitpropotdel 14 14 9
Agitpropotdel * 2 4 2
Department for women 5 5 3
Department for women * 1 1 -
Department for rural affairs 6 5 5
Total (responsible staff only) 105 (54) 140 (54) 70 (34)
Note: Those party workers marked with an * were technical staff, and the rest were 
responsible staff.
Source: Adapted from Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 27, 10 September 1928, p. 8.
 ^Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 27, 10 September 1928, p. 6.
 ^ Ibid., p. 1.
This meant that, counting responsible staff only, the obkom staff was to be cut from 68 to 54.
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On the other hand, an urban raikom could have maximum of nine staff if it 
contained more than 3,500 communists. Each of Leningrad’s six urban raikoms had 
over 9,000 communists in July 1928, and therefore they were entitled to have the 
maximum number of staff. The nine staff included the following positions: a 
secretaiy, an instructor, an agitation-propagandist, a women’s organiser, a head 
organiser, a technical secretary, an accounting clerk or statistician, an operator and a 
messenger or office-cleaner. The first five were responsible staff and the rest were 
teclmical staff.^ Even though Leningrad’s raikoms could have the maximum number 
of staff available, this was far from enough to accommodate the previous party 
officials who had held their posts in Leningrad’s raikoms. Taking into account the fact 
that in 1927 the number of staff at raikom level in Leningrad was around 200, six 
urban raikoms had to shed around one third of their staffs In other words, around 70 
raikom persoimel in Leningrad were to lose their jobs in this re-organisation.
Table 6-2. Actual number o f party staff in the Leningrad region, March 1929
Responsible staff Technical staff
Obkom 60 60
Urban raikoms 124 96
Factory party cells 409 101
Olcruzhkoms 119 50
Rural raikoms 184 72
Source: Stenograficheskii biulleten ’ Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (Leningrad, 
1929), no. 9, p. 17.
However, data on the number of staff at each level of the Leningrad party 
organs in 1929 show that the recommendation of 1928 was not strictly adhered to. In 
total, the party apparatus in the Leningrad region had grown to 593 responsible and 
257 technical/operative staff by March 1929,^ *^  excluding over 400 staff employed in 
the countryside of the newly formed oblast (see table 6-2). The Leningrad obkom and 
Leningrad’s six urban raikoms had a larger number of staff than they were supposed 
to have. The Leningrad obkom had 60 responsible and 60 technical staff instead of 54
® Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 27, 10 September 1928, p. 7. 
 ^Ibid., p. 6.
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responsible and 51 technical staff. In Leningrad’s urban raikoms, there were still 
about 220 party workers including 96 technical staff (see table 6-2). Taking into 
account the huge size of the party membership in each raion, it seems that the 
maximum nine staff allowance must have been far too small for Leningrad’s urban 
raikoms.’’
No comprehensive data on the number of party officials in the early 1930s were 
found, but it seems that the party apparatus at the obkom, gorkom and raikom levels 
had expanded. First of all, the reorganisation of the party organs in 1930 and 1931 
contributed greatly to the expansion of the party apparatus. With the introduction of a 
functional-sectoral system, a larger number of party officials came to work in party 
committees. The obkom secretariat and bureau also expanded: for instance, the 
number of obkom secretaries increased from two in 1929 to five in 1932. 
Furthermore, the creation of a separate Leningrad gorkom in 1931 led to an increase 
in the number of party officials engaged at this level. For instance, in 1932, there were 
four gorkom secretaries and four department heads in Leningrad. Leningrad’s urban 
raikoms also saw an expansion. In 1930 an additional two raikoms were established in 
Leningrad, and this also led to an increase in the total number of the staff working in 
the urban raikoms. All these factors contributed to an increase in number of party 
workers at the obkom, gorkom and urban raikom levels. Indeed, we Icnow that over 
3,000 party and Komsomol officials were checked in the 1933 purge, a figure which 
should be compared to a total party apparatus of around 850 at the beginning of
1929.’2
Since the key posts at the obkom and gorkom level were occupied by paid full­
time party officials, the expansion of the party organs must have led to an increase in 
the number of full-time party officials. However, at the same time, the party sought to
This meant an increase from 210 officials in 1921. See Sbornik materialov Peterburgskogo komiteta 
RKP(b) (Petrograd, 1921), no. 3, p. 91.
”  A maximum of 9 staff were allowed for a large raikom, containing more than 3,500 party members 
and candidates. However, already in 1928, 5 raikoms in Leningrad had more than 10,000 paity 
members and candidates, and only one raikom (Peti'ogradskii) had 9,000 party members and 
candidates. Therefore, Leningrad urban raikoms seem to have needed a larger number of staff For 
the party membership in each raion, see Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), 
no. 10, 1928, p. 30.
’2 Cited from P. O. Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan: The Case 
o f  Leningrad (CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, University of Birmingham, 1983), part 2, p. 
28.
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make full use of the unpaid party activists. Indeed, there were numerous unpaid party 
workers in the obkom and Leningrad’s raikoms. For instance, there were 77 unpaid 
instructors in the Leningrad obkom in June 1929.’  ^However, it seems that most party 
positions were occupied by full-time officials. It seems reasonable to assume that 
Leningrad, as an important industrial centre, with a large network of party committees 
and cells in its factories, must have had a larger number of full-time party officials 
than many other regional organisations.’^
By the beginning of 1928, the number of communists and party workers in rural 
areas was extremely small. Rural raion party organisation was weak. For instance, in 
1928, there were some rural raions in which there were only a few communists (10-15 
communists). In such raions, almost all party members were elected into the leading 
party organs such as the raikom, the raion control commission, and the plenipotentiary 
control commissions, in order to fill the post of raikom, which was set up as seven to 
nine party members and tliree candidates, and that of control commission, which was 
set up as tliree members and two candidates. ’ ^
Table 6-3. Standard number ofparty staff suggested for ol<ruzhkoms, September 1928
Number of communists in one okrug 5,000-
10,000
2,500 - 
5,000
1,500-
2,500
800-
1,500
Secretai*y 1 1 1 1
Managers 1 1 - -
Managers * 6 5 4 3
Orgraspredotdel 7 5 4 3
Orgraspredotdel * - 1 1 1
Agitpropotdel 4 2 2 1
Department for women 2 2 2 1
Total (responsible staff only) 21 (15) \1(11) 14(9) lOfdJ
Note: Those party workers marked with an * were technical staff, and the rest were 
responsible staff.
Source: As for table 6-1.
’3 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2710, pp. 29-30.
Despite growth in the size o f the apparatus, the ratio o f full-time officials to party members in the 
Leningrad oblast dropped considerably over the 1920s. The main reason for that was the rapid 
growth of party membership. At all-Union level, the ratio of party officials to party members fell 
from 1:22 in 1924 to 1:49 in 1928, and was down to 1:82 in 1930. See X IV  s ’‘ezd VKP(b): 
Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1926) and K  X V I s ”ezdu: Materialy k organizatsionnomu 
otchetu TsK VKP(b) (Moscow, 1930), no. 1, pp. 99-100.
’3 Partrabotnik, no. 18, 25 October 1928, p. 44.
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According to a Central Committee resolution of 9 August 1928, which 
established standard staff levels for party organisations according to a number of 
factors such as population and size of party membership, olcuzhkoms could have a 
minimum of seven staff and a maximum of 30 staff. Since eight okruzhlcoms in the 
Leningrad oblast had less than 10,000 party members each, the size of the population 
was not taken into account when deciding the number of party staff. ’ Instead, the 
number of staff was decided in accordance with the number of communists within the 
okrug. For instance, the Leningrad olauzhlcom, the largest okruzhlcom in the 
Leningrad oblast with over 8,000 party members and candidates, could have a 
maximum of 21 staff including six teclmical staff. Pskov, Novgorod, Velikie luki, and 
Cherepovets olaruzhlcoms, containing between 2,500 and 5,000 communists, could 
have 11 responsible and six technical staff. Luga olcmzhkom, containing about 1,700 
communists, could have nine responsible and five technical staff, and Lodeinoe pole 
and Munnansk okruzhkoms, having less than 1,500 communists could have only six 
responsible and four teclmical staff (see table 6-3).
Table 6-4. Standard number o f party staff suggested fo r  rural raikoms, September 
1928
Number of communists in one raion 1,200 - 800- 500- 100- Up to
3,000 1,200 800 500 100
Secretary 1 1 1 1 1
Instructor 1 1 - - -
Agitation-propagandist 1 1 1 - -
Women’s organisers 1 1 1 - -
Accounting clerk / statistician * 1 - - - -
Clerk / operator 1 1 - - -
Clerk - - 1 1 -
Total 6 5 4 2 1
Note: Those party workers marked with an * were technical staff, and the rest were
responsible staff.
Source: As for table 6-1.
In the same way, the standard number of staff for the rural raikoms was decided 
by the party membership size (see table 6-4). It was recommended that a rural raikom
Only when a oknizhkom contained more than 10,000 party members and candidates, the size of 
population mattered.
’2 The size o f party membership in each okruzhkom was based on data from the first o f July 1928, 
given in Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 10, 1928, p. 30.
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have a maximum of six party workers. In general, rural raikoms were to have slightly 
fewer staff than olcruzhkoms and urban raikoms containing a similar number of party 
members.
However, in July 1930 the standard staff levels for the rural raikoms were re­
established according to a number of factors such as the size of population and the 
number of their party membership, party cells, and rural soviets (see table 6-5). Some 
industrial raions, fully collectivised raions, raions on the border, and those closely 
linlced to large city organisations, were allocated the number of staff associated with 
the category above them.’  ^For example, those who were placed in category four were 
allocated the four responsible and three technical staff associated with category three. 
When compared with the standard number of staff in 1928, the rural raikoms could 
have a slightly larger number of staff. This might be an reflection of the growing 
importance of the rural raikoms, especially after the abolition of the olcruzhlcoms.
Table 6-5. Maximum number ofparty staff suggested for rural raikoms, 1930
Number of 
party 
members
Number of 
party cells
Number of 
population
Number of 
responsible 
staff
Number of 
technical 
staff
Category 1 over 1,000 over 50 over 70,000 5 3
Categoiy 2 750-1,000 40-50 50,000-70,000 5 2
Category 3 500-750 30-40 40,000-50,000 4 2
Categoiy 4 200-500 15-30 30,000-40,000 4 1
Category 5 under 200 under 15 under 30,000 3 1
Source: RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p.123.
Even though each rural raikom had a relatively small number of staff, the total 
number of party workers employed in the mral raikoms significantly increased due to 
the expansion of the rural raion party organisations in the countryside. This was the 
case especially after 1930. Most of the expansion of the party apparatus in these years 
took place primarily in the countryside, where party officials in the collective farm 
and village, though still far from ubiquitous, became far more commonplace. In 
addition, re-organisations of the party apparatus in 1930 served to considerably 
increase the number of officials employed in the rural raikoms. Following the 
abolition of the olcruzlikoms in 1930, a substantial number of the foncier olcruzhlcom
*8 RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 123.
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officials were transferred to the rural raikoms.'^ In addition, a large number of party 
workers from the city were sent to the countryside, to help in the establishment of the 
party organisations in the countryside. For instance, by Februaiy 1931, some 4,000 
party workers and specialists were sent from the city of Leningrad to the 
countiy side. 20 Some came to the countryside only for couple of months, but many for 
a longer period.2’
Consequently, a total of 425 staff employed in the countryside in 1929 
(including those employed in the olcruzhkoms) increased to 518 staff a year later. In 
total, some 380 responsible and 138 technical staff were working in 111 rural 
raikoms, excluding the raikoms of the Murmansk olmig.22 The total number of staff 
for 111 rural raikoms was set to be 380 responsible and 138 teclmical staffs. The 
increase in the number of party workers in the countryside seems to have continued in 
the following two years. By 1933 there must have been well over 2,000 party officials 
in the rural organisations of the Leningrad oblast. This was a considerable increase 
when compared with the figure of around 400 in 1929.23
6.1.2 Party workers within the Leningrad obkom and gorkom
Party workers within the Leningrad obkom, the highest party organ in the 
region, carried a major amount of responsibility for party work within the region. 
Likewise, those in the Leningrad gorkom were in charge of the city’s political and 
economic life. Therefore, the most experienced party members were chosen to be 
party workers at these levels. Even though there were some voluntary party activists 
who were carrying out party work at the Leningrad obkom and gorkom, the most 
important party posts were occupied by full-time party officials. The leading party 
officials at the regional and city level included secretaries, department heads, and 
bureau members of both the Leningrad obkom and gorkom. The importance of these
For instance, in 1929, there were 119 responsible and 50 technical staff in the okmzhkoms. See 
Rezoliutsii ob ”edinnennogo plenuma Leningradskogo obkoma i oblKK VKP(b) 15-16 fevralia 1931 
g.: Ob itogakh likvidatsii okrugov i ukreplenii raionov (Leningrad: Ogiz-Priboi, 1931), p. 3, See also 
table 5-3.
20 Ibid., p. 3.
2' For instanee, it was recommended that leading party workers be sent to rural raions for a period of 
one to three months. See ibid., p. 12.
22 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2751, p. 123.
23 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 28.
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posts was reflected in the fact that appointments to these posts required the approval 
of both the obkom and the Central Committee.
Between 1928 and 1932, the following were obkom secretaries: M. S. Kirov 
(first secretary throughout this period); M. S. Chudov (second secretary between 1928 
and December 1931 and again from May 1932 onwards); P. I. Struppe (second 
secretary between December 1931 and May 1932); B. P. Pozern (third secretary from 
April 1930 to December 1931); P. A. Irklis (third secretaiy from December 1931);24 
A. V. Osinov (fourth secretary between December 1931 and May 1932); A. A. 
Nikulin (secretary in charge of transport from December 1931) and P. L. Nizovtsev 
(secretary from May 1932).25 In the city of Leningrad, the Leningrad gorkom 
secretaries, elected on 29 January 1932, were as follows: Kirov (first secretary); 
Chudov (second secretary); Pozem (third secretary) and I. 1. Gaza (fourth s e c r e t a r y ) .  
Later in May when Chudov was transferred to the obkom, he was replaced by Gaza. 
Instead, A. I. Ugarov, former head of the department for culture and propaganda, was 
elected as the gorkom secretary.2?
Official biographies show that most of the obkom and gorkom secretaries had 
had prominent careers within the party. The most important figure was the first 
secretary of the Leningrad obkom, Sergei Mironovich Kirov (1886-1934). He had 
been an outstanding party leader, even before his appointment as the Leningrad 
obkom secretaiy. Having joined the party early in 1904, he took an active part in the 
revolutionary movement as a party organiser and propagandist in Tomsk, Irkutsk, and 
Vladikavkaz between 1904 and 1918, and this led to him being imprisoned on four 
occasions during this period. Between 1919 and 1924, he undertook party work as a 
leading party official in the Transcaucasian area in such places as Astrakhan lorai, 
Georgia, and A z e r b a i j a n . 2 8  Then in 1925, after the fourteenth Party Congress, Kirov, 
along with Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, and Kalinin, was sent to Leningrad 
in order to persuade those supporting Trotsky and Zinoviev to defect to Stalin. In the 
following year, Kirov became a secretary of the Leningrad gubkom and of the Severo-
24 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2697, protocol 7.
25 Ibid., delo 2697, protocol 7; and delo 2698, protocol 3.
2*^  Ibid., delo 2698, protocol 1.
22 Ibid., protocol 3.
2  ^ In 1921, he was elected secretary of the Central Conimitte of the communist party in Azerbaijan.
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Zapadnyi bureau of the communist party. When the Leningrad province was 
transformed into the Leningrad oblast in 1927, he became a Leningrad obkom 
secretary, and later in 1932, he also headed the Leningrad gorkom. He had been the 
most powerful figure in the region until his assassination in December 1934.29 During 
his leadership over the Leningrad party organisation, he had been extremely popular 
among Leningrad’s party members and workers, and was often acclaimed as an 
outstanding organiser and party leader. It has been said that he often visited factories 
and construction places without giving prior notice, talked to workers and Icnew a 
great deal about the situation in the factories, sometimes even more than the factory 
managers did.^o At the same time, he was a figure of national prominence; he was 
chosen as a candidate member of the Central Committee at the tenth Party Congress in 
1921, as a member of the Central Committee at the twelfth Party Congress in 1923, as 
a candidate member of the Politburo in 1926, and as a Politburo member in 1930.3’
Chudov (1893-1937), who was bom into a peasant family, joined the 
communist party in 1913. While working in the printing factory in Petrograd, he took 
part in the revolutionary activity among Petrograd’s printers, and became a member 
on the board of printers’ union. Immediately after the 1917 February Revolution, he 
was involved in trade union and party work in Petrograd. From 1918 to 1928, he held 
the post of the head of the Bezhetskii uispolkom, the head of the Tver gubkom, the 
secretary of Donlcom, and the secretary of Severo-Kavkazskii raikom in Rostov-on- 
Don. Then in 1928, he returned to Leningrad as a secretary of the Leningrad obkom. 
He was also a party leader of national standing. Since he became a Central Committee 
member at the twelfth Party Congress, he managed to retain his post at the Central 
Committee with an exception of the thirteenth Party Congress in 1 9 2 4 . 3 2
Unlike Kirov and Chudov, who were brought from outside Leningrad, the other 
obkom and gorkom secretaries had held their party posts in Leningrad before their 
promotion. Struppe, Irklis, Nizovtsev and Gaza had been Leningrad’s raikom 
secretaries, while Pozem, Osinov and Ugarov had been heads of the obkom
29 B o l’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd edn (Moscow: B ol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1953), 
vol. 21, pp. 111-114.
3® Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, pp. 383-384.
3’ B o l’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 21, pp. 111-114.
32 /W ., vol. 51, p. 317.
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departments before their promotion (see tables 6-7 and 6-8). It seems that the creation 
of additional secretarial posts within the obkom^^ and the establishment of the 
separate Leningrad gorkom with four secretaries of its own led to greater 
opportunities of promotion for some leading party officials in Leningrad.
Party membership dating back to before 1921 seems to have remained an almost 
essential prerequisite for entry into the high level of the party apparatus tliroughout 
this period. The 1925 Party Rules did not specify any requirement in relation to the 
length of party membership for the secretaries of the regional party organisations, but 
did require at least seven years’ party membership for the secretaries of the provincial 
organisations. Assuming that a similar length of party membership was expected for 
the obkom and gorkom secretaries, it follows that they should have joined the party 
before December 1920. Later in 1934, new Party Rules stipulated that secretaries of a 
regional organisation must have at least 12 years’ party membership and those of a 
city organisation must have at least ten years’ party membership. This leads us to 
hypothesise that in 1934, the obkom and gorkom secretaries were expected to have 
joined the party by 1924 at the latest. Indeed, almost all the Leningrad obkom and 
gorkom secretaries on whom data are available had joined the party before 1920 (see 
table 6-6). Kirov, Chudov, Stmppe and Pozem had joined the party before the 
Revolution, whereas Nizovtsev, Gaza and Ugarov had joined the party between 1917 
and 1919.34 Not all secretaries at these levels were of working-class background (see 
table 6-6). Chudov, Pozem, Nizovtsev and Gaza were workers by social origin, while 
Kirov, Stmppe and Ugarov were white-collar workers. It is not very clear whether this 
means that one’s social background was not a deciding factor in being appointed as an 
obkom secretary or a gorkom secretary.
The bureau members of the Leningrad obkom and gorkom included the most 
powerful figures of the party organisation and government in the area. Unfortunately, 
information on the composition of the obkom bureau members has not been found. 
However, information on the gorkom bureau members, which is available, gives a 
rough idea of their composition. Table 6-6 shows social origin, year of entry into the 
party, and the post held by the gorkom bureau members elected on 29 January 1932:
33 The number of obkom secretaries increased from two in March 1929 to five by the end of 1931.
34 No data were found on the year o f entry into the party of Irklis, Osinov and Nikulin.
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Table 6-6. Leningrad gorkom bureau members, January 1932
Name Social
origin
Year of 
entry
Post
I. I. Alekseev worker 1917 secretary of Narvskii raikom
P. A. Alekseev worker 1914 chairman of Leningi'ad oblast council of tiade 
unions
S. I. Afanas’ev employee 1912 chairman of cauldron-turbine (kotloturbina)
D. P. Belitskii employee 1919 technical editor of Leningradskaia pravda
P. I. Bushuev worker 1911 secretary of Moskovskii raikom
V. S. Voltsit worker 1912 secretary of Vasileostrovskii raikom
I. S. Vaushlia worker 1925 second secretaiy of the Leningrad committee 
of Komsomol
1.1. Gaza worker 1917 secretary of Leningrad gorkom
I. F. Kadatskii worker 1914 chairman of the Leningrad Soviet
S. M. Kirov employee 1904 first secretary of Leningrad obkom and 
gorkom
1.1. Kondraf ev worker 1905 chairman of union trust of shipyard
F. D. Medved’ employee 1907 head of Unified State Political Administration; 
the political police
A. S. Miloslavskii worker 1918 secretary of Smol’ninskii raikom
P. L. Nizovtsev worker 1919 secretary of Volodarskii raikom
M. A. Osvenskii employee 1917 secretary of Oktiabr’skii raikom
B. P. Pozem worker 1902 secretary of Leningrad gorkom
G. N. Pylaev worker 1912 chairman of Leningrad oblast Council for the 
National Economy
M. M. Serganin worker 1912 chairman of Leningrad union of consumers’ 
society
P. I. Smorodin worker 1917 secretary of Vyborgskii raikom
S. M. Sobolev worker 1918 secretaiy of Peti'ogradskii raikom
P. I. Struppe employee 1907 second secretary of Leningi'ad obkom
I. E. Slavin employee 1917 head of political control of military disti'ict
A. I. Ugarov employee 1918 head of the culture and propaganda department 
(gorkom)
F. F. Tsar’koV worker 1906 chairman of Lenobispolkom
M. S. Chudov worker 1913 secretary of Leningrad gorkom
L. K. Shaposhnikova worker 1917 seeretary of Leningrad oblast council of trade 
unions
V. M. Petrovskii employee 1920 deputy chairman of Leningrad oblast council 
for the National Economy
Note: The posts of Nizovtsev and Voltsit are from Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii 
KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), vol. 2, p. 385.
Source: Adapted from RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, pp. 10-11.
Out of the 27 gorkom bureau members, 18 were workers by social origin, while nine 
were white-collar workers. Most of the gorkom bureau members elected at this time 
had joined the party before 1920. About half (14) had joined the party before 1915, 
twelve between 1917 and 1920, and only one had joined the party after 1920. This
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reveals that almost all gorkom bureau members, made up with leading party officials 
and govermuent functionaries in the city, had been party members from the Civil War 
or earlier. Taking into account the fact that there was a significant overlap in 
personnel between the obkom bureau members and those of the gorkom, we can 
assume that the composition of the obkom bureau members, in relation to social 
origin and length of party membership, seem to have been similar to that of the
gorkom.
Department heads, who were in charge of carrying out all the routine work of 
the obkom or gorkom, were another category of leading party officials. All 
department heads were full-time party officials. Those who were appointed as 
department heads of the obkom between 1929 and 1932 were as shown in table 6-7. In 
the Leningrad gorkom, the following people were appointed as department heads in 
January 1932; S. la. ShuTman (the department for organisation and instruction), M. 
N. Rozov (the department for cadres), Ugarov (the department for culture and 
propaganda) and F. N. Ivanov (the department for mass work).^^ When Ugarov was 
promoted to a gorkom secretary in October 1932, L. V. Ermolov was appointed as the 
head of the department for culture and propaganda.^^ No overall data on their social 
origin or year of entry into the party were found, but selective information on some 
department heads who were also the gorkom bureau members in 1932 suggests that 
most department heads had a long period of party membership (see table 6-6).
As table 6-7 shows, the turnover in the post of department heads were relatively 
high over this period. It appears that the re-organisation of the party apparatus, such as 
the re-structuring of the departments in 1930 and 1931 and the establishment of the 
separate Leningrad gorkom in December 1931, caused some personnel changes at this 
level. Heads of the key departments, such as the organisation and instruction 
department and the assignment (or cadres) department, had changed three times
For instance, in January 1932, out o f the 22 obkom bureau members, 13 were also chosen to be the 
gorkom bureau members. Out of the nine obkom bureau candidate members, one person was also 
appointed to the Leningrad gorkom bureau. One of the differences between the obkom bureau and 
the gorkom bureau was the number o f raikom secretaries it included. All the first raikom secretaries 
were appointed to the gorkom bureau, whereas only the secretaries of the three largest raikoms 
(Narvskii, Vyborgskii and Sm ol’ninskii raikoms) were appointed to the obkom bureau. See 
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, protocol 1.
Ibid., protocol 1.
Ibid., protocol 4.
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within five years. On the other hand, in the less important departments, such as the 
department responsible for party history and for general work, there was no staff 
change in the post of the department head for five years. The frequent personnel 
changes in the post of department heads seem to have been caused by the promotion 
of some department heads into more senior party positions. This was the case of 
personnel changes in key departments such as the cadres department and the culture 
and propaganda department. Indeed, A. I. Stetskii was promoted to the Central 
Committee, Pozem and Osinov were appointed as Leningrad obkom secretaries, 
Ugarov as Leningrad gorkom secretai*y, and Voltsit as Leningrad’s Vasileostrovskii 
raikom secretary.
Table 6-7. Head o f departments attached to Leningrad obkom, 1929, 1930 and 1932
Department March 1929 (1) March 1930 (2) Sept. 1930 (3) Jan. 1932 (4)
Orgraspredotdel M. S. Chudov - - -
Organisation and 
instruction
“ P. N. Sirotinin A. V. Osinov A. P. Sorokin
Assignment
(Cadres)
“ A. V. Osinov V. S. Voltsit A. A. Nelcrasov
Agitpropotdel A. I. Stetskii * - - -
Agitation and 
Mass campaigns
F. Ivanov F. Ivanov B. B. Rodenkov
Culture and 
propaganda
A. I. Ugarov A. I. Ugarov A. E. Romanov
Party history P. F. Kudeir P. F. Kudeir P. F. Kudeir -
General work N. F. N. F. N. F. N. F.
Sveshnikov Sveshnikov Sveshnikov Sveshnikov
Rural affairs N. la. Kuz’min - - -
Women L. K.
Shaposhnikova
Note: * A. I. Stetskii was promoted to the Central Committee in December 1929, and was 
replaced by B. P. Pozern.
Sources: (1) RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocols 1 and 2; (2) Ibid., protocol 
10; (3) Ibid., delo 2696, protocol 2; (4) Ibid., delo 2698, protocol 1.
Even though the most important party posts were occupied by salaried full-time 
party officials, some of the most active party workers were promoted into the obkom 
as well. Already in the spring 1928 party elections, those party activists who had had 
the right social credentials and who had showed a particular enthusiasm in carrying 
out their duties were elected into the obkom. For instance, there were 77 unpaid
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instructors in the Leningrad obkom in June 192978 Data on their year of entry into the 
party present that the majority of them had a long period of party membership. Out of 
the 77 instructors, 66 (86 per cent) had joined the party before 1921, and eight (10 per 
cent) had joined the party between 1921 and 1927. These unpaid instructors held 
positions in various sectors such as the state administration, factories, local 
newspapers and educational institutions. 9^ However, as a whole, the proportion of 
those voluntary party activists working in the Leningrad obkom appears to have been 
small. According to the results of the 1930 elections, the proportion of workers by 
occupation among party workers at the Leningrad obkom level was only 20 per cent.^o 
On the other hand, about 74 per cent of party workers were of working-class 
background in 1 9 3 0 , which was quite high compared to other levels of the party 
apparatus.
6.1.3 Party workers in urban raikoms in Leningrad
The post of the raikom secretary in Leningrad city must have been of 
importance, considering the size of the party membership and the number of industrial 
workers in each raion. Therefore, the most experienced party officials were chosen as 
secretaries of Leningrad’s raikoms. In March 1929 when the second Leningrad oblast 
party conference was held, P. A. Alekseev, A. M. Amenitskii, Tsar’kov, Pylaev, 
Serganin and Struppe were secretaries of Leningrad’s six r a i k o m s . Soon after the 
second Leningrad oblast party conference, Alekseev, the secretary of the Moskovsko- 
naiwskii raikom, was promoted to the position of chainnan of the Leningrad oblast 
council of trade unions. 3^ This triggered some transfeiTals between the different party 
posts; Serganin, the Petrogradskii raikom secretary, moved to the Moskovsko-narvskii 
raikom as a s e c re ta ry ,a n d  M. N. Zernov was promoted to the post of the
^8 Unpaid instiuctors were selected from the most active party members, and they were to instruct and 
give help to lower party organisations. They worked on the basis o f no more than 2 weeks in a 
month. However, they sometimes went to the countryside on an official journey for a longer period. 
See Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 4, 1929, p. 10.
39 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2710, pp. 29-30.
This was an increase from 15.1 per cent in 1929. See Partmbotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
This was an increase from 73.5 per cent in 1929. See ibid., nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
42 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 321.
43 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocol 2.
44 Leningradskaia pm vda, 10 September 1929, p. 3.
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Petrogradskii raikom s e c r e t a r y . 4 5  Later that year, Ameniskii, the TsentraPno- 
gorodskoi raikom secretary, was dismissed after the September 1929 Pravda expose 
on the shortcomings in the party work of the TsentraPno-gorodskoi raikom. 
Subsequently, he was replaced by I r k l i s . 4 6  It is not clear whether these secretaries 
mentioned above held the same posts in 1930. However, due to the promotion of 
Struppe to the post of the head of the oblast control commission and the division of 
the Moskovsko-narvskii and TsentraPno-gorodskoi raion party organisations into two 
separate party organisations respectively, at least three new raikom secretaries must 
have been appointed. The composition of Leningrad’s raikom secretaries in 1931 
suggested that all the raikom secretaries of 1929, except Tsar’kov, had been replaced 
by new party officials: Bushuev, Gaza, Nizovtsev, Osvenskii, Smorodin and 
S o b o l e v . 4 2  Then in Januaiy 1932, there was yet another change in personnel. Only 
three were to hold the same posts (Bushuev, Osvenskii and Sobolev), two were 
promoted (Gaza and Tsar’kov), two were shifted to other raikoms (Nizovtsev and 
Smorodin), and three new party officials were appointed as Leningrad’s raikom 
secretaries (I. I. Alekseev, Miloslavskii and Voltsit) (see table 6-8).
Table 6-8. First secretaries o f Leningrad’s raikoms, 1931 and 1932
Leningrad’s raikoms In 1931 In 1932
Moskovskii P. I. Bushuev P. I. Bushuev
Narvskii 1.1. Gaza 1.1. Alekseev
Oktiabr’skii M. A. Osvenskii M. A. Osvenskii
Smol’ninskii P. L. Nizovtsev A. S. Miloslavskii
Vyborgskii F. F. Tsar’kov P. I. Smorodin
Volodarskii n. d. P. L. Nizovtsev
Vasileostrovskii P. I. Smorodin V. S. Voltsit
Petrogradskii S. M. Sobolev S. M. Sobolev
Note: The posts of Nizovtsev and Voltsit are from Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii 
KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 385.
Source: Adapted from RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2698, pp. 10-11.
The importance of the post of Leningrad’s raikom secretary was reflected in the 
fact that most of those chosen as secretaries of Leningrad’s raikoms were party
43 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocol 3.
4(^  Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 331.
42 Smorodin and Sobolev built up their career in the Komsomol organisation before taking up their 
party posts. See ibid., p. 385.
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officials with a long period of party membership and working-class background. Out 
of the 14 raikom secretaries mentioned above, with the exception of Amenitskii, 
Zernov and Irklis, on whom no data were found, seven had joined the party before 
1917 and the rest had joined the party between 1917 and 1920 (see table 6-6). This 
meant that all of them were communists with either pre-revolutionary underground 
resistance experience or militant experience during the October Revolution and the 
Civil W a r . 48 By social origin all of them, except Osvenskii and Struppe, were of a 
working-class background.
Given the importance of Leningrad’s raikoms, it is no surprise that the party 
leaders in the raion party organisation were expected to have great responsibility for 
party work. Not all leading party officials at the raikom level managed to carry out the 
responsibilities expected of them effectively. Poor party work and the distortion of 
party lines could lead to the dismissal of leading officials in the raion party 
organisation, as actually happened in September 1929. Following the Pravda's 
exposure of the shortcomings in the party work of certain leaders of the TsentraPno- 
gorodskoi raion party organisation on 1 September 1929, virtually all party leaders of 
the TsentraPno-gorodski raikom were d i s m i s s e d . 4 9
However, those who had successfully carried out their duties during their 
leadership in Leningrad’s raikoms were later promoted to more senior party posts. In 
fact, many raikom secretaries were later promoted to key posts within the party and 
government of the Leningrad oblast. Those who were promoted to govermuent posts 
included Alekseev (chairman of Leningrad oblast council of trade unions), Tsar’kov 
(chairman of Lenobispolkom)„ Pylaev (chainnan of Leningrad oblast Council for the 
National Economy), and Serganin (chairman of Leningrad union of consumers’ 
society). On the other hand, Stmppe, Irklis and Nizovtsev were promoted to obkom 
secretaries, and Gaza was promoted to a Leningrad gorkom secretary.
Apart from the key posts in raikoms, a considerable amount of party work was 
carried out by party activists. In the spring 1928 party elections, party activists who
48 Gaza and Osvenskii had been active participants in the Civil War and Miloslavskii used to be a 
sailer in the Baltic Fleet. See ibid., p. 385.
49 Pravda, 1 September 1929. For the Leningrad obkom’s resolution, see Leningradskaia pravda, 3 
September 1929. Plenum o f Tsentral’no-gorodsoi raikom revealed serious flaws in work o f raikom 
bureau and elected new staff o f raikom bureau with its head Irklis.
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had the right social credentials and who showed a particular enthusiasm for carrying 
out their duties were elected into the raikoms. As a consequence, among party workers 
in the urban raikoms in Leningrad the ratio of workers from the bench was relatively 
high. Thus, at the end of 1928, 35 per cent of the party workers of Leningrad’s six 
raikoms consisted of activists from the shop f l o o r . 3o After the 1930 elections, the 
proportion slightly increased to 37 per cent. When compared with the proportion of 
production workers in other-level party organs, this figure was almost as high as the 
figure for the kollektiv bureaux in Leningrad.3i This meant that, by 1930, a relatively 
large number of party activists fi'om the workshop bench were elected into 
Leningrad’s urban raikoms.
At the same time, a lot of attention was paid to improving the social 
composition of party workers. For instance, in March 1928, the Leningrad obkom 
suggested that the social composition of instmctors in Leningrad’s raikoms, 42 per 
cent of whom were classified as employees, should be improved in favour of 
w o r k e r s . 32 As a result of deliberate efforts, the proportion of workers by social origin 
among party workers of Leningrad’s urban raikoms remained relatively high. For 
instance, in 1929 and 1930, the percentage of those having a working-class 
background was 84 and 87 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y . 3 3
6.1.4 Party workers in okruzhkoms and rural raikoms
Party officials within the olcruzlrlcoms in the Leningrad oblast appear to have 
been less important and less powerful than those leading party officials in Leningrad. 
In March 1929 when the second Leningrad oblast party conference was held, the eight 
olcruzhkom secretaries were Irklis, R. P. Bauze, F. R. Ivanov, A. A. Babitsyn, I. E. 
Glushenlcov, V. P. Vinogradov, Voltsit and A. la. F a i v i l o v i c h . 3 4  The post of the 
olouzhlcom secretary appears to have been less important posts than Leningrad’s
3® Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo 
oblastkoma VKP(b), 1929), no. 1, p. 40.
31 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, pp. 38-39.
32 In particular, in Vyborgskii and Moskovsko-Narvskii raions, it was recommended that party activists 
should be attracted to party instruction work. See RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2739, pp. 
59-60.
33 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
34 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 321.
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raikom secretary, seeing that Irklis and Voltsit were later appointed as Leningrad’s 
raikom secretaries.
Among party workers in okmzhlcoms, the proportion of those with a working- 
class background accounted for 64 per cent in 1929 and 65 per cent in 1930. These 
figures were ten to 20 per cent lower than the figures for party workers at Leningrad’s 
urban raikoms and those at the Leningrad o b k o m . 33 By contrast, the proportion of 
those who were actually engaged in production among the party workers within the 
olcruzhlcoms was relatively high in 1929: 25 per cent. This figure was higher than the 
figure for the obkom party workers, but lower than the figure for Leningrad’s raikom 
party workers. However, in 1930, the percentage decreased considerably to 18 per 
cent. This figure was the lowest one when compared to figures for the party workers 
of the obkom, Leningrad’s urban raikom and Leningrad oblast’s rural raikoms. Later 
in 1930 when the okruzhlcoms were abolished, most of the party workers within the 
okruzhlcoms were transferred to the rural raikoms.
Lower down at the raikom level, party workers in the Leningrad oblast appear to 
have had less impressive qualifications, especially in tenus of social origin. Not 
surprisingly, a large number of the rural raikom party workers were from peasant 
backgrounds, and, as a result, the proportion of those having a working-class 
background was smaller than among party workers within the Leningrad obkom or 
Leningrad’s urban raikoms. For instance, among the mral raikom party workers of the 
Luga olcrug, those from a working-class background accounted for only 35 per cent 
after the 1928 spring e l e c t i o n s , 36 while those who were of peasant origin accounted 
for 46 per cent. There was a greater proportion of party workers with a working-class 
background among the rural raikom secretaries than among the party workers as a 
whole. Out of the 11 rural raikom secretaries of the Luga okrug, seven were of worker 
origin, tluee were of peasant origin, and only one person was of white-collar origin.3?
Therefore much attention was paid to improve the social composition of party 
workers within the rural raikoms. As a result, the proportion of those from working- 
class background among the rural raikom party workers gradually increased over the
33 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
36 In the 1928 spring elections, the turnover rate in Luga okrug was 47 per cent. See Partrabotnik, nos.
12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 69.
67 Ibid., p. 69.
255
period. The average percentage of workers with a working-class origin increased from 
49 per cent in the spring of 1928 to 53 per cent in January 1929.3» Between 1929 and 
1930 it increased further from 55 to 59 per cent.39 Yet, despite the increase, this figure 
was much lower than among party workers within the obkom and Leningrad’s urban 
raikoms.60 In addition, the ratio of those who were actually engaged in production also 
increased after the 1928 autumn elections,6' and stabilised at about 21 per cent in 
1929 and 1930.62
Rural raikom secretaries assumed the direct responsibility for party work in the 
countryside, for example, carrying out the collectivisation drive. Therefore, the ability 
and readiness to cany out the duties placed upon them were considered as the most 
important factor in successful fulfilment of party policy in the countryside. In 1930, in 
connection with the collectivisation drive, the composition of the rural raikom 
secretaries was thoroughly reviewed. According to information on the 146 rural 
raikom secretaries that was published in May 1930, about 63 per cent of the rural 
raikom secretaries were of working-class origin, 26 per cent had a peasant origin, and 
11 per cent were of white-collar origin. However, there was great variation within 
each okrug. Despite the seemingly large proportion of those from a working-class 
background among the rural raikom secretaries as a whole, in some olcrugs the 
proportion of those who were not from a working-class background were quite large. 
For instance, in the Borovichi okrug, the percentage of those of white-collar origin 
reached 42 per cent. On the other hand, in the Leningrad okrug they accounted for 
only 13 per cent. Therefore, it was demanded that the social composition of the rural 
raikom secretaries should be improved in favour of workers, faim labourers and poor
peasants.63
In teims of the length of party membership, the majority of the rural raikom 
secretaries had a sufficiently long period of party membership, but there were also a
38 At the same time, the percentage of workers by social origin increased from 52.1 to 57.7 per cent in 
mral cell bureaux. See Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1929, p. 19.
39 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
66 After the 1930 party elections, the proportion of workers by social origin among obkom level party 
workers was 74.3 per cent, and among urban raikom workers, it was 86.7 per cent. See ibid., nos. 
16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
6^  Biulleten' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1929, p. 19.
62 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
63 Ibid., no. 12, May 1930, p. 41.
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number of rural raikom secretaries with only four or five years’ party membership. 
Some 60 per cent (88 secretaries) had been party members for over ten years, 21 per 
cent for between six and nine years, and 18 per cent for four and five years.64 Here 
again, the picture was quite different for each raikom. For instance, in the Leningrad 
olaaig, among the raikom secretaries those who had been party members for more than 
ten years accounted for 83 per cent, whereas in the Novgorod olcrug they accounted 
for only 37 per cent. On the other hand, those who had been party members for only 
four or five years accounted for four per cent in the Leningrad okrug whereas in the 
Novgorod okrug, they accounted for 37 per cent.65 Consequently, the okrugs with a 
high proportion of rural raikom secretaries with less than five years’ party 
membership were criticised.
Most of the rural raikom secretaries appeared to have some kind of experience 
of party work before they became secretaries. Out of the 146 secretaries, 72 per cent 
(105) had worked in the party beforehand: among them 38 per cent had worked in the 
olcruzhlcoms as either instructors or department heads and 44 per cent as either 
secretaries or agitation-propagandists in the raikoms or Komsomol raion 
organisations. Some 22 per cent had work experience within the party kollektivy and 
party cells.66
Facing the hardships experienced in the countryside as a result of the 
collectivisation drive in the winter of 1929 and 1930, the rural raikom secretaries 
served as scapegoats when anything went wrong. Already in April 1930, the obkom 
secretariat aclmowledged the necessity of strengthening the staff of the rural raikom 
secretaries within the five okrugs of the Leningrad region. It was recommended that in 
total, 29 rural raikom secretaries be replaced and ten secretaries be transfeiTed into 
other raions. It seems that those who had carried the collectivisation to extremes, 
those who lost directions in the face of hardships and those who could not cope with 
their responsibilities were subject to dismissal. Their places were filled by party 
workers from other institutions and party organisations within olcrugs, or those sent to 
the counti*yside by the obkom. It was recommended that party workers with a long
6 4 / 6 î U , p .  4 1 .
63/W .,  p. 41.
66 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
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period of party membership (especially those who had gone through the Revolution), 
or those who had been industrial labourers for a long time, be chosen as rural raikom 
secretaries. In particular, it was instructed that the proportion of party workers with a 
relatively short period of party membership be reduced in the Novgorod olcrug. As 
regards the Borovichi olcrug, it was instructed the proportion of those party workers of 
white collar origin be decreased.6?
In May 1930, following the evaluation of the party work of the rural raikom 
secretaries, about 21 per cent of the rural raikom secretaries under review were said to 
be in need of replacement. In particular, nine per cent of them were to be replaced due 
to their poor work and failure in implementing party’s class policy. In addition, five 
per cent were to be replaced due to their poor health, or due to the fact that they were 
undertaking studies. In total, 26 per cent of the rural raikom secretaries in the region 
were in need of replacement. Besides, 15 rural raikom secretaries were to be 
transferred into other r a i o n s . 68 The rural raikom secretaries in the Pskov olcrug were 
affected most severely: some 61 per cent were subjected to replacement or transfer. In 
this particular olcrug, the mistakes made by the secretaries while carrying out the 
collectivisation process were said to be the main reason for their dismissal. In the 
Murmansk olcrug, about half the mral raikom secretaries were to be replaced, and 
most of them were replaced mainly due to their relatively short length of time spent as 
a party member and their lack of experience in party work. Some 48 per cent of the 
rural raikom secretaries in the Karelia olci'ug and 30 per cent in the Cherepovets, Luga 
and Novrogod olcmgs were to be dismissed. In the other olcrugs the rate of 
replacement was slightly lower, being 23 per cent in the Borovichi okrug and 26 per 
cent in the Leningrad okmg. The Lodeinoe pole okmg experienced the smallest 
percentage of replacement (20 per cent).
Among the mral raikom secretaries dismissed, those who had four to five years’ 
party membership accounted for 33 per cent, those with six to nine years’ party 
membership 32 per cent, and those with over ten years’ party membership 31 per 
c e n t . 69 Even though the proportion of rural raikom secretaries with less than five
67 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2750, p. 255.
68 Partrabotnik, no. 12, May 1930, p. 42.
69 Ibid., p. 42.
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years’ party membership was the greatest, the proportion of those with much longer 
party membership was almost as large as those with less than five years’ party 
membership. It appears that the review had a far reaching effect on the rural raikom 
secretaries regardless of the length of their party membership.
It seems that those who were from peasant backgrounds were most severely 
affected. About 13 mral raikom secretaries dismissed were classified as being of 
peasant origin, six had a working-class background, and seven had a white-collar 
background. Among those 13 mral raikom secretaries with a peasant background, nine 
were dismissed due to their poor party work, and four were dismissed due to their 
failure of implementing of the party’s class policy.7o
Those who had not had any experience of party work in the countryside were 
more likely to be dismissed. For instance, out of the six persons promoted from 
production, half were dismissed due to their lack of experience in party work in the 
countryside. In addition, those who had no experience in any party work before 
accounted for 29 per cent of the 35 mral raikom secretaries dismissed. This was a 
slightly bigger proportion than among those who had some previous party work 
experience (25 per cent).7^
It seems that many rural raikom secretaries were dismissed for their poor work 
or insufficient qualifications in relation to social origin, length of party membership 
and party work experience, and that they were subsequently replaced by those who 
had better qualifications. As a result, by the beginning of 1932, the proportion of those 
from working-class background had increased to 68 per cent, a five per cent increase 
from the 1930 level. In addition, those who had joined the party before 1924 increased 
to 66 per cent.72
6.1.5 Stability and mobilitv within the party apparatus
A striking aspect of the party apparatus in this period was the frequent personnel 
changes within it. Even though the leading party officials within the Leningrad 
obkom, gorkom and Leningrad’s urban raikoms were not subject to elections, they do
70 /6W., p. 42.
7' Ibid., p. 43,
72 Otchet Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b) Ill-i oblastnoi partiinoi konferentsii 
(Leningrad: 1930), p. 119.
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not seem to have retained the same party position for a long period. Probably Kirov 
and Chudov were the only exceptions: Kirov held the same position as the first obkom 
secretai-y throughout the first FYP period, and Chudov held the position of the second 
obkom secretary except for five months where he was the second gorkom secretary. 
As regards the rest of the leading party officials, they were subject to frequent 
transfers between positions within the party apparatus. As already stated, the party 
officials were often moving from obkom to gorkom or vice versa, from one 
department to another, and one raikom to another. In particular, it is notable that there 
was a considerable degree of turnover within the post of the obkom department heads 
and the Leningrad’s raikom secretary. These frequent changes in the leading party 
posts seems to have caused by the reorganisation of the party apparatus, such as the 
restmcturing of the departments in 1930 and 1931 and the establishment of the 
separate Leningrad gorkom in 1932.
Moreover, it appears that the transfer of the leading party officials to positions 
within the government administration also took place quite frequently. For instance, 
among the Leningrad gorkom bureau members in January 1932, many of those who 
held a govermnent post had been party officials before. In fact, the most responsible 
government posts, such as the chairman of the Lenobispolkom, and the chairman of 
the Leningrad oblast Council for the National Economy, were occupied by former 
leading party officials (see table 6-6).
The frequent changes within the party posts are also reflected in the changes 
that occuiTed in bureau membership. If one compares the Leningrad obkom bureau 
membership in March 1929 and January 1932, it is clear that the personnel changes 
were considerable. Out of the 29 members and nine candidates, who were included in 
the obkom bureau in March 1929, 14 members and seven candidates failed to retain 
their bureau membership either in the Leningrad obkom or gorkom in January 1932. 
This meant that only 43 per cent of the 1929 obkom bureau members and candidates 
remained in the obkom or gorkom bureau by the beginning of 1932.73
Not only did horizontal movement occur within the party posts of the same 
level, but also upward mobility occurred in this period. The organisational
73 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2694, protocol 1; and delo 2698, protocol 1.
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development of the party apparatus between 1928 and 1932 created a larger number of 
leading party posts, and this made it possible for certain party officials to be 
promoted. The case of Gaza provides a good example of party officials who was 
promoted to the top position within the regional party organisation. Gaza (1894-1933) 
had been a young worker from the Narvskaia Zastava and had a distinguished Civil 
War c a r e e r . 74  He had been a secretary of the party kollektiv in the Krasnyi putilovets 
factory for six years, and then he became an orgotdel head of the Narvskii raikom and 
later a secretary of the same r a i k o m . 7 5  in January 1932, he was promoted as the fourth 
gorkom secretary, and in May of that year he became the second gorkom secretary, 
being Kirov’s first assistant. The case of Struppe provides another example of party 
officials who were rapidly promoted into a higher position during the first FYP. In 
1929 he was a raikom secretary, and in 1930 he became the head of the oblast control 
commission. Then in December 1931, he became the second secretary of the 
Leningrad obkom, and in May of the following year, he became the chairman of the 
Lenobispolkom. Thus Struppe’s fast promotion led to his repositioning into three 
different posts over a four year period. This may be an extreme example, but in 
general, it can be said that some party officials were promoted very quickly, and 
undoubtedly this led to frequent transfers of the party officials within the apparatus.
Another notable feature was the relative stability that the leading party officials 
within the obkom, gorkom and Leningrad’s urban raikoms enjoyed over this period. 
Even though there was a great deal of mobility within the different posts, only a few 
of the leading party officials were demoted or dismissed over this period. Already by 
the beginning of 1928, virtually all of the leading officials from Zinoviev’s time had 
either been removed or demoted, replaced to a large extent either by those who had 
been promoted from Leningrad’s factories or by ‘outsiders’ brought in by Kirov. 
These party officials who occupied the most senior posts in the Leningrad oblast party 
organisation in 1928 seem to have enjoyed considerable stability and by the end of 
1932 most of them retained their positions of prominence.
Even though these high ranldng officials were also under direct attack during 
the self-criticism campaign in 1928 and 1929, most of them managed to get off
74 Evan and Margaret Mawdsley, Moscow and Leningrad (London: Ernest Benn, 1980), p. 332. 
73 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 384.
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lightly. The self-criticism campaign, which had a strong anti-bureaucratic tone, was 
intended to expose ‘bureaucratic practices’ in the apparatus.76 Although the main 
focus of this campaign was undoubtedly aimed at the soviet, trade union and 
economic organs, it was clear that this campaign was to include the party’s own 
bureaucratic apparatus. Workers, non-party members and junior party workers were 
encouraged to criticise the shortcomings of party officials. Therefore, the party 
officials came in for a direct attack from below. However, the impact of these calls for 
self-criticism on the Leningrad party apparatus appears to have been minimal, at least 
in its initial stages. Certainly in 1928 there was very little mention in the press of self- 
criticism directed specifically at the party officials. In fact, by 1929 the most common 
complaint was advanced that the party apparatchiki were attempting to suppress or 
bypass the actual process of self-criticism at party meetings.77 While the state 
apparatus was undoubtedly the target for heavy criticism, the party apparatus, at least 
in Leningrad, got off much more lightly.78 it seems that an apparently deep-rooted 
fear on the part of the rank and file party members to speak out against the party 
authorities served to exclude the party authority from criticism.79 This remained a 
major feature of the campaign in 1928.
However, in 1929 when the self-criticism campaign was stepped up, the ranlc 
and file party members were given further encouragement to expose shortcomings in 
the work of the party apparatus. For instance, a strongly-worded article in 
Leningradskaia pravda at the end of March 1929 criticised the party apparatus in 
general, and singled out certain obkom officials who were said to ‘wear out more than 
one pair of trousers sitting tlorough interminable sessions and c o m m i s s i o n s . ’8o Then 
later in May 1929, some 214 open party meetings were held in order to review the
76 In an article in Izvestiia TsK VKP(b) in March 1929, it was declared that the self-criticism campaign 
was exposing the apparatus’ ‘rottenness, its bureaucratic sloth, dissoluteness, drunkenness and 
wilful lack of attention to the needs of the masses, its presumptuous servility and grovelling to its 
superiors, ignorance, stagnation, conservatism, and routineness.’ See Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 7, 20 
March 1929, p. 7.
77 For instances of this complaint, see the debate held at the Moskovskii-Narvskii raion party 
conference in Leningradskaia pravda, 10 Febmary 1929; and the review of the self-criticism 
campaign in Leningrad in Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), nos. 8-9, 31 March 1929, p. 20.
78 Ibid., no. 28, 21 September 1928.
79 For evidence o f this, compare the articles in Leningradskaia pravda, 16 February 1928, p. 3 and 19 
February 1928, p. 2 with those in Partrabotnik no. 12, 25 October 1928, pp. 25-28.
86 Leningradskaia pravda, 9 February 1929, p. 3.
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work of the city’s leading party officials. About 336 leading party officials within the 
obkom, the oblast control commission and the oblast auditing commission had been 
subject to review, and out of 336, only 12 received party censures, and none were 
purged.81 Yet, the most serious attack on the Leningrad party apparatus did not come 
until September 1929. On 1 September 1929, Pravda published the results of an 
investigation which revealed a whole range of abuses, along with evidence of ‘right 
opportunist’ attitudes, within a number of state institutions in Leningrad’s 
Tsentral ’no-gorodskoi raion.8^  Accordingly the leadership of the Tsentral’no- 
gorodskoi raikom and the oblast control commission was heavily criticised for failing 
to uncover those who had sought to stifle self-criticism, had created family circles, 
and had indulged in favouritism.83 A number of dismissals followed, including G. A. 
Desov, the chainnan of the oblast control commission, and Amenitskii, the 
T sentral ’no-gorodskoi raikom secretary. At the plenum of the Tsentral’no-gorodskoi 
raikom, the work of Tsentral’no-gorodskoi raikom bureau was heavily criticised and 
new staff of the raikom bureau were elected.84
However, apart from this event, the Leningrad party apparatus appears to have 
been able to defend itself by one means or another from this centre-inspired attack 
from below. Indeed, throughout this period remarkably few party officials in 
Leningrad were actually dismissed. This is partly because the Leningrad party 
apparatus had been affected only marginally by the threat of rightist tendencies in 
1 9 2 8 - 1 9 2 9 . 8 3  Indeed, in many cases, the struggle against bureaucratism was 
specifically identified with the fight against the right opposition.86 it is no coincidence 
that the self-criticism campaign first began in the spring of 1 9 2 8  in Moscow, where 
the right opposition had a strong hold.8?
8’ Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 7, 25 August 1929, p. 7.
82 The investigation had apparently been triggered by reports sent to the newspaper from the 
Komsomol and party activists o f the raion.
83 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, p. 330.
84 p. 331.
83 However, this is not to deny that the state and economic administrations in the city had shown some 
opposition to the leadership’s policies.
86 Pravda, 27 November 1928.
87 The anti-bureaucratic atmosphere which had prevailed in 1927 was more reinforced by the crisis of 
1928, such as the grain procurements crisis in the winter o f 1927-1928 and the Shakhty affair in 
March 1928. These crises led to the purges of state and economic institutions and this was soon 
extended to the party apparatus, with the announcement o f the launching o f the self-criticism 
campaign at the Central Committee plenum of April 1928.
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By contrast, party officials within the rural raikoms of the Leningrad oblast 
suffered more seriously. They were not only subjected to elections every six months,88 
but also to criticisms when anything went wrong in the countryside. In 1928 and 
1929, party officials in Leningrad oblast’s rural area were seriously dealt with. For 
instance, the party leaders in the Muimansk and Sestroretsk okrugs were removed by 
the end of 1928 for ‘suppression of self-criticism.’89 In addition, some party officials 
within the small rural raikoms were purged in the winter of 1928-1929.96 Altogether, 
in 1928-29 some eighty rural officials were censured, of whom forty one were 
subsequently dismissed.9i Then in 1930, in connection with the collectivisation drive, 
the party workers in the countryside became subject to criticism and were 
subsequently replaced. In particular, many rural raikom secretaries were seriously 
criticised for their poor work and were subsequently replaced by those who were more 
suitable in tenus of their social origin, length of party membership and party work 
experience. Indeed, it appears that, during the purges of the party apparatus in 1929 
and 1930, it was the party officials in the countryside who were dealt with most
severely. 92
In conclusion, one can say that the leading party officials within the obkom, 
gorkom and Lenignrad’s urban raikoms enjoyed relative stability, especially when 
compared to those in the countryside and those at the lower party levels. If one looks 
at the top twenty two posts in the Leningrad party apparatus at the begimiing of 1928 
(obkom secretaries and heads of departments, raikom secretaries and deputy 
secretaries), only five failed to retain a leading position within the city at the time of 
Kirov’s death, tliree of these being removed following the September 1929 Pravda 
expose.93 However, not surprisingly, this stability came to be undermined by 
Zhdanov’s arrival in the city in 1934. He slowly replaced the existing party officials
88 The turnover was relatively high.
89 Ko 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b): Otchet oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), noiabr’ 
1927g.-fevraV 1929 g. (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo oblastkoma VKP(b), 1929), p. 126.
96 See Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), nos. 8-9, 31 M arch 1929, p. 19.
91 K X V Is" e zd ,  no .l, p. 40.
92 For instance, the initial stage o f the 1929 purge removed 15.4 per cent o f all rural party workers in 
the Soviet Union, a fifth o f whom were described as ‘class-hostile elements’.
93 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 29-30.
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with his own men and this process was greatly speeded up following the February 
1937 Central Committee P lenum .94
6.2 Party personnel in lower party organs
6.2.1 The expansion of the party apparatus
With the huge growth of party membership and the development of party cell 
network, the lower party apparatus expanded significantly during the first FYP period. 
Party workers below the raikom level, who were elected every six months, included 
party kollektiv bureau members, their secretaries, workshop cell bureau members and 
their secretaries. In factories, the party workers encompassed non-salaried members of 
workshop cell bureaux and their commissions, organisers of party groups and units 
{gruporgy and zvenorgy), agitators, propagandists, women’s organisers, and members 
of party factions in non-party organisations within the enterprise.
Already in 1927, Leningrad had a considerable number of party workers. With 
the expansion of workshop cells and party units in its enterprises after 1925, the party 
workers were estimated to have grown from 28 per cent of the total industrial 
membership in 1926, to around 37 per cent a year l a t e r . 93 In the autumn 1927 party 
elections, about 18,000 party members were elected as the leading party officials in 
the lower party organs in the city of L e n i n g r a d . 96 Data on their composition shows 
that 5,439 were elected party kollektiv bureau members, 762 as kollektiv secretaries, 
4,492 as workshop cell bureau members, 702 as workshop cell secretaries, and 5,896 
as party unit o r g a n i s e r s . 9? In addition, there were 840 women’s organisers and 1,427 
agitprop workers at kollektiv and workshop cell l e v e l s . 98
In the years following, the number of party workers in lower party organs 
continued to expand rapidly. In Leningrad the largest growth of party apparatus had 
occuned at the enterprise level. Especially, the lower party workers in Leningrad had 
significantly broadened and increased with workers from the shop-floor. Results of
94 By June 1937, only 17 of the 65 members to the newly-appointed gorkom had held leading posts 
prior to 1935, and only three could claim to belong to the 1928 party elites of Leningrad. Cited from 
ibid., p. 29-30.
93 Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 41, 9 November 1927, p. 2.
96 The number of party activists included those in the city of Kronstadt.
97 Partrabotnik, no. 2, 15 February 1928, p. 66.
98 Ibid., p. 69.
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the May-June 1928 elections in Leningrad show that some 5,555 were elected as 
kollektiv bureau members, 758 as kollektiv secretaries, 5,369 as workshop cell bureau 
members, and 872 as workshop cell secretaries (see table 6-9). Later in January 1930 
the total number was estimated to be around 20,000,99 and in May 1930 it reached 
over 26,000.'60
From then on, a huge expansion of the lower-level party apparatus took place, 
and by the end of 1931 the number of lower-level party workers increased to about 
34,921.'61 This was mainly due to the party reorganisation in 1930 which brought 
about the rapid expansion of party cells. As the table 6-9 shows, there was a 
considerable increase in the number of those elected as bureau members of both party 
kollektivy and workshop cells. In November 1931, the number of those working at the 
factory party committees and kollelctivy was counted as 10,084, which means that 
there were almost 4,000 more party workers in this level of the party organs, when 
compared to the 1927 level. Those working in the factory party committees and 
kollektivy showed a slightly higher growth rate: from 3,379 to 6,539 between October 
1927 and November 1931. The increase in the number of workshop cell bureau 
members was far greater than among the kollektiv bureau members. Between October 
1927 and November 1931, the number of the workshop cell bureau members tripled, 
whereas the number of kollektiv bureau members almost doubled (see table 6-9). This 
reveals that the largest growth of the party apparatus had occurred at the workshop 
cell level. The growth of party workers at the workshop cell level accelerated even 
further by transferring officials downwards from the factoiy party committees to the 
workshop cells in the 1932 reorganisation. As a result, by April 1933, there were only 
710 kolleMv secretaries whereas there were as many as 3,000 workshop cell 
secretaries in L e n i n g r a d . '62
At the bottom rung of the party’s organisational ladder, great value was placed 
on the party unit organisers. In Leningrad’s enterprises there were already 5,896 unit 
organisers at the beginning o f  1 9 2 8 , '63 and their number increased to 7,000 by the end
99 Ibid., no. 15, June 1930, p. 65.
'66 Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 48.
'61 Ibid., p. 48.
'62 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 28. 
163 Partrabotnik, no. 2, 15 Febmary 1928, p. 68.
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of 1928.'64 The Central Committee adopted two resolutions, one in January 1929'65 
and one in June 1930,'66 reiterating the importance of these unit organisers and the 
need to increase their number still further. Accordingly the number of unit organisers 
rapidly increased throughout 1929, and by May 1930 there were as many as 9,304 unit 
organisers in Leningrad.'6? From July 1930 onwards, party units were set up in almost 
every primary production unit, and as a consequence, the number of party unit 
organisers sharply increased to 11,430 by November 1931.'68 However, the 1932 
reorganisation, which intended to strengthen the party cells at the party unit and 
workshop level by abolishing those cells and units which bore no relation to the basic 
production set up of the enterprise, led to a drop in the number of party unit 
organisers. Given that the number of party units had fallen to 5363 by January 
1934,'69 the number of party unit organisers must have been halved by this time. The 
lower-level party apparatus which had rapidly expanded between 1927 and 1931 
began to shrinlc from 1932, and by January 1934, the lower-level party workers 
amounted to only 19,000, a considerable decrease horn the 1931 level. "6
Table 6-9. Number o f party workers in lower party organs in Leningrad, 1927-1931
Oct. 1927 May 1928 May 1930 Nov. 1931
Kollektiv bureau members 5339 5555 7233 10084
(factory kollektiv bureau members (3379) (3507) (4945) (6539)
only)
Kollektiv secretaries 744 758 n. d. n. d.
(factory kollektiv secretaries only) (408)
Workshop cell bureau members 4492 5369 10441 13407
Workshop cell secretaries 702 872 n. d. n. d.
Note: The figure for kollektiv bureau members included those working at factory partkoms. 
Sources: Figures for 1927 and 1928 are taken from Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo 
komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 1928, pp. 37-40; figures for 1930 and 1931 are taken from 
Partrabotnik, no. 23, December 1931, p. 48.
'64 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b), p. 127.
'65 Spravochnikpartiinogo rabotnika (Moscow, 1930), no. 7, part 1, p. 364. 
'6 6 /W . (1934), no. 8, p. 302.
'67 Partrabotnik, no. 23, December 1931, p. 48.
'68 Ibid., p. 48.
'69 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 381.
' '6 Partiinoe stro itel’stvo, no. 21, November 1933, p. 24.
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The lower-level party workers were either full-time officials or voluntary 
activists, often referred to as party aktiv (the active members of the party 
organisation). Full-time officials were salaried bureaucrats, whereas voluntary 
activists were non-paid. At the beginning of this period, a relatively few lower-level 
party workers were full-time officials. In October 1 9 2 7 ,  for instance, only 2 8  per cent 
of kollektiv secretaries were freed from production work for permanent party work." ' 
About 1 5  per cent of agitprop workers and women’s organisers at party kollektiv level 
were full-time officials, whereas none of those at workshop cell level were full-time 
o f f i c i a l s .  " 2  In May 1 9 2 8 ,  about 2 9  per cent of kollektiv secretaries were full-time 
officials. In factory kollektivy, the percentage of full-time officials was much higher; 
about 4 8  per cent of Leningrad’s 4 0 8  factory kollektiv secretaries were full-time 
officials, and fewer than 2 9  per cent were voluntary activists employed on the shop- 
f l o o r .  On the other hand, all the workshop cell secretaries were voluntary activists, 
and about 8 9  per cent were employed on the s h o p - f l o o r . "4
Later that year, the Central Committee adopted a resolution which aimed at 
rationalising the party apparatus by establishing uniform staff levels for party 
organisations. This applied particularly to the party apparatus at industrial enterprise 
level, where strict limits were to be placed on the number of salaried officials allowed 
in each industrial cell, again according to criteria such as the size of the workforce and 
party membership in the enterprise. One of the main reasons behind the Central 
Committee’s decision of the rationalisation of party apparatus seemed to encourage 
the principle of using non-paid, volunteer party members to perform certain functions 
of the apparatus in the course of their party duties. "6 Indeed, from 1928 onwards, 
much emphasis was given to reducing the size of the party’s paid staff and using 
unpaid party activists to perform the duties. The importance of rank and file 
involvement in the work of party cells was continuously stressed, and more and more 
non-paid party activists were recruited into lower party organs. In factories, great 
encouragement was given to the ordinary party members to undertake a whole range
* ' ' PartrabotJiik, no. 2, 15 Febmary 1928, p. 68.
"2  Ibid., p. 69.
"2  Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 16 July 1928, p. 38. 
" 4 / W . ,p .  40.
Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 27, 10 September 1928, p. 6.
" 6  Ibid., p. 1.
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of functions fonnerly carried out by full-time officials. They were urged to carry out 
agitprop work, the convening and chairing of open party meetings, observing and 
reporting on breaches of party discipline, ensuring the payment of membership dues, 
liaising with higher-level party organs, and taking responsibility for infoimational and 
technical work.
However, despite the ‘regime of economy’ which intended to rationalise the 
party apparatus from top to bottom, the number of full-time enterprise-level officials 
had still increased. Nationally, by 1930, top and middle levels of the apparatus as a 
whole had suffered a 35 per cent reduction in numbers, whereas the low level 
apparatus, in contrast, had increased by 20 per cent. "7 Between June 1930 and 
January 1934, the huge growth in the industrial party membership meant that the 
number of cells and candidate groups in enteiprises almost trebled in the Soviet 
Union, "8 and in order to maintain control over this expansion, the number of full-time 
party officials employed in enterprises in the country expanded by 107 per cent. "9 As 
far as Leningrad is concerned, it appears that the increase was even greater, given the 
strength of its industrial party membership.
It appears that, at factory party committee level, most party workers were more 
experienced full-time officials and their number seems to have increased over the 
period. At the beginning of 1929, as a reflection of the increased importance of 
factory party committees, a decision was taken to draft a number of experienced 
officials, in some cases selected by the centre, into the most important factoiy party 
committees.'20 Even though the factory party committee tended to be much bigger 
than the former kollektiv bureau, originally there was to be no increase in the number 
of full-time officials within the enteiprise. However, the reorganisation of 1930 
accelerated the expansion of party workers, especially full-time workers, in factory 
party committees. In the summer of 1930 a number of Leningrad’s giant industrial 
enterprises, due to the adoption of the functional-sectoral system, experienced an 
increase in the number of full-time officials. Unlike the small commissions attached to
" 7  XVI s ”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1930), pp. 
92-93.
' ' 8 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 28,
" 9 / W . ,p .  28.
'20 See the Central Committee resolution of 7 January 1929 in Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo 
komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 8 March 1929, and K X V I s ”ezdu, no. 1, pp. 93-94.
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party kollektivy, the factory party committees had permanent sectors staffed by full­
time officials to deal with the ever-widening range of party work in the enterprise. As 
there was a substantial increase in the number of factory party committees in the city 
in 1931, there must have been an increase in the number of full-time party workers. 
However, in 1932, when the Leningrad gorkom resolved to strengthen the workshop 
level of the party organisation by transferring officials downwards from the factory 
party committees, the number of full-time party officials employed in Leningrad’s 
factory party committees fell from around 400 to 200, while almost all of those 
removed were subsequently reappointed to take up posts as workshop cell
secretaries. *21
The same trend can be traced to workshop cell level, as well. Officially, 
workshop cell secretaries were not allowed to be free of production work. *22 However, 
it was not easy for them to engage in both party and production work. Many argued 
that taking people away from their normal work for party duties merely increased 
costs, and party work done in the evenings or in spare time was largely worthless. *23 
Therefore, both leading apparatchiki in the city and enterprise-level officials began to 
insist that a number of free hours should be set aside each week to allow workshop 
cell secretaries to perform their duties. *24 Indeed, secretaries in the largest workshop 
cells, some of which had as many as 200 members by 1928, were increasingly 
converted to full-time officials.*25 Later in 1932, due to the party’s decision to 
strengthen the party cells at workshop level by shifting full-time party officials into 
posts in the workshop cells, the full-time party officials in the workshops became a 
more common sight. About 200 full-time party officials removed from Leningrad’s 
factory party committees were re-appointed to take up posts as workshop cell 
secretaries.*26 As a result, by April 1933, merely counting secretaries alone, there
*2 * Partrabotnik, no. 17, September 1932, pp. 3-4.
*22 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 212.
*23 Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 27, 30 November 1928, p. 1.
*24 See Leningradskaia pravda, 12 February 1928, p. 3; 24 February 1928, p. 3 and 16 March 1928, p. 
3.
*25 The payment for party officials was often considered to be way below the necessary level, often 
amounting to far less than skilled workers’ wages in the same factory. Later, at the sixteenth Party 
Congress in 1930, the wages fund for the low-level party apparatus had increased by 66 per cent 
from its 1928 level. See Stenograficheskii biulleten’ Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii 
(Leningrad, 1929), no. 9, p. 18; X V I s ”ezd VKP(b), p. 93; and K X V I s ”ezdu, p. 100.
126 Partrabotnik, no. 17, September 1932, pp. 3-4.
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were 592 full-time kolleJctiv secretaries in Leningrad, out of a total of 710, and 501 
full-time workshop cell secretaries, out of a total of around 3,000.*2? This was clearly 
a considerable advance on the size of the enterprise-level party apparatus, since we 
know that in 1929 the total number of full-time party officials in Leningrad’s 
enterprises numbered only around 500. *28
However, lower down the party hierarchy, all party unit organisers were 
exclusively volunteer activists recruited from within the work brigade throughout this 
period. They were not allowed to be full-time officials and required to be workers 
engaged in production, which means that they should not be administrative and 
teclinical persoimel.*29 This requirement for unit organisers remained unchanged and 
confirmed again by the obkom bureau resolution of July 1930, which stipulated that 
unit organisers should be recruited exclusively among workers. Since unit organisers 
were to cany out their party duties while engaging in production, it was called for that 
they should be freed from all other responsibilities.*3o Again, in July 1930, the obkom 
bureau adopted a resolution, which stipulated that unit organisers should be freed 
from all other loads, except from being a member of a workshop cell (or a kollektiv) 
bureau.*8* However, these requirements were not often met. For instance, a review of 
group organisers in the Volodarskii raion in November 1928 showed that some 60 per 
cent of them had other party duties.*^ 2 Therefore, the problem of overloading of unit 
organisers was often discussed in the party journals.
6.2.2 Social composition of party workers at factory level
In this period, the quality of party workers was judged by their social 
backgrounds and occupation, and therefore, much attention was given to an increase 
in the proportion of workers both by social origin and by actual occupation among 
party workers. The party attempted, in particular, to draw those from a working-class 
background and workers from the bench into party work. A breakdown of Leningrad’s 
party workers at the level of the lower party organs by social origin reveals that, in
*27 Cited from Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 2, p. 28. 
*28 Ibid., p. 28.
*29 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 217.
*20/W ., p. 217.
*2* Ibid.,de\o  2712, p. 18.
*22 Partrabotnik, no. 20, 25 November 1928, p. 35.
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general, a relatively large proportion of them were workers and their percentage had 
increased over this period. However, the ratio of workers by occupation was less 
impressive and it seems that the proportion of workers by occupation remained stable 
over the same period.
Records of party workers at the party kollektiv level show that their social 
composition had been improved in terms of the proportion of workers by social origin 
between 1927 and 1930 (see table 6-10). In October 1927, about 72 per cent of the 
city’s party kollektiv bureau members were of a working-class origin, and from then 
on, the percentage continuously increased and by 1930 it reached 78 per cent. An 
especially large increase, from 74 to 78 per cent, took place between 1929 and 1930. 
The growth of proportional rate of workers among kollektiv secretaries was even 
greater than among kollelctiv bureau members. In October 1927, those from working- 
class background accounted for 69 per cent of kollektiv secretaries, three per cent 
below the figure for kollektiv bureau members. However, by 1930 the figure increased 
to 81 per cent, three per cent above the figure for kollektiv bureau members. It seems 
that this increase of workers in the leading staff composition of kollektivy was 
achieved by drawing more workers from a working-class background into leading 
party work.
According to the data on factory kollektiv bureau members and secretaries in 
1927, 1928 and 1931, their percentages were much higher than the average ones 
which included all sort of kollektivy. In October 1927, about 85 per cent of factory 
kollektiv bureau members were workers by social origin, and their proportion 
increased to 90 per cent in 1931. Among the factory kollektiv secretaries, the increase 
was more dramatic; from 80 to 90 per cent over the same period.
Data relating to factory party committees were given only in 1929 and 1930, but 
it reveals that a considerable proportion of their members and secretaries were from a 
working-class background. In 1929, about 90 per cent of factoiy party committee 
members and 83 per cent of their secretaries were workers by social origin. In 1930 
the percentage of workers among factory party committee secretaries increased to 91 
per cent, whereas among factory party committee members it remained unchanged. In 
1931 and 1932, no separate data were given on factoiy party committees, but data 
including factory party committees and kollektiv bureaux show that about 81 and 79
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per cent of them were composed of workers in 1931 and 1932 respectively. Taking 
into consideration the fact that factory party committees had a high percentage of 
workers among them, the social composition of the party committeess and kollektiv 
bureaux does not seem to have greatly improved in these last two years.
Table 6-10. Proportion o f workers by social origin among elected party workers in 
Leningrad, 1927-1932 (percentages)
Oct. May Oct. 1929 1930 1931 1932
1927 1928
(1) (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5)
Factory partkom members - - - 90.7 90.8 n. d. n. d.
Factory partkom secretaries - - - 83.3 90.5 n. d. n. d.
Kollektiv bureau members 72.1 72.5 73.3 73.7 78 80.6 79
(factory kollektiv bureau
members only)
Kollektiv secretaries 68.7 72.5 n. d. 78.9 80.7 n. d. n. d.
(factory kollektiv (90)
secretaries only)
Workshop cell bureau 91.4 89 90.6 90.5 90.4 90.4 89.9
members
Workshop cell secretaries 94.4 92 n. d. n. d. n. d. 93 n. d.
Notes: The figure for kollektiv bureau members in October 1928 includes those in the 
Leningi'ad oblast; the figures for kollektiv bureau members in 1931 and 1932 include those 
working at factory partkoms.
Sources: (1) Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 1928, pp. 37-40; 
(2) Ibid., no. 2, 1929, p. 18; (3) Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 39; (4) Ibid., no. 23, 
December 1931, p. 48; (5) K IV oblastnoi i gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii: Otchet 
Leningradskogo oblastnogo i gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b) (Leningrad, 1932j, p. 100.
At the workshop cell level, the proportion of workers by social origin among 
their party workers were much higher than among those of the party kollektiv. About 
90 per cent of workshop cell bureau members were reported as being workers from a 
working-class background. Between October 1927 and May 1928, the percentage of 
workers had been diminished from 91 to 89 per cent. However, this was soon 
recovered to 91 per cent by the next party elections held in the autumn of 1928, and 
from then on it remained more or less stable. *33 The ratio of workers among workshop 
cell secretaries was even higher than that of bureau members, about 92 to 94 per cent. 
Between October 1927 and May 1928, it also showed a slight decrease from 94 to 92
133 jjj 1932, there was a slight decrease in the percentage of workers in workshop cell bureaux, to 89.9 
per cent.
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per cent, and then by December 1931 it stabilised at 93 per cent. In spite of some 
fluctuations in each election, it seems that there was not so much change in the ratio 
of workers by social origin among party workers at the workshop cell level over this 
period.
Table 6-11. Proportion o f workers by occupation among elected party workers in 
Leningrad, 1927-1930 (percentages)
Oct. May Oct. 1929 1930
1927 1928 1928
(I) (1) (2) (3) (3)
Factory partkom members - - - 62.7 <57.8
Kollektiv bureau members (factory 34.5 38.6 42 37.7 38.3
kollektiv bureau members only) (55.5)
Kollektiv secretaries 16.0 18.9 n. d. n. d. n. d.
(factory kollektiv secretaries only)
Workshop cell bureau members 86.7 85.2 85.6 84.2 86.8
Workshop cell secretaries 88^ 89 n. d. 90.3 90.9
Sources: (1) Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 1928, pp. 37-40; 
(2) Ibid., no. 2, 1929, p. 18; (3) Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 39.
Despite the seemingly high percentage of those from a working-class 
background, the percentage of those actually engaged in production was in general 
much lower, especially among party workers of kollektiv bureaux (see table 6-11). 
Records of party workers at the lower party organs, elected at the 1927 October and 
1928 May elections, show that, in May 1928, only 39 per cent of the party kollektiv 
bureau members were engaged in production, despite an inerease from 35 in October 
1927. Furthermore, workers by occupation among kollektiv secretaries accounted for 
only 19 per cent, despite an increase by three per cent from October 1927. Among 
factory kollektiv bureau members, the percentage was higher: 51 per cent in October 
1927 and 56 per cent in May 1928. Over 25 per cent of factory kollektiv secretaries 
were reported to be workers by occupation in 1927 and its proportion had increased to 
29 per cent in May 1928. At the workshop cell bureau level, the proportion of workers 
by occupation among their party workers were much higher than among those of the 
party kollektiv bureaux. About 85 per cent of workshop cell bureau members were 
composed of production workers, whereas some 88 to 89 per cent of workshop cell 
secretaries were workers.
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According to the result of the 1928 autumn party elections, the percentage of 
workers by occupation among party kollektiv bureau members had increased to 42 per 
cent, where it reached its peak, whereas among those of the workshop cell bureaux it 
remained unchanged. Data from 1929 and 1930 show that among party workers of 
factoiy party committees, the percentage of workers by occupation increased from 63 
to 68 per cent between 1929 and 1930, whereas among the party kollektiv bureau 
members it fell to 38 per cent in 1929 and stabilised at 39 per cent in 1930. The 
percentage of workers by actual occupation among workshop cell bureau members 
increased slightly from 84 to 87 per cent, whereas among workshop cell secretaries it 
showed no significant change between 1929 and 1930 (about 90 per cent).^ "^^
Party unit organisers also showed high ratio of workers: in October 1927, 94 per 
cent were workers by social origin, and about 96 per cent were workers engaged in 
p ro d u c tio n .L a te r in 1932, all the group organisers in enterprises were said to be 
exclusively from workers.
When we compare two tables, one by social origin and the other hy occupation, 
one can see there is a greater discrepancy between them at party kollektiv level than 
workshop cell level (see tables 6-10 and 6-11). It is probably beeause not all party 
kollektivy were based in factories, and there were fewer workers by oceupation in non- 
faetory party kollektivy. But still, even if we compare figures only for factory party 
kollektivy, the difference between the proportion of workers by social origin and by 
occupation was huge: for instance, in May 1928, 86 per cent of factory kolleldiv 
secretaries were reported as being workers by social origin, but only 29 per cent were 
actually engaged in production. On the other hand, at workshop cell level, the 
difference was less than five per cent in most cases. This leads us to conclude that at 
kollektiv level, party workers were drawn from workers from the bench but ceased to 
work in production, either by converting into full-time party officials or having other 
jobs, whereas party workers at workshop cell level were largely drawn from workers 
from the bench and still working in production. Besides, in general, one can say that, 
despite the party’s emphasis on drawing workers from the bench into the party work.
Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 39.
Biulleten’Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1928, p. 67. 
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 385.
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the proportion of workers by occupation among the lower-level party workers did not 
greatly improve over this period.
6.2.3 Length of party membership among party workers at factory level
According to the obkom resolution of 1928, a factory kollektiv secretary, chosen 
among the kollektiv bureau members, was required to have at least one year’s party 
membership.’ Likewise, a workshop cell secretary, chosen among the workshop cell 
bureau members, required at least one year’s party m ember sh i p . Ho wev er ,  
appointment to post of secretary of a factory party committee required a much longer 
party membership. Later, in 1929, a minimum of five years’ party membership was 
made a necessary condition for those elected to the post of secretary of a factory party 
c o m m i t t e e . ’^ 9 general, the requirement mentioned above was met by those who 
were selected as secretaries.
However, data on the length of party membership of party workers shows that 
their length of time spent as a party member significantly shortened over the period 
(see table 6-12). Data relating to the city’s kollektiv bureau members and secretaries 
shows that, in the beginning of the first FYP period, the majority of them were party 
members who had joined the party before 1924. In October 1927 some 55 per cent of 
the kollektiv bureau members and almost 80 per cent of their secretaries were pre- 
1924 party members. In factory kollektiv bureaux, the proportion of pre-1924 party 
members was lower: about 45 per cent of the factory kollektiv bureau members and 77 
per cent of their secretaries. However, the percentage of pre-1924 party members 
gradually decreased over the period, and by December 1931, they accounted for only 
28 per cent of kollektiv bureau members and 21 per cent of factory kollektiv bureau 
members. The decrease among the factory kollektiv secretaries was most impressive, 
from 77 to 32 per cent between October 1927 and Deeember 1931.
The main reasons for a decrease in the proportion of pre-1924 party members 
were partly straightfoi'ward transfers to posts elsewhere and partly the overall 
expansion of party posts at enterprise level. However, more importantly, it was due to 
the mobilisation and promotion of young party workers into leading party work. Year
’37 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 202.
’38 / W . ,  p . 211 .
’39 Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 6, 30 July 1929, p. 25.
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after year, more and more young communists with only two or tliree years’ party 
membership were recruited or elected as party workers. Indeed, young party members 
with less than five year’s party membership increased remarkably over the period. As 
the table 6-12 shows, between 1927 and 1928, there was an increase of party members 
from 1924 and after among the city’s party workers at kollektiv level. For instance, 
after the 1928 May-June election, they composed 51 per cent of the city’s kollektiv 
bureau members, an increase from 41 per cent in January 1927, and 45 per cent in 
October 1927.’40 in faetory kollektiv bureaux, their proportion was greater. As the 
table 6-12 shows, their proportion grew from 55 to 60 per cent between October 1927 
and May 1928. The same tendency can be traced in party membership change among 
kollektiv secretaries. After the 1928 May-June election, about 64 per cent of kollektiv 
secretaries were still those who had joined the party in the period 1917-1920. Those 
who had joined the party during and after 1924 accounted for 28 per cent, an increase 
from 20 per cent when compared to that of October 1927. At the factory party 
kollektivy, the increase was greater: from 23 to 32 per cent.
Already in 1930, the percentage of those who had joined the party during and 
after 1924 had increased as a whole in all party organs. Additionally, there was an 
increase, at the lower levels of the party, in the percentage of those joining the party 
during and after 1927.’^ ’ This process, refened to as omolozhenie, took place 
especially at industrial enterprise level. By the end of 1931, the length of party 
membership of party officials and activists at enterprise level in Leningrad had begun 
to decrease significantly.’ 2^ Especially, the number of those who joined the party 
during 1927 enlistment and after increased among elected party workers. For instance, 
in November 1931, those who had joined the party during and after 1927 comprised 
over 41 per cent of kollektiv bureau members, of which 12 per cent joined the party in 
1930 and 1931. At industrial enterprise level, the proportion of those who had joined 
the party during and after 1927 increased more rapidly and by November 1931, nearly 
half of the factoiy kollektiv bureau members had joined the party in and after 1927. By
Partrabotnik, nos. 12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 92. 
Ibid., nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 39.
Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 47.
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1932, many of the vacant positions seems to have been filled by recruits from the 
1927 aktiv.
Table 6-12. Length o f party membership o f kollektiv bureau members and secretaries 
in Leningrad, 1927-1933 (percentages)
Kollektiv bureau members
Pre 1924 1924-1926 1927-1929 1930-1931
October 1927 (1) 55.1 44.9
May 1928 (1) 48.8 51.7
May 1930 (2) 33.3 36.8 29.9
November 1931 (2) 28.1 30.9 29.3 11.7
Kollektiv secretaries
Pre 1924 1924 and after
October 1927 (1) 79.8 20.2
May 1928 (1) 72.4 27.6
Factory kollektiv bureau members
Pre 1924 1924-1926 1927-1929 1930-1931
October 1927 (1) 45.2 54.8
May 1928 (1) 40.2 59.8
May 1930 (2) 27.7 39.5 32.8
November 1931 (2) 21.2 30.9 26.3 21.6
Factory kollektiv secretaries
Pre 1924 1924-1926 1927-1928 1929-1930
October 1927 (1) 77.2 22.8
May 1928 (1) 68.4 31.6
October 1928 ( 3 ) 62.5 37.4
October 1929 ( 3 ) 55.5 44.5
May 1930 ( 4 ) 42.1 42.3 15.6
December 1931 ( 4 ) 31.8 41.5 26.7
December 1933 ( 5 ) 29.7 50.6 14.0
Sources: (1) Biulleten' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 16 July 1928, pp. 
37-40; (2) Partrabotnik, no. 23, December 1931, p. 48; (3) Ibid., no. 15, June 1930, p. 65; (4) 
Leningradskaia oblastnaia partiinaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Leningrad: Izdanie 
Leningradskogo oblastkoma VKP(b), 1931), no. 3, pp. 36-37; (5) Leningradskaia pravda, 12 
December 1933, p. 2.
On the other hand, kollektiv secretaries seems to have had a longer period of 
party membership. In 1930 there was still an overwhelming number of old party 
members in the leading party organs. It is noticeable that the majority of secretaries 
had joined the party in the first years of the Russian Revolution and during the Civil
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War period.’43 Even in December 1931, the majority of factory kollektiv secretaries 
had joined the party before 1927 and those who joined the party in and after 1927 
comprised only 27 per cent. There was not much change to these figures. According 
to data given in 1933, among party kollektiv secretaries in Leningrad, almost one-third 
had over ten years’ party membership, more than half had party membership of five to 
ten years, and about 14 per cent had less than five years’ party membership.’44
Table 6-13. Length o f party membership o f workshop cell bureau members and 
secretaries in Leningrad, 1927-1931 (percentages)
Workshop cell bureau members
Pre 1924 1924-1926 1927-1929 1930-
1931
October 1927 (1) 22.2 77.8
May 1928 (1) 20.6 79.4
November 192 8 (2) 19.4 57.9 22.7
May 1930 (3) 13.1 43.5 43.4
November 1931 (3) 8.9 30.1 32.3 28.8
Workshop cell secretaries
Pre 1924 1924-1926 1927-1929 1930-1931
October 1927 (1) 32.2 67.8
May 1928 (1) 29.5 70.5
May 1930 (4) 17.8 49.4 32.8
December 1931 (4) 11.9 34.0 35.6 18.5
Sources: (1) Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 9, 16 July 1928, pp. 
37-40; (2) Leningradskaia oblastnaia partiinaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh (1929), no. 
1, p. 38; (3) Partrabotnik, no. 23, December 1931, p. 48; (4) Leningradskaia oblastnaia 
partiinaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh, (1931), no. 3, pp. 36-37.
This tendency was also reflected at the workshop cell level (see table 6-13). 
Among the workshop cell bureau members, the proportion of pre-1924 party members 
was relatively small when compared to those among factory kollektiv bureau 
members, about 22 per cent in October 1927. In the years following, their proportion 
became even smaller, and by November 1931, only nine per cent were those with pre- 
1924 party membership. Among workshop cell secretaries, the percentage of those 
with pre-1924 party membership was slightly higher than that of the workshop cell 
bureau members, but much lower than that of factory kollektiv secretaries. In October
’43 Ibid., nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 39.
’44 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1968), vol. 2, p. 447.
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1927, about 32 per cent were pre-1924 party members, but their proportion rapidly 
decreased over the period, and by the end of 1933, it was only 13 per cent.'45
Instead, the proportion of party members with less than five years’ party 
membership increased over the same period. Between October 1927 and May 1928, 
the percentage of those who had joined the party in 1924 and after increased from 78 
to 79 per cent among workshop cell bureau members, and from 68 to 71 among their 
secretaries. From 1930, their percentage increased still more rapidly. For instance, 
between May 1930 and November 1931, their proportion among workshop cell 
bureau members increased from 43 to 60 per cent, and among workshop cell 
secretaries from 33 to 54 per cent. Accordingly, by the end of 1931, over half of the 
party workers in workshop cells were those who had joined the party in 1927 and 
after. By 1932, the process of omolozhenie had proceeded still further. It was reported 
that in April, about 27 per cent of workshop cell secretaries had party membership of 
less than two years.’46
Lower down the ladder, a unit organiser was required to be an actual party 
member, which means that the party did not allow a party candidate to be a unit 
organiser. It was also required that he (or sometimes she) be politically trained, be 
able to utilise authority and be trusted by communists and other non-party 
members.’47 However, these requirements for unit organisers were not often met. For 
instance, a review of the composition of unit organisers in the Volodarskii raion in 
November 1928 showed that many unit organisers had only party candidate 
membership.’48 it was also revealed that many did not have any political education.’49 
The increase of party candidates in the composition of unit organisers was criticised, 
but the situation did not improve even in 1930. It was reported that in a number of 
factories, one third of unit organisers were composed of party candidates, who were 
regarded as politically weak and having less authority among party unit members.
In 1930, according to data on the composition of unit organisers in three raions of 
Leningrad, about 78 per cent had joined the party in the period between 1925 and
’46 Leningradskaia pravda, 12 December 1933, p. 2.
’46 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1980), vol. 2, p. 162. 
’47 RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2707, p. 217.
’48 Partrabotnik, no. 20, 25 November 1928, p. 35.
’49 /6W., p. 35.
’69 Ibid., no. 11, May 1930, p. 19.
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1928, and those who had joined the party after 1929 comprised almost 14 per cent, 
whereas those who had longer periods of party membership (who had joined the party 
between 1924 and 1925) accounted for only eight per cent. Furthermore, 15 to 20 per 
cent d i d  not have any political e d u c a t i o n . In December 1931, the ratio of those who 
had joined the party from 1927 and onwards increased up to 73 per cent, among which 
44 per cent had joined in 1930 or 1931.’62 %n 1932, more unit organisers had been in 
the party for a relatively short period. In January, 44 per cent of the city’s unit 
organisers were party members of less than two years s t a n d i n g , ’63 and by April the 
figure went up to 58 per c e n t . ’64
In 1934, a Leningrad party worker was likely to be somewhat younger than his 
1928 counterpart, less experienced both in terms of the number of years he had spent 
in industry and in terms of his party membership. He was likely to have joined the 
party in a very different period of party history, during the early years of 
industrialisation when activism and radicalism were at a premium. In addition, apart 
from having avoided the political wrangles that marked the 1920s, the party official in 
1934 was in every respect likely to be more of a professional bureaucrat - better 
trained, better paid, and presiding over a much more complex and all-embracing 
administrative structure.
6.2.4 Instability of lower-level party apparatus
One of the main features of party apparatus throughout these years had been the 
excessive fluctuation of party officials, especially at the lower levels. First of all, 
much of this fluctuation was a direct result of elections, which showed an extremely 
high rate of turnover. Elections of lower party organs were held evei*y six months and 
leading party workers such as secretaries and bureau members of both kollektivy and 
workshop cells were subjected to these elections. In the May 1928 party elections, 
Leningrad stood out as an example for others to follow. Enterprises staged a series of 
preliminary mass meetings prior to the actual election meeting, where candidates 
could be put to the test by both party and non-party workers. Most of the candidates
’6’ Ibid., p. 20.
’63 Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 48.
’63 /c /L  oblastnoi i gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii: Otchet Leningradskogo oblastnogo i gorodskogo 
komitetov VKP(b) (Leningrad, 1932J, pp. 100-101.
’64 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 161.
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were apparently nominated directly at election meetings, and the number of 
candidates outweighed the number of available places by two to three and sometimes 
even by five to six t i m e s . ’ ^ 5
The turnover rate at the lower level of party organs was extremely high, as can 
be seen in the 1928 election results. In the May-June 1928 election, in the city of 
Leningrad, the turnover rate of kollektiv bureau members reached 48 per cent as a 
whole, and among factory kollektiv bureau members, it was slightly higher: 50 per 
c e n t . ’ 6 6  The turnover rate of workshop cell bureau members was even higher than that 
of kollektiv bureau members: 57 per cent, an increase from 54 per cent in the October 
1927 elections.’67 The turnover rates of both kollektiv and workshop cell secretaries 
were also high: out of 758 kollektiv secretaries elected, only 477 were re-elected, and 
out of 872 workshop cell secretaries elected, only 469 managed to be re-elected.’68 In 
the autumn party elections of 1928 the percentage of workshop cell secretaries and 
bureau members newly elected had exceeded 60 per cent.’69
Initially, the high turnover rate was not considered a danger. Elections were 
believed to inhibit bureaucratism, and rapid turnover was valued as a good sign. 
However, in 1928, some party officials began to express negative views about this 
high turnover rate. The election campaigns, which could go on for several months, 
were criticised for being an enonuous waste of time and energy, and the short tenn in 
office that many secretaries and organisers enjoyed was seen as having a negative 
effect both on the party’s work in the enterprise, and on the development of specialists 
with long experience in a particular sphere of the economy. ’ 69 Therefore, at the 
begimiing of 1929, a long-running debate was published in Leningradskaia pravda on 
a proposal to hold elections to party cells and raion organisations annually instead of 
every six months.’6’ However, at the second oblast party conference in March 1929,
’66 Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 25, 22 August 1928, pp. 11-12. See also Leningradskaia pravda, 15 
Febmary 1929, p. 3.
’66 Partrabotnik, nos. 12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 90.
’67 Ibid., nos. 12-13, 1 August 1928, p. 93.
’68 Ibid., p. 94.
’69 Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 8 March 1929, p. 19.
’99 Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), nos. 2-3, 31 January 1929, p. 19; and ibid., nos. 5-6, 28 Febmary 1929, pp. 
23-24.
’61 See the remarks of Sokolov, representing the Khalturina factory, at the second oblast party 
conference in Leningradskaia pravda, 15 March 1929, p. 2; Fisunenko, representing the Baltic
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Kirov dismissed the idea, pointing out that regular elections ‘have an enormous 
educational significance, and also undoubtedly reduce bureaucratism’.’62
Despite the expectations on the value of elections, the excessive turnover 
inevitably led to the disruption of party work at lower levels. Therefore, much 
pressure was put on the apparatus to deal with the enormous turnover of its enterprise 
level officials. In the 1930 elections, the turnover rate slightly lowered, the average 
rate being 60 per cent. The lowering of the turnover in the city of Leningrad was 
evaluated as a positive factor, since the excessive turnover of previous elections 
caused instability of party work. On the other hand, the turnover rate in the 
countiyside increased, which was explained as a way of ‘correcting distortion of party 
lines on the matter of collectivisation’.’63 However, after 1930, the problems again 
became more acute. In the November 1931 elections, about 62 per cent of party 
committees and kolleJuiv bureau members, 58 per cent of workshop cell bureau 
members and 61 per cent of party unit organisers were newly elected, and the majority 
of them were promoted into the leading party positions for the first time.’64 This 
extremely high rate shows that turnover had began to spin out of control. Much of this 
60 per cent plus turnover of the autumn 1931 party elections was described as 
spontaneous. By 1932, the rate of turnover had become even greater. In April 1932, 
39 per cent of the city’s workshop cell secretaries and 43 per cent of its unit organisers 
had held their posts for less than six months. Lack of experience and political training 
proved to be a major shortcoming for many of them, and as a result they were unable 
to lead other party members in the enterprise who were themselves often ‘politically 
very backward’ .’65
However, the excessive turnover at elections was just one part of the problem. 
Tliroughout this period, party activists, many of whom were lower-level party 
workers, were mobilised for the party work in the countryside, sometimes in their own 
oblast, but often in other parts of the country, or promoted into either administrative 
posts within their enterprise or the state apparatus. All these factors caused still greater
factory in ibid., 10 February 1929, p. 3; and the articles in Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 7, 20 March 
1929, pp. 19-21.
’62 Stenograficheskii biulleten ' Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii, no. 9, pp. 19-20.
’63 Partrabotnik, nos. 16-17, June 1930, p. 38.
’64 Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, p. 47.
’65 Ibid., nos. 11-12, June 1932, pp. 21-22.
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fluctuation in lower party apparatus. Taking the example of the giant Karl Marx 
factory, between February 1929 and the spring of 1930, three party secretaries and 
four different full-time agitprop workers had been appointed; but 21 of the 50 party 
committee members had left, as had 30 of the 52 workshop cell secretaries and 
agitprop workers. Of those who had left, 43 per cent had been promoted out of the 
factory, 29 per cent had been mobilised to the countryside, and 24 per cent had left to 
take up full-time study.’66
Indeed, the city party organisation suffered from having to act as a supplier of 
cadres to other regions, including its own. From the summer of 1927 the Leningrad 
organisation based in the city had been in charge of a sizeable agricultural region. The 
adoption by this large urban industrial centre of a substantial rural region was to 
change the outlook of the city’s party organisation and require it to take responsibility 
for a large number of administrative units where the party presence was extremely 
low.’67 In addition, throughout the years of major collectivisation Leningrad was 
second only to Moscow in acting as a major supplier of cadres not only for its own 
mral region, but for other parts of the Soviet Union as well. Already in 1928 the 
Central Committee had dispatched over 500 Leningrad residents out of the city to take 
up work in such regions as Siberia, Kazaldistan and the North C a u c a s u s . ’ 68 A whole 
series of special mobilisations of party workers in 1929 to grain procurement regions 
served to further drain the city’s reserve of c a d r e s . ’ 69 The greatest burden came in 
November 1929, when Leningrad was expected to provide over 4,500 of the so-called 
‘twenty flve-thousanders’, who were to act as the vanguard force in setting up and 
administering eollective farms.’7” By 19 January 1930, 5,000 Leningrad’s workers 
were mobilised for kolkhoz work in regions such as Siberia, the Lower Volga, the 
Sevemyi Icrai, Central Asia and Tambov.’7’ Information on the composition of 3,543 
workers selected by 7 January 1930 shows clearly that most of them were active party
’66 Ibid., nos. 13-14, May 1930, p. 36.
’67 Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 12, 25 October 1928, pp. 31-33.
’68 Ko Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii, p. 111.
’69 See, for instance, Partrabotnik, no. 15, 10 August 1929, p. 12.
’79 K X V I s ’’ezdu, pp. 61-62. For more information on the ‘25,000ers’, see Lynne Viola, The Best Soi^s 
o f  the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard o f  Soviet Collectivization (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1987).
’71 RTsKliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2750, p. 41.
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members with over ten years’ industrial experience.’72 They were also experienced in 
social and political work, and many were full-time party officials, the greatest 
proportions being apparently metalworkers.’73 Besides, extensive use of temporary 
worker brigades sent out to the countryside during campaign periods added to the 
urban organisation’s cadre crisis.’74 Between March 1929 and May 1930, according to 
Kirov’s speech at the third oblast party conference, Leningrad had lost 13,000 party 
and non-party worker activists to the countryside. To a substantial degree, these 
workers had gone not to Leningrad oblast, but beyond its c o n f i n e s . ’ 76 Later, a Central 
Committee resolution of 21 February 1931 resulted in more cadres being sent down to 
the countryside.’76 Between August 1930 and October 1931 some 550 people were 
sent out of the city to take up party posts in the oblast, and a further 264 to other rural 
party organisations.’77 In addition, over 5,500 cadres were dispatched to strengthen 
rural soviet, economic and co-operative organisations.'78 Altogether, between the 
beginning of 1931 and October 1932 some 17,500 urban activists would leave the city 
for work of some kind in the countryside.’79 This kind of massive mobilisation of 
industrial workers for the party work in the countryside led inevitably to instability in 
the party apparatus, particularly at lower level.
In addition, problems of instability were further aggravated by the extensive 
promotion of party activists, which was strongly advocated by the party from 1927 
onwards. In the summer of 1928, the Central Committee took a decision to extend the 
policy of vydvizhenie (the direct promotion of production workers into administrative 
positions) to include the party apparatus itself.’89 However, it appears that, in the 
begimiing, both party and non-party activists were promoted mainly into 
administrative posts within and outwith the enteiprises, and only a few were promoted
’72 Among 3,543 workers, about 75.2 per cent were party members, and those who had been workers 
over 10 years accounted for 58.7 per cent, over 15 years 33.5 per cent, and over 25 years 7.5 per 
cent. See ibid., p. 11.
’73 Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi oj'ganizatsii KPSS  (1968), vol. 2, pp. 367-368.
’7 4 /W .,p p . 366-367.
'76 Leningradskaia pravda, 12 June 1930, p. 4.
’76 Spravochnikpartiinogo rabotnika (1934), no. 8, p. 276.
’77 oblastnoi i gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii, p. 101.
’78 V. K. Beliakov, Organizatsionnoe ukreplenie Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza v period  
nastupleniia sotsializma po vsemu frontu, 1929-1932 (Moscow, 1972), p. 168.
’79 Leningradskaia pravda, 16 January 1933, p. 1.
’89 Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 20, 30 June 1928, pp. 8-9.
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into party posts. For instance, in Leningrad, between 1927 and 1928, some 2,500 
workers moved into minor administrative posts within their en te rp rise .D u rin g  the 
whole of 1928, 602 workers were promoted to administrative posts outside their own 
enterprise. This compares with 199 promoted into economic positions and 141 who 
took up posts within the enteiprise (which was far more common). Only 62 of these 
went to party posts. This suggests that the number actually moving into party posts 
was relatively low.’82 Certainly statistical evidence suggests that few promotions into 
party posts took place in Leningrad prior to 1929, and that most of those promoted 
went into minor technical and operative positions within the factory.’83 Since the 
majority of those promoted were party activists, this meant that a eonsiderable number 
of party activists were drawn out of party work. Therefore, the party posts left over by 
those promoted, as well as the posts created by the expansion of the enterprise level 
party apparatus, had to be filled by new reeruits. This is why from the end of 1929, 
despite the reservations expressed concerning the promotion of party activists into 
responsible party posts, the party apparatus had to fill many of the posts with raw, 
inexperienced, and even insufficiently ‘class-conscious’ activists.'84 Not surprisingly 
all these factors made the lower-level party apparatus extremely fluid throughout the 
period.
Initially, fi'equent transfers and promotions of party workers were considered as 
desirable, because it was thought that they would train personnel, help to find new 
leadership, advance younger party members, and prevent localism. It was not until 
1930 that the negative side of these processes was fully felt and expressed. In 
September 1931, a serious and systematic study of the frequent swapping and shifting 
around of party workers was called for, because it was felt that the situation ‘in the 
present circumstanees is becoming intolerable [since] it wrecks any possibility of 
creating the neeessary degree of specialisation of party cadres’.’86 In 1932, the high 
tekuchest’ (turnover) eontinued, and by then, tekuchest’ caused partly by the
’8’ Ko 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b), pp. 148-149.
’82 See the figures for the Vyborgskii raion in Leningradskaia pravda, 14 February 1928, p. 3. 
’83 Ko 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b), pp. 148-149.
K X V I s ”ezdu, p. 17 diwà Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, no. 17, September 1931, p. 35.
'86 Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, p. 1.
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combination of promotions, mobilisations and extended study leave, but also by 
straightfoi'ward sackings and unauthorised ‘resignations’, had beeome r a m p a n t . '8 6
Indeed, the 1928-1934 period was notable for the degree of instability of the 
party apparatus at enterprise level, the result of the mixture of rapid promotions, 
transfers out of the city, extended periods of study leave, and the straightforward 
‘drift’ of party activists shifting from one job to the next, in and out of the city. All 
this made for a very amorphous social grouping, and can hardly have served to 
alleviate the problems facing the party organisations during these years. In terms of 
the social and career profile of the party apparatus in the enterprise, the massive 
turnover was bound to result in a different kind of party official.
'86 Ibid., nos. 7-8, April 1932, p. 12; and nos. 11-12, June 1932, pp. 35-37.
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7. Factory Party Cells In Leningrad
During NEP, the party organisations had concerned themselves principally with 
organisational matters, internal party questions, and agitational work. However, with 
the launching of the first FYP, the nature of party work underwent a significant 
change. The party was expected to play a much more active role not only in these, but 
also in economic matters. Although the party was not the only body involved in the 
economy, in general, ultimate responsibility for industrial development lay with party 
organisations. Party organisations, especially those at factory level, were in turn 
expected to play a mueh more complex role to ensure industrial development.
The Leningrad party organisation was no exception. With the remarkable 
advances in Leningrad’s industrial base, combined with the enormous growth in party 
membership, factory party organisations had to meet much more complex demands. 
Considering the importance of Leningrad’s industry and the status of the Leningrad 
party organisation as a leading regional organisation, it is not too difficult to imagine 
how much pressure was put on the party organisations at the factoiy level. They had 
to be involved in everything, including industrial management and mass mobilisation. 
An examination of the role of factoiy party organisations in Leningrad during the FYP 
period illustrates the practical effectiveness of the party’s involvement in production 
matters and also provides examples of interaction between the party and industrial 
workers.
This chapter considers, first of all, the changing nature of party work at the 
factoiy level. Even though the faetoiy party organisations undertook various kinds of 
work, special emphasis is placed on the party’s growing involvement in economic 
matters, and its consequences for the party itself. The central issue is whether party 
organisations at the factoiy level could cope with all the demands placed upon them 
and whether the involvement of factory party cells in production matters was 
effective. This is followed by an analysis of the development of production meetings 
and socialist competition movement in Leningrad, which considers whether the 
factory party cells were capable of mobilising their workers for industrialisation in the 
way they were now expected to do.
288
7,2 Party work vs. economic work
7.2.1 ‘Face to production (litsom k proizvodstvuy
Generally speaking, party work consisted of party-organisational, mass and 
economic work. Party-organisational work referred to the recruitment, placement and 
education of party personnel including cadres and the rank and file, the development 
of an effective party organisation aided by improved intra-party communications, and 
the monitoring of performance of various party units and individuals. The meaning of 
‘economic work’ changed over time and could mean the direction, supervision, 
control of and involvement in economic affairs by communists. Mass-party work 
involved the dissemination of the regime’s values and objectives among the general 
population by means of meetings, speeches and formal instruction.' It goes without 
saying that factoiy party organisations were involved in other matters as well.
In the earlier 1920s party cells in factories concentrated on mass work, 
recruitment and intra-party affairs. However, with the launching of the 
industrialisation drive, factory party cells were expected to become involved in 
economic questions as well. This change in direction came in 1928 under the slogan 
of ‘face to production {litsom kproizvodstvuy. The slogan ‘face to production’, which 
became widespread in 1928-29, meant that party organisations were to concern 
themselves with basic production questions - rationalising production, lowering costs, 
increasing productivity, improving the quality of production, and improving labour 
discipline.^ Accordingly the nature and methods of party work at the enterprise level 
changed considerably. Perestroika (restructuring) was said to involve a change in both 
the ‘form and content’ of party work, to give it a ‘clearly expressed production 
character’ and to enable it to meet the demands of socialist construction. In terms of 
‘form’ of party work, perestroika meant shifting the focus of party work to lower 
party cells. In terms of ‘content’, perestroika meant the party’s growing involvement 
in production questions.^
’ Daniel Thorniley, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Rural Communist Party, 1927-39 (London: 
Macmillan, 1988), p. 180.
 ^ See Izvestiia TsK VKP(b), no. 34, 22 November 1928, pp. 1-4; ibid., no. 25, 1 September 1929, pp. 1- 
7; ?a\d Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 2, Decembere 1929, pp. 55-58.
 ^Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 1, November 1929, pp. 17-30.
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Undoubtedly, the main aim of this change was to secure the successful 
implementation of industrialisation. In the eyes of the party leadership, the success of 
the industrialisation drive depended on whether the party could ensure that decisions 
made at the centre were transmitted from higher to lower organs and then carried out 
properly by those responsible at the periphery. Therefore the active role of factory 
party cells in production matters was considered to be vital in ensuring successful 
industrial development. They were obliged to monitor the economic achievement of 
the factory, and to undertake agitation work to mobilise the masses of workers.
In the Leningrad region, the role of the faetory party organisations in facilitating 
successful industrialisation was considered particularly important. Already at the first 
oblast party conference held in November 1927, the tasks of party organisations in 
bringing about successful industrialisation was specified as follows. Party 
organisations at the enterprise level were to involve themselves deeply in the 
promotion of labour discipline and the shock-work movement. They were to combat 
the worsening rate of absenteeism and also ensure the implementation of the seven- 
hour working day. They were also expected to help reduce the production costs and 
generally oversee the rationalisation of industry. The first oblast party conference also 
recognised that at all levels of the organisation the party’s propaganda and agitation 
functions would now become an essential ingredient in the general effort to raise 
enthusiasm and mobilise public opinion around the industrialisation programme, 
while at the same time ensuring acceptance of the material hardships that would
.. 4accompany it.
In Leningrad, the importance of economic matters in party work was 
continuously emphasised in 1928. At the same time, the main focus of party work 
shifted to lower party organs - the workshop cells. This was motivated by the belief 
that workshop cells could decide produetion matters more effectively. As early as 
January 1928, for instance, a leading party worker wrote an article in Partrabotnik as 
follows: ‘in the coming period questions of the economic life of the workshop must 
occupy a basic place in the work of the workshop cell and much more independence 
and responsibility must be given to activists in the cell’.^
Partrabotnik, no. 2, 15 February 1928, p. 31.
 ^Ibid., no. 1, January 1928, pp. 18-20.
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Accordingly workshop cells were given wide-ranging responsibilities and 
expected to become the main focus of party work. In its March 1928 resolution, the 
Leningrad obkom urged workshop cells to undertake a ‘systematie study of various 
questions of the production life of the workshop’. In order to make it possible for 
workshop cells to operate properly, the resolution also called for a widening of the 
rights of workshop cell administrations and for the creation of a trade union bureau in 
every workshop with a workforce of more than 200.'’
However, a review of the workshop cells’ work conducted in October 1928 
revealed that the obkom plenum resolution of March 1928 had not been fully put into 
practice. Although most Leningrad factories had transferred the focus of party work to 
the workshop cells by this time, the rights of the workshop cell administration and 
trade union had not been expanded. In many workshops, the latter did not even exist. 
This caused a serious problem in the work of workshop cells, as they could not 
operate efficiently in production matters without the expansion of the rights of 
workshop cell administrations and the creation of workshop trade union bureaux.^
Nevertheless, a significant change took place in the type of questions factory 
party cells discussed in 1928. Economic questions were part of the agenda of local 
cells in the 1920s, but it was not until 1928 that the details of economic management 
began to dominate the meetings of local cells, as well as those of the raikoms and the 
obkom itself. In 1927 most questions discussed at workshop cell bureaux and plenums 
were either inner-party matters or mass work. Economic questions were hardly 
discussed at workshop cell level: they accounted for only four to five per cent of the 
total questions discussed.^ According to a suivey of five selected workshop cells in 
Leningrad, economic questions were discussed only 30 times thi'oughout 1927. Some 
workshop cells never dealt with production questions of their workshop, and some 
appeared to be helpless.^ Not surprisingly, factory party cells came under criticism for 
not discussing economic matters with sufficient frequency or confidence. They were 
roundly censured for failing to take a leading role in production matters."'
 ^Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 5, 9 April 1928, pp. 3-7.
 ^Partrabotnik, no. 18, 25 October 1928, p. 32.
® Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, 15 March 1928, pp. 20-21.
 ^Ibid., p. 24.
'6 See Leningradskaia pravda, 29 January 1928, p. 3; Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta 
VKP(b), no. 4, 15 March 1928, pp. 20-21.
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However, the October 1928 review of workshop cells’ work revealed that by 
this time economic questions had been included in the workshop cells’ work plan, and 
that production matters were often discussed at workshop cell meetings." A kollektiv 
bureau at Krasnyi treugol’nik, for instance, had been involved in various economic 
questions by November 1928. The questions discussed included the results of 
rationalisation, the accumulation of capital for the next economic year, an examination 
of the reasons for the high rate of absenteeism, and wages policy.'^
As factory party cells became more and more involved in production matters 
from 1928 onwards, the proportion of economic questions in their work increased. As 
can be seen in table 7-1, in the Moskovsko-narvskii raion the relative weight of 
economic questions in the work of party organisations, from raikom down to 
workshop cells, increased considerably between 1927 and 1929. In 1929, economic 
questions accounted for 20 per cent of the questions discussed at the raikom and 
kollektivy and for 18 per cent at workshop cell bureaux (see table 7-1).
Table 7-1. Proportion o f economic questions o f the total number o f questions 
discussed by party organs in Moskovsko-narvskii raion, 1927-1929 
(percentages)
Year R aikom K ollek tiv
bureaux
P lenum s o f  
ko llek tivy
W orkshop cell 
bureaux
P lenum s o f  
w orkshop cells
1927 8 10.8 4.4 2.4 -
1928 14 18.8 9.8 10.2 8.2
1929 20 20.8 20.4 17.8 17.4
Source: P artiinoe  s tr o i te l ’stvo , nos. 11-12, June 1930, p. 37.
Party cells’ work in production matters, however, proved to be unsatisfactory. 
First of all, the proposals made and resolutions adopted at party cell bureaux and 
meetings were often of poor quality. According to the October 1928 review, workshop 
cell bureaux and meetings heard only general reports on the condition of the 
workshops, and did not deal with particular problems such as waste, idle time and 
absenteeism. As a result, most resolutions adopted were not in specific ternis. The 
debates were also often vague, and dwelt on trivial details or criticism of
" Partrabotnik, no. 18, 25 October 1928, p. 33.
Ibid., no. 19, 5 November 1928, p. 32.
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individuals.'^ In addition, workshop cells showed more interest in discussing matters 
which directly affected the material interests of workers. Therefore, it was 
recommended that workshop cells should pay proper attention to matters that did not 
directly affect the material interests of workers, such as absenteeism.'"' Another 
problem was the possibility of replacing production meetings by workshop cells. 
Workshop cells often tried to lay down a list of questions which should be discussed 
at production meetings. On the other hand, some workshop cells did not become 
involved in economic matters sufficiently on the grounds that they were not willing to 
meddle with the activity of production meetings.'^
However, the most serious problem was the growing tension between party cells 
and economic managers. From the first stage of perestroika, the call for party cells’ 
involvement in economic questions created serious confusion and tension on the shop 
floor level. Traditionally, three main organisations were responsible for administrative 
questions within the factory: the party cell, the trade union committee and the 
management. Each of these had specific responsibilities, although the precise 
boundaries between them were uncertain. At the factory level, the ‘triangle’ {troika) 
consisted of the management director, the party cell secretary, and the chairman of the 
factory trade union committee. The director was supposed to be in sole charge of 
economic affairs, and the party was supposed to confine its activities in economic 
matters to monitoring and exhortation. Not surprisingly, the party’s growing 
involvement in economic questions led to confusion about the respective roles of the 
party cell, economic management, and trade union at the factory level. As the party 
turned its ‘face to production’, the boundary between the responsibilities of the party 
cell and the director became more blurred. Although party directives continuously 
emphasised that they should not inteiwene in the work of managers, party cells often 
found themselves becoming involved in economic matters that were properly the 
responsibility of managers.
Tension between party cells and economic management in these circumstances 
was bound to grow. As was revealed by the October 1928 review of workshop cells’
Ibid., no. 18, 25 October 1928, p. 33.
'UZ?/^/.,pp. 34-35. 
Ibid., p. 33.
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work, there was a growing tendency for workshop cell bureaux or meetings to adopt a 
resolution calling for a replacement of the workshop administration. In fact, in 1928 a 
considerable number of resolutions called for the replacement of foremen or brigade 
leaders.'^ Indeed, there was an enormous abnormality as to the mutual relation 
between the workshop cells and the direetors of the workshop. As the expression dcto 
kogoT suggests, they were fighting in effect for control over the workshop. When the 
workshop cell was strong, it often dominated the director by overriding his decisions 
and obliging him to carry out all the resolutions of the plenum or bureau. In many 
cases, workshop cells meddled with the functions of administrative-technical 
personnel, claiming that decisions made by workshop eells should be binding for 
directors or the factory management.’^
In an article in Partrabotnik, an attempt was made to clarify the party cells’ 
rights and obligations in production matters. It was argued that the party cells should 
take part in production, but not being in eharge of production. It was emphasised that 
party organisations should not get involved in administration and not interfere in the 
administrative functions of factory (or workshop) directors. Instead, they should 
discuss production questions and draw the working masses into socialist construction. 
The roles workshop cells were supposed to play included highlighting the defects, 
monitoring performance and ensuring the fulfilment of their proposals. At the same 
time, calls were made to the effect that the economic manager should not ignore the 
party organisation or prevent it from taking part in management, and that all the 
workshop cells’ proposals, which the workshop cell administrator did not object to, 
should be implemented.’^
It is doubtful that this clarification could help to reduce tensions on the shop 
floor. Nevertheless, a procedure was set for the dissolving of disagreement between 
workshop cells and management. In case the workshop cell administrator did not 
agree with the decision made by the workshop cell, he could appeal to the factory
Ibid., p. 33. It was considered inappropriate for the workshop cells to get involved in personal 
conflict. Therefore, warnings were made that workshop cells might become distracted from other 
more important matters by getting involved in such conflicts or personal matters.
”  Ibid., pp. 34-35.
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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administration. If the workshop cell did not agree with the measures taken by the 
workshop cell administrator, it could appeal to the kollektiv bureau.'^
7.2.2 ' Edinonachalie'’
Despite various attempts, tension grew quickly between party cells and 
industrial managers. The former often attempted to meddle in the detailed operation of 
the enterprise and the latter attempted either to ignore or bypass the suggestions made 
by party officials and activists. Moreover, it soon became clear that excessive 
interference in management by party officials and activists with little or no technical 
expertise could seriously damage the performance of their enterprise. Therefore, 
leading officials in the city began to feel the need to try to set some limit to the 
activities of party cells in the enterprise. For instance, in January 1929, G. Pylaev, the 
Vyborgskii raikom secretary, criticised the attacks on foremen and directors that party 
cells were making, as being ‘unfair’ and ‘not objective’.^ "
As confusion continued about the responsibility of the party, especially at lower 
levels, the principle of one-man management became a topic of debate. At the second 
oblast party conference in the spring of 1929, the question of edinonachalie was 
raised by a delegate during the debate following the Central Committee report 
delivered by Voroshilov. In reply to the delegate’s question, Voroshilov was keen to 
stress that edinonachalie certainly did not mean that the party organisation should not 
‘play the very closest role in the leadership of our enterprises’. However, he also 
pointed out that the party was already promoting to responsible economic work its 
own cadres, who ‘must have the initiative in their own sphere and, most importantly, 
take upon themselves responsibility for the enterprise as a whole’. ‘In future’, he went 
on, ‘the party and trade union organisations should give them maximum support’.^ ’ 
Despite his explanation, confusion and dispute remained. Thus at a later session of the 
same conference a party activist from the Bol’shevik factory criticised his director for
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
Cited from P. O. Gooderham, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan: The Case 
o f  Leningrad (CREES Discussion Papers, SIPS, no. 24, University o f Birmingham, 1983), part 2, p. 
2 .
Stenograficheskii biulleten' Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (Leningrad, 1929), no. 4, p. 
4.
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attempting ‘to take all the responsible work of the enterprise solely on [his] own 
shoulder’ and appealed to the obkom for support/^
In 1929 confusion regarding the role of the factory party cells in industry 
continued and tension between party cells and factory managers accumulated. Factory 
party cells kept meddling in the operation of the enteiprise and attacking industrial 
managers who ignored or bypassed their suggestions. According to a review of party 
cells’ work in economic matters carried out in the early summer of 1929, some 
members showed a negative attitude towards administrative-technical personnel, and, 
moreover, attempted to stand in the way of the need to raise labour discipline in the 
factories and opposed raising work nomis and labour productivity.^^
The first major attempt to clarify the position came only in September 1929 
when the Central Committee adopted a resolution on edinonachalie. The resolution 
proclaimed that the director was directly answerable for the fulfilment of the industrial 
and financial plan and all production tasks. He was also in charge both of the 
management apparatus and all the organisational-technical functions of production at 
the enterprise. As for the party cells, they were responsible for the ‘social-political and 
economic life of the enterprise, so as to ensure the fulfilment of the party’s principal 
directives by trade union and economic organs, without interfering in the detailed 
work of the trade union coimnittee and [enterprise] director, especially in the 
operational command of the administration’. On the other hand, the factory trade 
union committee was expected to become an ‘energetic organiser of the production 
activity and initiatives of workers’, listen to management reports, investigate problems 
with production, make suggestions for improvement, and see to it that they were 
actually implemented by management.^"'
Obviously, the main aim of one-man management was to eliminate the 
parallelism of economic management, party cell, and factory trade union committee. 
The institutionalisation of one-man management sought to establish sole managerial 
command by eliminating the parallelism of these three organisations. One-man 
management was intended to make management strong, efficient, and accountable. On
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the other hand, it dictated not managerial but political and social roles to the party and 
union organisations. They, in turn, were supposed neither to ‘collude’ nor to compete 
for power with management, but to aid it by educating and organising workers in the 
spirit of ‘proletarian discipline’. In other words, it was intended to reorient the party 
and union organisations toward the new offensive by gearing their activity both to the 
control of management and to the political and social mobilisation of workers.
Despite the party leadership’s effort to draw a clear distinction between the 
obligations of party, economic management, and trade union, the decree never 
adequately defined how the system was to operate in practice. Party and trade union 
organisations were strictly forbidden to intervene in managerial questions, but were 
encouraged both to aid management and to control or monitor it. In the real world, 
these two functions often contradicted each other. Furthermore, as for the party cell, it 
was not clear to what extent it should get involved in economic matters, since the 
distinction between monitoring and interference was difficult to identify in concrete 
instances. Therefore, there remained much ambiguity about the precise role of each of 
the troika’s three bodies, and this ambiguity and contradiction continued to undermine 
one-man management in the following years.
Indeed, the party faced serious problems in implementing its directive on 
edinonachalie. In March 1930, it was reported that many party organisations, even 
those in highly industrialised areas such as Moscow and Leningrad, were not carrying 
out the directive on edinonachalie. Even though reports on edinonachalie were heard 
at factory general meetings, no specific resolutions were adopted. In the eyes of the 
central leadership, the violation of the principle of edinonachalie was the main reason 
for the poor performance of the industry in the first four months of the economic year 
1929-30. Therefore, factory party organisations were asked to implement the party 
directive on edinonachalie so that rights and responsibilities within the ‘triangle’ 
could be delimited clearly.^^
The main obstacle in implementing the party directive on edinonachalie was 
that economic managers and teclmical personnel disliked the idea of one-man
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management, and often refused to assume the rights with which they had been 
entrusted. The factory directors and workshop chairmen were to take responsibility for 
the operating of the economy. In reality, however, many economic managers were not 
willing to take over responsibility for economic performance. At the same time the 
party and the trade union, instead of helping the work of economic managers, often 
interrupted them. '^^
Problems regarding the interpretation of the party’s role at the enterprise 
continued to surface, especially at workshop level, where interference by workshop 
cells in ‘operational-economic’ questions ‘diverted and distracted attention’ away 
from the party’s real responsibilities, and acted as a brake on the industrialisation 
drive.^^ Parallelism between the work of the director and the party secretary was often 
reported. Especially when poor economic performance was often associated with 
political f a i lin g s ,th e  party secretaries and other workers were inclined to get 
involved in concrete economic questions, even though they were reprimanded for 
their breaches of edinonachalie.
A  further resolution in April 1930 had to be published in order to re-emphasise 
the significance and meaning of edinonachalie?^ However, the immediate 
improvement which the party leadership hoped for did not take place in that year. In 
May 1930 when the work of the Moskovsko-naivskii raion party organisation was 
reviewed, Glinskii, the Central Committee instructor, criticised the failure of some 
factories in the raion to achieve their production targets, and linlced this fact to the 
violation of the principle of edinonachalie. He also criticised factory directors for not 
fully understanding the meaning of this principle.'" Buratov, another Central 
Committee organisational instructor, also complained that many factories in this raion 
had not implemented the party directive concerning edinonachalie. He also noted that 
the middle-ranking administrative and teehnieal personnel failed to take 
responsibility.^^ A review of the work of the Elektrosila factory carried out in October
Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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1930 also revealed that the principle of edinonachalie had not been implemented in 
this factory, and that there was still some parallelism in the work of sections of the 
factoiy.
As the case of Elektrosila illustrates, the party directive on edinonachalie had 
not been fully implemented in many factories by the end of 1930. There were a 
number of reasons for this. First of all, the fact that not all workshops were 
reorganised along khozraschet lines made the implementation of edinonachalie less 
meaningful.^^ Moreover, the ‘triangle’ did not fully understand the meaning of 
edinonachalie. Apparently, economic managers and technical personnel were so 
afraid of having to take responsibility for economic performance that they did not 
want to make full use of their own rights. Combined with this, the inappropriate 
interference of party cells in the administrative work of directors and technical 
personal was seen as evidence that edinonachalie had not been fully implemented.^"^
Therefore, in following years, constant references were made in the party press 
to the need for enterprise party officials to give their full backing to the principle of 
one-man management and to ensure that it was not violated.^^ For instance, in its 
resolution on ‘party-mass work in workshops and brigades’ adopted on 21 March 
1931, the Central Committee once again urged the principle of one-man management 
to be implemented undeviatingly. It emphasised that ‘the production work of party 
organisations must aim at undeviating implementation of the principle of one-man 
management
7.2.3 Further shift of focus of partv work to party units and zveno cells
From 1930 onwards, the centre of gravity of party work was transferred 
downwards to party unit level in Leningrad. An article appearing in Partrabotnik in 
April 1930 called for the focus of party work to be shifted not only to the workshop 
cells, but also to the zveno as the primany party unit. Accordingly the party work of 
the zveno was to be transformed to cope with the new roles expected from it. Unit
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organisers, who had previously been infonnants or agitators of workshop cell bureaux, 
were now expected to act as organisers or leaders. Henceforward, party units were to 
operate independently, taking responsibility for all party work within each unit. They 
were to be created according to the production principle so that various kinds of party 
work connected with production could be carried out easily. Work plans were to be 
provided to each party unit so that the ‘triangle’ of each zveno (unit organiser, brigade 
leader, and trade union organiser) would be responsible for plan fulfilment. It was 
thought that this would give the work of the zveno flexibility and increase the activity 
of workers. With the creation of zveno cells, the factory party committee or kollektiv 
bureau would remain responsible for the guiding and instructing of workshop cells. 
The latter would be the centre of all economic and political life of the workshop, and 
it would directly guide the zveno
One of the aims of transfening the focus of party work was to guarantee the 
implementation of industrial tasks by mobilising the activity of the masses. It was 
claimed that where the zveno triangle operated properly, the zveno fulfilled the plan 
and other tasks in the due time.^^ Taking into the consideration that a radical change in 
production (the shifting of production tasks to brigades, the shock movement, and the 
widening of the rights of the lower level administration) took place, it was thought to 
be necessary to transfonn the party unit into an organisation that was able to discuss 
and make decisions on questions regarding the local brigade. Accordingly, unit 
organisers were urged to act as leaders and organisers of all the political and economic 
work of the brigades.
The main task of the zveno was the implementation of the production tasks set 
out for the particular production unit where it was formed. In addition, the zveno was 
expected to make better use of equipment and to prevent waste and absenteeism. It 
was also zveno's responsibility to guide socialist competition. Moreover, it was to 
undertake a study of non-party activists, recruit them to the party, and explain party 
policy to the workers so that the party’s political influence would reach every 
w o rk er.T h e  relative roles of the ‘triangle’ were also specified. The ‘triangle’ were to
Partrabotnik, no. 9, April 1930, pp. 27-28. 
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relate to each other in an appropriate manner, which meant that they should share 
information, and discuss common concerns. It was argued that this would facilitate the 
implementation of edinonachalie, and help mobilise the workers of a brigade for the 
implemention of production tasks and the improvement of party leadership. It was 
admitted that there was a great danger of interferring in day-to-day work, but, it was 
thought, with the proper guidance provided by factory party committee and cells, the 
problem could be overcom e.Later, in July 1930, unit organisers and party units as a 
whole were given more rights and they were allowed to show maximum initiative and 
independence in a new resolution concerning their organisation."^^
However, the restmcturing process proceeded rather slowly in its initial stage. 
By May 1930, the restructuring had only started in Leningrad. Even though the 
production task was to be broken down to the level of each brigade, most brigades did 
not have their own production workplan. The zveno ‘triangle’ had not been formed 
within the unit."^  ^ However, by June 1930, party units {zveno) had been transformed 
into basic organs in some factories such as Krasnyi putilovets and Elektrosila. They 
recruited new members, promoted cadres, and distributed party and social 
assigmnents so that everyone would have an appropriate economic-political task."^ "^
By 1931, the focus of party work had been transferred to party units or zveno 
cells in many factories. In April of this year, a review of the reconstruction of party 
work in the Moskovskii raion revealed that in party organisations where party work 
had been reconstructed, factories (or workshops) had achieved better results in 
fulfilling the industrial and financial plan. For instance, it was claimed that at 
Elektrosila the creation of zveno cells along production lines had made it possible to 
implement the plan. The protocols of brigade meetings in other factories showed that 
by this time brigades had become independent production units. Reportedly, party 
units exposed the shortcomings of their work, found ways of fighting against waste, 
and influenced the workers who failed to fulfil their production norm or were absent 
from work."^  ^ The review of the work of party units at Baltic shipbuilding works
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showed the same tendency. By this time most party units had their own work plans, 
the implementation of which, it was claimed, enabled them to achieve positive 
production results."^  ^ At the Stalin factoiy, party units and zveno cells became the 
lowest level of party organisation, and they turned their ‘face to production’. Almost 
all zveno cells operated according to work plans which they had to abide by. 
Economic questions comprised the biggest proportion of the work plan agenda of 
party cells. It was claimed that this led to an increase in party members’ activism and 
also strengthened the leading role of communists in production matters.
At this point, the Central Committee resolution on ‘party-mass work in 
workshops and brigades’ adopted on 21 March 1931 called for a radical restructuring 
of party-mass work in the factories. The main aim of the resolution was to emphasise 
the social-organisational role of party cells and of individual communists. The tasks 
were specified as follows: the proper allocation of communists; further raising of the 
vanguard role of party cells and of each communist at the factory; the transfonnation 
of party units into centres of party-mass work with the aim of engaging the masses of 
workers by influencing the party; and better organisation of the struggle for the 
implementation of the industrial and financial plan’."^^
7.2.4 ‘Concrete’ party leadership over production matters
In 1931, the party began to call for ‘concrete’ leadership over production 
matters. In January 1931, the party leadership expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
work carried out by factory party organisations. It complained that party work on 
economic matters was of a ‘declaratory’ character, that party directives concerning 
edinonachalie had not been carried out, and that communists did not have sufficient 
technical Icnowledge."^  ^ By this time, in the country as a whole questions of an 
economic nature accounted for 45 per cent of questions discussed at workshop level. 
However, party leadership over production matters was often limited to declaratory 
and general statements, and the resolutions of the factoiy party cells were not 
binding.T herefore, it was recommended that the party cells should take specific
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decisions on production matters, and also provide ‘concrete’ leadership over 
production matters. The article went on to say that ‘without concrete party leadership, 
without the systemic verification of fulfilment of the basic indicators of the plan, we 
will not be able to realise the responsible task of the third year of the FYP’.^  ^ The 
‘concrete’ leadership of the party meant redistributing party strength to the most 
important sections of the enteiprise and mobilising non-party activists and the entire 
mass of workers in order to obtain the necessary effect in certain sections over a set 
period of time.^^
Indeed, discussions held and resolutions adopted at party cell meetings were 
vague and of a ‘declaratory’ nature. In many cases, the party cell bureaux simply 
replicated resolutions already adopted at the higher level of the party organisation. 
This led to a call for more focused and specific leadership of the party over economic 
matters. Now, factory party cells were expected not only to discuss production 
matters, but also to check the perfonnance of the particular workshop or brigade.
According to a report by Lysakov, a party official from the Ki*asnyi putilovets, 
to an organisers’ conference held on 29 Januaiy 1931, party organisations at the 
Krasnyi putilovets, from the factory party committee down to zveno cells, were 
involved in questions of an economic nature. They monitored the fulfilment of tasks 
every ten days, and were also involved in resolving problems coimected with the 
industrial and financial plan, and workers’ invention. All these questions were not 
only discussed, hut also decided in specific t e r m s . B y  September 1931, party 
organisations at Krasnyi putilovets were involved not only in plan examination, but 
also in a review of the work of the entire enterprise as well as its most important 
sectors. Earlier, plan fulfilment had been examined on a monthly basis. Now, 
however, it was examined every ten days. The enterprise, it was claimed, had obtained 
positive results due to its ‘concrete’ leadership. The case of the metallurgical 
department of this factory illustrates how the party organisations provided ‘concrete’ 
leadership. When this department fell behind the plan, the factory party committee 
became actively involved in solving the problem which had caused a systemic delay
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in the fulfilling of the plan. At first, a report on the condition of the department was 
heard at the party committee’s plenum. Then, the party committee began to control 
and supervise the department’s work on a daily basis and provided assistance. Leading 
workshops also provided assistance to less advanced workshops which were lagging 
behind. It was claimed that, as a result, the metallurgical department had fulfilled 
almost 100 per cent of the plan already by May 1931
Factory party organisations became much more generally involved in technical 
matters at this time. Indeed, the practice of ‘concrete’ party leadership could not be 
realised without dealing with technical matters. For instance, at Krasnyi putilovets, 
questions such as the organisation of engine-building, inner-factory transportation, the 
reconstruction of the factory, and of instrumental matters, became the main concern of 
the party organisation.^^ Technical questions constituted the largest part of the 
resolutions of party committees, kollektivy, workshop cells, and the z v e n o .Likewise, 
at Russkii dizel’, all party cells were involved in specific production tasks. It was also 
claimed that the factory party organisations played an active role in realising Stalin’s 
‘six conditions’.^  ^ It was argued that the fight for accurate organisation of production 
process and mastering technique had raised party work to a new and higher level
However, it soon became obvious that without technical knowledge, party cell 
secretaries or activists were in no position to provide ‘concrete’ leadership over 
production matters. One of the problems was that most party secretaries did not have a 
technical education, and often completely did not understand the production processes 
at the given production units.T herefore, in 1931 much emphasis was given to the 
improvement of the technical level of each communist. An article in Partiinoe 
stroitel’stvo, for instance, suggested that each communist guide production matters
Ibid., no. 17, September 1931, p. 9.
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specifically, be familiar with the equipment, materials, instruments, and products of 
brigades, and learn the technique of the production which he or she was guiding.^^
7.2.5 Re-emphasis on party-mass work in 1932
In 1932, the emphasis of party cell work shifted from economic back to political 
matters and in particular, mass-party work. In the mid-1920s, the party leadership’s 
main fear had heen that the cells were not discussing economic matters with sufficient 
frequency or confidence. By 1932 the problem, from the centre’s point of view, was 
that cells were overruling the directors too frequently. Such practices were usually 
disparaged officially not only because they violated the principle of edinonachalie but 
also because they had a deleterious effect on party work itself. Indeed, due to factory 
party cells’ excessive involvement in production matters in the previous four years, by 
1932 serious damage had heen done to their ideological-political work: party mass 
work was largely neglected in many factories. Already in November 1931, during the 
re-election campaign to lower party organs, it was acknowledged that there were 
serious shortcomings in the organisation of party work and the guiding of workshop 
cells - in particular, zveno cells and party units, and that both organisational and party 
education work had been largely neglected.^' Furtheimore, only a few factories had 
been undertaking work with leading groups of highly qualified workers. This was 
thought to be the most serious shortcoming in party mass work.*^ ^
Therefore, by 1932 the concern with the need to improve party-mass work in the 
enterprise had become of paramount im portance.From  the beginning of 1932, the 
party journal, Partiinoe stroiteVstvo, published articles emphasising mass-party work 
at the enterprise level. In March 1932, while emphasising the importance of realising 
Stalin’s six conditions and the slogan ‘face to production’, an article in Partiinoe 
stroitel'stvo argued that the practice of some factory party organisations was 
completely wrong as they failed to pay attention to questions such as trade union 
work, agitation-mass work among non-party workers, and party education.^"^ Another
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article argued that party conferences should broaden their concerns to include ‘not 
only the most important economic questions but also questions of general political 
and inner-party life’.*^  ^ The same points were made in a number of other articles 
tliroughout 1932.*"^
In March 1932, the party leadership criticised the delay in reorganising party 
work at the factories. Despite the Central Committee resolution on party mass work in 
workshops and brigades of March 1931, party work had not heen fully reconstructed 
by this time. Untimely, insufficient and formalistic reconstruction of party work in 
individual enterprises, and in particular, the incomplete implementation of the Central 
Committee directive on work in workshops and brigades were thought to be the main 
reason for the insufficient implementation of Stalin’s six conditions.*"^
The situation at Leningrad factories appeared to be slightly better than in other 
regions. While some factory party organisations elsewhere were criticised for 
shortcomings in the work of their party units, some zveno cells in Leningrad’s 
Narvskii raion were hailed as models to be emulated. For instance, Gartsev’s party 
unit, composed of fitter-assemblers working in the second Ki'anovii factory, was 
acclaimed as one of the best. This party unit contained 25 people, all of whom were 
shock workers. Among them five were party members and five were candidates. A 
‘triangle’ had heen formed within the unit, and work plans had been drawn up. This 
party unit discussed a monthly production plan, heard its foreman’s report on plan 
fulfilment, and discussed questions concerning truancy. From September 1931, all 
brigades of the zveno were operating on a khozraschet basis.
However, not all zveno cells were working as they were supposed to, even in 
Leningrad’s Narvskii raion. It was claimed that at Krasnyi putilovets, for instance, the 
zveno cells were strengthened as a result of re-election campaigns. The activities of 
the unit organisers were discussed at zveno party meetings at which non-party workers 
also took part.*"^  However, it was revealed that party units were not organised as 
instructed. The majority (65 per cent) united communists of two to ten brigades, ten
Ibid., no. 9, May 1932, p. 25
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per cent of them united communists of more than ten brigades, and 13 per cent united 
workers of three shifts. Obviously, this made party mass work in brigades and shifts 
difficult. Thus the question arose of organising party groups in every brigade of ten or 
more workers - the latest task of party organisational work.^^
Party units were expected to take the lead in the fight for the industrial-financial 
plan, and to be the support point of party work at factories. However, a great number 
of party units were operating very poorly, and many of them existed only on paper. 
Many factory party committees and workshop cell bureaux did not provide sufficient 
support to lower party units. Here the work of the zveno was lagging behind.^’
Another article on the work of factory party cells of the Narvskii raion revealed 
that in many factories, there were serious shortcomings in the party-mass work the 
party cells carried out. It is true that party units had been strengthened and that they 
operated according to work plans that were drawn up every month and also every ten 
days. However, many of them did not Imow how to combine the role of implementing 
the industrial-production plan with the role of strengthening and developing inner- 
party work such as party education, work with candidates, party membership growth, 
and discipline. Therefore, it was emphasised that without strong, well-established 
inner-party work, without well-established party-education work among party 
members, in particular, candidate members, it would be difficult to secure a successful 
outcome in the fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan. Together with this, the 
importance of party-mass work with non-party workers and of ideological-political 
work was emphasised.^^ Unfortunately, factory party committees and kollektivy did 
not provide sufficiently enthusiastic and specific assistance to the workshop cells 
when the latter promoted party-mass and inner-party work in party units. In addition, 
when all party organisations were involved in the development of party-mass work in 
brigades and the strengthening of unit organisers, the economic leadership of some 
factories showed a fonnalistic attitude towards them.^^
The major turn in party policy concerning the factory party cells came in May 
1932, when Kaganovich delivered a speech to the Moscow obkom plenum. In it he
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made a number of disparaging references to the low ideological level of many party 
members, the poor state of agitation work in the factories, and the over-abundance of 
workshop cells and party units in some enterprises. At the same time, concerning a 
number of instances of the abuse of the principle of one-man management, 
Kaganovich warned both party and economic officials in the enteiprise against 
misinterpreting edinonachalie either as complete non-interference or, on the other 
hand, ‘excessive meddling’.
Similar views were expressed in the Leningrad region. While emphasising the 
need to improve party-mass work at the enterprise, ‘good-for-nothing leaders of party 
organs’ were roundly condemned for continuing to attempt to act as a substitute for 
the economic organs, giving operational orders to the factory managers and ‘violating 
edinonachalie in the most flagrant way’.^  ^ However, the change in emphasis did not 
mean that party workers would not be responsible for economic conditions at their 
factories. As Gaza, one of Leningrad’s gorkom secretaries, put it, those officials who 
argued that because of the 1929 directive they had ‘simply become agitators and 
[were] no longer answerable for anything’ were mistaken. He went on to make it clear 
that ‘the party organisation is answerable for the state of economic life at the 
enterprises, and on this the directive is quite precise’.^ *" This loosely defined, 
apparently confused and contradictory position of the party official in the supervision 
of economic life at the enterprise became a recurring theme throughout the 1930s.
Nevertheless, this shift in emphasis in party work soon had an effect in 
Leningrad region. Following Kaganovich’s speech in May, party mass work in the 
large and medium scale enteiprises of the Leningrad region was reviewed in June 
1932. The review revealed that inner-party, educational and mass-political work were 
lagging behind economic work. It was observed that workshop cells, instead of 
engaging themselves in necessary party political work, were completely engrossed in 
economic questions, thus violating the principle of edinonachalie?^ Organisational 
work was not properly carried out, due to the overloading of secretaries with the
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details of economic questions. Party education work was also poorly carried out. For 
instance, in the building-construction workshop cell of the Mart’ factory, despite the 
relatively high level of party saturation and the con'ect distribution of party members, 
there was no agitation-mass and explanatory work carried out in the workshop. The 
party’s economic and political tasks were badly explained to communists and non- 
party workers; and worker agitators were not properly trained. Kalyrin, a trade union 
group organiser of an assembers’ brigade, provides another example of poor party- 
agitation work. Even though he was not even a party candidate, he had to explain 
party policy to other non-party workers, since there was not a single party member in 
his brigade, except the brigade leader who was a party candidate member. He 
requested that a communist be sent to his brigade, but nothing had been done.^^
The review also revealed that most party members did not caiay out any specific 
tasks. The majority of their assigmnents were not political but rather economic or 
organisational-technical ones. Party cells did not monitor whether each communist 
earned out the work assigned to him, did not instruct them properly, and did not help 
them with implementing party assignments. In some cases, party eells did not even 
know who were party members. Party cells were keen to recruit workers into the 
party, but they did not do enough work to educate them. In general, work with 
candidate members was evaluated poor.^^
In addition, party organisations at the workshop level were not always set up in 
accordance with instructions. In one case, two workshop cells were created within one 
workshop. This led to a transfer of responsibility from one to the other. The party 
instruction concerning the creation of shift cells was largely ignored, and as a result, 
no serious party-mass work was earned out at the evening and night shifts. Thus, it 
was thought that there was not sufficient party influence on workers of the evening 
and night shifts, which, in turn, resulted in low labour productivity within them.^^
Moreover, the majority of communists did not take an active part in party life. 
Party meetings were held in'egularly and their main concern was production matters. 
The agenda was not interesting enough to stir the workers’ attention. Generally it
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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lacked lively political questions. Besides, communists working at night shift were not 
able to attend party meetings. Some did not attend meetings for several months. Party 
days were poorly prepared.
One of the measures taken to overcome poor party work was the introduction of 
the ‘single party day’ {edinyipartden '). Originally introduced in 1921, the idea was to 
regularly set aside a day for party work, including study. In 1932, this idea was 
revived and vigorously implemented. The practice of holding party meetings in all the 
different units of the factoi*y organisation on one or two days each month was first 
introduced by the Moscow party organisation and was hailed as a successful way of 
getting high attendances at party meetings, improving party democracy, raising the 
political level of ranlc and file members and so on.^  ^ In Leningrad, the party 
organisation had introduced thi*ee such ‘party days’ per month. This was later 
criticised as being too many. Another criticism was that they were likely to supplant 
workers’ meetings, especially when they were open to non-party members.
When the Central Committee organisers’ general meeting was held on 8 July 
1932, they discussed the question of introducing party days. At this meeting, the 
representative from Ki'asnyi putilovets reported that the single party day had already 
been introduced in May. Attendance at the meetings had been high: almost 90 per cent 
of party members participated. Open party meetings, in addition, were scheduled to be 
held three times a m o n t h . T h e  report on party work at Elektrosila showed that 
serious preparations were carried out prior to these meetings. All party members were 
notified of the meeting through the unit organisers, individual communists, 
propagandists and agitators. Not only party cell secretaries, but also unit organisers, 
propagandists and agitators were called to the party committee. At least three days 
before the meeting, the agenda of the meeting was conveyed to all party members.
In general, the practice of introducing party days in the Leningrad party 
organisation was evaluated positively. Now, not only communists, but also the
83
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majority of non-party workers laiew about party days and the agenda of the meetings. 
Notification work was also canied out more systematically: party days were 
announced by posters as well as verbal and written announcements. To increase 
attendance at party meetings, all the other meetings scheduled to be held on a party 
day were cancelled. Various preliminary work was also earned out: discussions at 
lunch breaks, newspaper readings on the questions to be discussed, instructing of 
activists, and recommendations and distribution of literature on the given questions. 
All these factors contributed to the increase in attendance at the meetings not only by 
communists, but also by non-party workers.
However, there were also shortcomings. Not infrequently, those who gave a 
report to the meetings came to that particular factory or workshop for the first time 
and did not know the local conditions. Also, the agenda of party days was often 
chosen without appropriate preparation, which made meetings less interesting and 
even boring. In addition, the proposals made at the party meetings were often not 
specific enough. Therefore, it was difficult to examine whether the proposals had 
indeed been put into practice.
Finally, in August 1932, the Central Committee adopted a resolution ‘on the 
work of party cells at enterprises’, which in fact reversed the tendency of the previous 
four years towards the party cells’ growing involvement in economic matters. In this 
resolution, the party called for the full involvement of all workers in political work 
and party influence; raising the level of political education and mass work among 
workers; improving the work of party cells by concentrating their strength directly on 
their own workshops; linking the political education of party members and candidates 
with current political tasks and slogans; and finally, raising the role of party cells at 
factories as leaders of political life, party work, and economic measures, and as 
organisers of struggle to improve workers’ daily life and improve supplies to 
w orkers.Evidently , this resolution played down the role of the party cells in the 
economic life of the enterprises and emphasised a more ‘political mass function’.
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., pp. 29-30.lo a zv ju
Ibid., no. 16, August 1932, pp. 1-2.
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Now, it is clear that emphasis was placed on party-mass and political education work 
rather than on economic issues.
Based on this resolution, party work was re-oriented to undertake a ‘political 
mass function’ and to gradually withdraw from direct involvement in economic 
matters in the following months of 1932. Much effort was made to ensure that party 
activists in the enterprise turned their attention to party rather than economic 
questions. Effectively, this meant their concentrating more attention on purely internal 
matters such as collecting dues, sorting out membership rolls, raising party diseipline, 
and generally improving the quality of membership via the network of party education 
courses.
7.3 Mass mobilisation
During the first FYP, party-mass work within the industrial enterprises became 
increasingly significant. With the party’s growing involvement in economic questions, 
the nature of party-mass work changed considerably. Under the slogan of perestroika, 
party-mass work gained a ‘clearly expressed production character’ in order to ‘meet 
the demands of socialist construction’.^  ^ The main task of mass work was defined as 
mobilising the mass of workers to enthusiastically fulfil the industrial-financial plan. 
Here, we shall concentrate upon party work regarding production meetings and the 
socialist competition movement, which were the two most common forms of workers’ 
participation in production matters.
7.3.1 Production meetings
Before the shock movement and socialist competition got under way in 1929, 
the most common foiin in which workers expressed their initiatives was production 
meetings in the factoiy. Since wages could not be offered as incentives, and since the 
party leadership regarded participation by the workforce in certain aspects of decision­
making as desirable, the active support of workers for productivity campaigns was 
sought through the offer of open meetings with management. Production meetings 
were one forum for this participation, although any general workers’ meeting was
Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no. 1, November 1929, pp. 17-30.
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empowered to raise production issues. In these meetings, administrative-technical 
personnel, the party, union, and Komsomol officials, and workers discussed a variety 
of production problems and exchanged ideas on how to resolve them.^° Workers were 
encouraged to discuss reports from management and to suggest ways of increasing 
productivity and efficiency. The purpose of these meetings was to involve workers, 
specialists and factory administrators in efforts to rationalise production, to improve 
factoiy life and to solicit worker suggestions on how to overcome problems caused by 
mismanagement or which managers were otherwise unable to resolve.^^
In the Leningrad region, production meetings were held at workshop level as 
well as factory level in 1928. In addition, joint factory production meetings and the 
production-technology conferences were held. The issues most frequently discussed at 
these meetings were rationalising production, increasing productivity, and cutting 
production costs. In 1928, the agenda of production meetings shifted from discussing 
specific production questions to discussing questions of a planning nature and 
questions concerning capital accumulation and the re-equipment of workshops.
Interestingly, the nature of production meetings changed during the self- 
criticism campaign in mid-1928. In promoting the self-criticism campaign in 1928, 
the party leadership directed the focus of production meetings toward control over 
management. In the special appeal on self-criticism that the party issued on 3 June 
1928, the Central Committee advocated the ‘punishment of those who are guilty of 
sabotaging workers’ suggestions’ and called for the ‘conversion of production 
meetings into mass control organs’. I t  was stated in this appeal that the party alone 
could not solve the main problems of socialist reconstruction without the masses 
overseeing the malfunctioning industrial and govermnent administration. The motto 
of self-criticism, the appeal said, should be the following: ‘criticism coming from the 
bottom to the top and fi'om the top to the bottom, without exempting anyone.’ The
Kiiromiya, S ta lin’s Industrial Revolution, p. 116.
William Chase, ‘The Dialectics of Production Meetings, 1923-29’, Russian History, vols. 2-3, no. 
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task of the day now, clarified the appeal further, was ‘to raise a mighty wave of self- 
criticism coming from the bottom up’.^ "^
The change of tone was soon reflected in the Leningrad region. The self- 
criticism campaign that followed the 1928 appeal was directed against economic 
managers at the shop floor l eve l .However ,  despite some criticisms of the 
misconduct of managers, the self-criticism campaign did not hring substantial positive 
results. In August 1928 when the Leningrad obkom secretariat issued an appeal which 
called for a review of production meetings, it was felt that the self-criticism campaign 
had not been fully directed towards the elimination of the specific shortcomings of 
industry. Criticisms were made of slovenliness, drunkermess, absenteeism and 
negligent attitudes towards production. However, it was thought that the campaign did 
not lead to the establishment of a new production culture. For instance, questions of 
raising labour productivity were not sufficiently discussed at meetings. Accordingly, 
the obkom secretariat called for the identifying of shortcomings as well as for 
workers’ involvement in eliminating such shortcomings and improving the work of 
production meetings. In particular, the secretariat instructed that a fonnalistic and 
cold-hearted attitude towards workers’ suggestions should be fought against and that 
those guilty of bureaucratic impediment of workers’ initiatives should be exposed.^*"
As was revealed during the self-criticism campaign in 1928, workers did not 
show much enthusiasm towards taking part in production meetings. Even party 
members did not attend them. ‘Production meetings are held, but no party members 
want to a t t end . Indeed ,  a review of workshop cells’ work conducted in early 1928 
showed that the attendance rates of party members at production meetings were low in 
factories such as Skorokhod, Ki'asnyi sudostroitel’, Svetlana, and Znamia truda. In the 
Mart’ shipbuilding works, the active participation of party members at production 
meetings was reportedly very rare.^^
One of the reasons for workers’ low participation was that at the meetings, no 
practical decisions were made in relation to production issues with which the workers
Ibid., pp. 1-2.
See Gooderliam, The Regional Party Apparatus in the First Five Year Plan, part 1, p. 14. 
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 11, 1928, pp. 3-4. 
Partrabotnik, no. 14, 15 August 1928, p. 53.
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, 15 March 1928, p. 24.
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were most concerned/^ The resolutions adopted at production meetings were often 
too general to bind a n y b o d y / T h e  main reason workers shied away from production 
meetings, however, was that management tended to ignore their views. Workers’ 
suggestions accepted at the meetings, for instance, were not always implemented. 
Minor suggestions were normally put into practice, but suggestions on important 
matters were less likely to be realised. When workers questioned why their 
suggestions were not being implemented, they were given various excuses, or some 
kind of agreements were made in order to appease them. Finally workers were told 
that their suggestions were ‘not stipulated by the plan’.'*^* All these factors 
discouraged workers from attending the meetings.
Therefore, it was argued that economic managers should take responsibility for 
not implementing workers’ suggestions without justifiable grounds, and that workers 
should be given information as to what was being done concerning their suggestions. 
Otherwise, the work of production meetings could not be activated in reality. In fact, 
this claim had been continuously repeated in resolutions of higher party organisations, 
but was never really realised.
Indeed, the attendance rates at production meeting were rather low in 1928. In 
general, workers were not so keen to participate in production meetings. According to 
an article in Partrabotnik published in November 1928, about 20 per cent of workers 
were participating in production meetings in the Moskovsko-narvskii raion. In other 
raions, attendance rates were lower than this: only ten to twelve per cent of workers 
attended production m e e t i n g s . A t  Ki'asnyi treugol’nik, for instance, 12 to 17 per 
cent of workers attended the meetings and workers did not show suffieient enthusiasm 
for the meetings.
In October 1928 an all-Union review of the production meetings was conducted 
in order to evaluate the work of production meetings and to eradicate their problems. 
The review, which continued in 1929, attracted much attention from workers, who put 
forward various proposals while the review was in progress. However, as was often
Partrabotnik, no. 14, 15 August 1928, p. 53.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4 ,15  March 1928, p. 24. 
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reported in newspapers, progress towards implementing the proposals was very slow. 
Many suggestions put forward by workers were not realised in Leningrad’s industrial 
enteiprises. Concerning the rationalisation of production, a total of 24,127 suggestions 
were put forward at production meetings in 1928, but only about half of them were 
implemented. Some 1,875 suggestions were rejected on sound grounds, but the rest 
were not put into practice due to what was reported to be administrative negligence. 
Some administrative-economic officials were blamed for their bureaucratism and 
sluggishness.
In 1929, the party paid more attention to the work of production meetings and it 
urged the masses of workers to take part in them. At the second oblast party 
conference held in March 1929, the Leningrad obkom called for a systematic 
strengthening of production meetings by attracting workers to the study of basic 
economic questions, by strengthening trade union organs’ leadership over its work, 
and by ensuring that economic organs provided proper a s s i s t a n c e . I n  November 
1929, the obkom adopted another resolution concerning production meetings. Again 
the obkom called for increased participation in production meetings and for the 
creation of a temporary control commission responsible for rationalising production. 
Furthermore, the obkom instructed that production meetings should be organised in 
each brigade and shift, and that the chairmen of production meetings should select 
permanent cadres responsible for the work of production meetings.
In 1929, production meetings gained more importance by amalgamating with 
the socialist competition movement. With the emergence of socialist competition, the 
nature of production meetings changed considerably. Just as the emphasis was put on 
mobilising party cadres to use production meetings to implement the regime of 
economy from 1926, now, production meetings became a fomm where the idea of 
socialist competition could be explained to workers and diseussed. For instance, 
factory production meetings held in October and November 1929 heard reports on the 
initial results of the socialist competition movement and its impact on the enterprises’
Gutarov, ‘Proizvodstvennye soveshchaniia na leningradskikh predpriiatiiakh’, p. 68. 
Leningradskaia pravda, 16 March 1929.
Gutarov, ‘Proizvodstvennye soveshchaniia na leningradskikh predpriiatiiakh’, p. 69.
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economic performance, and discussed the contents of new socialist competition 
agreements.'
Apparently, the socialist competition movement played a major role in reviving 
the activities of production meetings in 1929. Both the number of production meetings 
held and the attendance rates increased in that year. In the first half of the economic 
year 1928/29, a total of 561 all-factory production meetings, 3,787 workshop 
production meetings, and 111 production conferences were held in Leningrad. In the 
second half, the figure increased to 612, 4,335, and 132 respectively.A ttendance at 
these meetings also increased. In the first half of 1928/29, 59 workers on average 
participated in all-factory production meetings, 43 workers participated in workshop 
production meetings, and 250 workers participated in production conferences. In the 
second half, this increased to an average of 77, 47, and 239 workers respectively."^
Moreover, in 1929 a slight improvement was made in the implementation of 
workers’ suggestions. According to an official report concerning production 
conferences in Leningrad, in 1927-28, 78 per eent of workers’ suggestions were 
accepted, and 69 per cent were implemented by management. The conesponding 
figures for 1928-29 rose to 83 and 81 per cent, respectively.'" Another report also 
suggests that more suggestions were accepted and put into practice in 1929 than in 
1928. Between April and October 1928, a total of 13,122 suggestions were put 
forward, and 79 per cent of them were either fully or partially accepted. Among the 
10,387 suggestions accepted, 65 per cent were fully or partially implemented. The 
1929 figures for the corresponding period suggested a slight improvement in the work 
of production meetings. More suggestions (a total of 16,040) were put fbi-ward and 
more of them (a total of 12,749) were adopted. Among the suggestions accepted, 72 
per cent were fully or partially implemented."^
In addition, they discussed the factory administr ation's reports on the results o f the fulfilment of the 
economic plan and the perspectives on economic performance for 1929/30. See Biulleten’ 
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In order to realise workers’ suggestions more efficiently, the party allowed the 
selection of an assistant director who was mainly responsible for production meetings. 
The Central Committee resolution of 5 September 1929 sanctioned the selection of the 
assistant director."^ In December 1929, the obkom clarified the rights and obligations 
of the assistant director in realising the suggestions put forward at production 
meetings. This aimed at utilising worker initiatives more fully and implementing their 
suggestions in due time in the production process and encouraging workers to take 
more initiative in production matters.""'
The years 1930 and 1931 saw a further increase in attendance at production 
meetings. For instance, in the Moskovsko-narvskii raion, 38 per cent of workers 
participated in production meetings in 1930, a huge increase on the 1928 figure of 20 
per cent."^ On average, 45 per cent of Leningrad’s workers were participating in 
production meetings in 1930 and hy 1931 the figure had reached 70 per cent. At 
Ki'asnyi putilovets, for instance, the number of participants in meetings increased 
from 4,500 to 21,000 workers between 1930 and 1931, and about 4,000 workers 
regularly attended the meetings."^
The rise in overall attendance in 1930 and 1931 appears to have resulted from 
the increased attendance at production meetings organised at the brigade level. 
Production meetings were not held or organised on a systemic basis at brigade level 
until 1930. In accordance with the shift in the centre of gravity of party work to lower 
levels, production meetings were held not only at all-factory and workshop levels, but 
also at brigade levels. It was argued that production meetings organised at the brigade 
level considered matters concerning their own brigade. Obviously, this attracted 
workers’ attention more to the meetings, and as a result, a high attendance rate was 
achieved. As can be seen in table 7-2, workers’ attendance at production meetings 
increased considerably in the economic year 1930/31. The increase took place both at 
the all-factoiy and workshop production meetings. For instance, in the first quarter of 
1931, almost 40 per cent of workers attended all-factory production meetings, and 60 
per cent attended workshop production meetings. This was a considerable increase on
Gutarov, ‘Proizvodstvennye soveshchaniia na leningradskikh preddpriiatiiakh’, p. 69. 
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the attendance rates in the previous year: the figures for the first quarter of 1930 were 
13 per cent and 21 per cent respectively. Workers’ attendance at production meetings 
was even greater at brigade level. For instance, between October 1930 and March 
1931, the attendance exceeded 60 per cent (see table 7-2).
Table 7-2. Workers’ participation in production meetings in Leningrad oblast, 1929- 
1931 (percentages)
All-factory 
production meeting
Production meeting 
at the workshop level
Production 
meeting at the 
brigade level
October-December 1929 22.0 34.2 -
January-March 1930 12.9 21.3 _
April-June 1930 10.5 32.3 48.2
October-December 1930 29.5 54.1 64.4
January-March 1931 39.5 59.5 69.0
April-June 1931 30.8 45.9 54.6
Source: Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona v gody pervoi piatiletki, 1929-1932 gg. 
(Leningi'ad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1967), p. 389.
Moreover, the nature and work of the production meeting changed significantly 
in these years. The roles expected of production meetings were clearly stated in the 
Central Committee’s resolution of March 1931. The Central Committee instructed, in 
its resolution on ‘party-mass work in workshops and brigades’, that the work of 
production conferences be radically restructured in such a way as to ensure the 
fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan, and the development and consolidation 
of socialist competition and the shock worker movement. While calling for the active 
participation of the best non-party shock-workers, communists, and Komsomolers in 
production conferences, the Central Committee instructed that production conferences 
should really be at the forefront of production activity and should help to organise the 
shockworker movement. At the same time, it emphasised that party organisations 
should endeavour to carry out workers’ proposals which had been discussed and 
accepted at production conferences. It also approved the practice of holding 
production conferences at group and shift levels, and instructed that this practice.
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together with the practice of holding specialised production conferences of workers in 
priority occupations, should he extended to all enterprises.' "
Based on this resolution, the work of production meetings was reconstructed in 
the following months in Leningrad. On 19 May 1931, the obkom secretariat adopted a 
resolution concerning the results of perestroika and the immediate tasks of production 
meetings’ work.' '  ^ By this time, the number of production meetings had increased 
significantly in the region, and their work had improved in terms of attendance and 
workers’ participation. It was evaluated that the restructuring of production meetings, 
by transferring production-mass work to workshop and brigade level, made it possible 
to increase workers’ activity with regard to questions of improving all-factory and 
iimer-workshop planning, rationalising production, and gathering workers’ proposals 
together. Moreover, it was claimed that the leadership of socialist competition and the 
shockwork movement improved in a number of factories: more specific agreements 
were set out; the implementation of these agreements was monitored; and workers 
came to fully understand the shockwork movement.
However, there were also a number of serious shortcomings. Organisational 
reconstruction had not been completed in factories such as the Stalin and Sverdlov 
factories. Work plans for production meetings had not been drawn up at the Lenin and 
Stalin factories and the Mart’ shipbuilding works. Positive experiences on production 
matters were not exchanged between factories, workshops and brigades. Accordingly, 
the obkom secretariat suggested a number of measures to overcome these 
shortcomings. It instructed that the work of production meetings should be reviewed 
within a month and that their work should he restructured in order to transfonn them 
into ‘operative headquarters’ in leadership over the socialist competition and shock­
work movement. The obkom secretariat also called for the promotion of exemplary 
work achieved by the shockwork brigades and by individual shock workers, and it 
directed production meetings, first of all, to overcome the shortcomings in production. 
Furthennore, the obkom secretariat advocated the establishment of a system of
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 7, April 1931, p. 64.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 16, 1931, pp. 3-7.
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periodically reviewing brigades or workshops’ fulfilment of socialist agreements and 
shockwork obligations."^
Insufficient participation by engineers and technical personnel in production 
meetings was another major problem. Engineers and technical persomiel did not show 
much interest in production meetings and their attendance rates were rather low. In 
addition, assistant directors and assistant workshop heads who were mainly 
responsible for the work of production meetings did not pay sufficient attention to the 
perestroika of production meetings and did not provide any assistance. This was the 
case in many factories. Moreover, they did not provide proper guidance as to the 
process of realising workers’ proposals and invention. In some factories such as 
Elektrosila, assistant workshop heads responsible for production meetings detached 
themselves completely from their work.
In some factories, however, the experimental arrangements achieved what were 
apparently positive results. For instance, at the Karl Marx factory, shock workers and 
brigade leaders reported directly to production conferences together with 
administrative-technical personnel. Also at the Znameni truda no. 1 factory, 
specialists and workers who were highly qualified were attached to each brigade. 
These practices were positively evaluated, and therefore, the obkom secretariat urged 
such practices to be promoted in as many places as possible. In addition, the obkom 
secretariat recommended that competitions for the best engineers, teclmicians, 
masters, and brigade leaders be organised in order to raise their participation in 
production meetings.
Lastly, serious shortcomings in realising workers’ suggestions continued to be 
reported: the aiTangement of calculation of workers’ proposals was unsatisfactory; 
there was a delay in realising them; proposals were processed slowly; and there was 
poor regulation and feedback to the workers. Indeed, in October 1930 alone, as many 
as 4,785 suggestions that had been accepted were not put into practice. The figure 
increased to 8,209 in January 1931. The implementation of the accepted suggestions 
was delayed mainly due to the failure of economic managers. In general, economic 
managers did not pay enough attention to the realisation of the accepted suggestions.
Ibid., pp. 3-7. Also see Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no. 13, July 1931, pp. 66-67. 
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Even though assistant directors and assistant workshop heads were responsible for the 
work of production meetings, they did not guide the process of realising workers’ 
suggestions and inventions properly.'^'
Facing such problems, the obkom secretariat instructed that a unifonn procedure 
be established to ensure the realisation of workers’ suggestions and inventions. A 
number of practical suggestions were made in order to improve the situation. First of 
all, the obkom secretariat called for proposals to be realised precisely and in the 
shortest possible period. This was already happening at the Baltic shipbuilding works. 
Secondly, it was recommended that workshop heads, factory administration, and the 
bureaux responsible for rationalisation and invention {Briz) should regularly report 
back at production meetings on the realisation of workers’ suggestions and inventions. 
Thirdly, all factory administrations and workshop administrations were now obliged 
to publish quarterly reports on the realisation of workers’ suggestions, inventions and 
the savings achieved as a result of them in local newspapers. Important suggestions 
and inventions were also to be published in factory newspapers.
In 1932, production meetings were held in small production units such as shifts. 
In Narvskii raion, production meetings were organised at group as well as at shift 
level. Following the Central Committee’s resolution of March 1931, the practice of 
holding of group-shift production meetings spread rapidly in Leningrad’s factories. In 
March 1932, more than 3,000 such meetings were held in 53 factories in the Narvskii 
raion. For instance, at Ki'asnyi putilovets, 574 such meetings were held in December 
1931 alone, and some 17,000 workers attended these meetings. At the Kirov factoiy, 
13 workshop, 71 group and five shift production meetings were held.'^^
7.3.2 The shockwork movement and socialist competition
Tlu'oughout the first FYP, a mass movement called socialist competition played 
an important role within the factories. This movement aimed at cutting down on 
absences, overfulfilling output nonns and reducing the unit cost of production. 
Socialist competition represented the expansion and systématisation of such efforts,
Ibid., pp. 3-7.
Ibid., pp. 3-7.
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usually in the fonn of open letters, resolutions, and challenges to emulate or outdo the 
examples of pioneering workers.'^"' Factories, workshops, brigades, and individual 
workers competed for greater production and productivity, cost reduction, and labour 
discipline.
The basic form of socialist competition, at its initial stage, was the shock- 
worker movement, which played an important role in attracting the masses of workers 
into socialist competition.'^^ ‘Shock work’, which originated during the Civil War to 
denote the performance of particularly urgent tasks, acquired new meaning in 1927-8 
when isolated groups of workers, primarily members of the Komsomol, organised 
brigades to fulfill obligations over and above their work assignments. These ranged 
from cutting down on absences and abstaining from alcohol to overfulfilling output 
nonns and reducing the per unit cost of production.Simultaneously promoted, the 
shock movement played a central role in socialist competition. Workers organised into 
model or shock brigades acted, as it were, as a ‘vanguard’ on the shop floor in 
promoting not only competition but also other social and political mobilisations.'^^
In Leningrad, the first shock worker group appeared at the Ravenstvo textile 
factory as early as June 1928.'^^ The shock-worker movement spread quickly to other 
factories, and hy the end of 1928, shock brigades had been set up in almost 20 
factories.'^*' By February 1929, more shock brigades had been organised in various 
factories. For instance, at the Baltic shipbuilding works, 13 shock brigades began to 
work in February. Also six shock brigades had been organised at the Kazitskii factory 
by this time. Shock brigades were also organised at the Krasnyi vyborzhets and the 
Uritskii tabacco factory.'^' At its initial stage, the majority of the shock workers were, 
in general, young non-party workers. For instanee, Leningrad’s first shock worker
Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics o f  Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 40.
Kuromiya, Sta lin’s Industrial Revolution, p. 115.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 192.
Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics o f  Productivity in the USSR, p. 40.
Kuromiya, S ta lin’s Industrial Revolution, p. 115.
This shock worker group pursued the following targets: increasing labour discipline; condensing the 
working day; eliminating absenteeism; reducing breaks in production; cutting waste and prime 
production costs; and improving the quality o f production. See Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo 
raiona, p. 367.
These included the Vereteno, Krasnyi putilovets, Karl Marx and Kazitskii factories and the Baltic 
shipbuilding works. See Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1980), vol. 2, p. 192. 
Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 367.
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group organised at the Ravenstvo factory was composed of 150 young workers. The 
shock brigade organised at the Vereteno in August 1928 was also composed of 130 
young workers. Likewise, the majority of those workers comprised of the six shock 
brigades set up at the Kazitskii factory were young non-party workers.
Early in 1929 the party and the government began to vigorously promote the 
shock movement and socialist competition. In particular, Pravda"s publication of 
Lenin’s article, ‘how to organise competition,’ on 20 January 1929 played a crucial 
role in the popularisation of socialist competition. As a result, a mass campaign 
called socialist competition swept tluough Leningrad as it did in the other parts of the 
Soviet Union. In Leningrad the socialist competition was first called for by the 
workers of the Krasnyi vyborzhets. In March 1929, the workers of the Krasnyi 
vyborzhets, tlirough Pravda, called for competition with other factories in the country. 
This received replies from other factories in Moscow, Khar’kov, Rostov-on-Don and 
other c i t i e s . T h i s  encouraged workers in many other factories to become involved 
in socialist competition. By 15 April 1929, almost two million workers in 70 factories 
in Leningrad were involved in competition between f a c t o r i e s . T h e  goals were to 
implement the production programme sooner than planned, to raise labour 
productivity, to cut production costs, and to reduce waste in p ro d uc t io n . Ma n y  of 
Leningrad’s factories competed with Moscow’s factories: the Krasnyi treugol’nik 
competed with the Krasnyi bogatyr’; the Krasnyi vyborzhets with the Seip i molot; 
and the Ravenstvo factory with the Trigomyi manufactory.’^^
At its initial stage, the socialist competition was a movement spontaneously 
organised by workers. However, neither management nor political authorities wished 
to leave the organisation of competition to their independent initiative. In particular in 
Leningrad, the party apparatus provided seemingly adequate leadership over the 
movement by adopting two resolutions on how to organise socialist competition. The 
first one came in April 1929. In this resolution, the Leningrad obkom secretariat 
emphasised that the success of socialist competition depended on its organisation. The
Ibid., p. 367.
Pravda, 29 January 1929.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 192. 
Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 367.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 192. 
Ibid., p. 194.
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obkom secretariat stressed in particular the necessity not to disperse strength by 
organising competition with regard to the most important and specific tasks. In other 
words, competition should be organised to achieve cost cutting, raising labour 
productivity, strengthening labour discipline, and the avoidance of waste, absenteeism 
and breakage. The resolution also clarified that socialist competition could have 
various organisational fonns in order to be flexible. At the same time, the obkom 
called for the drawing of all organisations - the party, soviet, economic, trade union, 
Komsomol, and other social organisations - into the movement. In particular, the trade 
union, economic organs and Komsomol were asked to play an important role in 
organising competition. It was thought to be necessai*y to draw all workers as well as 
administrative-technical personnel (masters, first of all) and managers such as 
enterprise directors or trust directors. Specialists were also expected to take part in the
, 138movement.
The second resolution came only a month later. However, this resolution 
reflected the important changes which had taken place between the two resolutions. 
The ‘appeal to all workers’, made at the sixteenth Party Conference on 29 April 
1929’^^  and the Central Committee’s resolution of 9 May 1929 ‘on socialist 
competition of factories’, contributed to the organisation of competition by 
transfonning it into a mass movement. In particular, in its May resolution, the Central 
Committee, stating the necessity of mobilising ‘the conscious and active part of the 
masses’ as well as the most active specialists, resolved to delegate the organisation of 
competition to the trade unions. The resolution went on to call on Vesenkha (Supreme 
Council for the National Economy) and VTsSPS (All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions) to administer a special bonus fund for the most successful competitors.
Following the Central Committee resolution of 9 May, the Leningrad obkom 
adoped a resolution concerning socialist competition on 20 May 1929. This resolution 
gave further detailed instructions as to how to organise competition. In the resolution, 
it was clearly specified that the trade union should assume the main role in the 
development of competition. Zavkomy and mestkomy (trade union organisations at the
Biiilleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 3, 1929, pp. 7-8.
XVI konferentsiia VKP(b), apreV 1929 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatefstvo, 1962), pp. 668-670.
KPSS V rezolutsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 4, pp. 508-510.
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factory level) were responsible for organising and regulating socialist competition. In 
addition, the obkom strongly called for avoiding a parade-like form, such as 
challenging plans without specific and carefully prepared tasks, taking excursions not 
linlced with practical necessity of exchanging the experiences, and issuing resolutions 
which were not specific enough.’"”
Now, the roles which were expected to be played by each organisation became 
clearer. Trade unions were supposed to organise competition and record the results, 
management was to facilitate, and party organs to supervise the process. In fact, from 
June 1929, the trade union organisations began to supervise the organisation of 
competition in the Leningrad region, as was revealed from a selective inspection of 96 
enterprises at the end of 1929.’"’^  Party organisations in the region also played an 
important role in the development of socialist competition. Raikoms appealed to their 
workers to take an active part in the movement. In factories, the aims and objectives 
of the movement were explained extensively to workers. Factory party committees, 
together with the trade union and Komsomol organisations, proposed a number of 
measures which would strengthen the effectiveness of competition.’"’^
At the same time, the party encouraged communists to take the lead in the 
movement. Communists were now expected to play an active role in socialist 
competition. Their roles included conducting propaganda and agitation, popularising 
the idea of competition, verifying its performance, and taking measures to eliminate 
formalism while guiding it.’"’"’ Local party organisations issued a number of appeals in 
relation to communists’ role in the movement. For example, in April 1929 the 
Vyborgskii raikom issued an appeal calling for communists to be the leading example. 
Likewise, the Moskovsko-narvskii and Volodarskii raikoms emphasised the necessity 
of the vanguard role of communists in the shock movement.’"’^  Accordingly, more
Biulleten’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 4, 1929, pp. 3-4.
Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 368.
For instance, the party committees in factories such as the Elektrosila, Lenin, Karl Marx, Metal, and 
Krasnyi putilovets made specific decisions regarding this. See Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi 
organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 194.
Ibid., p. 196.
Leningradskaia pravda, 2, 3 and 4 April 1929.
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communists got involved in this movement in the following months, although it was 
still Komsomol members who played a vanguard role in organising competition.'"”^
In September 1929, the obkom secretariat decided to launch a mass political 
campaign to check the fulfilment of socialist competition agreements in the course of 
September and October. The aim of the campaign was to assess the degree to which 
socialist competition influenced the improvement of production. It was expected that 
this review would form the basis for the renewal of agreements and lead to the further 
involvement of workers in socialist competition. Temporary control commissions 
were set up in all factories for the purpose of conducting a review. These commissions 
aimed to highlight economic results, all obstacles and the reasons for them. At the 
same time, they paid speeial attention to proposals put foi*ward in the process of 
competition. In October and November, the trade union, together with economic 
organs, held all-factory and all-trust production conferences.'"’^  A further resolution 
gave specific instructions on how to regulate socialist competition agreements.'"’^
Accordingly, a campaign was carried out in October and November 1929 in 
order to sum up the results of competition and to prepare for the renewal of socialist 
agreements. Conferences were held at all-factory and all-trust levels and, reportedly, 
some 70 per cent of the participants were workers ‘from the bench’. Raikoms and 
okruzhlcoms sent special instructors to the factories in order to assist the trade union 
organisations that were responsible for conducting the review. Even though party 
organisations did not take direct responsibility for conducting the review, the party 
committees and kollektiv bureaux closely monitored the process by hearing the reports 
of the party fractions within the trade union organs at the factory and workshop 
levels.'"’^
As a result of the review, workers’ interest in industrial construction, reportedly, 
increased considerably. It was claimed that more enterprises became involved in
For instance, in April 1929, as many as 72 per cent o f the communists at Krasnyi putilovets 
participated in competition. At Krasnyi gvozdil’shchik, the number o f communist participating in 
competition doubled in only tlnee months. See Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS 
(1980), vol. 2, p. 195.
Biulleten' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 8, 1929, p. 7.
Ibid., no. 9, 1929, p. 16.
N. B. Lebedeva, Partiinoe rukovodstvo sotsialisticheskim sorevnovaniem: Istoriia i sovremennost’: 
Deiatel'nost' Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii po razvitiiu sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v 
promyshlennosti 1927-1977 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1979), p. 71.
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competition and more workers took part in production meetings and conferences. 
Various forms of competition emerged and socialist competition grew into more 
developed forms: from shockworker brigades to shockworker workshops or factories. 
In addtion, more engineers and technical personnel participated in competition. It was 
evaluated that trade union organisations provided better leadership over the 
movement, and economic organs paid more attention and provided better help to those 
competing.'^’’
The results of the review provided useful information on the development of 
socialist competition in the region.'^' A total of 96 enterprises containing 176,000 
workers were examined during the review. By the beginning of the review campaign, 
most factories in the region had been already competing with other factories or 
engaged in imier-factory competition. By the time the review was conducted, almost 
90 per cent of the region’s factories were involved in inner-factory or inner-workshop 
competition, and almost 30 per cent of the oblast’s workers were actively involved in 
competition. In some factories, the proportion of those engaged in socialist 
competition was considerable, exceeding 50 per cent (see table 7-3).
Table 7-3. Workers ’ participation in socialist competition in Leningrad, 1 November 
1929
Total worlcforce Workers engaged in competition
N N %
Krasnyi putilovets 12,000 5,200 * 43.3
Khalturin textile factory 7,000 3,364 48.1
Volodar clothing factory 4,500 2,400 53.3
Lenin factoi*y 3,400 1,700 50.0
Ki-asnyi treugol’nik 18,000 9,467 * 52.6
Krasnyi maiak 3,845 2,258 58.7
Egorov factory 1,665 1,281 * 76.9
Komintern 955 707 74.0
Krasnyi shveinik 1,344 1,344 100.0
Notes: Percentages are my own calculations; the figures marked with an * included workers 
engaged in various kinds of competition. All the other figures included only those who were 
either working in shockworker brigades or competing individually.
Source:Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, pp. 369-370.
Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 378.
76W., pp. 367-379.
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Various forms of competition emerged in June 1929. Apart from the shock 
brigades, there were competitions between factories, workshops, brigades, groups, and 
individuals. Workshops competed with other workshops, so did shifts, brigades, 
groups, and individuals. Out of the 89 enterprises reviewed, shock brigades were 
organised in 74 enterprises, brigades competed with other brigades in 64 enteiprises, 
workers competed individually in 42 enterprises, and workers had voluntarily reduced 
their wage rates in 46 factories.
The competition was organised in a different way in each factory. At Krasnyi 
treugof nik, for instance, a total of 65 shock brigades containing 848 shock workers 
were organised. All the workshops and shifts were competing with each other. Some 
8,480 workers competed on an individual basis or as a part of groups, and 130 
workers eut their wage rates voluntarily. At the Kiasnaia n i f , all the workers were 
engaged in competition; six workshops and shifts competed with each other; there 
were nine shock brigades containing 261 workers; some 1,946 workers competed on a 
group basis; and 16 competed on an individual basis. At the Izhorskii factory, some 
4,500 out of 6,500 workers were engaged in competition: 15 workshops were engaged 
in imier-workshop competition; 18 shifts were competing with each other; and 38 
shock brigades and 34 rationalisation groups were o r g a n i s e d . I n  some factories such 
as the October textile factory, the Baltic shipbuilding works, and the Voskov factory, 
production communes were organised.'^"’ These communes were made of workers 
who shared their wages on an equal basis, irrespective of skill levels or output.
Table 7-4 shows the proportion of workers involved in various forms of 
competition. Shock workers accounted for 14 per cent of a total workforce and some 
30 per cent were engaged in competition among brigades. There was a considerable 
variation across different branches of industry. Within the sewing industry, those who 
made up of shockbrigades accounted for 48 per cent, whereas in the paper industry 
they accounted for less than two per cent. Some 30 per cent of workers in the former
Percentages were given in Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 371. Absolute figures are 
my own recalculation.
However, there were a number o f factories where socialist competition was poorly organised. At 
Ravenstvo, for instance, no other forms o f competition existed except shock brigades and 
competition between workshops. See Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, pp. 370-371.
Ibid., p. 372.
Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics o f  Productivity, p. 46. For more information on the 
production commune, see Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo, no. 6, March 1931, pp. 44-48.
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industry were engaged in competition among brigades, whereas in the latter, some 92 
per cent were. In the textile industry, some 11 per cent were competing on an 
individual basis, while the figures for other industries were not more than three per 
cent (see table 7-4).
Table 7-4. Proportion o f workers participating in various forms o f competition in 
Leningrad, 1 November 1929 (percentages)
Union Shock
brigades
Proportion among the total workers
N
Shock
brigades
%
Other Workers competing Workers voluntarily 
brigades individually cutting wage rates 
% % %
Metalworkers 860 12.4 30.7 2.2 1.1
Woodworkers 4 1.0 17.8 0.2
Textileworkers 404 20.6 33.7 11.5 0.2
S e wing worker s 21 48.0 31.1 1.4 6.3
Paperworkers 3 1.8 92.1 - -
Foodworkers 29 5.4 28.3 0.1 0.2
Leatherworkers 104 11.1 12.2 1.6 0.03
Chemicalworkers 74 4.5 44.5 0.02 0.7
Printers 67 25.8 29.5 2.4 3.2
Total among 9 unions 1,566 14.4 32.3 4.3 0.9
Source: Adapted from Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 372.
Overall, the proportion of those engaged in various fonns of socialist 
competition among the total workforce was not very impressive. The reasons for that 
included the following factors: the trade union’s putting insufficient emphasis on the 
development of various forms of competition; the insufficient promotion; the trade 
union’s being incapable of providing leadership over inner-workshop competition; the 
lack of systematic infomiation on the achievements and shortcomings of each group 
of workers; the lack of practical help and technical advice from engineers and 
technical persomiel; and the economic organs’ poor elaboration of the control figures 
set for each group of workers.
The review also provides information on the composition of those taking part in 
the shockworker brigades or groups. Over half of the 85,230 shock workers were non- 
party workers. Some 28 per cent were Komsomol members, and only 19 per cent were
Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 372.
330
party members. The proportion of party members varied greatly depending on the 
industrial branches. Among the chemical workers, they accounted for as much as 50 
per cent, while among wood workers, they accounted for only six per cent. Among the 
metal, sewing and food workers, some 25 per cent of shockworkers were party 
members. On average, 23 per cent of shockworkers were trade union activists (see 
table 7-5).
Table 7-5. Composition o f workers participating in shock brigades or shock groups in 
Leningrad, 1 November 1929
Union Workers engaged Party Komsomol Non- Trade
in shock brigades members members party union
or groups workers activists
N % % % %
Metalworkers 34,357 25.0 40.7 34.3 24.1
Woodworkers 442 5.9 94.1 - 17.6
Textileworkers 29,421 13.0 38.2 48.8 27.0
Sewingworkers 1,848 25.8 9.6 64.6 18.0
Foodworkers 4,951 25.0 14.6 60.4 24.4
Leatherworkers 11,072 6.4 23.3 70.3 -
Chemicalworkers 1,092 50.0 31.3 18.7 31.3
Printers 2,047 42.5 36.8 20.7 35.6
Total among 8 unions 85,230 19.0 27.5 53.5 23.4
Source: Adapted from Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raiona, p. 373.
Table 7-6. Skill level o f workers participating in shock brigades or shock groups in 
Leningrad, 1 November 1929
Union Workers engaged in 
shock brigades or groups
Skilled
workers
Semi-skilled
workers
Unskilled
workers
N % % %
Metalworkers 34,357 24.0 30.3 45.7
Woodworkers 442 - 100.0 -
Textileworkers 29,421 95.3 4.7 -
Sewingworkers 1,848 100.0 - -
Foodworkers 4,951 23.2 42.4 34.4
Leatherworkers 11,072 93.4 16.6 -
Chemicalworkers 1,092 81.3 14.3 4.4
Printers 2,047 85.5 11.8 16.1
Total among 8 unions 85,230 60.4 26.0 13.6
Source: As for table 7-5.
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On average, 60 per cent of those taking part in the shockworker brigades or 
groups were skilled workers, 26 per cent were semi-skilled, and 14 per cent were 
unskilled workers. In the textile, sewing, leather, chemical and print industries, skilled 
workers comprised the majority of shockworkers. In the wood industry, all the 
shockworkers were semi-skilled. By contrast, in the metal and food industries, the 
unskilled accounted for 46 and 34 per cent respectively (see table 7-6).
Table 7-7. Proportion o f workers participating in shock brigades in Leningrad, 1 
November 1929
Union Workers Party
members
Komsomol
members
Non-party
workers
Trade union 
activists
N % % % %
Metalworkers 25,676 2.8 9.9 1.6 12.1
Woodworkers 442 1.7 24.3 - 8.3
Textileworkers 19,184 3.4 14.2 3.7 8.5
Sewingworkers 1,848 97.7 85.2 64.4 79.4
Foodworkers 4,951 14.3 7.3 18.0 18.3
Leatherworkers 449 - 100.0 - -
Chemicalworkers 1,092 4.0 7.3 0.9 3.2
Printers 2,047 10.1 15.7 3.7 18.4
Total among 8 unions 55,689 7.6 13.4 7.8 15.7
Source: Adapted from Industrializatsiia severo-zapadnogo raion, p. 377.
As can be seen in table 7-7, only eight per cent of party members and 13 per 
cent of Komsomol members were shockworkers. There were great variations across 
the different industrial unions. Almost all party members in the sewing industry were 
shockworkers, while in the metal industry only three per cent of party members were 
shockworkers. In the leather industry, all Komsomol members were shockworkers. 
Trade union activists were more likely to be shockworkers, than party or Komsomol 
members: on average, 16 per cent of them were shockworkers. In particular, among 
sewingworkers, as much as 80 per cent of trade union activists were shockworkers.
In general, the proportion of shockworkers among the total skilled or semi­
skilled workers was extremely low (see table 7-8). Only six per cent of the total 
skilled workers and eight per cent of the total semi-skillled workers were 
shockworkers. Among the food and print workers, a larger proportion of skilled 
workers were involved in shock brigades: shockworkers accounted for 16 and 12 per
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cent of the total skilled workforce respectively. In the food industry, almost half of the 
total semi-skilled workers were involved in shock brigades, and in the print industry, 
about one fifth of semi-skilled workers were involved in shock brigades. The 
proportion of shockworkers among the total unskilled workers was, on average, higher 
than among skilled or semi-skilled workers: 11 per cent. This was mainly due to the 
fact that a considerable number of unskilled workers were shock workers in the food 
and printing industries. In other industrial branches, there were hardly any 
shockworkers amongst the unskilled workforce.
Table 7-8. Proportion o f workers participating in shock brigades in Leningrad, 1 
November 1929
Union Shock
workers
Among
women
workers
Among
skilled
workers
Among
semi-skilled
workers
Among
unskilled
workers
N % % % %
Metalworkers 25,676 9.8 2.7 5.1 8.6
Woodworkers 442 5.3 - 10.6 -
Textileworkers 19,184 7.2 5.1 10.1 -
Sewingworkers 1,848 67.1 2.5 - -
Foodworkers 4,951 15.8 7.7 55.3 22.1
Leatherworkers 449 - 15.8 - -
Chemicalworkers 1,092 - 7.6 1.4 -
Printers 2,047 8.7 12.0 22.4 32.6
Total among 8 unions 55,689 12.9 6.0 8.0 10.5
Source: As for table 7-7.
On 26 December 1929, the obkom secretariat adopted a resolution ‘on the initial 
results and the further development of socialist competition’, declaring that in the first 
year of the FYP the production programme set out for the Leningrad industry had 
been largely overfulfilled, and that this was achieved mainly due to the spontaneous 
activity of the masses of workers and due to socialist competition.'^^
In the later years of the first FYP, various new forms of competition emerged. 
These included cost-accounting brigades, planning-operative groups, shift 
counterplanning brigades, and periodic competitions for the ‘best shock worker’ in 
particular branches of industiy as measured by the degree of exceeding output norm.
Biulleten ' Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 2, 1930, p. 3.
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In general, they represented a differentiation of goals previously subsumed under 
shock work, reflecting the party’s increased emphasis after mid-1931 on cost 
accounting, the assimilation of technology and individual piece rates.
In Leningrad, 1930 saw the emergence of various new forms of competition: 
tugboats {buksiry), skvoznye and rationalisation brigades and quality b r i g a d e s . A t  
Krasnyi putilovets, workers organised planning-operative groups. In addition, the plan 
was challenged in the fonn of a counterplan (ystrechnyi plan), a proposal to 
accomplish more within a shorter period of time. The first such plan in the city was 
put forward by shock workers of the Karl Marx factory in April 1930. In the same 
month, shock workers of the Znamia truda appealed to all shock workers to get 
involved in counterplanning. Following this appeal, counterplanning was soon 
adopted by many factories. Then, in July workers of the Karl Marx factory sent a 
letter to Pravda, explaining their own experience in preparing counterplans, and the 
practice of this factory spread throughout the country.
In 1931 cost-accounting brigades emerged in the city. The first cost-accounting 
brigade, the first as such in the country as well, was foirned by moulders at the Lenin 
factory. Then another brigade was set up at the Baltic factory and another at the 
Sevkabel’. The main tasks of cost-accounting brigades were maximising the economic 
use of resources and ensuring the safe use of equipment while increasing output. Each 
brigade member was expected to reduce costs.
Reportedly, the Leningrad party organisation promoted cost-accounting 
brigades enthusiastically.'^^ The aims and advantages of cost-accounting brigades 
were extensively explained to the factoiy workers. Party organisations also tried to co­
ordinate the creation of cost-accounting brigades and the setting out of specific 
production tasks. In accordance with an obkom decree, raikom members were sent to 
factories, and chairmen and members of executive committees of trusts and unions
Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics o f  Productivity, p. 40.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (1980), vol. 2, p. 196. Terms such as tugboating 
{buksirovat’) and sponsorship {shefstvo) were use to express the goal o f lifting up the less advanced. 
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid.,^p. 198.
See for example, Itogi plenutna Leningradskogo obkoma VKP(b), 16-17 maia 1931 g.: Plan-tezisy 
doklada ob itogakh plenuma obkoma VKP(b) (Leningrad: Ogiz-priboi, 1931); Biulleten' 
Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), no. 16, 1931, pp. 3-5; Partrabotnik, no. 11, June 
1931, pp. 22-32; ibid., no. 23, December 1931, pp. 53-60; and ibid., nos. 5-6, March 1932, pp. 91- 
93.
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provided assistance to workers. Furthermore, in order to exchange experiences, party 
activists’ meetings were held at city and raion levels, and also conferences of 
enteiprises’ triangles were held. In 1931 alone, three massive rallies of workers from 
cost-accounting brigades and the oblast conference of cost-accounting brigades were 
held. Special training courses were organised for cost-accounting brigade leaders and, 
at the same time, consultations were given to them.”^^
All these factors contributed to the expansion of the movement. At Krasnyi 
putilovets, the number of cost-accounting brigades had increased from 29 on 1 June 
1931 to 206 by 1 July, then to 449 by 1 August, and to 715 by 1 September 1931. By 
September 1931, cost-accounting brigades accounted for 40 per cent of all brigades in 
this factory.” "^’ In Leningrad as a whole, there were only ten cost-accounting brigades 
in February, and this figure had increased to 52 by March, 250 by April, 5,276 by 10 
July, 8,263 by 10 August, and finally to 14,421 by 10 October. ' By the end of 1931, 
over 26,000 such brigades with 300,000 workers had been established in Leningrad.
At the same time, 1931 saw the emergence of shift counterplanning brigades. 
The essence of shift-counterplanning was that brigades, after studying the feasibility 
of the counteiplans carefully, proposed them and fulfilled them. In Leningrad, 
workers at Krasnyi treugol’nik were the first to propose such plans. The shift- 
counterplanning brigades turned out to be effective, and this practice spread rapidly in 
the city. It was claimed that shift counterplamiing, together with cost-accounting 
brigades, achieved considerable results. By the beginning of 1932, some 1,512 such 
brigades had been formed in the city’s machine-building factories alone, and it was 
claimed that shift counterplans had resulted in the overfulfilment of the plans by ten to 
thirty per cent.”^^
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 198. For instance, in April 1932, 
the Vyborgskii raion set up a course specially for cost-accounting brigade leaders, coneerning 
labour organisation, planning, and accounting.
Otchet o pabote partiinogo komiteta zavoda “Krasnyiputilovets’’ za vremia s pervogo maia 1930 
goda po pervoe sentiabria 1931 goda (Leningrad, 1931), p. 34.
Partrabotnik, nos. 19-20, November 1931, p. 49.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 198. It was evaluated that these 
brigades worked economically very effeetive from the very beginning. Reportedly, out o f 990 
brigades under review, 940 brigades lowered expenditure on materials considerably and 263 
brigades saved more than 42,000 mb les within only two months.
Ibid., p. 199.
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All in all, workers’ participation in socialist competition had increased 
considerably, at least in terms of their enrolment. As can be seen in table 7-9, in 
October 1929, only 14 per cent of Leningrad’s workers were involved in socialist 
competition, but by March 1930, this figure had increased to 43 per cent. This shows 
that ‘Lenin’s appeal to the shock brigades’ published in January 1930 led to the 
number of workers taking part in socialist competition being tripled. In some 
factories, those workers participating in socialist competition accounted for over 60 
per cent of the total workforce by this time.'^^ By 1 April 1930, there were 250,000 
shock workers and 39 shock enterprises in the city. Shock enterprises included the 
Ki'asnyi putilovets, the Lenin factoiy, the Ki'asnyi treugol’nik, and the Bol’shevichka. 
In addition, 627 workshop cells in various factories became involved in shock
1 169work.
Table 7-9. Proportion o f workers participating in socialist competition in Leningrad, 
1929-1931 (percentages)
Proportion o f workers participating in socialist competition
1 October 1929 14.1 (I)
1 March 1930 42.7 (1)
1 August 1930 51.0 (1)
1 December 1930 65.8 (2)
1 January 1931 70.1 (1)
1 April 1931 75.6 (2)
3 December 1931 79.2 (2)
Sources: (1) Partrabotnik, nos. 8-9, April-May 1931, p. 59; (2) Ibid., no. 23, December 1931, 
p. 59.
Workers’ participation continued to increase in the latter half of 1930, and by 
January 1931, almost 70 per cent of Leningrad’s workers participated in socialist 
competition (see table 7-9). In some factories, the figure was much higher: it was 83 
per cent at ICrasnyi putilovets'^’’ and 87 per cent at the Karl Marx factory.'^' The
Ibid., p. 196. By February 1930, those workers participating in socialist competition accounted for 
approximately 70 per cent o f the total workforce at Krasnyi putilovets, 60 per cent at the Metal 
factory, and 90 per cent at the Lenin factory.
Na fronte industrializatsii, no. 9, 1930, p. 8.
Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, nos. 3-4, Febraary 1931, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25. This was a considerable increase from the June 1930 figure of 50 per cent and the 
October 1930 figure o f 61 per cent.
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increase in the number of workers participating in socialist competition continued 
throughtout 1931. By December 1931, almost 80 per cent of the city’s workers were 
engaged in socialist competition (see table 7-9). In 1932, the figure increased further. 
For instance, in April 1932, 98 per cent of a total of 30,000 workers in the Narvskii 
raion were shock-workers.'^^
As already mentioned, party members’ participation in the shock movement and 
socialist competition was not great in 1929. Not all communists in the city showed an 
interest in taking part in the shock movement at this initial stage. In some factories, 
only a few communists participated in socialist competition. However, from 1930 
onwards, the party strongly urged their involvement and this correspondingly led to an 
increase in party members’ participation.'^^ On 11 February, in its resolution 
concerning party recruitment, the Central Committee called for ‘the involvement of 
every single communist in shock brigades and socialist competition’.'^ "' Similar calls 
had been made in Leningrad on 4 February 1930, when the obkom bureau set out on 
the task of drawing all party and Komsomol members into the shock movement.
Following this, the proportion of communists involved in the shock movement 
and socialist competition increased rapidly. In particular, the directives of the 
sixteenth Party Congress regarding the involvement of eveiy single party and 
Komsomol member in socialist competition and in the shock-worker movement 
resulted in the number of workers participating in the competition doubling. By the 
beginning of 1931, the majority of communist workers had already been involved in 
socialist competition. For instance, at Ki'asnyi putilovets only 39 per cent of 
communists took part in socialist competition in February 1930,'^ *  ^ but the figure 
reached 72 per cent by 15 April 1930'^^ and it increased further to 86 per cent by 
January 1931.'^^ At the Karl Marx factory, as many as 96 per cent of party members 
were involved in socialist competition in February 1931.'
Ibid., nos. 7-8, April 1932, p. 29.
At the same time, the party vigorously recruited shockworkers. See chapter 4-2 of this thesis.
KPSS V rezoliiitsiiakh i resheniiakh (1984), vol. 5, p. 88.
Leningradskaia pravda, 4 February 1930.
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 2, February 1930, p. 47.
Otchet partiinogo komiteta zavoda “Krasnyi putilovets p. 21.
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, nos. 3-4, February 1931, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25. It was reported that the other four per cent were those who had only recently arrived at
the factory, and therefore, had not managed to join the movement.
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Therefore, it is no wonder that in March 1931 certain factories in Leningrad 
were hailed as the most advanced factories in the country. In these factories, 90 to 95 
per cent of party members were engaged in socialist competition. In its resolution ‘on 
party mass work in workshops and brigades’, the Central Committee admitted that 
‘the decision of the sixteenth Party Congress that every single party and Komsomol 
members must engage in socialist competition remains unfulfilled to a considerable 
extent.’ While 90 to 95 per cent of the party members were engaged in socialist 
competition in advanced factories such as the Stalin factory in Leningrad, in a number 
of others only 50 to 60 per cent of communists were participating. Therefore, it urged 
that the directive of the sixteenth Party Congress should be enforced at once.'^”
Table 7-10. Communists’ participation in the shoclcwork movement, March 1932 
(percentages)
Party membership Communist shock- 
workers
All shock-workers
Stalin  factory (1) n. d. 93.0 n. d.
K rasnyi m aiak (1) n. d. 100.0 n. d.
K rasnyi vyborzhets (2) 28.1 87.4 79.3
R ussk ii d iz e f (2) 29.3 100.0 83.1
K arl M arx  factory (2) 32.9 100.0 89.4
Sources: (1) Partrabotnik, nos. 5-6, M arch  1932, p. 51; (2) Partiinoe stroiteTstvo, no. 6, 
M arch  1932, p. 31.
In most factories, the proportion of party members engaged in competition was 
relatively high and increasing continuously. For instance, in November 1931, some 98 
per cent of those who participated in socialist competition at Sevkavel’ were party 
members, and 95 per cent of the 1,007 people were Komsomol members.'^' By 
February 1932, some 130,000 of Leningrad’s shock workers were either party or 
Komsomol members. In other words, party or Komsomol members accounted for 30 
per cent of the workers participating in the shock m o v e m e n t . T h e  figures for some 
factories in the Vyborgskii raion were particularly impressive. In March 1932, as 
many as 25,417 full and candidate party members (or 75 per cent of them) in this 
raion were engaged in socialist competition. As can be seen in table 7-10, in factories
Ibid., no. 1, April 1931, p. 64.
Partrabotnik, nos. 19-20, November 1931, p. 79.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 200.
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such as the Krasnyi maiak, Russkii dizek, and Karl Mai-x, almost all the full and 
candidate party members were engaged in the shock movement. In other factories 
such as the Stalin factory, the figure was over 90 per cent.
However, this was not the case for all factories. In some factories, the situation 
was rather unsatisfactory. For instance, at Krasnyi oktiabr’, only 366 out of the 535 
full and candidate party members were shockworkers.'^^ Nevertheless, by the end of 
the first FYP, party organisations in many of Leningrad’s factories had achieved the 
task of involving all party and Komsomol members in socialist competition. These 
factories included the Metal factoiy, Russkii dizel’, K'asnyi Maiak and Karl Marx.'^"' 
At the same time, party organisations continuously supervised the progress of 
socialist competition. On 4 February 1930, the obkom bureau called for the 
transformation of shock brigades into shock workshops and shock factories. In 
accordance with this instruction, factory party kollektivy became deeply involved in 
the socialist competition movement, encouraging the activities of the trade union and 
Komsomol organisations.'^^
In March 1930, the obkom conducted a review of the movement. This revealed 
a number of shortcomings. Party and Komsomol organisations, trade union 
organisations in particular, provided insufficient leadership over the movement. The 
obkom resolutions of 26 December 1929, 8 February and 19 Febmaiy 1930, had not 
been implemented. Hence there was a failure to make economic-political agreements 
specific enough, to draw engineers and technical personnel into the movement in 
order for them to provide technical help to shockworkers, to reconstruct all cultural- 
daily life work on the basis of socialist competition and the shock movement, to 
establish qualitative and quantitative accounts of the shock movement and to monitor 
the fulfilment of agreed obligations.'^^
Party, Komsomol, trade union and economic organisations as well as the press 
failed to eliminate such shortcomings. In many factories, self-assessment as a mass 
economic-political campaign was not conducted. Moreover, it was noticed that the 
attention paid to socialist competition and the shock movement had recently
Partrabotnik, nos. 5-6, March 1932, p. 51.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (1980), vol. 2, p. 200.
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1966), vol. 2, p. 396. 
RTsKhlDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2752, p. 82.
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weakened: in almost all enterprises the number of workers involved in the shock 
movement had decreased; the efficiency of shock brigades had fallen; labour 
discipline had worsened; and there had been an increase in waste and absenteeism. It 
was argued that, despite the resolution of the sixteenth Party Congress regarding the 
tasks of the trade union, socialist competition and the shock movement had not 
become the central activity of trade union organisations within enterprises and 
workshops.
In 1930 when the work of the Moskovsko-narvskii raion party organisation was 
reviewed, Gilinskii, a Central Committee instructor, criticised the fact that the 
agreements were not specific enough and that it was unclear as to whether these 
agreements were actually being carried out. He argued that the weak participation of 
administrative-technical personel was one of the shortcomings of socialist 
competition. Factory managers did not make an effort to ensure that shockworkers had 
what they needed in order to fulfil their agreements. A great number of factoiy 
managers even did not laiow their own shockworkers.'^^ In addition, as was admitted 
by Shul’man, a party worker from the Moskovsko-narvskii raikom, not all of the 
shock-workers in this raion, which numbered 80,000 at this time, were genuine 
shockworkers. There were pseudo-shockworkers and hangers -on .Another  Central 
Committee organisational instructor, Buratov, also criticised the fonnalistic attitude 
towards socialist competition, the poor disclosure of pseudo-shock workers, the 
increase in absenteeism and defective articles and delaying the process of cutting 
costs.'’”’
A report on the Elektrosila’s party work made in October 1930 revealed further 
shortcomings. In this factory, a total of 162 shock brigades which contained 1,564 
young workers were formed after the Central Committee’s appeal. However, the 
emergence of the shock brigades did not contributed to the elimination of breakage. 
There were shock workers who were not genuinely shock workers. The shock worker 
movement was rather like a parade. The agreements were not specific and there was
Ibid., p. 82.
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 9, May 1930, p. 51. 
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 55.
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no procedure to check whether the agreements were in fact being implemented. 
Hence, the agreements were never properly realised in this factory.'”'
In March 1931, the Central Committee, in its resolution ‘on party mass work in 
workshops and brigades’, instructed that a resolute struggle should be waged against 
pretended shock-work, particularly among party and Komsomol members. It was 
stated that the genuine participation of all party and Komsomol members in socialist 
competition and the shock-worker movement should be measured by the workshop’s 
or brigade’s fulfilment of its production targets as a whole. It therefore instructed that 
production indices should be registered precisely and visibly, and that the systematic 
assessment and self-assessment of the persons engaged in competition should be 
organised.'”^
Nevertheless, a number of shortcomings were continuously reported in 1931. 
There still were pretend shockworkers, who were not being exposed in many cases. 
There was inadequate assessment as to whether agreements were in fact being 
achieved. Moreover, not all communists set an example in the process of production. 
Some of them lagged behind the rest of the workers. Workshop cells and factory party 
organisations did not provide the necessary assistance to party units in this sphere of 
work, and no measures were adopted to eradicate these shortcomings.
In some areas and factories, the number of those who had achieved their 
agreements slightly increased in 1931. For instance, in the Narvskii raion, some 
21,000 workers had achieved their agreements in May 1931, but the figure had 
doubled by September 1931.'”"' However, the general picture could not be considered 
positive. At Krasnyi putilovets, for instance, only 205 out of the 715 cost-accounting 
brigades had fulfilled the production tasks set for July and August. In the same 
months, 657 cost-accounting brigades (92 per cent) fulfilled the nomi in relation to 
expenditure on resources, and 692 brigades fulfilled the nonn in relation to 
expenditure on materials. However, a substantial number of brigades could not fulfil
RTsICliIDNI, fond 17, opis’ 21, delo 2712, p. 74. 
Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, no. 7, April 1931, p. 64.
N. Emel’ianov, Na khodu perestroiki - iz opyta partiinoi raboty v Leningrade (Leningrad : Ogiz- 
priboi, 1931), pp. 64-65.
Partiinoe stroitel ’stvo, nos. 7-8, April 1932, p. 29.
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the norm in relation to cutting costs or reducing wages: the former applied to 205 
brigades (29 per cent) and the latter to 198 brigades (28 per cent).'”^
By 1932, it seems that the party had come to place more attention on its own 
organisational issues and had turned its attention away from socialist competition and 
the shockwork movement. No major resolutions were adopted in relation to socialist 
competition and the shockwork movement at either the central or local level.
Otchet o pabote partiinogo komiteta zavoda “Krasnyi putilovets ", p. 34.
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8. Conclusion
For Leningrad region, as for the whole of the Soviet Union, the first FYP was a 
period of rapid transformation. Leningrad’s industry, in particular heavy industiy, was 
refurbished and rapidly expanded. In the rural area surrounding Leningrad, agriculture 
was collectivised. Peasants migrated to Leningrad seeking jobs in the rapidly 
expanding industrial sector. This resulted in a massive increase in Leningrad’s 
working class population and a significant change in the composition of the city’s 
workforce. By 1932 more peasant workers, new arrivals to industry, women and 
young workers were employed in Leningrad’s industry than before, and the longer 
established workforce comprised only slightly more than half of the total (Chapter 2).
Communist party organisations in the region also experienced a series of far- 
reaching changes. This was due to the party’s own deliberate decisions, but the rapid 
transfoiTnation within the wider society was also a contributing factor. With the 
launch of the rapid industrialisation drive, the party had to adjust itself to new 
enviromnents. In order to keep pace with the rapidly expanding industrial sector, the 
party decided to develop its organisation within factories, enrol more workers, and 
mobilise activists for party work. The party also had to change its role in production in 
order to ensure the successful fulfilment of party decisions with regard to 
industrialisation. This, in turn, led to a significant change in its structure, membership, 
and role.
The impact of industrialisation on the party apparatus generally meant an 
increase in its size and complexity, in particular an increase in the size of the lower 
apparatus relative to the intermediate and central levels. Even though it was claimed 
that one of the principles of the reorganisation of the apparatus was the reduction and 
simplification of the apparatus, all levels of the party apparatus experienced a 
remarkable increase in their size and degree of complexity and sophistication during 
the first FYP. This was mainly due to the introduction of a functional-sectoral system, 
which aimed to increase specialisation of work in the party apparatus. The apparatus 
at intennediate levels expanded, albeit at a less impressive rate than at lower levels. 
The lowest levels of the party apparatus were to a certain extent affected by the same 
developments which occurred in upper levels: the introduction of a functional-sectoral
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system led to a development of the party apparatus at lower levels. The expansion of 
the party apparatus within the enterprise was particularly impressive. The concept of 
‘breaking up’ of party cells, which was strongly advocated in the first FYP, led to 
larger and more complex party structures within factories. Party cells were formed in 
smaller production units than in previous years, and factory party organisations 
evolved from one or two-tier structures into multi-tier structures. However, the factory 
party cell structure was significantly simplified in the summer of 1932 (Chapter 3).
The impact of industrialisation can also be seen in the growth of party 
membership and the consequent change in its composition. Throughout the first FYP 
period, the party experienced an unprecedentedly rapid expansion of its membership. 
In the Leningrad region, its membership grew from 119,446 to 278,280 between 
January 1928 and January 1933. As recruitment policy strongly emphasised the 
working class, industrial workers constituted more than 80 per cent of all recruits. In 
the city of Leningrad alone, the figure reached about 95 per cent. This deliberate 
recruitment policy had a visible effect on the composition of party membership. The 
proportion of production workers among the total party membership in the city was 
over 60 per cent between 1927 and 1930. Although the figure began to decrease from 
1930 onwards, it still stood at about 50 per cent in January 1933. These figures were 
higher than the national average throughout the first FYP period. More importantly, 
the composition of party membership changed sharply in tenns of year of entry. By 
the end of the first FYP, those who had joined the party during the period of massive 
worker recruitment constituted the largest group within the Leningrad party 
organisation: approximately 50 per cent. The effect of the massive worker recruitment 
on party saturation in the factories, however, was not very impressive. As the 
industrial workforce expanded rapidly, party saturation did not rise greatly despite the 
party’s intensive recruitment of workers (Chapter 4).
The two party purges that were accompanied or followed by a major recruitment 
drive had also a visible effect on the Leningrad party membership. However, the 
1929-30 and 1933 party purges affected the Leningrad party organisation in different 
ways. In the 1929-30 purge, it did not suffer a massive expulsion and indeed had the 
lowest expulsion rate in the country, 5.1 per cent. By contrast, in 1933, a sizeable 
number of its members were expelled and the expulsion rate in the region reached
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12.7 per cent. Moreover, 8.8 per cent of its full members were transferred to candidate 
status, 1 per cent to sympathiser status, and 13.5 per cent of candidate members to 
sympathiser. Altogether some 20 per cent of its membership were affected by the 
1933 purge. The data available show that in the 1929-30 purge, the main victims were 
peasants, whereas in 1933 a considerable number of workers were expelled. Those 
who were expelled for ‘passivity’ or ‘drunkenness’ constituted the largest group in 
1929-30, while those who were expelled for ‘passivity’ or ‘violation of party 
discipline’ constituted the largest group in 1933. This suggests that the main victims 
of both purges were ordinary rank-and-file members. Although there is no doubt that 
political considerations had played a certain role in these purges, they were more a 
mass purge rather than a purge directed at eradicating political opponents (Chapter 5).
The rapid expansion of party membership and the organisational development 
of the party apparatus were accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of 
party workers. Although the party sought to reduce the number of paid workers at all 
levels by mobilising activists for party work, this objective was only partially 
achieved. At obkom and raikom levels, the number of full-time party officials 
increased rather than decreased; and at the lowest level of the party the overall number 
of party workers increased considerably, mainly due to the rapid expansion of the 
party cell network in factories. Throughout the first FYP period, a considerable 
number of party activists were mobilised for party work and this was more the case at 
the lowest level than at the intennediate level. As a result, by the end of 1932, 
Leningrad party workers at the lowest level were likely to be much younger than their 
1928 counterparts, less experienced both in terms of the number of years they had 
spent in industry and in tenns of their party membership; many of them joined the 
party during the early years of industrialisation (Chapter 6).
Another aspect which needs special attention is that party workers at all levels 
experienced great mobility, in most cases upward mobility, in the first FYP. It was 
partly because the organisational development of the party apparatus resulted in the 
creation of more posts within the party apparatus. Another major factor that 
contributed to great mobility was the party policy of vydvizhenie: many experienced 
party workers were promoted into more responsible jobs either in the state apparatus 
or in the party. Moreover, a considerable number of Leningrad’s workers, many of
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whom were party activists, were transfen'ed to other regions in order to help local 
people construct new industrial centres. Here again, this was more the case at the 
lower level than at intermediate levels. For party workers at the enterprise level, 1928- 
32 was a period of considerable turnover and promotion. The turnover was 
considerable throughout the period: almost half of all party workers were replaced at 
each election. Other factors mentioned above made turnover even greater. Rapid 
turnover and promotion resulted in the emergence of new kinds of party workers by 
the end of the first FYP period. In general, they were less experienced, and had often 
been in the party for only two or three years (Chapter 6).
Meanwhile, the content of party work changed significantly. As the party 
became involved in directing the industrialisation process, it became more involved in 
production matters. The relative weight of questions of an economic nature in the 
work of party organisations, from the obkom down to workshop cells, increased 
considerably from 1928 onwards. Party cells at factoiy level were affected the most 
directly. Under the slogan ‘face to production’, they became more and more involved 
in this way. However, this policy had its adverse effects. First of all, the traditional 
division of work between party cells, trade union units and factory administrations 
was blurred; and conflicts and confusion arose at the shop floor level. The most 
negative aspect of the party’s growing involvement in economic matters was that 
party cells often ignored their primary responsibilities in the realm of politics and 
ideology. Factory party cells simply could not engage in party work when they had to 
spent most of their time securing the fulfilment of the production and financial plan. It 
was only in the summer of 1932 that the party undertook a thorough review of factory 
party cells and tried to reverse the course of events. The poor work of factory party 
cells in the sphere of political education, mass propaganda and agitation, and party 
discipline was severely criticised. From this time onwards, the emphasis was finuly 
placed on party work (Chapter 7).
All in all, party organisations below the oblast level experienced a considerable 
degree of instability during these years of massive transformation. It was lower party 
organisations that suffered the most from a chaotic situation. In factories, not only did 
the workforce expand rapidly, but workers also moved constantly in search of better 
jobs. New workers arrived and already established workers left their workplace for
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jobs in other factories or regions. Those who were engaged in party work in factories 
were not immune from such a situation. They themselves experienced mobility either 
as a result of being promoted, taking study leave, or being transferred to the 
countryside or in some cases to other regions. This adversely affected party work at 
the factory level. Party work could not be carried out properly when responsible party 
workers did not retain their posts for more than six months. Moreover, the party 
policy of mobilising activists for party work had its negative aspects. Party workers at 
lower level were extremely overloaded, and often unprepared to carry out all the 
duties and responsibilities expected of them. Nevertheless, they were responsible not 
only for political work but also for work of an economic nature. A great burden was 
placed on party activists in factories who were expected to recruit workers and 
educate them, at the same time explaining party policies to the mass of workers, 
collecting party dues and securing the implementing of party policies concerning 
industrialisation. It is easy to imagine how difficult, if not impossible, it was for party 
workers to carry out their responsibilities in such circumstances.
Given these circumstances, it was extremely difficult for central party organs to 
keep close control over what was happening at lower levels of the party organisation. 
Although central party organs sought to control or monitor events at lower levels of 
the party by issuing decrees and directives or by reviewing the work of party cells or 
local party committees, they were not always able to achieve their objectives. In 
general, party directives were not strictly adhered to, and indeed were often ignored. 
There were reasons for this. First of all, directives from the leadership often offered 
little concrete guidance. Confusion arose, for instance, when the central authorities did 
not issue precise, unambiguous instructions as to how to introduce various 
organisational reforms. Party directives on edinonachalie were also ambiguous and 
did not help to clarify the responsibility of party cells in production matters. Even 
when party directives were specific enough to provide concrete guidance, they were 
often not put into practice. For instance, party directives concerning the organisation 
of cells within the factories were largely ignored and the factory cells did not operate 
as intended. Likewise, party directives on edinonachalie were completely ignored in 
1930 and 1931. The central party leadership’s warning against the mass expulsion of
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ordinary ranlc-and-fîle members on the ground of being passive did not prevent 
ordinai-y rank-and-file members from being expelled en masse in 1933.
Even when lower party organisations achieved the targets set by higher party 
organs, it was only at the expense of quality as had been the case in the party’s 
recruitment process during the first FYP. Frequently, central policies were followed 
only in a very fonnalistic sense. For instance, the 1932 review showed that many 
party cells formed in smaller production units existed only on paper. Likewise, not all 
of those who claimed to be shockworkers were really engaged in the shockwork 
movement. Lower party organisations simply issued directives similar to those 
already issued by higher party organs, when they were urged to get involved in 
production matters.
In the face of such problems, central party organs appear to have been incapable 
of controlling events effectively. Although the work of party cells or local party 
committees was reviewed by higher party organs and any evident shortcomings were 
criticised, the situation did not improve greatly. In general, the party control system 
did not work as it should have done. In particular, the complicated party structure in 
factories led to quite serious problems in the regulation of lower party organisations. 
As was often reported, the connection between different levels of the party 
organisation within factories was weak, and factory party committees were often 
unable to control or monitor the activities of party cells below them. As a result, the 
perfonnance of lower party cells varied considerably; and when irregularities and 
confusion were reported, these shortcomings were not immediately resolved.
Overall, it appears that the centre’s grip on affairs at the local level was not as 
close as often assumed, and that central party organs could not fully control the way 
party policy was implemented at the local level. When the party encountered the 
negative aspects of a certain policy, it had to change the policy to remedy the 
situation. For instance, the party could not control its own recruitment as much as it 
wished, and its policies kept changing. The massive expansion of party membership 
during the first FYP was followed by a complete ban on recruitment that lasted until 
the end of 1936. Up to 1938 the emphasis was to be put fimily on ‘quality’ and it was 
only then that recruitment began to pick up and the party once again took on the task 
of encouraging workers to join its ranks. Likewise, when the complicated party
348
structure resulted in a weakening of control, party policy changed to a simpler 
structure at the factoi-y level. When the party’s growing involvement in production 
matters led to confusion and conflict on the shop floor, the party decided to turn away 
from production matters in 1932. In almost all of the aspects we have looked at, the 
party changed its policies either in 1932 or in 1933.
Weak control from central party organs meant that there was some scope for 
local initiative and modification. At first glance, it appeared that central party organs 
had decided everything for the whole party. However, when we look more closely into 
the course of events, this was not always the case. Obviously local initiatives played a 
less important role in the fonnation of policy on more important matters. It was in 
conducting the policy that there was often some local modification. Although major 
decisions were made by central party organs in most cases, much was left for lower 
party organs to choose when it came to implementation. In addition, there were other 
cases where local practice was confirmed later by central organs. This was more often 
the case in recruitment and organisation than in other issues. For instance, the 
Leningrad party organisation strongly advocated the mass recruitment of production 
workers even in the mid-1920s when the party recruitment campaign’s priority was 
not the emolment of workers. Moreover, it was one of several organisations which 
had appealed to the Central Committee in favour of the mass recruitment of workers, 
and this facilitated the Central Committee’s decision to step up their recruitment. In 
addition, it set a higher recruitment target than the Central Committee did. As for 
organisational matters, local party organisations enjoyed substantial autonomy. In 
dealing with matters of this kind, the practice of Leningrad party organisations, such 
as the creation of workshop cells and factory party committees, was confirmed later 
on by central party organs and adopted nationwide. Factory party organisations were 
given a considerable degree of autonomy as to how to organise their cells over this 
period; and party structures varied substantially across factories.
All these factors suggest that regional party organisations still enjoyed some 
kind of autonomy during these years of ‘mass’ politics, although to a lesser degree 
than in the NEP period. In fact, the party policies concerning recruitment, 
organisation, and personnel that were pursued during the first FYP allowed party 
organisations at lower levels to find some scope for local initiative. However, with
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party policy changes in 1932 and 1933, the scope for local initiative became 
significantly diminished. Stricter control over recruitment together with the mass 
purge in 1933 led to tightened controls over party membership. The simplification of 
the party cell network in 1932 also facilitated tighter control over the activities of 
party cells. Party activists were then expected to uphold party discipline. In these 
circumstances, activism on the part of ordinary ranlc-and-flle members was bound to 
decline. Accordingly, party policy changes in 1932 and 1933 seem to have had 
important implications for the development of Stalinism; and they contributed 
substantially to the emergence of full-blown Stalinism in the mid-1930s.
In general, the Leningrad party organisation appear to have been supportive of 
party policies implemented in the first FYP. Given the fact that Leningrad was a 
highly industrialised city with a substantial number of industrial workers, it was not 
surprising that the Leningrad party organisation was supportive of party decisions 
concerning the rapid industrialisation drive. It was also supportive of party policies 
concerning recruitment and organisation matters. Indeed, it appears to have been 
genuinely enthusiastic about the mass recruitment of workers, as can be seen from 
various aspects of recruitment over this period. However, enthusiasm itself did not 
guarantee that party decisions were implemented at the grassroots level as had been 
intended. Even in Leningrad, confusion arose and party work was poorly carried out 
during these years of turmoil. Leningrad’s industrial workers, in spite of their apparent 
commitment to the industrialisation drive, did not always fully understand the party’s 
directives and the tasks that had now been placed upon them. It is easy to imagine 
how difficult the situation must have been for party organisations in regions where the 
impact of industrialisation was greater than in Leningrad.
Indeed, it should be borne in mind that Leningrad occupied a unique position in 
the Soviet Union at this time. The party apparatus in Leningrad played a very different 
role than an organisation such as Smolensk, based in a largely rural region. Although 
Leningrad region contained some rural areas, it was not a major agricultural region. 
The party apparatus in Leningrad, therefore, was not burdened with collectivisation as 
much as those in other major rural regions. Party organisations in the Leningrad 
region enjoyed support from their party members, mostly workers, whereas party 
organisations in the countryside were not able to rely on their own members when
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they encountered serious problems in the course of implementing party policies as the 
size of party membership in the countryside was not sufficiently large in the 1920s. In 
general, it was much more difficult for those in rural regions to cope with the pressure 
caused by rapid collectivisation. Moreover, it was always rural party organisations 
that suffered the most in both party purges during the first FYP.
Regional variation, indeed, was great even when we look at Moscow. While the 
Moscow party organisation experienced a turbulent political life which reflected the 
protracted struggles over policy and leadership in the Politburo,’ the Leningrad party 
organisation appears to have been marginally affected by political struggle during the 
first FYP. Indeed, unlike Moscow, which suffered heavy losses among its party 
leaders who showed right-wing tendencies at the beginning of the first FYP, senior 
party officials in Leningrad enjoyed relative stability, hardly being subject to purges. 
It was only in 1934 that the assassination of Kirov triggered a massive shake-up of the 
party apparatus in Leningrad.
Despite regional differences, however, there was one outcome that was common 
to all regions: the creation of an inefficient system. As industrialisation was carried 
out not based on rational calculations, but on mass mobilisation and activism, the 
system created during the first FYP was extremely inefficient. Industrialisation and 
collectivisation were a limited success in the sense that the state’s minimum aims 
were achieved, but at great economic and human cost. The experience of rapid 
industrialisation and collectivisation had an adverse impact: people learned how to 
cany out seemingly impossible tasks and how to avoid taking responsibility for their 
work. The impact of rapid industrialisation and of party policies associated with it 
lasted longer than party policies themselves. This long-term legacy undoubtedly 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the end, and has still to be 
overcome.
In this the inefficiency which the Leningrad party organisation experienced 
during the first FYP merely reflected paradoxes evident in the industrialisation of the 
Soviet Union as a whole. Across the whole period under review, despite repeated
See Catherine Merridale, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f  Stalin: The Communist Party in the 
Capital, 1925-32 (London: Macmillan, 1990); and Nobuo Shimotomai, Moscow Under Stalinist 
Rule, 1931-34 (London: Macmillan, 1991).
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attempts at both central and local party level, the party continued to prove incapable of 
ensuring the implementation of its directives. Lower party organisations, responsible 
for implementing party policies concerning industrialisation, were not properly 
prepared for their new tasks in terms of personnel and industrial loiowledge. 
Nevertheless, they became deeply involved in directing the industrialisation process, 
which often caused confusion and tension on the shop floor level.
Indeed, my findings suggest that the process which the party had gone through 
during the first FYP was far from a process of bureaucratisation in Max Weber’s 
sense.^ Although the party apparatus experienced an organisational development with 
more departments and sectors being formed within the apparatus, this did not lead to 
specialisation and professionalism. Contrary to the party’s expectation, the over­
elaborated party structure only made party work more difficult. The recruitment and 
promotion of industrial workers, who were often not capable of carrying out their new 
jobs, proved to be unsatisfactory.
If bureaucratisation means red tape, inefficiency, bureaucratic rigidity and 
routinism,^ there certainly was a process of bureaucratisation of the Soviet state in 
general, and of the party in particular. Frequently, decisions made by the central 
leadership were implemented only in a very formalistic sense; and party organs at all 
levels issued resolutions and declarations that simply replicated those already adopted 
at higher levels of the party organisation. Both party committees and cells were 
compelled to do an enormous amount of paper work, and they held too many 
meetings.'’ Continuous attempts to make party organisation both more efficient and 
responsible, tlirough a variety of teclmiques - from organisational reform and to the 
self-criticism campaigns and purges - failed to eliminate underlying and long-term 
inefficiencies.
 ^Weber defined a bureaucracy as an efficient organisation of which specialisation based on division of 
labour and professionalism are characteristic. A bureaucracy was seen by Weber as the most 
developed and technically most efficient system of administration. For Max W eber’s discussion of 
bureaucrary, See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, edited and 
translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 329-336.
 ^ In the Soviet Union, the term 'biurokratizm' was often used in this sense.
Apparently this problem was known to the party leadership. See, for instance, Kaganovich’s report to 
the seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 in XVII s ”ezd VKP(b), 26 ianvaria-IO fevralia 1934 g.: 
Stenograficheskii otchet {Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), pp. 556-557,
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All in all, my findings are closer to those put forward by ‘revisionists’ than by 
totalitarian theorists/ In my view, the party was not a monolithic, hierarchical and 
blindly obedient instrument of rule during these first FYP years. There were many 
developments which indicated that party control was not nearly as strict as the 
totalitarian theorists had suggested. The party was far from omnipotent and 
omnipresent, and it was often not able to impose its will on its own members. When 
the party could not sufficiently firmly control its own recruitment and organisation, it 
was still less likely that it would exercise effective control over activities outside the 
party, especially at local level.
This study of the Leningrad party organisation has shown, more generally, that 
local variations in a formally hierarchical system were always greater than was 
acknowledged at the time, and greater than subsequent scholarship has normally been 
prepared to recognise. It follows that further studies on other regions in the future will 
provide us with a better understanding of the party and of its development during a 
period that was described at the time as a ‘great transfonuation’. Other subjects for 
which there was no room for a detailed discussion in the thesis include changing 
popular attitudes in the region,*  ^ and the consequences of the purges at the level of 
individuals. The present author hopes to be among those who will carry out such 
studies in the future.
See for example, J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party 
Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 198; and Graeme 
Gill, Stalinism, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 10 and 34. Contemporary Russian 
scholarship, on the whole, leans towards the totalitarian approach. A very recent study of the 
development of Soviet party politics, for instance, suggests that Stalin and his entourage had created 
a totalitarian system in which society was marginalised and impoverished. See A. I. Zeveleva, lu. P. 
Sviridenko and V. V. Shelokhaeva, Politicheskie partii Rossii: Istoriia i sovremennost’ (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2000), pp. 459-460.
In one such conttibution, Sarah Davies has examined popular opinion in Leningrad between 1934 and 
1941 using NKVD and party reports, letters and other evidence. See Davies, Popular Opinion in 
Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997).
353
Bibliography
1. ARCHIVAL SOURCES
RTsKhlDNI (Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii) 
fond 17: Tsentral’nyi komitet VKP(b)
opis’ 21; Otdel rukovodiashchikh partorganov. Sektor informatsii. Partiinye organizatsii 
Rossii i Soiuznykh respublik (1925-1937)
delo 2692-2694: Protokoly zasedanii plenuma obkoma VKP(b)
delo 2695: Stenogramma zasedanii plenuma obkoma VKP(b)
delo 2696-2698: Protokoly zasedanii plenumov obkoma VKP(b)
delo 2707-2715: Protokoly zasedanii biuro obkoma VKP(b)
delo 2716-2718: Protokoly zasedanii ob” edinennogo biuro Leningradskogo 
oblastnogo i gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b)
delo 2737-2761: Protokoly zasedanii selcretariata obkoma VKP(b)
delo 2762-2764: Protokoly zasedanii ob” edinennogo selcretariata obkoma i gorkoma 
VKP(b)
2. NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS AND PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS IN RUSSIAN 
(Place of publication is Moscow unless otherwise stated)
Bol 'shevik
Izvestiia tsentml’nogo komiteta VKP(b) [renamed Partiinoe stroitel’stvo in late 1929] 
Partiinaia zhizn ’
Pravda
Spravochnikpartiinogo rabotnika 
Voprosy istorii 
Voprosy istorii KPSS
Biulleten ’ Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b) (Leningrad)
Leningradskaia pravda (Leningrad)
Partrabotnik (Leningrad)
354
3. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
All-Union Party Congresses
XV s ”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (M oscow ; G osudarstvennoe iz d a te l’stvo, 1928).
X V Is”ezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (M oscow : G osudarstvennoe iz d a te l’stvo, 1930).
XVII s ”ezd VKP(b), 26 ianvaria-10 fevralia 1934 g.: Stenograficheskii otchet (M oscow : 
P artizdat, 1934).
All-Union Party Conferences
XVI konferentsiia VKP(b), apreV 1929 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (M oscow : 
G osudarstvennoe iz d a te l’stvo, 1962).
XVI konferentsiia VKP(b), 13-29 aprelia 1929 g.: Rezoliutsii (M oscow : P artiinoe 
izd a te l’stvo, 1932).
XVIIkonferentsiia VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (M oscow : P artiinoe  iz d a te l’stvo, 1932).
Plenums of the VKP(b) Central Committee
Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s ”ezdov, 
konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 8th edn, 14 vols. (M oscow : Iz d a te l’stvo  po litichesko i 
literatu ry , 1970-82).
Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s"ezdov, 
konferentsii i plenumov TsK (1898-1986), 9th  edn, 15 vols. (M oscow : Izd a te l’stvo 
p o litichesko i literatu ry , 1983-1990).
Leningrad Party Conferences
XXIV Leningradskaia gubernskaia konferentsiia VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet i 
rezoliutsii (L eningrad , 1927).
Stenograficheskii otchet pervoi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b), 15-19 noiabria 
1927 goda (L eningrad: P ribo i,1927).
Stenograficheskii biulleten’ Il-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii (L en ingrad , 1929), 
nos. 1-14.
Itogi 2-oi Leningradskoi oblastnoipartkonferentsii (L eningrad: P riboi, 1929).
Tret’ia Leningradskaia oblastnaia konferentsiia VKP(b), 5-12 iiunia 1930g. (L eningrad , 
1930).
355
O tchet L en ingradskogo  oblastnogo  kom itetaV K P (b) I l l - i  ob lastno i p a r tiin o i kon feren tsii 
(Leningi'ad, 1930).
O tchet o rabo te  L en ingradsko i ob lastno i k o n tr o l’noi kom issii VKP(b) i raboche-krest 'ianskol 
in spektsii I I I  L en ingradsko i ob lastno i kon feren tsii (Leningrad , 1930).
B iu lle te n ' o b ”ed inenno i V ob lastno i i I I I  gorod sko i L en ingradsko i kon feren tsii VKP(b) 
(Leningrad, 1934).
O tchet L en ingradskogo  ob lastnogo i g o ro dskogo  kom ite tov  VKP(b) o b ”ed inenno i 
L en in g ra d sko i p ia to i ob lastno i i vtoro i gorod sko i p a r tko n feren ts ii (Leningi'ad, 1934).
Plenums of the Leningrad obkom and gorkom
S b o rn ik  osnovnykh  p a rtiin ykh  d irek tiv  (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo oblastkoma 
VKP(b), 1928).
S b orn ik  vazhneish ikh  reshen ii L en ingradskogo  oblastnogo i vyborgskogo  ra ionnogo  
kom ite tov  VKP(b) i p a rtko m a  VKP(b) zavoda  “K rasnaia  z a r ia ” za  J 929-30 g o d  
(Leningrad: Izdanie partkoma zavoda “Krasnaia zaria”, 1930).
O  perevyb o ra kh  parto rg a n o v: P ostano v len iia  p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  ob lastkom a  VKP(b) 
ot 5 aprelia  1930 g. (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo obkoma VKP(b), 1930).
R ezo liu ts ii o b "ed in e n n o g o  p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  obkom a i oblK K , 15-16 fe v ra lia  1931 
g.: Ob itogakh liicvidatsii okrugov i ukrep len ii ra ionov  (Leningrad: Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
Ito g i p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  obkom a VKP(b), 16-17  m ala 1931 g .: P la n -tezlsy  doklada  ob  
itogakh p len u m a  obkom a VKP(b) (Leningrad: Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
R ezo liu ts ii p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  obkom a VKP(b), 3-4 oktiabria  1931 g. (Leningrad: 
Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
R ezo liu ts ii o b ”ed inennogo  p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  kom iteta  i L e n K K  VKP(b) ot 19-20  
aprelia  1932 g.: O  rabo te  L en ing ra d sko i p ro m ysh len n o sti za  1 Icvartal 1932 goda  
(Leningrad: Partiinoe izdatePstvo, 1932).
R ezo liu tsii p len u m a  L en ingradskogo  kom iteta  VKP(b), 21 iiunia  1932 g.: O partiin o -  
rnassovoi rabote na fa b rich n o -za vo d sk ikh  p red p riia tiiakh  (Leningrad: Partizdat, 1932).
M ezhdu  dvum ia  s" e zd a m i:  L en ingradska ia  p a rtiin a ia  o rgan iza tsiia  v resheniiakh
kon feren tsii i p len u m o v  oblastkom a i L K  VKP(b) m ezhdu X V I  i X V II  s ”ezdam i 
(Leningrad: Lenpartizdat, 1934).
4. OTHER BOOKS, THESES, ETC., IN RUSSIAN
(In alphabetical order by author, or first word of title where no author is available) 
Abramov, A., and A. la, Aleksandrov, P artiia  v reko n s tru k tiv n y ip e r io d  (Moscow, 1934/
356
Alekseev, E. P., P artiinoe  rukovodstvo  p o d g o to vko i inzhenernykh  ka d ro v  v go d y  p ervo i  
p ia tile tk i  (Avtoreferat dissertatsii, Leningrad, 1971).
A tla s  L en ingradsko i ob lasti (Moscow: Glav. upravlenie geodezii i kartografii, 1967).
Avtorlchanov, A., Tekhnologiia  v lasti (Frankfurt am Main: Possev, 1976).
Beilin, A., B o r ’ba K om m unistichesko i p a r tii  za trudovo i p o d ’ ’em m ass i o rganiza tsiiu  
so tsia lis ticheskogo  sorevnovan iia  v 1926-1929 gg. (Leningrad, 1953).
Beliakov, V., and N. Zolotarev, P a rtiia  ukrep liae t svo i r ia d y  (Moscow: IzdatePstvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1970).
Beliakov, V. K., O rganiza tsionnoe ukrep len ie  K om m unistichesko i p a r ti i  Sovetskogo  Soiuza  v 
p e r io d  nastup len iia  so tsia lizm a  p o  vsem u fro n tu , 1929-1932  (Moscow, 1972),
B iuro  ko llek tiva  zavoda “K rasna ia  z a r ia ’’: O tchet biuro ko llek tiva  VKP(b) c oktiabria  
1928g. p o  iiun ’ 1929 goda  (Leningrad, 1929).
B o l’sha ia  sovetska ia  en tsik loped iia , 2nd edn, 51 vols. (Moscow: BoPshaia sovetskaia 
entsiklopediia, 1949-58).
Bordiugov, G. A., and B. A. Kozrov, Is to riia  i k o n ’’iunktura  (Moskva: IzdatePstvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1992).
______________________________________ , Tragediia  b o l ’shevistskogo  reform izm a  (unpublished
paper).
Breitman, A., O vydvizhen ii raboch ikh  v gosap p a ra t  (Moscow, 1929).
Bukhteev, N. I., Id e in o e  i organ iza tsionnoe ukrep len ie  K om m un istich esko i p a r tii  v p e r io d  
m ezhdu X V I - X V I I s ’’ezdam i VKP(b) (Moscow, 1979).
Derevnina, L. I., ‘Vosstanovlenie petrogradskoi promyshlennosti izmeneniia v chislennoste i 
sostave rabochikh,’ in Is to riia  rabochikh  L en ingrada , vol. 2 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972).
10 le t rabo ty  s  p a rta k tivo m : Ito g i rabo ty  dom a p a rtiin o g o  p ro svesh ch en iia  im eni S. M. 
K iro va  L en ingradskogo  ob lastnogo  i g orodskogo  kom ite tov  VKP(b) za  1926-1936 gg. 
(Leningrad: Lenoblizdat, 1936).
Efimova, G. A., ‘RoP partiinoi organizatsii Izhorskogo zavoda v podgotovke rabochikh 
kadrov (1928-1932 gg.) m Iz  istorii K P S S  i L en ingradsko i p a r tiin o i organ iza tsii 
(Leningrad: IzdatePstvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1968).
E ko n om iko -sta tistichesk ii sp ra vo ch n ik  L en ingradsko i ob lasti (Leningrad: Izdanie
oblispolkoma i Lensoveta, 1932).
EmePianov, N., N a khodu p e re s tro ik i - iz opyta p a rtiin o i raboty  v L en in g ra d e  (Leningrad: 
Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
Erldiov, G. P., ‘Sti'oitePstvo i razvitie fabrichno-zavodskikh partiinykh iacheek (1921-1930 
gg.)’, Voprosy istorii K P SS, no. 4, 1974, pp. 77-86.
357
Ershova, E. A., et al, eds., Is to riia  L en ingradsko i G osudarstvennoi ordena  L en ina  i ordena  
trudovogo  K rasnogo  Z nam eni obuvno i fa b r ik i  Skorokhod  im eni la. K a lin ina  (Leningi'ad: 
Lenizdat, 1969).
Finogenov, V. F., K P S S  v b o r ’be za  so tsia listichesku iu  rekonstru k ts iiu  p rom ysh lennosti, 
1929-1937 gg. (Avtoreferat dissertatsii, Leningrad, 1969).
Gilinski, A., P artiache ik i na khozia istvennom  fr o n te  (Leningrad, 1930).
Glazkov, G. and E. Ivanov, V a v a n g a rd e p ia tile tk i:  R abo ta  zven ia ch eek  na za bode  “K rasna ia  
Z a r ia ’’ (Leningrad, 1931). (1932).?
Gordon, L. A. and Klopov, E. V., Chto eto b y lo ? : razm yshlen iia  o p red p o sy lka kh  i itogakh  
togo, chto s lu c h ilo s ’ s nam i v 30-40-e g o d y  (Moscow: IzdatePstvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1989).
G orodskoe khozia istvo  (Leningrad, 1957).
Gurevich, D., Za u lu ch sh en iep a r tiin o i rabo ty  (Moscow, 1929).
Gutarov, A. N., ‘Proizvodstvennye soveshchaniia na Lenmgradskikh predpriiatiiakh (1926- 
1929 gg.)’ in Istoriia  rabochego klassa  Len ingrada , vol. 1 (Leningi'ad: IzdatePstvo 
Leningradskogo universiteta, 1962).
laroslavskii, E., O chistke  ip ro v e rk e  ch lenov i kand ida tov  VKP(b) (Moscow, 1929).
laroslavskii, Em., ‘Pervye itogi chistki partorganizatsiP, B o l ’shevik , no. 15, August 1934, pp. 
9-23.
Id e i p a r tii  - v m assy: Iz  opyta  o rgan iza tsii p a rtiin o -p o litich esko i p ro p a g a n d y  v L en ingrade  i 
L en ingradsko i oblasti, 1917-1982  (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1984).
Industria liza ts iia  severo -zapadnogo  raiona  v g o d y  p e rv o i p ia tile tk i, 1929-1932 gg. 
(Leningi'ad: Leningi'adskii ordena Lenina gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1967).
Industria liza tsiia  SSSR : D okum en ty  i m ateria ly  (sbornik) (Moscow, 1970-71).
In struk tsiia  o p o ria d ke  p r iem a  v kan d id a ty  i perevo d a  v chleny VKP(b) L en ingradsko i 
oblastno i o rgan iza tsii VKP(b) (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta 
VKP(b), 1929).
Istoriia  o techestva: L iudi, ideu, reshen iia  (Moscow: IzdatePstvo politicheskoi literatury, 
1989).
Isto riia  P u tilovskogo  za vo d a  (Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe sotsiaPno-ekonomicheskoe 
izdatePstvo, 1939).
Isto riia  rabochego klassa  L en ingrada , 2 vols. (Leningi'ad: IzdatePstvo Leningradskogo 
universiteta, 1962-63).
Isto riia  rabochikh  L en ingrada , 2 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972).
358
Isto riia  R ossii X X  vek  (Moscow; AST, 1996).
Ito g i ch istk i L en ing ra d sko i ob lastno i o rgan iza tsii VKP(b) (Leningrad: Izdanie Leningradskoi 
oblastnoi komissii po chistke, 1934).
Ivanov, I. A., ‘Uchastie rabochikh Leningrada v kollektivizatsii sel’skogo khoziaistva SSSR 
(1929-1932 gg.) in Is to riia  rabochego klassa  L en ingrada , vol. 1 (Leningrad: 
IzdatePstvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1962).
Iz istorii K P S S  i L en ingradsko i p a r tiin o i organiza tsii (Leningrad: IzdatePstvo
Leningradskogo universiteta, 1968).
Kaganovich, L., O rgan iza tsionnye  voprosy: P artiin o e  i sovetskoe  s tr o i te l ’stvo: D o k la d  X V II  
s ”ezdu VKP(b) (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934).
Kalinin, A. F., D e ia te l’n o s t ’ K om m unistichesko i p a r tii p o  sovershen stvo va n iiu  raboty  
so ve to v  V gody  p e rv o i i v toro i p ia tile to k  (Avtoreferat dissertatsii, Leningrad, 1984).
Katerli, E. and S. FarfeP, G orod  Lenina: K  vyboram  v m estnye  so ve ty  depu ta tov  
trud iashch ikhsia  (Leningrad: GazePro-zhumaPnoe i Icnizhnoe izdatePstvo
Leningradskogo soveta RK i KD, 1939).
Khlevniuk, Oleg V., S ta lin  i O rdzhonikidze: K o n flik ty  v p o litb iu ro  v 30-e g o d y  (Moscow: 
Rossiia molodaia, 1993).
____________  , et al., eds., S ta lin skoe  p o litb iu ro  v 30-e gody: S b o rn ik  dokum entov
(Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995).
_, P olitb iuro: M ekh a n izm y p o litich esko i v lasti v 1930-e g o d y  (Moscow:
ROSSPEN, 1996).
Kirov, S. M., L en ingradska ia  organ iza tsiia  nakanune X V I  s ”ezda VKP(b): D o k la d  o rabote  
obkom a VKP(b) na I I I  ob lastno i p a r tko n feren ts ii (Leningrad: Priboi, 1930).
____________ , Zaversh im  p o stro en ie  fu n d a m e n ta  so ts ia listichesko i ekonom iki SSSP: D o klad
ob itogakh o b ”ed inennogo d e k a b r ’skogo  p len u m a  TsK  i TsK K  VKP(b) na aktive  
L en in g ra d sko ip a rto rg a n iza ts ii, 24 d e k a b r ’ 1930 g. (Leningrad: Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
____________ , K  novym  B oiam  i pobed a m : D okla d  t. K irova  na p e rv o i L en ingradsko i
g orod sko i p a r tiin o i p a rtkon feren tsii, 12 d e k a b r ’ 1931 g. (Leningrad: Ogiz-priboi, 1931).
 , G eneral 'naia lin iia  p a r tii  p ro veren a  m illionam i: R ech  ’ na p len u m e  Lensoveta ,
28 I V 1932 g. (Leningi'ad: Partiinoe izdatePstvo, 1932).
________ , Ob itogakh s e n tia b r ’skogo  p len u m a  TsK  VKP(b): D o klad  na
obshchegorodskom  so b ran ii p a rtiin o g o  aktiva  L en ingradsko i o rgan iza ts ii VKP(b), 8 
oktiabria  1932 g. (Moscow: Partizdat, 1932).
________ , O derzhana velika ia  istoricheska ia  pob ed a : D o k la d  ob itogakh ianvarskogo
o b ”ed inennogo p len u m a  TsK  i TsK K  VKP(b) na sobran ii p a r ta k tiva  L en ingradsko i 
organ iza tsii VKP(b), 17 ianvaria  1933 g. (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatePstvo, 1933).
359
Kliucheva, Z. I., Ideinoe i organizatsionnoe ukreplenie Kommunisticheskoi partii v 
usloviiakh bor’by za postroenie sotsializma v SSSP (Moscow: MysP, 1970).
Ko 2 Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii VKP(b): Otchet oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b), 
noiabr’ 1927 g.-fevral’ 1929 g. (Leningrad; Izdanie Leningradskogo oblastkoma 
VKP(b), 1929).
Komarov, N., Khoziaistvennoe polozhenie Leningradskoi oblasti i nashi zadachi: Doklad na 
pervoi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferentsii, 18 X I1927 g. (Leningrad; Priboi, 1927).
Kommunisty Leningrada v bor’be za vypolnenie reshenii partii po industrializatsii strany, 
1926-1929 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1960).
Konstantinov, A. P., V. Ml. Ibanov and V. I. Zubarev, Leninskie traditsii partiino- 
gosudarstvennogo kontrolia: Iz istorii sozdaniia i geiatel’nosti Leningradskoi oblastnoi 
i gorodskoi K/C-ÆK/(Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1963).
Kostiuchenko, S., I. Khrenov and lu. Fedorov, Istoriia Kirovskogo zavoda, 1917-1945 
(Moscow: MysP, 1966).
K IV-oi oblastnoi i gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii: Otchet Leningradskogo oblastnogo i 
gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b) (Leningrad, 1932/
K XVI s ’ 'ezdu: Materialy k organizatsionnomu otchetu TsK VKP(b) (Moscow, 1930).
Krasil’nikov, ‘Sviaz’ Leningradskogo rabochego s zemlei’, Statisticheskoe obozrenie, no. 4, 
April 1929, pp. 107-110.
Krasnikov, S. V., S. M. Kirov v Leningrade (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1966).
Kuibyshev, V., O khoziaistvennom polozhenii SSSP: Doklad na sobranii aktiva 
Leningradskoi organizatsii VKP(b), 19 IX 1928 g. (Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1928).
Kulagina, E. I., et ah, eds., Fabrika na vzmor’e (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1973).
Kurochkin, B. A. and O. P. Khaneev, Zavod i liugi: Ocherk istorii Leningradskogo zavoda 
(Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1971).
Kutuzov, V. A., DeiateTnost’ organov TsKK-RKI v gody pervoi piatiletki (Avtoreferat 
dissertatsii, Leningrad, 1965).
Kuzin, N. P., ‘O povyshenii politicheskogo i kul’turnogo urovnia trudiashchikhsia v rogy 
pervoi piatiletki’ in Voprosy razvitiia sotsialisticheskoi kul’tury (Leningrad, 1977),
Lebedeva, N. B., Partiinoe rukovodstvo sotsialisticheskirn sorevnovaniem: Istoriia i 
sovremennost’: Deiatel’nost’ Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii po razvitiiu
sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v promyshlennosti, 1917-1977 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 
1979).
360
Leningrad: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik (Leningrad: BoPshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 
1957).
Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast’ v tsifrakh: StatisticheskU sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 
1961).
Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast’ v tsifrakh: StatisticheskU sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 
1971).
Leningradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia VKP(b) v tsifrakh, 4 vols. (Leningrad: Izdanie 
Leningi'adskogo oblastkoma VKP(b), 1929-33).
Leningradskii okruzhnoi komitet VKP(b): Sbornik materialov o partraboie v okriige 
(Leningrad, 1930).
Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968).
Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh, 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974).
Leningradskaia promyshlennost’ za 50 let (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967).
Leningradskie rabochie v bor’be za sotsialism 1926-1937 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1965).
Leningrad za 50 let: StatisticheskU sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967).
Lezhneva, Irina Borisovna, Deiatel’nost ’ Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii po povysheniiu 
roli sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v formirovanii novogo tipa sovetskogo rabochego 
V gody pervoi piatiletki, 1928-1932 gg. (Avtoreferat dissertatsii, Leningrad, 1982).
Lunev, V. and V. Shilov, Nevskii raion (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1966).
Lysakov, P., Partrabota v tsekhu (Leningrad, 1931).
________ , Partrabota v promyshlennom raione: Opyt perestroiki partraboty v narvskoi
organizatsii (Leningrad, 1931).
Makarenko,V. P., Biurokratiia i stalinizm (Rostov-na-Donu: IzdatePstvo Rostovskogo 
universiteta, 1989).
Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1929-30).
Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 3rd edn, 10 vols. (Moscow: BoPshaia sovetskaia 
entsiklopediia, 1958-60).
Maleiko, L. A., Voprosy partiinogo stroitel’stva v gody pervoi piatiletki 1928-32 gg. 
(Avtoreferat dissertatsii, Kiev, 1959).
Meerzon, Zh., Voprosy partiinogo rukovodstva (Moscow, 1928).
______  , Na perelome polozhitel’nyi opyt perestroiki partiinoi raboty (Moscow, 1930).
361
MitePman, M., B. Glebov, and A. UPianskii, Istoriia Putilovskogo zavoda (Leningrad: 
Gosudarstvennoe sotsiaPno-ekonomicheskoe izdatePstvo, 1939).
Narodnoe khoziaistvo goroda Leningrada: StatisticheskU sbornik (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatePstvo, 1957).
Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningrada i Leningradskoi oblasti za 60 let: StatisticheskU sbornik 
(Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1977).
Narodnoe khoziaistvo Leningradskoi oblasti: StatisticheskU sbornik (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatePstvo, 1957).
Ocherki istorii Moskovskoi organizatsii KPSS, 1883-1965 (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 
1966).
Ocherki istorii Leningrada, 1 vols. (Leningrad: IzdatePstvo akademii nauk SSSP (vols. 1-3) 
and Nauka (vols. 4-7), 1955-89).
Ocherki istorii Leningrada, vol. 4.' Period velikoi oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii i 
postroeniia sotsializma v SSSR, 1917-1941 gg. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1964).
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS, 2 vols. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1962 and 
1968).
Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS, 3 vols. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1980 and 
1985).
O perevyborakh biuro kollektivov (iacheek) VKP(b) i ob ocherednykh zadachakh partiinoi 
raboty: Pis’mo Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP(b) (Leningrad, 1929).
Organizatsionno-partiinaia rabota: Iz istorii partiinogo stroitel'stva, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1969).
Osokina, Elena A., lerarkhiia potrebleniia: O zhizni liudei v usloviiakh stalinskogo 
snabzheniia, 1928-1935 gg. (Moscow: MGOU, 1993).
______________ , Za fasadom “stalinskogo izobiliia Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii
naseleniiav gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998).
Otchet o rabote partiinogo komiteta zavoda “Krasnyi putilovets” za period s pervogo maia 
1930 goda po pervoe sentiabria 1931 goda (Leningrad, 1931).
Otchet partiinogo komiteta zavoda “Krasnyi putilovets” za vremia s pervogo oktiabria 1929 
goda po pervoe maia 1930 goda (Leningrad, 1930).
Panfilova, V. Z., Formirovanie rabochego klassa SSSR v gody pervoi piatiletki, 1928-32 
(Moscow, 1964).
Pashkevich, E. F., Bor’ba Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii za sotsialisticheskuiu 
industrializatsiiu strany v 1926-1929 godakh (Leningrad, 1954).
362
Pavlov , B. V ., Rost i ukreplenie pervichnykh i nizovykh partiinykh organizatsii v 
promyshlennosti v pervye gody sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii, 1926-1933 gg. 
(L eningrad , 1972).
Pervichnaia partiinaia organizatsiia: Dokumenty KPSS (M oscow ; Izd a teP stv o  politichesko i 
literatui*y, 1970).
P irogov, P. P., VasiTevskii ostrov (L eningrad , L enizat, 1966).
P irozerskaia , A ., God pereloma v partuchebe: Opyt postanovki partprosveshcheniia v 
vasileostrovskom raione v 1930-1931 gg. (L eningrad , O giz-p ribo i, 1931).
Poliakov, lu. A ., ‘20-e gody: N astro en iia  partiinogo  av an g ard a’, Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 
10, 1989, pp. 25-38.
Polozhenie o rabote sektorov v tsekhovykh partiinykh iacheikakh (L eningrad : Izdanie 
orginsti'uk torskogo o tdela  L K  V K P (b), 1932).
Popov, I. S., Deiatel’nost’ partiinoi organizatsii Leningrada po razvitiiu massovogo
tekhnicheskogo tvorchestva 1928-1932 gg. (A vtoreferat d isserta tsii, L en ingrad , 1972).
Popov, G ., ‘5  tochki zreniia ekonomista: S romane Aleksandra Beka “Novoe naznachenie”\  
Nauka i zhizn ’, no. 4, A pril 1987, pp. 54-65.
Posle chistki: Itogi chistki Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii po materialam TsO
“Pravhfl ” (L eningrad; L enpartizdat, 1934).
P ospelov, P. N ., et al., Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 5 vols. 
(M oscow : IzdateP stvo  po litichesko i lite ra tu ry , 1964-80).
Putilovets na putiakh k oktiabriu: Iz istorii ‘Krasnogo putilovtsa ” (L eningrad: P artiinoe 
IzdateP stvo , 1933).
Rabochie Leningrada, 1703-1975: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk (Leningi'ad: N auka, 1975). 
R ashin , A. G ., Sostavfabrichno-zavodskogoproletariate SSSR (M oscow , 1930).
R ogovin , V adim , Vlast' i oppozitsii (M oscow : Teatr, 1993).
 _ , Stalmskii neoNEP (M oscow , n. p ., 1994).
 __________ , Partiia rasstreliannykh (M oscow , n. p., 1997).
R ozanov, M . M ikhail, Obukhovtsy: Istoriia zavoda "Bolshevik”, 1863-1938 (L eningrad; 
L enoblizdat, 1938).
R ybakov, A natoli i N aum ovich , Deti arbata (M oscow : K nizhnaia  palata , 1988).
R ykov, A. I., Industrializatsiia i khleb: Doklad na sobranii aktiva Leningradskoi organizatsii 
VKP(b), 30 X I 1928 g. (L eningrad: G osudarstvennoe izda teP stvo , 1928).
363
Sankt-Peterburg, Petrograd, Leningrad: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik (M oscow :
B o l’shaia  ro ssiisk a ia  en tsik loped iia , 1992).
Sbornik materialov Peterburgskogo komiteta RKP(b) (Petrograd , 1921).
Severo-zapadnaia oblast’: Kratkii StatisticheskU  spravochnik, 1926 g. (L eningrad: Izdanie 
L en ingradskogo  gubsta to tdela  i up rav len iia  upo lnom ochennogo  T sSU  po sev.-zap. 
oblasti, 1926).
S hkaratan , O. I., T zm enem iia  v  so ts ia l’nom  sostave fab richnozavodsk ikh  raboch ikh  
L eningrada, 1917-1928 ,’ Voprosy istorii SSSR, N o. 5, 1959, p. 23.
__________________ , ‘K  voprosu  ob urovne b lagososto ian iia  rabochego  k lassa SSSR  v
perekhodny i period  ot k ap ita lizm a k so tsia lizm a, 1917-1937 gg. (na m ateria lakh  
L en in g rad a)’ in Istoriia rabochego klassa Leningrada, vol. 1 (L eningrad : Izd a te l’stvo 
L en ingradskogo  un iversite ta , 1962).
S h u l’m an, S., Perestroimpartiinuiu rabotu (L eningrad , 1930).
Sergei Mironovich Kirov v Leningradskoi pechati, 1926-1934 (L eningrad : Izd a te l’stvo 
akadem ii N au k  SSSP, 1936).
S korodnikov, M . G ., "Rabochii”: Ocherk istorii ordena Oktiabr’skoi Revoliutsii priadil’no- 
tkatskoi fabriki (L eningrad: L enizdat, 1971).
S. M. Kirov i Leningradskie kommunisty, 1926-1934 (L eningrad: L en izdat, 1986).
Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrakh, vypuskX I(M oscow : P artiinoe iz d a te l’stvo, 1932).
[Stalin, I. V .], I. V Stalin: Sochineniia, 13 vols. (M oscow : G osudarstvennoe iz d a te l’stvo 
po litichesko i literatu ry , 1946-51).
S tepanov, Z. V ., Rabochie Rétrograda v period podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr’skogo 
vooruzhhennogo vosstaniia (M oscow , 1965).
Sulcnovalov, A. E. and I. N . F om enkov, Fabrika "Krasnoe Znamia”: Ocherki istorii 
Leningradskoi gosudarstvennoi ordena Lenina trikotazhno-chulochnoi fabriki "Krasnoe 
Znamia”, 1855-1967 (L eningrad: L enizdat, 1968).
T s iru l’, la , Za ratsionalizatiiupartiinoi raboty (M oscow , 1929).
T ugan-B aranovsk ii, M ., Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskoe razvitie 
russkoi favriki v XIXv. (M oscow : M oskovsk ii rabochii, 1922).
Urokdaet istoriia (M oscow : Iz d a te l’stvo po litichesko i literatury , 1989).
V aganov, F. M ., ‘O regu lirovan ii sostava partii v  1928-29 g g .’, Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 6, 
1964, pp. 65-70.
V dovin , A. I. and V. Z. D rovizhev , Rost rabochego klassa SSSR, 1917-40 gg. (M oscow ,
1976).
364
V echtom ova, E. A ., Zdes’pechatalas’ "Pravda”: Ocherk istorii tipografii no. 4 (Leningrad: 
L enizdat, 1969).
V olkogonov , Dm iti'ii, Triumf i tragediia: I. V. Stalin, politicheskii portret, 2 vols. (M oscow : 
Izd a teP stv o  agen tstva pechati N ovosti, 1989).
V olkov, V. S., Leningrad - Forpost sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii (L en ingrad , 1976).
V orosh ilov , K. E., Za general’nuiu liniiu partii: Doklad o rabote TsK VKP(b) na IFi 
Leningradskoi oblastnoi partkonferentsii, 5-7 marta 1929 g. (Leningi'ad: P ribo i, 1929).
V oronkova, K. M ., Iz istorii partiinogo prosveshcheniia v Leningrade v pervye gody 
industrializatsii, 1926-1929 gg. (L eningrad , 1969).
V oslensky , M ilchail, Nomenklatura: Gospodstvuiushchii klass Sovetskogo Soiuza (London: 
O verseas Pub lica tions In terchange, 1990).
XV  let diktatury proletariata: Ekonomiko-statisticheskii sbornik po gorodu Leningradu i 
Leningradskoi oblasti (L eningrad: Izdan ie  ob lispo lkom a i L ensoveta , 1932).
Zanin, A. F., et ah, eds., Rabochaia entsiklopediia, 1928-1980 gody (L eningrad: Lenizdat, 
1982).
Z eveleva, A. I., lu . P. S viridenko and V. V. S helokhaeva, Politicheskie partii Rossii: Istoriia 
i sovremennost’: Uchebnik dlia istoricheskikh i gumanitarnykh fakuTtetov vyshikh 
uchebnykh zavedenii (M oscow : R O S S P E N , 2000).
Z o lo tarev , N . A ., DeiateTnost’ Kommunisticheskoi partii po ulushchenii sostava svoikh 
riadov v period stroitel’stva sotsializma v SSSR, 1917-1939 (M oscow , 1970).
______________ , Vazhnyi etap organizatsionnogo ukrepleniia Kommunisticheskoi partii.
1928-1937gg. (M oscow : M ysP , 1979).
Zubarev , V. I., Partiinoe rukovodstvo sovershenstvovaniem gosudarstvennogo apparata: Iz 
opyta raboty Leningradskoi partiinoi organizatsii, 1921-1929 gg. (L eningrad: 
Izd a teP stv o  L en ingradskogo  un iverstite ta , 1979).
____________ , Partiinoe rukovodstvo sovershenstvovaniem gosudarstvennogo apparata.
1921-1929 gg. (A v to referat d isserta tsii, L eningrad , 1980).
5. B O O K S, T H E SE S, ET C ., IN  O T H E R  L A N G U A G E S 
(Includ ing  m ajo r artic les in p eriod ica ls)
A ndrle, V lad im ir, Workers in Stalin’s Russia: Industrialization and Social Change in a 
Planned Economy (N ew  Y ork: St. M a rtin ’s Press, 1988).
_, ‘D em ons and  D e v il’s A dvocates: P roblem s in H isto rica l W riting  on the
S talin  E ra ’, in N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R ittersporn , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and 
Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (London: M acm illan , 1992).
365
, A S o cia l H is to iy  o f  T w en tie th -C en tury R ussia  (New York: Routledge,
1994).
A ntonov-O vseenko , A nton, The Time o f Stalin: Portrait o f a Tyranny (N ew  Y ork: H arper &  
R ow , 1981).
A rendt, H annah , The Origins o f Totalitarianism, 3rd ed. (London: A llen  &  U nw in, 1967)
A rm strong , John  A ., The Politics o f Totalitarianism: The Communist Party o f the Soviet 
Union from 1934 to the Present (N ew  Y ork: R andom  H ouse, 1961).
A vtorkhanov , A bdurald im an., Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party: A Study in the 
Technology o f Power (M unich: Institu te  for the study o f  the U SSR , 1959).
B acon, E dw in, ‘Glasnost and the G ulag: N ew  Info rm ation  on Soviet F o rced  L abour around 
W orld  W ar IF , Soviet Studies, vol. 44, no. 6, 1992, pp. 1069-1086.
___________ , The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light o f the Archives
(B asingstoke: M acm illan , 1994).
B ailes, K. E., Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins o f the Soviet 
Technical Intelligentsia 1917-1941 (P rinceton: P rinceton  U n iversity  P ress, 1978).
B arber, John, ‘S ta lin ’s L etter to the E ditors o f  P ro le tarskaya R e v o ly u ts iy a ’, Soviet Studies, 
vol. 28, no. 1, 1976, pp. 21-41.
  , ‘T he D evelopm en t o f  Soviet E m ploym ent and L abour P o licy  1930-41’, in
D avid  Lane, ed., Labour andEmplayment in the USSR (B righton: W heatsheaf, 1986).
B aum , A nn T., Komsomol Participation in the Soviet First Five-Year Plan (B asingstoke: 
M acm illan , 1987).
B eattie , R obert, ‘A  “G reat T u rn ” T hat N ever H appened: A R econsidera tion  o f  the Soviet 
D ecree o f  L abor D isc ip line  o f  N ovem ber 1932’, Russian History/ Histoire Russe, vol. 
13, nos. 2-3, S um m er-F all 1986, pp. 235- 258.
B enevenuti, F rancesco , Kirov in Soviet Politics, 1933-34 (C R EES D iscussion  Papers, SIPS, 
no. 8, U niversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1977).
______________________ , ‘Industry  and Purge in the D onbas, 1 936-1937’, Europe-Asia Studies,
vol. 45, no. 1, 1993, pp. 57-78.
______________________ , ‘A  S ta lin ist V ic tim  o f  Stalinism : ‘S e rg o ’ O rd zh o n ik id ze ’, in Ju lian
C ooper, M aureen  Perrie , and E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in 
Honour ofR. W. Davies (London: M acm illan , 1995).
B roue, P ierre , ‘G orbachev  and H is to ry ’, in S tephen W hite, ed., New Directions in Soviet 
Histoiy (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 1992).
B row er, D aniel R, ‘C o llec tiv ized  A gricu ltu re  in Sm olensk: The Party , the  P easan try , and the 
C risis o f  1932’, The Russian Review), vol. 36, no. 2, 1977, pp. 151-166.
366
, ‘S ta lin ism  and the ‘V iew  from  B e lo w ” , The Russian Review, vol. 46, no.
4, O ctober 1987, pp. 379-381.
B rus, W lodzim ierz , ‘S talin ism  and  the “P e o p le ’s D em ocrac ies’” , in R o b ert C. T ucker, ed., 
Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork; W . W . N orton , 1977).
B rzezinsk i, Z b ign iew  K ., The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism 
(C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U n iversity  P ress, 1956).
____________________ , Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (C am bridge, M ass.:
H arvard  U niversity  Press, 1965).
Carr, E. H ., The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, vols. 1-3 (L ondon: M acm illan , 1950-3).
_________, The Interrregnum, 1923-1924 (London: M acm illan , 1954).
_________, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, v o ls .1-3 (L ondon: M acm illan , 1958-64).
_________, Foundations o f a Planned Economy, 1926-1929, vols. 1-3, vol. 1 w ith  R .W .
D avies (London: M acm illan , 1969-78).
C arrere  d ’E ncausse, H elene, A History o f the Soviet Union 1917-1953, vol. 2, Stalin: Order 
through Terror, trans. V. lo n escu  (L ondon: L ongm an, 1981).
C attell, D avid  T., Leningrad: A Case Study o f Soviet Urban Government (N ew  Y ork, 
P raeger, 1968).
C hannon, John, ed.. Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR (L ondon: M acm illan , 1998).
C hase, W illiam  J., ‘T he D ia lec tics o f  P roduction  M eetings, 1 9 23-29 ’, Russian History/ 
Histoire Russe, vol. 13, nos. 2-3, Sum m er-F all 1986, pp. 149-186.
 , Workers, Society and the Soviet State: Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918-
1929 (U rbana: U niversity  o f  Illino is Press, 1987).
_____________, ‘Social H isto ry  and  R ev ision ism  o f  the S talin ist E ra ’, The Russian Review,
vol. 46, no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 382-385.
_____________ , and  J. A rch  G etty , ‘The Soviet B ureaucracy  in 1935: A  Socio -P o litical
P ro file ’, in  John  W . Sti'ong, ed., Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism 
(C olum bus, O hio: S lav ica P ublishers, 1990).
C huev, Feliks Ivanov ich , Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with 
Felix Chuev (C hicago: I. R. D ee, 1993).
C ohen, S tephen F., Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888- 
1938 (London: W ildw ood H ouse, 1974).
___________________ , ‘B o lshev ism  and S ta lin ism ’, in R obert C. T ucker, ed., Stalinism: Essays
in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton, 1977).
367
Rethinking the Soviet Experience, Politics and History Since 1917
(O xford: O xford  U niversity  Press, 1985).
______________ , ‘S ta lin ’s T erro r as Social H is to ry ’, The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 4,
O ctober 1986, pp. 375-384.
C onquest, R obert, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge o f the Thirties (L ondon: M acm illan , 
1968).
   , Inside Stalin’s Secret Police: NKVD Politics 1936-39 (London:
M acm illan , 1985).
_, The Harvest o f Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine
(London: H utch inson , 1986).
_, ‘R ev ision izing  S ta lin ’s R u ss ia ’, The Russian Review’, vol. 46, no. 4,
O ctober 1987, pp. 386-390.
 , Stalin and the Kirov Murder (London: H utch inson , 1989).
  , The Great Terror: A Reassessment (London: H utch inson , 1990).
, ‘E xcess D eaths and C am p N um bers: Som e C o m m en ts’, Soviet Studies,
vol. 43, no. 5, 1991, pp. 949-952.
C ooper, Ju lian , M aureen  P e n ie , and E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in 
Honour ofR. W. Davies (London: M acm illan , 1995).
D aniels, R obert V incent, The Conscience o f the Revolution: Communist Oppostion in Soviet 
Russia (C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U niversity  Press, 1960).
 , The End o f the Communist Revolution (L ondon: R outledge, 1993).
D avid-Fox, M ichael, and D avid  H offm ann, ‘The Politburo  P ro tocols, 1 9 19-40 ’, The Russian 
Review, vol. 55, no. 1, January  1996, pp. 99-103.
D avies, R. W ., The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation o f Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930 
(London: M acm illan , 1980).
____________ , The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929- 7959 (L ondon: M acm illan , 1980).
_______________, ‘The S yrtsov-L om inadze  A ffa ir’, Soviet Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, January  1981,
pp. 29-50.
, ‘The E nding  o f  M ass U nem ploym en t in the U S S R ’, in D avid  Lane, ed.,
Labour and Emplayment in the USSR (B righton: W heatsheaf, 1986).
______  , The Soviet Economy in Turmoil 1929- 1930 (L ondon: M acm illan , 1989).
________ , Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (L ondon: M acm illan , 1989).
368
‘E conom ic A spects o f  S ta lin ism ’, in A lec N ove, ed., The Stalin Phenomenon
(L ondon: W eidenfe ld  &  N ico lson , 1993).
 _____ , ‘T he M anagem en t o f  S ov iet Industry , 1928-41’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and
L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: 
Ind iana U n iversity  P ress, 1993).
 , Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 1931- 1933 (L ondon: M acm illan ,
1996).
 , Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era (London: M acm illan , 1997).
_, and S. G. W heatcro ft, ‘F u rth er T houghts on the F irs t S ov iet F ive Y ear P la n ’,
Slavic Review, vol. 34, no. 4, 1975, pp. 790- 802.
 , M ark  H a n iso n  and S. G. W heatcro ft, eds.. The Economic Transformation o f
the Soviet Union, 1913- 1945 (C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1994).
D avies, Sarah, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934- 
1941 (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1997).
D eutscher, Isaac, The Prophet Unarmed, Trotslcy, 1921-1929 (L ondon: O xford  U niversity  
Press, 1959).
______________ , The Prophet Outcast, Trotsky, 1929-1940 (L ondon: O xford  U niversity
P ress, 1963).
__________ , Stalin: A Political Biography, 2nd edn (London: O xfo rd  U niversity  Press,
1967).
D iilas, M ilovan , The New Class: An Analysis o f the Communist System (L ondon: T ham es & 
H udson , 1957).
 , Conversations with Stalin (N ew  Y ork: H areourt, 1962).
D obb, M aurice  H erbert, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917 (L ondon: R outledge & 
K egan  Paul, 1948).
E ley , G eoff, ‘H isto ry  w ith  the Po litics L eft O ut - A g a in ? ’, The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 
4, O ctober 1986, pp. 385-394.
___________ , ‘Soviet Industria liza tion  from  a E uropean  P ersp ec tiv e ’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg
and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds., Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization 
(B loom ington: Ind iana  U n iversity  P ress, 1993).
E lle instein , Jean, The Stalin Phenomenon (London: L aw rence and W ishart, 1976).
E llm an, M ichael, ‘A  N ote on the N u m b er o f  1933 Fam ine V ic tim s’, Soviet Studies, vol. 43, 
no. 2, 1991, pp. 375-379.
Engel, B arbara  A ., and A nastasia  P osadskaya-V anderbeck , eds., A Revolution o f Their Own: 
Voices o f Women in Soviet History (B oulder: W estv iew  Press, 1998).
369
E rlich, A lexander, The Soviet Industrialization Debate 1924-1928 (C am bridge, M ass.: 
H arvard  U niversity  Press, 1960).
Fainsod , M erle , How Russia is Ruled (C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U n iversity  P ress, 1953).
____________ , Smolensk under Soviet Rule (L ondon: M acm illan , 1959).
F iltzer, D onald  A ., Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialisation: The Formation o f Modern- 
Soviet Production Relations (L ondon: P lu to , 1986).
F itzpatrick , Sheila, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (B loom ington: Ind iana 
U n iversity  P ress, 1978).
 , Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934
(C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 1979).
 , ‘S talin  and the M aking  o f  a N ew  E lite 1928-1939’, Slavic Review, vol.
38, no. 3, Sep tem ber 1979, pp. 377-402,
 , The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932 (O xford: O xfo rd  U n iversity  Press,
1982).
_______________ , ‘The R ussian  R evo lu tion  and  Social M obility : A  R e-exam ina tion  o f  the
Q uestion  o f  Social Support for the Soviet R egim e in the 1920s and  1 930s’, Politics and 
Society, vol. 13, no. 2, 1984, pp. 119-141.
 , ‘O rd zh o n ik id ze ’s T akeover o f  V esenka: A  C ase S tudy  m Soviet
B ureaucra tic  P o litic s ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, A pril 1985, pp. 153-172. 
 , ‘A fter N E P: the Fate  o f  N E P  Entei*preneurs, Sm all T raders, and A rtisans
in the “ S ocialist R u ssia” o f  the  1 930s’, Russian History/ Histoire Russe, vol. 13, nos. 2- 
3, S um m er-F all 1986, pp. 187-234.
 , et ah, ‘N ew  P erspectives on S tan lin ism ’, d iscussion  in The Russian
Review, vol. 45, no. 4, O ctober 1986, pp. 357-413, and vol. 46, no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 
379-431.
____________ , The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia
(Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  P ress, 1992).
_, ‘H ow  the M ice B uried  the Cat: Scenes from  the G reat Purges o f  1937 in
the R ussian  P ro v in ces’, The Russian Review, vol. 52, no. 3, Ju ly  1993, pp. 299-320. 
_______________ , ‘C onsti'ucting  S talin ism : R eflections on C hang ing  W estern  and Soviet
P erspectives on the S talin  E ra ’, in A lec N ove, ed.. The Stalin Phenomenon (London: 
W eiden fe ld  &  N ico lson , 1993).
_______________ , ‘T he G reat D eparture: R ural-U ban  M igration  in the S ov iet U nion, 1929-
3 3 ’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f 
Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: Ind iana  U niversity  Press, 1993).
370
_______________ , ‘T he Im p ac t o f  the G reat P urges on Soviet E lites: A  C ase S tudy from
M oscow  and L en ingrad  T elephone D irec to ries o f  the 1930s’, in J. A rch  G etty  and 
R oberta  T. M anning , eds., Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge 
U niversity  Press, 1993).
____________ , Stalin ’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Soviet Village after
Collectivisation (O xford: O xford  U n iversity  Press, 1994).
_______________ , ‘W orkers against B osses: T he im pact o f  the G reat P urges on L abor-
M anagem en t R e la tio n s’, in L ew is H. S iegelbaum  and R onald  G rigo r Suny, eds., Making 
Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
______________ , ‘S upplican ts and C itizens: Pub lic  L e tter-W riting  in Soviet R ussia  in the
1930s’, R/avic Review, vol. 55, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 78-105.
 , ‘S ignals from  B elow : Soviet L etters o f  D enuncia tion  o f  the 1930s’,
Journal o f Modern History’, vol. 68, no. 4, D ecem ber 1996, pp. 831-866.
_______   ‘E d ito r’s In troduction : P etitions and D enuncia tions in R ussian  and Soviet
H is to ry ’, Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 24, nos. 1-2, S p ring -S um m er 1997, pp. 1- 
9.
_____________ , com pile r and ed itor, ‘T he L etter as a W ork  o f  A rt: A  H ousing  C laim  in
the S tyle o f  an A n k e ta ’, Russian Histoiy/Histoire Russe, vol. 24, nos. 1-2, Spring- 
S um m er 1997, pp. 189-202.
 , com piler and  editor, ‘F rom  Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s F iles: L ife S tory o f  a
P easan t S tr iv e r’, Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 24, nos. 1-2, Spring-S um m er 
1997, pp. 215-237.
_______________ , ed., Stalinism: New Directions (L ondon: R ou tledge, 1999).
____________ , Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet
Russia in the 1930s (O xford: O xford  U niversity  Press, 1999).
_______________ , ed., Stalinism: A Reader (London: R outledge, 1999).
_______________ , and L ynne V io la , eds., A Researcher’s Guide to Sources on Soviet
Social History in the 1930s (A rm onk, N Y : M . E. Sharpe, 1990).
 , and R obert G ella te ly , ‘ In troduction  to  the P ractices o f  D enuncia tion  in
M o d em  E uropean  H is to ry ’, Journal o f Modern History, vol. 68, no. 4, D ecem ber 1996, 
pp. 747-767.
Friedrich , C arl J., and Z b ign iew  K. B rzezinsk i, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
(C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U niversity  Press, 1956).
G arros, V éronique, N ata lia  K orenevskaya, and  T hom as L ahusen, eds., Intimacy and Terror: 
Soviet Diaries o f the 1930s (N ew  Y ork: T he N ew  Press, 1995).
371
G elb, M ichael, ‘M ass Po litics u nder S talin ism : Tw o Case S tu d ies ,’ in  John  W . S trong, ed.. 
Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (C olum bus, O hio: S lav ica Publishers, 
1990).
G etty , J. A rch, ‘P arty  and P urge  in Sm olensk: 1933-1937’, Slavic Review, vol. 42, no. 1, 
Spring 1983, pp. 60-79.
________________, ‘R e p ly ’, Slavic Review, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 92-96.
_________ , Origins o f the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered,
1933-1938 (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 1985).
, ‘S tate and  Society  under S talin: C onstitu tions and  E lec tions in  the 1930s’,
Slavic Review, vol. 50, no. 1, S pring  1991, pp. 18-35.
_________ , The P olitics o f  R epression  R ev is ited ’, in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T.
M anning , eds., Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  
P ress, 1993).
_________ , ‘The P olitics o f  S ta lin ism ’, in A lec N ove, ed.. The Stalin Phenomenon
(L ondon: W eidenfe ld  &  N ico lson , 1993).
_________ , G abor T. R ittersporn , and V ik to r N . Z em skov, ‘V ic tim s o f  the Soviet Penal
System  in  the P re-W ar Y ears: A  F irs t A pproach  on the B asis o f  A rch ival E v id en ce’, 
American Historical Review, vol. 98, no. 4, O ctober 1993, pp. 1017-49.
 ______, and R oberta  T. M anning , eds.. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives
(C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1993).
_________ , and  W illiam  C hase, ‘P atterns o f  R epression  A m ong  the Soviet E lite  in the
Late 1930s: A  B iograph ical A p p ro ach ’, in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds., 
Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge U n iv ersity  Press, 1993).
  , and O leg V. N aum ov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction o f
the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (N ew  H aven: Y ale  U niversity  Press, 1999).
G ill, G raem e, The Rules o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (A rm onk, NY: M. E. 
S haipe, 1988).
  _, The Origins o f the Stalinist Political System (C am bridge: C am bridge
U niversity  Press, 1990).
 , Stalinism (London: M acm illan , 1990), 2nd edn (L ondon: M acm illan , 1998),
 , ‘S talin ism  and  Institu tionaliza tion : the N ature  o f  S ta lin ’s R egional S u p p o rt’, in
John W . S trong, ed., Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (C olum bus, Ohio: 
S lav ica P ublishers, 1990).
G inzburg, E vgeniia , Into the Whirlwind, ti'ans. by  Paul S tevenson  and M ax H ayw ard  
(London: C ollins & H arv ill Press, 1967).
372
Press, 1981).
, Within the Whirlwind, ti'ans. by  Ian B oland  (L ondon: C ollins & H arvill
G oldm an, W endy Z., Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 
1917-1936 (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 1993).
_______  , ‘Industria l P o litics, P easan t R ebellion , and the D eath  o f  the P ro letarian
W o m en ’s M ovem en t in the U S S R ’, Slavic Review, vol. 55, no. 1, Spring  1996, pp. 46- 
77.
G ooderham , P. O., The Regional Party Appartus in the First Five Year Plan: the Case o f 
Leningrad (C R EES D iscussion  Papers, SIPS, no. 24, U niversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1983).
G ouldner, A lv in  W ., ‘S talin ism : A  S tudy  o f  In ternal C o lo n ia lism ’, Telos, vol. 34, 1977-78, 
pp. 5-48.
G regor, R ichard , ed., Resolutions and Decisions o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union, 
vol. 2, The Early Soviet Period: 1917-1929 (Toronto: U niversity  o f  T oronto  Press, 
1974).
G rim stead , P. K ., Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the USSR: Moscow and 
Leningrad (P rinceton: P rinceton  U n iversity  P ress, 1972).
______________, A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR (T he W oodrow  W ilson
In ternational C en ter for Scholars, T he K ennan  Institu te  for A dvanced  R ussian  Studies,
1989).
G ross, Jan T., ‘A  N ote  on the N ature  o f  S ov iet T o ta lita rian ism ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, 
Ju ly  1982, pp. 367-376.
H agenloh , Paul, “ ‘Socially  H arm fu l E lem en ts” and the G reat T e rro r’, in Sheila  F itzpatrick , 
ed., Stalinism: New Directions (L ondon: R outledge, 1999).
H alfin , Igal, and Jochen H ellbeck , ‘R eth ink ing  the S talin ist Subject: S tephen  K o tk in ’s 
“M agnetic  M o u n ta in ” and the S tate o f  Soviet H istorical S tu d ie s’, Jahrbücher fUr 
Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 44, no. 3, 1996, pp. 456-463.
H a m s, Jam es R., ‘The Purg ing  o f  Local C liques in the U rals R egion, 1936-7’ in Sheila 
F itzpatrick , ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London: R outledge, 1999).
H atch, John, ‘The Po litics o f  Industria l E ffic iency  during  N EP: T he 1926 Rezhim Ekonomii 
C am paign  in M o sco w ’, in S tephen  W hite, ed.. New Directions in Soviet Histoiy 
(C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 1992).
H ill, R onald  J., and P eter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 3rd ed. (B oston: U nw in 
H ym an, 1986).
Histoiy o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (M oscow : 
Foreign  L anguages P ub lish ing  H ouse, 1939).
373
H offm an, D avid  L., ‘T he G reat T e n o r  on the Local Level: Purges in M oscow  Factories, 
1936-1938’, in J. A rch G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds., Stalinist Terror: New 
Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity  P ress, 1993).
_______________ , Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929-1941 (Ithaca:
C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
H ogan, H eather, ‘C lass F o rm ation  in the St. P etersbu rg  M eta lw ork ing  Industry : F rom  the 
“D ays o f  F reed o m ” to the L ena G oldfie lds M assac re ’, in L ew is H . S iegelbaum  and 
R onald  G rigor Suny, eds.. Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaca: 
C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
H ough, Jerry  F., The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making 
(C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U n iversity  Press, 1969).
 , The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (C am bridge , M ass.: H arvard
U niversity  Press, 1977).
_, ‘T he “D ark  F o rces ,” the T ota lita rian  M odel, and  Soviet H is to iy ’, The
Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 397-403.
 , and M erle  F ainsod , How the Soviet Union is Governed (C am bridge, M ass.:
H arvard  U n iversity  P ress, 1979).
H ughes, D. A., Zinoviev, the Leningrad Party Organisation and the 1925 Opposition 
(unpub lished  M SocSci d isserta tion . U n iversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1977).
H unter, H olland , ‘T he O veram bitious F irst Soviet F ive-Y ear P la n ’, Slavic Review, vol. 32, 
no. 2, June 1973, pp. 237-257.
________________, ‘Soviet A gricu ltu re  w ith  and w ithou t C o llec tiv iza tio n ’, Slavic Review, vol.
47, no. 2, Sum m er 1988, pp. 203-216.
____________, ‘W hy w ere the Faulty  Foundations N ever R ep a ired ? ’, in Ju lian  C ooper,
M aureen  Perrie , and E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour o f R. 
W. Davies (L ondon: M acm illan , 1995).
_____________ , and  Janusz  M . Szyrm er, Faulty Foundations: Soviet Economic Policies,
1928-1940 (P rinceton: P rinceton  U n iversity  Press, 1992).
Inkeles, A lex, and  R aym ond  A. B auer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian 
Society (C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard  U n iversity  Press, 1959).
Jasny, N aum , Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952 (C hicago: U n iversity  o f  C h icago  Press, 
1961).
K arcz, Jerzy  F,, ‘B ack  on the G rain  F ro n t’, Soviet Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, O ctober 1970, pp. 
262-294.
K elly , C atriona, and D av id  S hepherd , eds., Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction 
(O xford: O xford  U n iversity  P ress, 1998).
374
and David Shepherd, eds., C onstructing  R ussian  C ulture in the A g e  o f
Revolution, 1881-1940 {Oxïor&. O xford  U niversity  Press, 1998).
K enez, Peter, ‘S talin ism  as H um drum  P o litic s ’, The Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 4, O ctober 
1986, pp. 395-400.
K ershaw , Ian, and M oshe Lew in, eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison 
(C am bridge; C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1997).
K harkhord in , O leg, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study o f Practices 
(B erkeley: U n iversity  o f  C alifo rn ia  Press, 1999).
K hlevniuk , O leg  V., ‘T he O bjectives o f  the G reat Terror, 1937-38’, in Ju lian  C ooper, 
M aureen  Perrie , and E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour o f R. 
W. Davies (L ondon: M acm illan , 1995).
________________ , In Stalin’s Shadow: The Career o f ‘Sergo ’ Ordzhonikidze, edited  w ith
an in troduction  by  D onald  J. R ale igh  (A rm onk, N .Y .: M . E. Sharpe, 1995).
[K hrushchev, N ik ita  S ergeevich], Khrushchev Remembers, vol. 1, b an s , and ed. by  S trobe 
T albo tt (L ondon: Penguin  B ooks, 1971).
[_________________________ ], Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and
ed. by  S trobe T alb o tt (B oston: L ittle  B row n, 1974).
[__________________________], Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and
ed. by  Jerro ld  L. S checter w ith  V yacheslav  V. L uchkov (B oston: L ittle  B row n, 1990).
K neen, Peter, ‘The B ackground  to Perestroika: Political Undercurrents R econsidered  in the 
L igh t o f  R ecen t E v en ts’, in N ick  L am pert and  G abor T. R itte rspom , eds., Stalinism: Its 
Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (L ondon; M acm illan , 1992).
K nei-Paz, B aruch, The Social and Political Thought o f Leon Trotslty (O xford: O xford  
U niversity  Press, 1978).
K night, A m y W ., The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union (L ondon: U nw in Flym an,
1988).
_________________ , ‘B eria  and the C u lt o f  S talin: R ew riting  T ran scau casian  P arty  H is to ry ’,
Soviet Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, 1991, pp. 749-763.
______________ , Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton: P rinceton  U n iversity  Press,
1993).
K olakow ski, L eszek, ‘M arx ist R oots o f  S ta lin ism ’, in R obert C. T ucker, ed., Stalinism: 
Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton , 1977).
K otkin , S tephen, ‘P eop ling  M agnitostro i: T he P olitics o f  D e m o g rap h y ’, in W illiam  G. 
R osenberg  and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization 
(B loom ington: Ind iana  U n iversity  Press, 1993).
375
________  , ‘C oerc ion  and Identity : W o rk e rs ’ L ives in S ta lin ’s S how case C ity ’, in
L ew is H. S iegelbaum  and R onald  G rigor Suny, eds., Making Workers Soviet: Power, 
Class, and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iv ersity  Press, 1994).
_________ , Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilisation (B erkeley : U niversity  o f
C alifo rn ia  Press, 1995).
________________, ‘ 1991 and the R ussian  R evolu tion : Sources, C oncep tual C ategories,
A naly tical F ram ew o rk s’, Journal o f Modern History, vol. 70, no. 2, June  1998, pp. 384- 
425.
K urom iya, H iroaki, ‘E d inonachalie  and the Sov iet Industrial M anager, 1 9 28-37 ’, Soviet 
Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, A pril 1984, pp. 185-204.
 ______   ,‘The C risis o f  P ro le tarian  Identity  in the S ov ie t F actory , 1928-1929’,
Slavic Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 1985, pp. 280-297.
______________ , ‘S ta lin ism  and  H istorical R ese a rc h ’, The Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4,
O ctober 1987, pp. 404-406 .
, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1932
(C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity  Press, 1988).
 , ‘S ta lin ist TeiTor in the  D onbas: A  N o te ’, in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T.
M anning , eds., Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  
Press, 1993).
, ‘The C om m ander and the R ank  and File: M an ag in g  the Soviet C oal-
M ining  Industiy , 1928-33’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds., 
Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: Ind iana  U niversity  Press, 
1993).
___________ , Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland,
1870s-1990s (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iv ersity  Press, 1998).
L am pert, N icholas, The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State: A Study o f Soviet 
Managers and Technicians 1928-1935 (London: M acm illan , 1979).
L am pert, N ick  and G abor T. R itte rspom , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in 
Honour o f Moshe Lewin (L ondon: M acm illan , 1992).
Lane, D avid , State and Politics in the USSR (O xford: B asil B lackw ell, 1985).
L aqueur, W alter, Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations (London: U nw in H ym an, 1990).
Ledeneva, A lena, Russia’s Economy o f Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange 
(C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1998).
Lenoe, M atthew  L., ‘R eader R esponse  to the Soviet P ress C am paign  against the T ro tsk ii- 
Z in o v ’ev O pposition , 1 926-1928’, Russian Histoiy/Histoire Russe, vol. 24, nos. 1-2, 
S pring-S um m er 1997, pp. 89-116.
376
L evytsky , B oris, éd.. The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documentation from the Soviet 
Press (S tanford: H oover In stitu tion  P ress, 1974),
Lew , R oland, ‘G rapp ling  w ith  Social R ealities: M oshe L ew in and the M ak ing  o f  Social 
H is to iy ’, in N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R itterspom , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and 
Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (London: M acm illan , 1992).
Lew in, M oshe, ‘The Im m ed ia te  B ackground  o f  Soviet C o llec tiv iza tio n ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 
17, no. 2, 1965-1966, pp. 162-197.
______________ , ‘W ho w as the S ov iet K u la k ? ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 1966-67, pp.
189-212.
_, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study o f Collectivisation (London:
G eorge A llen  &  U nw in , 1968).
________ , Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Development: Bukharin and the
Modern Reformers (P rinceton: P rinceton  U niversity  Press, 1974).
__________ , ‘The Social B ackground  o f  S ta lin ism ’, in  R obert C. T ucker, ed., Stalinism:
Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton , 1977).
, ‘Society, S tate and Ideology  during  the F irst F iv e-Y ear P la n ’, in Sheila
F itzpatrick , ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia 1928-31 (B loom ing ton : Ind iana 
U niversity  Press, 1978).
 , The Making o f the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History o f Interwar
Russia (London: M ethuen , 1985).
__________ , ‘O n Soviet In d u stria liza tio n ’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and L ew is H.
S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: Indiana 
U niversity  P ress, 1993).
, ‘C onclud ing  R em ark s’, in L ew is H. S iegelbaum  and  R onald  G rigor Suny,
eds., Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaca: G om el 1 U niversity  
Press, 1994).
________ , Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift o f a Superstate (N ew  Y ork: N ew
Press, 1995).
__________ , ‘B ureaucracy  and the S ta lin ist S ta te ’, in Ian  K ershaw  and M oshe Lew in,
eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (C am bridge: C am bridge 
U niversity  Press, 1997).
__________ , ‘S talin  in  the M irro r o f  the O th e r’, in Ian K ershaw  and M oshe Lew in, eds..
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  
Press, 1997).
L ib, L ars T., O leg V. N aum ov  and O leg V. K hlevniuk , eds., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 
1925-1936 (N ew  H aven: Y ale U niversity  Press, 1995).
377
Lyons, E ugene, Assignment in Utopia (London: G eorge G. H arrap , 1938); w ith  a new  
in troduction  by  E llen  F rankel Paul (N ew  B runsw ick: T ransac tion  P ub lishers, 1991)
M alia, M artin , ‘L en in ist E n d g am e’, Daedalus, vol. 121, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 57-75.
M andel, D avid , The Petrograd Workers and the Fall o f the Old Regime (L ondon: M acm illan ,
1983).
M andelsh tam , N adezhda, Hope against Hope: A Memoir, trans. M . H ayw ard  (London: 
C ollins & H arv ill Press, 1971).
___________________ , Hope Abandoned, trans. M . H ayw ard  (L ondon: F larvill P ress, 1974).
M ann, M ichael, ‘The C ontrad itions o f  C on tinuous R ev o lu tio n ’, in Ian K ershaw  and M oshe 
Lew in, eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (C am bridge: 
C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1997).
M anning , R oberta  T., ‘S tate and Society  in S ta lin ist R u ssia ’, The Russian Review, vol. 46, 
no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 407-411.
 , ‘T he G reat P urges in a R ural D istrict: B elyi R aion  R ev is ited ’, The
Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 16, nos. 2-4, 1989, pp. 409-433 .
 __________  , ‘T he G reat P urges in a R ural D istrict: B elyi R aion  R ev is ited ’, in J. A rch
G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds.. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: 
C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1993).
_______________ , ‘The S ov iet E conom ic C risis o f  1936-1940 and  the G reat P u rg e s’, in J.
A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds.. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives 
(C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  Press, 1993).
M arkovic , M ihailo , ‘S ta lin ism  and M arx ism ’, in R obert C. T ucker, ed., Stalinism: Essays in 
Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton, 1977).
M artin , T e n y , ‘The O rig ins o f  Soviet E thnic C lean sin g ’, Journal o f Modern History, vol. 70, 
no. 4, D ecem ber 1998, pp. 813-861.
_____________ , ‘M odern iza tion  or N eo-T rad itionalism ? A scribed  N a tio n a lity  and Soviet
P rim o rd ia lism ’, in Sheila  F itzpatrick , ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London: 
R outledge, 1999).
M aw dsley , E van and M argare t M aw dsley , Moscow and Leningrad (L ondon: E rnest B enn, 
1980).
M aw dsley , Evan, The Stalin Years: the Soviet Union, 1929-1953 (M anchester: M anchester 
U n iversity  Press, 1998).
M cA uley, M aiy , Bureaucracy and Revolution: The Lesson from Leningrad 1917-1927 
(R ussian  and E ast E uropean  S tudies C en h e  D iscussion  P aper Series, no. 4, U niversity  o f  
Essex, 1984)
378
B rea d  a n d  Justice: S ta te  a n d  Socie ty  in P etrograd, 1917-1922  (Oxford:
C larendon  Press, 1991).
M cC auley , M artin , Stalin and Stalinism (L ondon: L ongm an, 1995).
M cN eal, R obert H ., ‘T he D ecisions o f  the C PSU  and the G reat P u rg e ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 
23, no. 2, 1971, pp. 177-185.
___________________ , ed.. Resolutions and Decisions o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet
Union, vol. 3, The Stalin Years: 1929-1953 (Toronto: U n iversity  o f  T oron to  Press, 
1974).
 , ‘T ro tsky ist In terp re ta tions o f  S ta lin ism ’, in  R obert C. T ucker, ed.,
Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton , 1977). 
 , Stalin: Man and Ruler (L ondon: M acm illan , 1988).
M edvedev , R oy A ., Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences o f Stalinism (London: 
M acm illan , 1972).
 , ‘N ew  Pages from  the P o litica l B iography o f  S ta lin ’, in R obert C. T ucker,
ed., Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton , 1977).
 , On Stalin and Stalinism (O xford: O xford  U n iversity  P ress, 1979).
___________ , All Stalin 's Men (O xford: B lackw ell, 1983).
M erl, S tephan, ‘Social M o b ility  in the  C o u n try sid e ’, in W illiam  G. R o senberg  and  L ew is H. 
S iegelbaum , eds., Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ing ton : Ind iana 
U n iversity  Press, 1993).
M e m d a le , C atherine, Moscow Politics and the Rise o f Stalin: The Communist Party in the
Capital, 1925-32 (London: M acm illan , 1990).
_____________________, ‘T he M oscow  P arty  and the S ocialist O ffensive: A ctiv ists and
W orkers, 1928-1931’, in  S tephen  W hite , ed.. New Directions in Soviet History 
(C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1992).
_________________, ‘T he O rig ins o f  the S ta lin ist State: Pow er and P o litics in M oscow ,
1928-32’, in John C hannon, ed.. Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR (L ondon: 
M acm illan , 1998).
M ikoyan , Sergo, ‘S ta lin ism  as I Saw  I t ’, in  A lec N ove, ed., The Stalin Phenomenon (London: 
W eiden fe ld  &  N ico lson , 1993).
M iller, Jam es R., ‘Sov iet R ap id  D evelopm en t and the A gricu ltu ra l S urp lus H y p o th es is ’, 
Soviet Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, Ju ly  1970, pp. 77-93.
________________, ‘The A gricu ltu ra l S urplus H ypothesis: A R eply  to A lec N o v e ’, Soviet
Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, 1971-72, pp. 302-306.
379
‘M ass C o llec tiv iza tion  and the C on tribu tion  o f  Soviet A gricu ltu re  to the
F irst F ive Y ear P la n ’, Slavic Review, vol. 33, no. 4, D ecem ber 1974, pp. 750-766. 
_________ , The Soviet Economic Experiment, ed. S. J. L inz (C ham paign  IL.; U niversity
o f  Illino is Press, 1990).
 , and C orinne A. G untzel, ‘The E conom ics and P olitics o f  C o llec tiv iza tion
R econsidered : A  R ev iew  A rtic le ’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 8, no. 1, 
1970-71, pp. 103-116.
____________, and A lec N ove, ‘W as S talin  R eally  N ecessary?: A  D ebate  on
C o llec tiv iza tio n ’, Problems o f Communism, vol. 25, no. 4, Ju ly -A ugust 1976, pp. 49-62.
M oses, Joel C., Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR (N ew  Y ork: 
P raeger, 1974).
M oty l, A lexander J., ed., Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and 
Comparison in the Study o f the USSR (N ew  Y ork: C olum bia  U n iversity  Press, 1992).
M unting , R oger, The Economic Development o f the USSR (L ondon: C room  Eielm, 1982).
N ico laevsky , B oris I., Power and the Soviet Elite: The ‘Letter o f an Old Bolshevik' and 
Other Essays, ed. J. D. Z agoria  w ith  an in troduction  by G. F. K ennan  (S tanford: H oover 
Institu te  Pub lica tions, Pall M all P ress, 1966).
N ord lander, D av id  J., ‘ O rig ins o f  a G ulag  C apital: M agadan  and S ta lin ist C ontro l in the  Early 
1930s’, S'/avic Review, vol. 57, no. 4, W in ter 1998, pp. 791-812.
N ove, A lec, Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics, or Was Stalin Really Necessary? 
(N ew  Y ork: P raeger, 1964).
, Was Stalin Really Necessary?: Some Problems o f Soviet Political Economy
(London: G eorge A llen  &  U nw in , 1964).
 , An Economic History o f the U.S.S.R. (F larm onds w orth: Pengu in  B ooks, 1969).
 , ‘The A gricu ltu ra l Surp lus H ypothesis: A  C om m ent on Jam es R. M illa r’s
A rtic le ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1970-71, pp. 394-401.
 , ‘A  R eply  to the R e p ly ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, 1971-72, pp. 307-308.
 , ‘Is T here a R u ling  C lass in the U S S R ?’, Soviet Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, O ctober
1975, pp. 615-638.
 , Stalinism and After (L ondon: G eorge A llen  &  U nw in , 1975; 2nd  edn., 1981).
_, ‘S talin ism : R ev ision ism  R eco n sid e red ’, The Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4,
O ctober 1987, pp. 412-417 .
 , Stalinism (L ondon: H isto rica l A ssociation , 1987).
, Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev (London: U nw in  H ym an, 1989).
380
Glasnost in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia (L ondon: U nw in H ym an,
1989).
‘H ow  m any  v ic tim s in the  1930s’, Soviet Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, A pril 1990, pp.
369-373.
 , ‘H ow  m any  v ic tim s in the 1930s 11’, Soviet Studies, vol. 42, no. 4, 1990, pp. 811-
814.
 , Studies in Economics and Russia (B asingstoke: M acm illan , 1990).
 , ‘Sov iet P easan ts and  S ov ie t L ite ra tu re ’, in N ick  L am p ert and G abor T.
R itte rspom , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe 
Lewin (L ondon: M acm illan , 1992).
, ed., The Stalin Phenomenon (L ondon: W eidenfe ld  &  N ico lson , 1993).
 , ‘V ic tim s o f  S talin ism : H ow  M an y ? ’, in  J, A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning ,
eds.. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 
1993).
 _____, ‘T erro r V ic tim s - Is the E v idence  C o m p le te? ’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no.
3, 1994, pp. 535-7.
N utter, G. W arren , The Growth o f Industrial Production in the Soviet Union (P rinceton: 
P rinceton  U n iversity  P ress, 1962).
Orlovslcy, D an iel, ‘T he H idden  C lass: W h ite -C o lla r W orkers in  the S o v ie t 1920s’, in L ew is 
H. S iegelbaum  and  R onald  G rigo r Suny, eds., Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, 
and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iv ersity  P ress, 1994).
O sokina, E lena A ., Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art o f Survival in Stalin’s 
Russia, 1927-1941, ed. and trans. by  K ate S. T ranschel and G reta  B u ch er (A rm onk, NY : 
M . E. Sharpe, 1999).
Perrie , M aureen , ‘T he T sar, the E m peror, the Leader; Ivan the T enab le , P e te r the G reat and 
A nato lii R y b ak o v ’s S ta lin ’, in N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R itte rsp o m , eds., Stalinism: 
Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (L ondon: M acm illan , 
1992).
P ethybridge , R oger, The Social Prelude to Stalinism (London: M acm illan , 1974).
P om per, Philip , Lenin, Trotslcy and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power (N ew  Y ork: 
C o lum bia  U n iveristy  Press, 1990).
Pons, Silvio, ‘S ta lin ism  and  P arty  O rgan isa tion  (1 9 3 3 -4 8 )’ in John  C hannon , ed., Politics, 
Society and Stalinism in the USSR (L ondon: M acm illan , 1998).
Preobrazhenslcy, E vgenii A ., The Crisis o f Soviet Industrialization: Selected Essays, ed. by 
D onald  F itzer (N ew  Y ork: M . E. Shaipe , 1979).
381
R adzinsk ii, E dvard , Stalin: The First In-depth Biography on Explosive New Documents from  
Russia’s Secret Archives, transla ted  by  H. T. W ille tts (N ew  Y ork: D oubleday , 1996).
_______________ , Stalin (M oscow : V agrius, 1997).
R aleigh , D onald  J., Soviet Historians and Perestroika: The First Phase (A rm onk, N Y : M .E. 
Sharpe, 1989).
 ________ , ‘T he R ussian  A rchive S e rie s ’, The Russian Reviev\>, vol. 55, no. 4,
O ctober 1996, pp. 692-98.
R ado, A ., Guide à travers l ’Union Soviétique (B erlin: N euer D eu tscher V erlag , 1928).
R assw eiler, A nne D ., ‘S ov ie t L abor P o licy  in the F irs t F ive-Y ear Plan: T he D neprostro i 
E x p erien ce ’, Slavic Review, vol. 42, no. 2, Sum m er 1983, pp. 230-246 .
__________________ , The Generation o f Power: The History o f Dneprostroi (O xford:
O xford  U niversity  Press, 1988).
R ees, E. A ., State Control in Soviet Russia: The Rise and Fall o f the Workers ’ and Peasants ’ 
Inspectorate, 1920-34 (L ondon: M acm illan , 1987).
_________, The Transport Crisis o f 1931-35: The Struggle fo r the Railways (C R EES
D iscussion  Papers, SIPS, no. 29, U niversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1987).
 , The Purge on the Soviet Railways 1937 (C R EES D iscussion  Papers, SIPS, no.
34, U niversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1992).
, ‘S talin , the P o litburo  and R ail T ransport P o lic y ’, in Ju lian  C ooper, M aureen
P e n ie , and E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour o f R. W. Davies 
(London: M acm illan , 1995).
, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-41 : Studies in Soviet History and
S'ocieO'’ (B asingstoke: M acm illan , 1995).
 , ed, Decision-Making in the Stalinist Command Economy, 1932-1937
(B asingstoke: M acm illan , 1997).
R eese, R oger R ., ‘T he R ed  A rm y  and the G reat P u rg es’, in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. 
M anning , eds.. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  
Press, 1993).
 , Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History o f the Red Army, 1925-1941
(L aw rence: U n iversity  o f  K ansas Press, 1996).
R eichm an, H enry, ‘R econsidering  “S ta lin ism ” ’, Theory and Society, vol. 17, no. 1, January  
1988, pp. 57-89.
R eim an, M ichal, ‘P olitical T ria ls o f  the  S ta lin ist E ra ’, Telos, no. 54, 1982-83, p p .101-113.
 _____ , The Birth o f Stcdinism: The USSR on the Eve o f the Second Revolution
(London: T auris, 1987).
382
________________, ‘T he R ussian  R evo lu tion  and S talinism : A  P o litica l P roblem  in its
H isto riograph ic  C o n tex t’, in John  W . Sh'ong, ed.. Essays on Revolutionary Culture and 
Stalinism (C olum bus, Ohio: S lav ica P ublishers, 1990).
R igby , T. H ., Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967 (P rinceton: P rinceton  
U n iversity  Press, 1968).
 ______ , ed., The Stalin Dictatorship: Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" and Other
Documents (Sydney: Sydney  U n iversity  Press, 1968).
 ‘S talin ism  and the M ono-O rgan iza tional S o c ie ty ’, in R obert C. T ucker, ed..
Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (N ew  Y ork: W . W. N orton , 1977).
, ‘E arly  P rov incia l C liques and the R ise  o f  S ta lin ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 33, no. 1,
January  1981, pp. 3-28.
, The Changing Soviet System: Mono-Organisational Socialism from its Origins
to Gorbachev’s Restructuring E dw ard  E lgar, 1990).
R im m el, L esley  A ., ‘A nother K ind  o f  Fear: T he K irov  M urder and the End o f  B read 
R ation ing  in L en in g rad ’, Slavic Review, vol. 56, no. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 481-499.
R itte rspom , G abor T am as, ‘The S tate against Itself; Social T ensions and  P o litica l C onflic ts 
in the U .S .S .R . 1936-1938’, Telos, vol. 41, 1979, pp. 87-104.
 , ‘The 1930s in the  L ongue D uree o f  Soviet H is to ry ’, Telos, vol.
53, Fall 1982, pp. 107-116.
_, ‘Soviet O ffic ia ldom  and  P olitical E vo lu tion : Ju d ic ia ry  A pparatus
and Penal P o licy  in the 1930s’, Theory and Society, vol. 13, no. 2, 1984, pp. 211-237. 
_____________________ , ‘R eth ink ing  S ta lin ism ’, Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 11,
no. 4, W in ter 1984, pp. 343-361,
_, ‘S ov iet P o litics in the  1930s: R ehab ilita ting  S o c ie ty ’, Studies in
Comparative Communism, vol. 19, no. 2, Sum m er 1986, pp. 105-128. 
_____________________ , ‘H istory , C om m em oration  and H ecto ring  R h e to ric ’, The Russian
Review, vol. 46, no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 418-423.
__________________, Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social
Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953 (Paris: H arw ood  A cadem ic 
Publishers, 1991).
______________________, ‘The O m nip resen t C onspiracy: O n Soviet Im agery  o f  Politics and
Social R elations in the 1930s’, in N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R itte rspom , eds., 
Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (London: 
M acm illan , 1992).
______________________, ‘F rom  W ork ing  C lass to U rban L aboring  M ass: O n Po litics and
Social C ategories in the F om rative  Y ears o f  the Soviet S y s tem ’, in L ew is H. S iegelbaum
383
and  R onald  G rigor Suny, eds., Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity 
(Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  P ress, 1994).
R osefie lde, S teven, ‘A n A ssessm en t o f  the  Sources and U ses o f  G ulag  Forced  L abour 1929- 
1956’, Soviet Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, January  1981, pp. 51-87.
__________________ , ‘E xcess C o llec tiv iza tion  D eaths 1929-1933’, Slavic Review, vol. 43, no.
1, Spring 1984. pp. 83-8 8.
, ‘N ew  D em ograph ic  E v idence on C ollec tiv iza tion  D eaths: A  R ejo inder to
S tephen  W h ea tc ro ft’, Slavic Review, vol. 44, no. 3, Fall 1985, pp. 509-516.
 _________ , ‘Incrim inating  E vidence; E xcess D eaths and F orced  L abour under Stalin:
A F inal R ep ly  to C ritic s ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 39, no. 2, A pril 1987, pp. 292-313.
R osenberg , W illiam  G., ‘S m olensk  in the 1920s: P arty -W orker R ela tions and the “V an g u ard ” 
P ro b lem ’, The Russian Review, vol. 36, no. 2, A pril 1977, pp. 127-150.
_______________________ , and  L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet
Industrialization (B loom ington: Ind iana U niversity  Press, 1993).
R osenfeld t, N ie ls  E rik , Knowledge and Power: The Role o f Stalin’s Secret Chancellery in the 
Soviet System o f Government (C openhagen: R osenk ilde and B agger, 1978).
 , ‘P rob lem s o f  E v id en ce ’, Slavic Review, vol. 42 , no. 1, Spring 1983,
pp. 85-91.
 , ‘S talin ism  as a System  o f  C o m m u n ica tio n ’, in John W . S trong, ed.,
Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (C olum bus, O hio: S lav ica Publishers,
1990).
R ossm an, Jeffrey  J., ‘W eaver o f  R ebellion  and P oe t o f  R esistance: K ap iton  K lep ikov  (1880- 
1933) and S hop-F loor O pposition  to  B o lshev ik  R u le ’, Jahrbiicher fiir Geschichte 
Osteuropas, vol. 44, no. 3, 1996, pp. 374-408.
 _______  , ‘The T eikovo C otton  W o rk e rs ’ Strike o f  A pril 1932: C lass, G ender and
Iden tity  P o litics in S ta lin ’s R u ss ia ’, The Russian Review, vol. 56, no. 1, January  1997, 
pp. 44-69.
R ow ney, D on K., ‘The Scope, A uthority , and Personnel o f  the N ew  Industria l C om m issaria ts  
in H istorical C o n tex t’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social 
Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: Ind iana  U n iversity  P ress, 1993).
R uble, B lair A ., Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (B erkeley: U n iversity  o f  C alifo rn ia  Press,
1990).
R ussell, John, ‘The D em ise o f  the  S hock-W orker B rigades in Soviet Industry , 1931-1936’, in 
S tephen W hite, ed., New Directions in Soviet History (C am bridge: C am bridge 
U niversity  P ress, 1992).
Sadler, A ntony , The Party Organisation in the Soviet Enterprise (unpub lished  M SocSci 
d isserta tion , U niversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1979).
384
Schapiro , L eonard , The C om m unist P arty  o f  the Sovie t Union, 2nd edn (L ondon: M ethuen , 
1970).
 , T ota litarian ism  (L ondon: Pall M all, 1972).
Scherer, John  L., and M ichael Jakobson , ‘T he C ollec tiv isa tion  o f  A gricu ltu re  and the Soviet 
P rison  C am p S y stem ’, E urope-A sia  S tud ies, vol. 45, no. 3, 1993, pp. 533-546.
S chlesinger, R udolf, ‘The T urn ing  P o in t’, S ovie t S tud ies, vol. 11, no. 4, 1960, pp. 393-414.
 ______ , H istory  o f  the C om m unist P arty  o f  USSR  (B om bay: O rien t L ongm an,
1977).
Sclii'oeder, H ans H enning , ‘U rban  Social M ob ility  and M ass R epression : C om m unist Party  
and  Soviet S o c ie ty ’, in  N ick  L am p ert and G abor T. R itte rsp o m , eds., Sta lin ism : Its 
N ature  an d  A fterm ath: E ssays in H o n o u r  o f  M o sh e  L ew in  (L ondon: M acm illan , 1992).
Scott, Jam es C., W eapons o f  the W eak: E veryday  F orm s o f  P ea sa n t R esis ta n ce  (N ew  H aven: 
Y ale U niversity  Press, 1985).
 , D om ination  and  the A rts  o f  R esistance: H idden Transcrip ts  (N ew  H aven:
Y ale U niversity  P ress, 1990).
Service, R obert, The B o lsh ev ik  P a rty  in R evo lu tion: A  S tudy  in O rg an isa tiona l Change, 
1917-1923  (London: M acm illan , 1979).
   , A H isto ry  o f  Tw entie th -C en tury  R ussia  (L ondon: A llen  Lane, 1997).
Sharlet, R obert, ‘S talin ism  and Soviet Legal C u ltu re ’, in R obert C. T ucker, ed., Sta lin ism : 
E ssays in H isto rica l In terpreta tion  (N ew  Y ork: W . W . N orton , 1977).
Shearer, D avid  R., ‘F acto ries w ith in  Factories: C hanges in the S tructu re  o f  W ork  and 
M anagem ent in Soviet M ach ine-B u ild ing  F actories, 1926-34’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  
and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds., S o c ia l D im ensions o f  S o v ie t Industria liza tion  
(B loom ington: Ind iana U n iversity  Press, 1993).
 ___________  , Industry, State, a n d  Soc ie ty  in S ta lin ’s Russia, 1926-1934  (Ithaca: C ornell
U niversity  Press, 1996).
Shim otom ai, N obuo , ‘T he D efea t o f  the R ight O pposition  in M oscow  Party  O rganization: 
1928’, Ja p a n ese  S lavic  an d  E a st E uropean  S tudies, vol. 4, 1983, pp. 15-34.
 ____ , M oscow  U nder S ta lin is t Rule, 1931-34  (L ondon: M acm illan , 1991).
S iegelbaum , L ew is H ., ‘Soviet N orm  D eterm ination  in T heory  and P ractice , 1917-1941’, 
S ovie t S tud ies, vol. 36, no. 1, Janua iy  1984, pp. 45-68.
 __________  , ‘Production  C ollec tives and C om m unes and  the “ Im p era tiv es” o f
Soviet Industria liza tion  1929-31 ’, Slavic  R eview , vol. 45, no. 1, Spring  1986, pp. 65-84.
385
‘The M aking  o f  S takhanov ites, 1935-36’, Russian History/Histoire
Russe, vol. 13, nos. 2-3, Sum m er-F all 1986, pp. 259-292.
______________ , Stakhanovism and the Politics o f Productivity in the USSR, 1935-41
(C am bridge; C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 1988).
, Soviet State and Society between Revolutions, 1918-1929
(C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1992).
   , ‘M asters o f  the Shop F loor: Forem en and S ov iet In d u stria lisa tio n ’, in
N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R itterspom , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: 
Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (L ondon: M acm illan , 1992).
__________________ , ‘N aiTatives o f  A ppeal and the A ppeal o f  N am atives: L abor D iscip line
and its C on testa tion  in the E arly  Soviet P e rio d ’, Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 24, 
nos. 1-2, S pring-S um m er 1997, pp. 65-87.
__________________ , ‘“D ear C om rade, Y ou  A sk  W hat W e N e e d ” : S o cia list P a tem alism
and Soviet R ural “N o tab les” in the m id -1 9 3 0 s’, in Sheila  F itzpa trick , ed., Stalinism: 
New Directions (London: R ou tledge, 1999).
__________________ , and R onald  G rigor Suny, ‘C oncep tualiz ing  the C om m and  E conom y:
W e stem  H isto rians on Sov iet In d u stria liza tio n ’, in W illiam  G. R osenberg  and Lew is H. 
S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet Industrialization (B loom ington: Indiana 
U n iversity  Press, 1993).
__________________ , and R onald  G rigor Suny, eds.. Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class,
and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
__________________ , and R onald  G rigor Suny, ‘C lass B ackw ards? In S earch  o f  the Soviet
W orking  C la ss ’, in L ew is FI, S iegelbaum  and R onald  G rigor Suny, eds.. Making 
Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
S lezkine, Y uri, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples o f the North (Ithaca: C om e 11 
U niversity  Press, 1994).
_____________ , ‘The Soviet U nion  as a C om m unal A partm ent, o r H ow  a S ocialist S tate
P rom oted  E thnic P a rticu la rism ’, in Sheila F itzpatrick , ed., Stalinism: New Directions 
(London: R outledge, 1999).
S lusser, R obert M ., ‘A  S ov iet H isto rian  E valuates S ta lin ’s R ole in H is to ry ’, American 
Historical Review, vol. 77, no. 5, 1972, pp. 1389-1398.
_______________ , Stalin in October: The Man Who Missed the Revolution (B altim ore:
Johns H opkins U niversity  Press, 1987).
Sm ith, S. A ., Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918 (C am bridge: 
C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 1983).
, ‘W orkers against Forem en  in St. P etersburg , 1 905-1917’, in L ew is H.
S iegelbaum  and  R onald  G rigo r Suny, eds.. Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and 
Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
386
Solom on, P e te r H ., ‘S ov ie t Penal P o licy  1917-1934: A  R e in te rp re ta tio n ’, Slavic Review, vol. 
39, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 195-217.
________   , ‘L ocal Political P ow er and  Soviet C rim inal Ju stice , 1922-1941 ’, Soviet
Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, Ju ly  1985, pp. 305-329.
Solom on, Peter H., Jr., ‘L egality  in Soviet Political C ulture: A  P erspective  on G o rb ach ev ’s 
R e fo im s’, in N ick  L am pert and G abor T. R itterspom , eds., Stalinism: Its Nature and 
Aftei'inath: Essays in Honour o f Moshe Lewin (London: M acm illan , 1992).
_______________________ , ‘ “C rim inal Justice  and the In d u sh ia l F ro n t” , C hanges in the
S tructure  o f  W ork  and M anagem en t in Soviet M ach ine-B u ild ing  F acto ries, 1926-34 ’, in 
W illiam  G. R osenberg  and L ew is H. S iegelbaum , eds.. Social Dimensions o f Soviet 
Industrialization (B loom ington: Ind iana U niversity  Press, 1993).
___________________ , ed.. Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996 (A n n o n k , NY: M . E.
Sharpe, 1997).
Solzhenitsyn , A lexander I., One Day in the Life o f Ivan Denisovich (H annondsw orth : 
P enguin  B ooks, 1974).
_______________________ , The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary
Ifjvestigation, vols. 1-3, trans. T hom as P. W hitney  and FI. T. W ille ts  (L ondon: C ollins & 
Flarvill Press, 1974-8).
‘Soviet Purges: A  Special B ib lio g rap h y ’, Political History o f Russia, vol. 4, no. 2-3, 1994, 
pp. 87-95.
S talin , Io s if  V ., Problems o f Leninism (M oscow : Foreign L anguages P ub lish ing  H ouse, 
1947).
[_____  ], /. V. Stalin: Works, 13 vols. (M oscow : Foreign  L anguages P ub lish ing
H ouse, 1952-1955).
[___________], The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-1952, ed. and w ith
an in troduction  by  B ruce F rank lin  (London: C room  H elm , 1973).
S teinberg , M ark  D ., ‘V anguard  W orkers and the M orality  o f  C la ss ’, in L ew is FI. S iegelbaum  
and R onald  G rigor Suny, eds.. Making Woilcers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity 
(Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
S trong, John  W ., ed.. Essays on Revolutionary Cultui^e and Stalinism: Selected Papers from  
Third World Congress fo r Soviet and East Suropean Studies (C olum bus, O hio: S lavica 
P ublishers, 1990).
Suny, R onald  G rigor, ‘M aking  Sense o f  S talin: Som e R ecen t and N o t-S o -R ecen t 
B io g rap h ies’, The Russian History/Histome Russe, vol. 16, nos. 2-4, 1989, pp. 435-448.
 , The Revenge o f the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse
o f the Soviet Union (S tanford: S tanford  U niversity  Press, 1993).
387
______________________ , ‘S talin  and  H is S talin ism : P ow er and A u tho rity  in the S ov ie t U nion,
1 9 30-53 ’, in  Ian  K ershaw  and  M oshe L ew in , eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships 
in Comparison (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1997).
Szam uely , T., ‘The E lim ination  o f  O pposition  betw een  the S ix teen th  and S eventeenth  
C ongi'esses o f  the C P S U ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, January  1965-66, pp. 318-338.
T aniuchi, Y uzuru , ‘A  N o te  on  the U ra l-S iberian  M eth o d ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 
O ctober 1981, pp. 518-547.
_________________ , ‘D ec ision -M ak ing  on  the U ral-S iberian  M e th o d ’, in  Ju lian  C ooper,
M aureen  Perrie , and  E. A. R ees, eds., Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in Honour o f R. 
W. Davies (L ondon: M acm illan , 1995).
T horn iley , D aniel, The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Rural Communist Party, 1927-39 (L ondon: 
M acm illan , 1988).
T hurston , R obert W ., ‘Fear and B e lie f  in  the U S S R ’s “G reat T e rro r” : R esponse to A irest, 
1935-1939’, Slavic Review, vol. 45, no. 2, Sum m er 1986, pp. 213-234 .
____________________, ‘T he S ov iet F am ily  during  the G reat T error, 1 9 35-41 ’, Soviet Studies,
vol. 43, no. 3, 1991, pp. 553-574.
_______________ , ‘R eassessing  the H isto ry  o f  Soviet W orkers: O p p ortun ities to C ritic ize
and P artic ipa te  in D ecision -M ak ing , 1935-1941 ’, in S tephen W hite , ed.. New Directions 
in Soviet History (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  Press, 1992).
_______________ , ‘T he S takhanov ite  M ovem ent: T he B ackground  to  the G reat T e n o r  in
the F actories, 1935-1938’, in J, A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds.. Stalinist 
Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge U n iversity  P ress, 1993).
 , Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941 (N ew  H aven: Y ale
U niversity  P ress, 1996).
T olz, V era, ‘P ub lica tio n  o f  A rch ive  M ateria ls  on S ta lin ’s T e rro r’, Radio Liberty Report on 
the USSR, vol. 2, no. 32, 10 A u g u st 1990, pp. 12-16.
___________ , ‘A i'chives Y ie ld  N ew  S ta tistics on the S talin  T e n o r ’, Radio Liberty Repoil on
the USSR, vol. 2, no. 36, 7 S ep tem ber 1990, pp. 1-4.
 , ‘A lek san d r Y akov lev  P rov ides N ew  Inform ation  abou t the M ystery  o f  K iro v ’s
M u d e r’, Radio Liberty Report on the USSR, vol. 3, no. 8, 22 F eb ru ary  1991, pp. 9-12.
, ‘N ew  S ituation  for C P S U  and K G B  A rch iv es’, Radio Liberty Report on the
USSR, vol. 3, no. 38, 20 S ep tem ber 1991, pp. 1-4.
^_____ , ‘M in istry  o f  S ecurity  O ffic ia l G ives N ew  F igures for S ta lin ’s V ic tim s’, RFE/RL
Research Report, vol. 1, no. 18, 1 M ay 1992, pp. 8-10.
T ro tsky , Leon, Stalin: An Appraisal o f the Man and His Influence, trans. C. M alam uth  
(L ondon: H ollis &  C arter, 1947).
388
 , The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?,
5th ed., trans. M . E astm an  (N ew  Y ork: P a th finder P ress, 1973).
_______ , My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography (H arm ondsw orth : P engu in , 1975).
, The Challenge o f the Left Opposition 1926-1927 (N ew  Y ork: P athfinder,
1980).
_______ , The Challenge o f the Left Opposition 1928-1929 (N ew  Y ork: P athfinder,
1981).
T ucker, R obert C ., The Soviet Political Mind (N ew  Y ork: P raeger, 1963).
 , Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality
(L ondon: C hatto  &  W indus, 1974).
, éd., Stalinism: Essays in Histoidcal Interpi^etation (N ew  Y ork: W . W .
N orton , 1977).
 , ‘P rob lem s o f  Intei*prelation’, Slavic Review, vol. 42, no. 1, S pring  1983,
pp. 80-84.
‘T he S talin  P eriod  as an  H isto rica l P ro b lem ’, The Russian Review, vol. 46,
no. 4, O ctober 1987, pp. 424-427 .
_, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (N ew  Y ork: W .
W . N orton , 1990).
, and S tephen  F. C ohen, eds.. The Gi'eat Pimge Trial (N ew  Y ork: G rosse t &
D unlap , 1965).
U lam , A dam  B runo, Stalin: The Man and His Et^a (London: A llen  Lane, 1974).
V an G eldern , Jam es, ‘The C en tre  and the Periphery : C ultural and Social Geogi*aphy in the 
M ass C u ltu re  o f  the  1930s’, in S tephen  W hite, ed.. New Directions in Soviet History 
(C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iv ersity  P ress, 1992).
V io la , L ynne, ‘T he 25 ,000ers: A  S tudy  o f  a S ov iet R ecru itm en t C am p aig n  during  the F irst 
F ive Y ear P la n ’, Russian History/Histoire Russe, vol. 10, no. 1, 1983, pp. 1-30.
_____________ , ‘N o tes on the B ackground  o f  S ov iet C ollectiv isation : M eta l W orker B rigades
in the C ountryside, A utum n 1929’, Soviet Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, A pril 1984, pp. 205- 
222 .
 , 'Bab’i bunty and  P easan t W o m e n ’s P ro test during  C o llec tiv iza tio n ’, The
Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 1, January  1986, pp. 23-42.
_________ , ‘The C am paign  to E lim inate  the K ulak  as a C lass, W in ter 1929-1930: A  Re-
evaluation  o f  the L eg is la tio n ’, Slavic Review, vol. 45, no. 3, Fall 1986, pp. 503-524.
, ‘The C ase o f  K rasny i M elio ra to r or ‘H ow  the K u lak  G row s into S o c ia lism ’,
Soviet Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, O ctober 1986, pp. 508-529.
389
Tn Search  o f  Y oung  R ev is io n is ts ’, The Russian Review, vol. 46, no. 4,
O ctober 1987, pp. 428-431 .
_______ , The Best Sons o f the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard o f Soviet
Collectivisation (O xford: O xford  U n iversity  P ress, 1987).
 ______ , ‘B ack  on the E conom ic  F ro n t o f  C o llec tiv iza tion  or S ov ie t A gricu ltu re
w ithou t S ov ie t P o w e r’, Slavic Review, vol. 47, no. 2, S um m er 1988, pp. 217-222. 
_________ , ‘T he S econd C om ing: C lass E nem ies in the S ov iet C oun tryside , 1927-1935’,
in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds., Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives 
(C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iv ersity  P ress, 1993).
_______ , Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivisation and the Culture o f Peasant
Resistance (O xford: O xford  U n iversity  Press, 1996).
V olkogonov , D m itri, Stalin: Triumph and Hagedy, ed. and trans. by  H aro ld  Shukm an 
(L ondon: W eiden fe ld  and N ico lson , 1991)
V olkov , V adim , ‘The C oncep t o f  K ul’turnost’: N otes on the S ta lin ist C iv iliz in g  P ro c e ss ’, in 
Sheila  F itzpatrick , ed., Stalinism: New Directions (L ondon: R ou tledge, 1999).
V on H agen, M ark , ‘S ta lin ism  and the P o litics o f  P ost-S ov ie t H is to ry ’, in  Ian  K ershaw  and 
M oshe Lew in, eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatoi'ships in Comparison (C am bridge: 
C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1997).
V on Laue, T heodore H ., ‘S talin  am ong  the M oral and P olitical Im pera tive , o r Flow to Judge 
S ta lin ’, Soviet Union/Union Soviétique, vol. 8, no. 1, 1981, pp. 1-17.
_______________________ , ‘S talin  in F o c u s ’, Slavic Review, vol. 42, no. 3, 1983, pp. 373-389.
_______________________ , ‘S talin  R ev iew ed ’, Soviet Union/Union Soviétique, vol. 11, no. 1,
1984, pp. 71-92.
W aller, M ichael, ‘The -ism s o f  S ta lin ism ’, Soviet Studies, vol. 20, no, 2, 1968-69, pp. 229- 
234.
W ard , C hris, Russia’s Cotton Workers and the New Economic Policy: Shop-Floor Cultw'e 
and State Policy, 7927-?929  (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iversity  P ress, 1990).
 , ‘T he C risis  o f  P roductiv ity  in the N ew  E conom ic Policy: R ationaliza tion
D rives and Shop floor R esponses in S ov ie t C otton  M ills  1924 -1 9 2 9 ’, in S tephen  W hite, 
ed.. New Directions in Soviet History (C am bridge: C am bridge  U n iv ersity  P ress, 1992).
  , Stalin's Russia (L ondon: E dw ard  A rnold , 1993; 2nd edn, 1999).
 , ‘L anguages o f  T rade  or a L anguage o f  C lass? W ork  C u ltu re  in R ussian  C otton
M ills in the 1920s’, in L ew is FI. S iegelbaum  and  R onald  G rig o r Suny, eds., Making 
Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity  Press, 1994).
 , ed., The Stalinist Dictatorship (L ondon: A rnold , 1998).
390
W atson , D erek , The Early Career o f V. M. Molotov (C R EES D iscussion  P apers, SIPS, no. 
26, U n iversity  o f  B irm ingham , 1986).
____________ , Molotov and Soviet Government: Sovnarkom, 1930-41 (B asingstoke:
M acm illan , 1996).
W einberg , R obert, ‘Purge and P o litics  in the P eriphery : B irob idzhan  in 1937% Slavic Review, 
vol. 52, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 13-27.
W erth , N ico las, Être Communiste en U.R.S.S. sous Staline (Paris: G allim ard /Ju llia rd , 1981).
______________ , La Vie Quotidienne des Paysans Russes de la Revolution a la
Collectivisation, 7 9 /7 -7 9 5 9  (Paris: H achette , 1984).
__________ , Histoire de LUnion Soviétique: de l ’Empire Russe a l ’Union Soviétique,
1900-1990 (Paris: P resses U n iversita ires  de F rance, 1990).
W heatcro ft, S tephen  G ., Views on Gi^ain Output, Agricultural Reality and Planning in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s (unpub lished  M S ocS ci d isse rta tio n . U n iversity  o f  
B irm ingham , 1974).
 , ‘O n A ssessing  the S ize o f  F orced  C oncenti'a tion  C am p L abour in the
Sov iet U nion, 1929-1956%  Soviet Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, A pril 1981, pp. 265-295. 
___________________ , ‘T ow ards a T h orough  A nalysis o f  F orced L abour S ta tistics % Soviet
Studies, vol. 35, no. 2, A pril 1983, pp. 223-237.
   , ‘N ew  D em ograph ic  E vidence on E xcess C o llec tiv iza tion  D eaths:
Y et A no ther K liukva from  S teven  R o se fie ld e?% Slavic Review, vol. 44, no. 3, Fall 1985, 
pp. 505-508.
   , ‘M ore  L igh t on the Scale o f  R epression  and E xcess M orta lity  in the
Soviet U nion  in the 1930s% Soviet Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, 1990, pp. 355-367. 
 , ‘M ore L igh t on the S cale o f  R epression  and E xcess M orta lity  in the
Soviet U n ion  in the 1930s% in J. A rch  G etty  and R oberta  T. M anning , eds.. Stalinist 
Terror: New Perspectives (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  P ress, 1993).
___________________ , ‘T he Scale and N atu re  o f  G erm an  and  S ov ie t R epression  and M ass
K illings, 1930-45% Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 8, 1996, pp. 1319-1353. 
 , and D avies R, W ., Materials fo r  a Balance o f Soviet National
Econotny 1928-1930 (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  Press, 1985). 
 , R, W . D av ies, and  J. M . C ooper, ‘S ov ie t Industria liza tion
R econsidered : Som e P re lim in a iy  C onclusions about E conom ic  D ev e lo p m en t be tw een  
1926 and 1941 % Economic History Review, vol. 39, no. 2, 1986, pp. 264-294 .
W hite, S tephen, ed.. New Directions in Soviet History (C am bridge: C am bridge  U niversity  
Press, 1992).
391
W itkin , Z ara, An American Engineer in Stalin’s Russia: The Memoirs o f Zara Within, 1932- 
1934, ed ited  by  M ichael G elb  (B erkeley : U n iversity  o f  C alifo rn ia  Press, 1991).
Y aney, G eorge L., ‘A gricu ltu ra l A dm in istra tion  in R ussia  from  the S to lyp in  Land R eform  to 
F orced  C ollec tiv iza tion : A n In te rp re tive  S tu d y ’, in Jam es R. M illar, ed., The Soviet 
Rural Community: A Symposium (U rbana: U n iversity  o f  Illino is  P ress, 1971).
_________________ , ‘B ureaucracy  as C ulture; A  C o m m en t’, Slavic Review, vol. 41, no. 1,
Spring  1982, pp. 104-111.
Z. (M alia, M artin ), ‘To the S talin  M au so leu m ’, Daedalus, vol. 119, no. 1, W in te r 1990, pp. 
295-344.
Z alesk i, E ugene, Planning fo r Economic Growth in the Soviet Union 1918-1932 (C hapel 
H ill: U n iversity  o f  N orth  C aro lina  Press, 1971).
392
